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SUMMARY 
 
 
To regulate and facilitate are the main functions of legal rules. These purposes are achieved 
by a harmonised legal system by which the law becomes identical in numerous 
jurisdictions. The process to unify the law of sale internationally started in the 1920s and 
culminated, in 1988, in the implementation of the CISG. This Convention intends to provide 
clarity for most international sales transactions by regulating the formation of contracts, and 
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer resulting from the contract. The CISG 
has these days enjoyed much ratification and influenced a number of legislation reforms 
worldwide. Despite the role it played during the drafting process of the CISG, the DRC has 
not yet ratified it. Instead, the country continued to rely, until recently, on colonial 
legislations which had become out-dated, and inadequate to meet modern international sales 
contracts requirements. The situation appears to have been improved a year ago as the effect 
of the adoption of OHADA law whose Commercial Act is largely inspired by the CISG. 
Because the introduction of OHADA law in the DRC is very recent, this study 
intends to assess the current state of Congolese sales law by comparing it with the CISG 
and South African law, which is non-CISG but modernised. The comparative study aims at 
establishing whether current Congolese law, as amended by OHADA law, is sufficient or 
has shortcomings; if it has some, it aims to identify those shortcomings, and make 
suggestions for their improvements. After discussion, it has been discovered that the 
ratification of OHADA law has significantly improved Congolese domestic sales law. 
Given that there remain certain unresolved shortcomings in Congolese international sales 
law, however, the study ends by a proposal for the accession of the DRC to the CISG in 
order to fill them.  
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Overview of the Study 
 
Trade and industry activities are characterised by the rapid progress and simplicity 
of relationships that exist when concluding and executing contracts. The sale of 
goods is one of the most important among these contracts.1 Sales, in effect, are 
considered to be at the heart of international trade;2 to use Lando’s words, they are 
“paradigmatic contracts”.3 The status of typical sales contracts is justified by the fact 
that everyone is, to some degree, a buyer of either commercial or consumable goods. 
Insofar as commercial transactions are concerned, they are in an exchange economy, 
“the essential means by which the various units of production exchange their outputs, 
thereby providing the opportunity for specialization and productivity.”4 Because 
every person is to some extent a seller or a buyer, there are, practically speaking, 
millions of contracts of sale being formed and performed every day.5 As a result of 
this situation, “the critical role of the law of sales is to establish a framework in which 
those transactions may take place in a predictable, certain, and orderly fashion with 
a minimum of transaction costs.”6 
 Congolese sales law, in particular, has for a very long time been out-dated and 
not suited to modern economic requirements, especially internationally. This 
                                               
1
 See Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 54; Kopel/Mukheibir/Schoeman in Scott Commerce 42; 
Mann/Roberts Business 318. 
2
 Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127 130. 
3
 See Lando in Hartkamp et al Civil Code 204. 
4
 Mann/Roberts Business 318. 
5
 Stephens in McKendrick Sale 1; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 33; Mann/Roberts Business 318. 
6
 Mann/Roberts Business 318. 
2 
 
changed recently with the adoption of OHADA law.7 This study is aimed at assessing 
the current state of Congolese sales law critically by comparing it with the provisions 
of two other legal systems, namely the United Unions Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)8 and South African sales law which is non-
CISG but modernised. The comparative study is aimed at establishing whether 
current Congolese law, as amended by OHADA law, is sufficient or has 
shortcomings; if it has shortcomings, it aims to identify those shortcomings, and 
make suggestions for improvements in domestic law. This study, furthermore, 
purposes to determine whether the CISG should be adopted for international sales. 
In view of that, this introductory chapter intends to provide an overview of the 
content of the study. It explains the context of the study, provides a background to 
the harmonisation of international sales law, outlines the role the CISG and OHADA 
sales law have played in this regard, and presents the problem statement. In addition, 
this chapter summarises the aims, objectives, and delimitations of the study. 
 
1.2 Context of the Study  
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the second largest country on the 
African continent.9 The area currently known as the DRC was officially taken over 
in 1885 by the Belgian King Leopold II, and it became known as the Congo Free 
State.10 In 1908, its administration shifted to the Belgian government, which renamed 
the country the Belgian Congo. The Belgian Congo was granted its independence on 
                                               
7
 OHADA is the acronym of the expression “Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law 
in Africa”, in French, Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires. 
8
 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods, hereinafter referred to as, the 
CISG, the Vienna (Sales) Convention, or the UN Sales Convention, Final Act, 1980, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1980), and in 19 Int’l Legal Materials 
668 (1980). Available online at: http://www.uncitral .org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_ 
goods/1980CISG.html (last accessed 19-6-2013).  
9
 DRC comes second after Algeria, since South Sudan’s independence was recognised on 9 July 
2011.  
10
 MacDonnell King Leopold II 165. 
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30 June 1960 and was given the new name of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.11 
During the colonial period, Belgians used to treat the colony as an area distinct 
from Belgium. Thus, the fact that Congo was officially an integral part of Belgium 
sovereignty did not automatically extend to it the application of Belgian laws. 
According to the 1908 Colonial Charter, the colony had to be ruled by particular 
laws.12 Nevertheless, even though the colony had its own rules, Congolese law-
making power was exercised by the Belgian king or by commissions established by 
him. As a result, Congolese contract law, in general, and its sales law, in particular, 
are legacies of the colonial power.13 In other words, since the Belgian legal system 
was based largely on French law, the DRC is a country with a civil legal system 
inspired by the Belgian version of French civil law. The DRC follows the Napoleonic 
French legal tradition.14 
Despite the fact that Congolese basic provisions originated from French and 
Belgian laws, there are, however, certain features which distinguish them. For 
instance, unlike the law of its mother country, the DRC does not have a single civil 
code dealing with the law of persons, property law, and the law of obligations. 
Instead, it has three different civil codes, namely the Family Code for the law of 
persons,15 Land Law for property law,16 and the Code of Obligations for contractual, 
torts, and unjust enrichment matters.17 As far as the CCO is concerned, it sets out the 
                                               
11
 For a brief overview of Congolese history, see CIA Foreign Policy 23; Crabb Constitution 14. 
12
 See Article 1 of the Law relating to the Belgian Congo Government of 18 October 1908 (BO 
1908 65); see also Crabb System 81. 
13
 For the case of almost all African countries in general, see Mbayé Destin 442. As Adei (African 
Law 1) has stated, in all African countries there are two legal systems, namely imported law 
introduced by the colonial powers, and indigenous systems.  
14
 Congolese law is based on the 1804 Napoleonic Code. 
15
 Law No. 87-010 of 1 August 1987 instituting the Family Code (JO Special No. 1 August 1987), 
hereafter CFC. 
16
 Law No. 73-021 of 21 July 1973 instituting the General Regime regarding Property and Land, 
as amended by Law No. 80-008 of 18 July 1980 (generally referred to as the Land Law) (JO Special 
No. 1980 1 December 2004). 
17
 Decree of 30 July 1888 relating to Contracts and Conventional Obligations (BO 1888 109), 
hereafter CCO. Compare this to French and Belgian Civil Code, Book Three ‘Contracts or 
Conventional Obligations in General’, Articles 1101 to 1369. 
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basic rules of contracts, rules that apply to all kinds of obligations, including sales 
contracts.18 Especially with regard to the law of sale, it is contained in Title III, which 
comprises seven chapters.19 Chapter one deals in detail with the nature and forms of 
sales.20 Chapter two specifies the types of things which may be sold.21 Chapters three 
and four deal with the obligations of the seller and the buyer.22 These chapters are 
the most comprehensive sections of the third Title. Regarding the last three chapters, 
they regulate issues such as repurchasing, sales by auction, and transfer of debts.23 It 
should immediately be noted that the CCO’s content corresponds with that of Book 
III of the Belgian and French civil codes. Many of the Congolese articles are like 
“duplicates” of the civil code provisions of its mother country.24 
As mentioned earlier, the CCO aims to govern all kinds of contracts, regardless 
of their nature. Thus, although it does not contain a specific rule relating to 
international sales contracts,25 it does apply to both domestic and international sales 
contracts.26 In other words, Congolese law did not originally follow the example of 
other nations, which have enacted legislation formally making a distinction between 
domestic and international sales. Since there is no separate or identifiable body of 
principles applicable to international sales contracts, the common principles of the 
                                               
18
 Cf. Article 7 al. 1 CCO for which, “Contracts, whether they have a specific title or not, are subject 
to general rules” provided by the Code.  
19
 See Articles 263 to 364 CCO. 
20
 Articles 263 to 274CCO. 
21
 Articles 275 to 278 CCO. 
22
 Articles 279 to 334CCO. 
23
 Articles 335 to 364CCO. 
24
 Cf. Crabb System 83 and 85; see also Mbayé Destin 442 449. Owing to this similarity, the English 
translation used in this study is borrowed from the French civil code translation by Rouhette, 
available online at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/ 
Code22.pdf (last accessed 23-7-2012). 
25
 Such provision can be found in Article 11 of the Decree of 20 February 1891, regulating the 
Status of Foreign Nationals in the DRC (BO 1895 138), which regulates contracts containing a 
foreign element. This Decree will be referred to as the Private International Law Decree, PILD in 
short. Article 11 PILD provides that (international) contracts are governed, according to their form, 
by the law of the place where they were concluded. The same provision specifies that, except when 
parties have provided otherwise, international contracts are governed, according to their substance, 
effects or evidence, by the law of the place where they were concluded. 
26
 Cf.  Masamba for whom, “Congolese commercial contract law takes refuge behind civil law.” 
Masamba Modalités 22.  
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law of sale have to apply, even when the sale is described as international. This parity 
of rules is justified, according to Bonell, by the fact that “international commercial 
contracts do not differ fundamentally from other contracts, and contain only a limited 
number of special provisions that would not be appropriate for contracts generally.”27 
With the achievement of independence, the DRC’s government had the power 
to modify or reject the legal inheritance that it was given by the colonial power. 
Unfortunately, during 51 years of independence,28 the DRC continued to apply 
legislation which had long been amended by the countries where they were originally 
enacted. In France, for instance, even though the 1804 Civil Code remains the 
principal source of French contract law, it has been supplemented by other sources, 
both national and international. French contract law has now, in addition to the civil 
code, international sources, above all, European law.29 The Belgian parliament has, 
likewise, supplemented the civil code with a number of special statutes, and the 
decisions of Belgian courts have observed the guidelines contained in the 
supplementary statutes.30 
Compared with French and Belgian contract laws, however, the DRC law 
remained unchanged for a very long time, but it has now been modernised to some 
extent by the adoption of OHADA law. The fact that recent legal developments 
recorded in Belgium and France were not simultaneously extended to the DRC has 
not been without consequences. In the Congo, rules governing contracts for the 
international sale of goods have become old-fashioned.31 Dating back to the colonial 
era, those rules were no longer sufficient and relevant with respect to actual 
international sales contract requirements. In other words, owing to the fact that many 
                                               
27
 See Bonell http://www.frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commissionon_european_contract_law/literature. 
htm/; quoted by Christie Law of Contract 59 62. 
28
 A number of scholars have observed that, “The great preoccupations of all Congolese 
governments since independence have been those of organising the state (...) while (...) legislation 
expressly directed towards convention private law concepts has been rare at most”. Crabb System 
87; Mbayé Destin 442 454. 
29
 See Tallon Contract 205 207; see also Witz in Ferrari CISG 129; Halperin Civil Code 87. 
30
 See De Bondt Contracts 222; Lecocq Code 234.  
31
 Vanderstraete Business 16; Masamba Modalités 22 and 53; Masamba Adhésion 347; Tshibende 
2011 RCDA 67 71. 
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aspects of modern social and economic life have changed since the early twenty-first 
century, a number of Congolese provisions were no longer suitable for contemporary 
business needs. Numerous legislative modifications were, therefore, needed in order 
to move towards legal modernity and security. This objective was achieved by the 
ratification of OHADA law, which came into effect in Congo on 12 September 
2012.32 But owing to the fact that this change is very recent, its practical effect is still 
difficult to assess this early on as there is no case law on it yet. 
At the international level, on the other hand, the importance of international 
commerce has increased dramatically over the last century as a result of the reduction 
of barriers and globalisation trends in trade.33 This development is largely due to 
developments in communication, transportation, and mass production of goods. 
Harmonisation of international sales law, which background is briefly discussed in 
the following section, has played a supporting role in facilitating trade across borders 
and lowering transaction costs. 
 
1.3  Background to the Harmonisation of International Sales Law 
 
It is undoubted that, these days, countries have started to extend their relationships 
with one another owing, inter alia, to modern means of transport and communication. 
Currently, international borders are becoming more and more irrelevant, especially 
with regard to international trade.34 This globalisation growth requires the 
elimination of barriers to trade, and one of the obstacles in this regard is the 
divergence of rules among legal systems and the territoriality of the law. Practically 
speaking, domestic laws differ from one system to another, and, within the same legal 
system, from one country to another. To exemplify this, in the common law legal 
                                               
32
 Voisin/Parra http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/DRC-accession-OHADA.pdf; 
OHADA Newsletter (8 September 2012) http://www.ohada.com/actualite/1659/ohada-rdc-le-traite-
et-les-actes-uniformes-seront-d applicati on-effective-a-partir-du-12-septembre-2012.htm; OHADA 
Newsletter (12 September 2012) http://www.ohada.com/ actualite/1663/12-septembre-2012-un-
grand-jour-pour-la-rdcongo-un-grand-jour-pour-l-ohada-un-grand-jour-pour-l-afrique.html. 
33
 See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 2; Coetzee Incoterms 1; Boghossian Performance 1.  
34
 Eiselen Globalization 97; Coetzee Incoterms 1. 
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system, an offer is generally revocable, whereas under civil law it is in principle 
irrevocable.35 In the same way, Eiselen remarks: 
(…) most civil law systems require a buyer to inform the seller of any non-
conformity of the goods within a fairly brief period of time, after which the buyer 
may lose the remedies available for such non-conformity. In systems based on the 
common law, the duty to notify the seller of deficient goods is much less clearly 
defined and usually it does not lead to a loss of remedies (...). Such differences may 
impact quite significantly on the conduct of the various parties to a sales contract, 
depending on their understanding of the law.36 
Additionally, every sales contract is governed by a specific legal system. In effect, 
in spite of the ease of communication, the law is still territorial in nature and is 
enforced only within a specified national boundary. As a result, another state is not 
bound to acknowledge or apply a foreign law.37 As Coetzee has observed,  
When a dispute arises it is often uncertain which country’s law governs the 
transaction, which court is to be approached for legal relief, or whether there will be 
access to a favourable court at all. The multiplicity of legal systems relevant to the 
transaction results not only in problems of forum shopping, but also in uncertainty 
as to the respective rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. Although the 
parties are in general free to choose the law applicable to their contract, in practice, 
the choice of a legal system is often not provided for in the contract. If not chosen, 
it is left open to the relevant courts and arbitral tribunals to establish the applicable 
law by using conflict-of-law principles (…). This entails an extremely complicated 
and possibly expensive enquiry, the results of which are often haphazard and 
unclear. Contracting parties, therefore, could be faced with uncertainty as to which 
system governs their contractual dispute; and even if the choice of law is clear, they 
could still be confronted with problems because of differences in the substance of 
national laws. Moreover, different aspects of a contract could be governed by 
different legal systems, which could complicate the situation even further.38 
                                               
35
 See Zimmerman Obligations 560; Huber/Mulis CISG 81; Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-
10; Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 85; Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 301; Garro 1989 
(23) Int’l L 443 455; Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11. 
36
 Eiselen Globalization  97 98; see, in the same sense, Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 596; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 623-624. 
37
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323. 
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98; De Ly 2005 (25) 6 JL & Com 1; Viejobueno 1995 28 CILSA 201; Griffin Trade 1. 
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In order to overcome these abovementioned impediments with regard to international 
trade, it was necessary to unify the law internationally.39 At that time, in effect, a 
number of legal systems “were obsolete, incomplete, fragmentary and inadequate to 
govern international transactions.”40 The process of unification was intended to 
simplify issues relating to international transactions by providing one global law for 
all international sales contracts.41 
The striving towards unification of the law of international sale of goods was 
started in the 1920s influenced by Ernst Rabel’s master-mind.42 The idea became a 
reality in 1926 through the creation of the Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT).43 In 1964, the work of UNIDROIT led to the adoption of two uniform 
acts, viz. the Convention governing the rights and obligations of parties to 
international sale of goods contracts (ULIS),44 and the Convention relating to the 
formation of international sales contracts (ULF).45 The implementation of both ULIS 
and ULF did not, however, fulfil the unification purpose because of the limited 
                                               
39
 Even though “harmonisation” and “unification” are two different concepts, in practice, however, 
they are often interchangeable. See Wethmar-Lemmer Private International law 1-2. For a better 
understanding of ideas that are hostile to legal harmonisation, see Rosett 1992 (40) Am J Comp L 
683; Rosett 1984 (45) Ohio St LJ 265; Stephan 1999 (39) Virginia Journal of International Law 743. 
40
 Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 2. 
41
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 328. 
42
 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Huber/Mulis CISG 2; Schwenzer/Hachem 
http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/ publics/6248/20110913164502_4e6f6c6e5b746.pdf; Cuniberti 2006 
(39) 5 Vand. J. Transnation’l L. 1511; Coetzee Incoterms 158.  
43
 UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organisation the goal of which consists in 
studying needs and methods for modernising, harmonising, and coordinating private law, in 
particular, commercial law between states or groups of states. It formulates uniform law 
instruments, principles, and rules to achieve these objectives. See UNIDROIT’s purpose at: 
http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (last visited on 18-6-2012). Created on 3 
September 1926, UNIDROIT was inaugurated on 30 May 1928. Its headquarters are in Rome 
(Italy) and it has 63 member states to date. Further information can be found on its website at: 
http://www.unidroit.org. For comments, see Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 2-3; 
Schwenzer/ Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads /publics/6248/201109131645024e6f6c6e5b746.pdf; 
Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 334; Eiselen Globalization 97 101. 
44
 Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 
U.N.T.S. 107, reprinted in 13 A.M. J. COMP.L453 (1964). Available online at: 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm (last accessed 20-6-2013). 
45
 Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (1972), reprinted in 13 AM. J. COMP.L472 (1964). Available 
online at: http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulf.htm (last accessed 20-6-2013).  
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number of member countries. Nevertheless, their failure did not stop efforts to 
achieve the worldwide unification of international sales law. When it became evident 
that they would difficultly obtain sufficient members, the UN General Assembly 
undertook to produce their revised version, which would be more widely accepted, 
through the creation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).46 This goal was achieved on January 1988 when the CISG entered 
into effect. 
 
1.4 The CISG and Harmonisation of International Sales Law  
 
It is acknowledged that current harmonisation of international sales law is one of the 
consequences of the establishment of the Vienna Convention. Scholars are 
unanimous in this regard that the CISG is the most successful and noteworthy 
outcome of the process of the unification of international contract law.47 Prepared by 
UNCITRAL, the CISG was adopted on 11 April 1980 at the conclusion of a 
Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna which saw the participation of delegates from 
62 countries, and observers from eight international organisations.48 The DRC, 
previously known as Zaïre, attended that conference. This country was, moreover, 
one of the fifteen member states elected to the Drafting Committee49 and one of the 
twenty-two Vice-Presidents of the conference.50 Unlike the DRC, during the CISG 
drafting process, South Africa had already been excluded from international 
                                               
46
 See UN General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 establishing 
UNCITRAL, hereinafter Resolution 2205, in UNCITRAL 1968-1970 (I) YB 65. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/YBs/yb-1968-70-e/yb_1968_1970_e.pdf (last accessed 20-6-
2013); see also Schlechtriem Uniform Law 18; Huber/Mulis CISG 3. 
47
 See, among others, Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 1-2; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §80:1; Eiselen 2011 (14) 1 PER/PELJ 1; Kokoruda 2011 
(6) Florida Bar Journal (The) 103; Hofmann 2010 22 (1) Pace Int’l LR 145; Castellani 2009 (13) 
1VJ 241; Grebler 2007 (101) American Society of International  Law 407; McNamara 2003 (32) 
Colorado Lawyer 11; Schroeter 2001 (5) VJ 74; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 30; and Hugo1999 (11) SA 
Merc LJ 1. 
48
 Those 62 states included all countries with significant commercial interests; see Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 11.  
49
 See UNCITRAL 1980 (XI) YB 150; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 11. 
50
 See Final Act (A/CONF/97/18), in UNCITRAL 1980 (XI) YB 149. 
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organisations and processes because of its internal race policies, and the international 
sanctions against it.51 This is why South Africa did not actively participate in the 
establishment of the CISG although it sent observers to the conference. Despite this, 
however, as an important economic force on the African continent, it would certainly 
have played a significant role in UNCITRAL activities.52 
As stated by Lookofsky, the Vienna Convention is “the most significant piece 
of substantive contract legislation in effect at the international level.”53 With regard 
to its ambit, the CISG is an international set of rules designed to provide clarity for 
most international sales transactions.54 Its preamble makes it clear that “the adoption 
of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods (…) will 
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the 
development of international trade.”55 This purpose was reiterated by the American 
District Court of California in the Asante Technologies case,56 in order to show that 
the CISG replaces internal domestic laws on matters within its field of application. 
In terms of its effect, the number of CISG contracting states had grown to 79,57 which 
represent about 80 per cent of world trade.58 As a result of this, the CISG has attained 
                                               
51
 See Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 353.  
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Lookofsky CISG 18; see also Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 1. 
54
 Cf. Schwenzer/Fountoulakis Sales Law 21; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; 
Galston/Smit Sales 1. 
55
 See CISG Preamble, Paragraph 4.  
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 USA 27 July 2001 Federal District Court [California] Asante Technologies Inc. v PMC-Sierra 
Inc., CLOUT case No. 433 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010727u1.html] (last accessed 20-6-
2013). In this case, the court quoted, word for word, the second and third main clauses of the 
Preamble of the CISG. See, in the same sense, USA 10 May 2002 Federal District Court [New 
York] Geneva Pharmaceuticals Tech Corp v Barr Labs Inc., CLOUT case No. 579 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html] (last accessed 19-6-2013); and USA 3 
September 2008 Federal District Court [Illinois] CNA Int’l, Inc. v Guangdong Kelon Electronical 
Holdings et al [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/080903u1.html] (last accessed 19-6-2013). 
57
 Up-to-date information on the CISG status is available on the UNCITRAL website at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last 
accessed 20-6-2013).  
58
 See Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Eiselen Globalization 97 136. 
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the status of “a world sales law”59 and is currently one of the most important 
harmonising international trade instruments.60 
The Vienna Convention does not, nevertheless, aim to regulate all legal 
questions which may relate to an international sale;61 neither does it cover all kinds 
of international sales contracts.62 As provided by Article 1, the CISG deals with sales 
contracts made between parties established in different states when those states have 
accessed it, or, if not, when the rules of private international law (PIL) lead to the 
application of the law of a CISG member country. More specifically, the 
Convention’s goal consists only in governing the formation of the contract, and 
defining the rights and obligations of parties resulting from international sale of 
goods contracts.63 One of its valuable qualities is that CISG rules contain solutions 
from civil, common, and socialist legal systems, chosen and adopted on a consensus 
basis.64 Owing to its influence, “the CISG has not only achieved the status of a 
veritable world sales law, but has also led a number of states to modernise their 
domestic sales laws.”65 Countries which have drawn from the Convention in 
revisiting their sales law include European countries in general, as well as China, 
Australia, and African OHADA law states.66 
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 Schwenzer/Fountoulakis Sales Law 21; Lookofsky Understanding 1; Lando in Hartkamp et al 
Civil Code 68-697. In the words of Karollus, the CISG is on the way to becoming “the Magna 
Carta of international trade”. Karollus 1995 Review of the CISG 51 77.  
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 Eiselen Globalization 97 103. With regard to its structure, the CISG comprises 101 Articles 
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form. Part II (Articles14 to 24) regulates the formation of international sales contracts. Part III 
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remedies available to the seller and buyer, as well as the passing of risk. Part IV (Articles 89 to 
101) contains final public international law provisions, such as those dealing with administrative 
procedures, declarations, and reservations that are applicable to signatory states. 
61
 See Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 65; Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 63; Hugo1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 15. 
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 Cf. Article 2 CISG. 
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 Cf. Article 4 CISG. 
64
 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 6. 
65
 Bonell http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell4.html (last accessed 1-7-2012). 
66
 See Ferrari CISG 413-480; Ferrari OHADA 79; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 14; 
Willmott/Christensen/ Butler Contract Law 869. 
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1.5 OHADA Sales Law and the CISG Compared  
 
OHADA is a regional organisation which aims to provide member countries with a 
harmonised set of business laws by elaborating on, and adopting simple and modern 
common rules that have been adapted to African economies.67 Its statutes, called 
Uniform Acts,68 are directly applicable and binding in all member states, 
notwithstanding any conflicting provisions in current or future national laws.69 
Several Acts have been entered into force under the organisation’s sponsorship, 
including the Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial Law.70 The Commercial 
Act contains eight main Books, of which the eighth deals with commercial sales 
matters.71 Its sphere of influence is delineated by Articles 1 and 234, for which the 
Act applies to “contracts of sale of goods” between traders located in one of the 
OHADA member nations or when conflict-of-law rules lead to the application of the 
law of a member state. UAGCL’s provisions govern both domestic and international 
commercial sales.72 This means that, with the accession to the OHADA community, 
modern Congolese commercial sale of goods law as well as international sales law 
is today achieved by the Commercial Act, of which Book VIII is expressly dedicated 
to commercial sales. 
A brief overview of the OHADA Commercial Act reveals that it has largely 
adopted principles contained in the CISG. A number of the Convention’s provisions 
                                               
67
 See Article 1 of the Treaty of 17 October 1993 Establishing OHADA; entered into force on 18 
September 1995, as amended in Quebec on 17 October 2008 (OHADA OJ No. 4 of 1 January 1997), 
hereafter OHADA Treaty.  
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 For an entire ruling on OHADA Uniform Acts, see Title II of the Treaty, viz. Articles 4 to 12. 
69
 See Article 10 OHADA Treaty; see also Ferrari OHADA 79 88; Diédhiou OHADA 223; Martor 
et al Business 20; Mancuso 2006 (5) 2 JI TR LP 55 59; Abarchi 2000 (37) Revue Bourkinabé de 
Droit 21.  
70
 See Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial Law adopted on 17 April 1997; entered into 
force on 1 January 1998 (OHADA OJ No.1 of 1 October 1997), as amended on 15 December 2010 
(OHADA OJ No. 23 of 15 February 2011). This Act will be referred to as the UAGCL, the 
(OHADA) Commercial Act, Uniform Act, or merely as the Act interchangeably. 
71
 See Articles 234 to 302 of the Commercial Act. 
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 See Martor et al Business 29; Huber Sales Law 950; Santos/Toe Commercial 339; Masamba 
Adhesion 347 362; Mutenda Apport 13. 
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have been duplicated or merely adapted to the realities of the African continent.73 
Magnus said, in this regard, that African OHADA states have “adopted a modified 
CISG as their common sales law”.74 Since Book VIII of the UAGCL did not 
transcribe UN Sales Convention rules but rather adjusted them in order to fit local 
needs, it follows that it is possible to compare its substantive provisions with those 
established by other legal systems as the CISG.  
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that problems usually 
resulting from international sales contracts are related to the formation of the 
contract, the obligations of parties, and the applicable law. In effect, a seller and a 
buyer can safely enter into a contract on the condition that their rights and obligations 
are sufficiently protected by law. Is this condition effectively satisfied in Congolese 
law? In order to answer this question, the research problem that is the focus of this 
study will be discussed. 
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
 
It was mentioned earlier that the adoption of the CISG marked a turning point in the 
harmonisation of international sales law history. The Convention has, in effect, been 
implemented as a uniform law governing contracts for the international sale of goods 
in all contracting states.75 Its significance is justified, in the view of Kröll and others, 
by the fact that,  
The (…) Convention contains substantive rules on two of the most important 
questions in international sales transactions. Part II regulates the formation of the 
contract of sale by matching acceptance and performance. Part III contains rules on 
the rights and obligations of sellers and buyers arising from the international sale of 
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goods contract, as well as the remedies that parties to a contract of sale have in 
response to the breach of its counterparty.76 
The importance of the CISG is, furthermore, accounted for by the fact that it provides 
commercial operators from all over the world with “the same substantive regime to 
be applied to the contract of sale: the same uniform language, methodology and a 
common understanding to the basic issues of the international sale of goods 
contract.”77 With such prestige, every country would normally access the UN Sales 
Convention, which is, however, not the case in reality. 
In the light of the above, the main problem of this study is located in the fact 
that, although the DRC took part in meetings that led to the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention, it has not yet ratified it. The failure of the DRC to ratify the CISG has 
meant that international sales contracts were, for a long time, governed in the DRC 
by provisions dating back to colonial times. The fact that the CCO had become out-
of-date suggested lacunas in the initial Congolese international sales contract law. 
These gaps have, to a certain extent, been filled by Articles 234 to 302 of the 
UAGCL. Compared to the CISG, Articles 234 to 302 also establish a set of rules 
dealing with the formation and performance of sales contracts, the rights and 
obligations of sellers and buyers, as well as remedies available to contracting parties 
in the case of a breach of contract.  
Even though UAGCL provisions bear a resemblance to CISG rules, modern 
Congolese law has, nevertheless, its own salient features which deserve attention. To 
remain within the scope of this study, some of the characteristics alluded to above, 
which in turn can be described as gaps, may be found in principles applicable to 
international contracts in general, as well as in provisions governing the formation 
of contracts and  the obligations of parties. 
With regard to general provisions relating to international contracts, 
Congolese PIL rules defer contracts with a foreign element, inter alia, to the law of 
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the place where they are concluded. As it is stated by Article 11 PILD, “Agreements 
are governed by the law of the place where they are made. (…) Contracts are 
governed, as for their substance, effects, and evidence by the law of the place where 
they are concluded, unless when parties provide otherwise.”78 
Since the provision designates the law of the place of conclusion of the 
contract as the law governing international contracts, it follows that the CISG may 
apply to contracts formed by Congolese entities by virtue of PIL principles.79 Article 
1(1) (b) CISG specifies, in this respect, that the Convention applies to contracts of 
sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different states “when 
the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State”. Consequently, despite the fact that the DRC has not yet ratified 
the Convention, Congolese businessmen might be surprised by its application to their 
contracts without choosing it as the applicable law, a situation that leads to legal 
insecurity. Where, however, contracts are concluded in the DRC, Congolese law, 
including OHADA law, will be applicable. Since the integration of OHADA law in 
the DRC is very recent, there is a need to assess critically the impact it has had on 
the historical Congolese sales law. It also needs to be compared to other modern 
systems of law, such as the CISG and South African law.  
It has already been noted that the CISG is a unified substantive law aimed at 
unifying the law of sale of goods internationally. Its importance for comparative 
purposes is then indisputable. With regard to South African law, on the other hand, 
it is a mixed legal system which combines both civil law and common law principles. 
Two main characteristics are common to the DRC and South Africa which justify the 
significance of a comparative undertaking between their legal systems. Firstly, both 
countries are CISG non-contracting states where the same rules apply to both 
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domestic and international sales contacts.80 Secondly, South African historical sales 
law is, like Congolese law, based on the Roman civil law tradition.81 Although both 
countries were influenced by Roman civil law, however, Congolese law follows the 
French Code Civil tradition while South African followed the non-codified Roman-
Dutch tradition. What is more, because of the Anglo-American common law 
influence, South African law departs from the law of the DRC on the basis that it is 
secular, and, as such, it is increasingly flexible, admitting, and undergoing constant 
changes in response to worldly exigencies.82 Owing to its flexibility, South African 
sales law is more updated than Congolese law, and that might enable it to serve as a 
reference to assess the latter.  
Coming back to the scope of this study, rules governing the formation of 
international sale of goods contracts are provided in Part II of the CISG. This part 
deals, among other things, with the offer and acceptance as essential elements of any 
valid international sales contract. Like the CISG, Article 241 UAGCL specifies that 
a contract is concluded either by the acceptance of an offer or by the conducts of the 
parties which indicate acceptance of the agreement. The provision does not, however, 
define what such conducts are. Similarly, Article 245 UAGCL states that any 
acceptance that contains material modifications amounts to a rejection of the offer, 
which then constitutes a counter-offer. Once again, in contrast to its equivalent CISG 
provision, this Article is silent with regard to additional terms that can be viewed as 
substantial alterations. Because the definition of conducts and material changes is 
left to the discretion of the judge, there is a risk that this situation will lead to 
uncertainty in commercial dealings. 
On the other hand, contracts are generally defined as agreements which give 
rise to obligations.83 Their most important effect is to establish rights and obligations 
for both the seller and buyer. As far as the obligations of the seller are concerned, 
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Congolese rules in Articles 250 to 259 UAGCL are almost in agreement with the 
CISG’s provisions in Articles 30 to 44. Both sources of law oblige the seller to deliver 
goods that are, among other things, of the right quantity, quality, and description, as 
stipulated in the contract, otherwise it will be sued for lack of conformity, and to 
protect the buyer against any third-party claims. If, however, the CISG has 
established a single concept of non-conformity, modern Congolese law gives the 
impression of maintaining the dual distinction between hidden and patent defects.84 
Establishing the seller liable for hidden defects is reasonable. Holding him 
responsible for disclosed defects, however, appears to be irregular. This situation has 
as consequence to generate negligent dealers. Such situation, in addition, places the 
seller in a condition that it may be sued anytime for discrepancies the buyer was 
presumed having agreed to tacitly, which is source of legal insecurity. Similarly, 
where the Convention requires the seller to protect the buyer against every 
intellectual property right,85 Congolese law appears to lack such a specific obligation. 
The lack of an explicit obligation in respect of eviction based on intellectual and 
industrial property rights means that claims relating to them are ruled by the general 
principle of guarantee against eviction. Such a situation is not favourable to the seller 
owing to the specificity of intellectual rights. With regard to the obligations of the 
buyer, both the Vienna Convention86 and modern Congolese law87 require the buyer 
to pay the price of the goods, take delivery of them, and examine the goods for a 
probable timely lack of conformity notification. Nevertheless, the shorter notice 
period provided by Congolese law seems to be more prejudicial than that indicated 
in both the CISG and South African law. 
 From the illustration above, it appears that, in spite of some similarities 
between the Vienna Convention, South African law, and modern Congolese law, 
these legal systems differ in terms of many specific aspects relating to international 
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sales contracts throughout their conclusion and performance. Such differences may 
have a significant impact on the behaviour of parties to international sales contracts88 
and contribute to the slowing down of international transactions in the DRC.  
Normally, the law should evolve with the society by developing and being 
adapted to modern demands. The existence of a modern sales contract law that 
incorporates rules recognised and accepted universally should undoubtedly reassure 
and protect contracting parties. Thus, in order to deal with the above research 
problem, two relevant questions need to be asked. Firstly, what are the shortcomings 
of Congolese law in terms of international sales contracts? Secondly, how can these 
shortcomings be dealt with in order to comply with the requirements of modern 
international transactions?  
 
1.7 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
In the context of international sales law, diversity of substantive rules may lead to 
additional costs such as transactional costs and opportunity costs, as well as to losses 
both in terms of money and time spent trying to determine the law governing the 
contract. Such situations have been managed by the CISG since it entered into force 
in 1988. In effect, the Convention provides a satisfactory set of rules for international 
transactions, and it successfully balances the interests of contracting parties. On the 
other hand, though South Africa has not yet accessed the CISG, its legal system is 
very supple and modernised. As  Christie and Bradfield have said, South African 
Courts have, indeed, acquired a long tradition of developing the common law from 
case to case89 in order to suit, inter alia, commercial contemporary requirements. 
With regard to modern Congolese sales law, it is governed by a new set of rules 
provided by the OHADA Commercial Act which appears to have been inspired by 
the CISG.  
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Owing to the fact that these rules are still very new in the country, this study 
aims at assessing them critically by establishing a comparison between the CCO, the 
Commercial Act, the CISG, and South African law provisions. Undertaking a 
comparative analysis has the intention of establishing whether current Congolese law 
is adequate for modern international commercial dealings requirements or, 
alternatively, whether it is still has gaps. Should the latter be the case, this study is 
aimed at identifying those gaps, and making proposals about how to provide 
appropriate solutions to help fill them. In addition, bearing the importance of the 
Vienna Convention for international sale of goods contracts in mind, this study aims 
to consider how the CISG could serve as a useful model to improve Congolese 
international sales law. The study, therefore, ultimately considers the accession of 
the CISG by the DRC in this regard. Likewise, given that there is no current treatise 
on Congolese contract law, this thesis will contribute to the goal of providing a 
systematic exposition of current Congolese law in its historical context and may 
provide the foundation for such a treatise. 
By conducting a comparative study relating to international sales contracts in 
Congolese law, the researcher would like to achieve the following objectives:  
1) To outline the basic principles of Congolese contract and sales laws;  
2) To compare Congolese sales law rules with those established by the CISG and 
South African law, in order to amend the former;  
3) To evaluate the extent to which OHADA law provisions have improved 
Congolese sales law in order to determine remaining gaps and propose the 
means to fill them; and  
4) To recommend that the Congolese Government ratifies the 1980 Vienna 
Convention. 
The above objectives are justified by the fact that, although the OHADA Commercial 
Act may have modernised domestic sales law, the failure of the DRC to ratify the 
CISG has led to gaps in Congolese international sales law. Its adoption should 
certainly harmonise Congolese law with aspects that regulate international sales of 
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goods worldwide. This ratification would, furthermore, improve the legal 
environment of the DRC for international sales transactions and protect Congolese 
dealers in their commercial transactions with foreign partners.  
 
1.8  Methodology 
 
In order to achieve the identified objectives, this study has, primarily, made use of 
the comparative method. According to its definition, a comparative approach is used 
to conduct legal research in countries that represent different legal systems, for 
instance, one with a civil law system and another with a common law system. Holmes 
JA has confirmed the importance of such an approach in Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Ngubane,90 in which the learned judge demonstrated the significant 
role of considering the law of other countries. For the purpose of this study, the 
Vienna Sales Convention and South African law have been selected as the focus 
areas. Of course, reference is also made occasionally to other jurisdictions, such as 
those of Belgian, French, English, German, American laws, the UNIDROIT 
Principles on International Commercial Contracts (PICC), and the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL) but not as frequently as the first two legal systems. 
It should be noted immediately that the Vienna Convention is not, strictly 
speaking, an independent legal system, but rather a combination of legal systems. Its 
rules constitute a compromise between civil law and Anglo-American common law 
families.91 Thus, the comparative approach used in this study is not the classical 
comparative method, but an adapted one. Still, however, the CISG operates as the 
international sales code in many different countries. In this regard, the choice of the 
CISG is justified by the fact that the Convention is currently the most important 
instrument dealing with international sale of goods contracts worldwide. Owing to 
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the fact  that OHADA law, which constitutes the basis of modern Congolese sales 
law, referred to this convention in order to modernise its sales Uniform Act shows 
its relevance to, and influence on, international commercial transactions. 
As regards South African law, South Africa is currently the most developed 
country on the African continent. Moreover, the DRC shares with South Africa 
membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)92 and the 
same basic Roman civil law tradition, while both countries are non-CISG members. 
In addition, South African law is flexible and evolving constantly. All of these 
reasons, and mostly the last, motivated us to examine how South African law can 
also be used in appraising Congolese sales law in order to align it with modern 
commercial laws instruments. 
 Undertaking a comparative study is not an easy task especially when the legal 
systems that are being compared do not have similar features.93 This statement seems, 
however, inapplicable with regard to Congolese law, South African law, and the 
CISG. As it was mentioned in previous sections, the DRC is a civil law country which 
has been influenced by the French Napoleonic code. With regard to South African 
law, it is a mixed jurisdiction which combines rules from both civil and common law 
legal systems. The CISG, on the other hand, is a result of cooperation between 
different legal systems, including civil and common law. The fact that all three legal 
systems have civil law aspects in common means that there are many similarities 
among them.  
Additionally, this study has also relied on the literature review approach. 
Sources of relevant information include statutes and conventions, judicial decisions, 
textbooks, journal articles, and electronic data. In particular, the database provided 
by the Institute of Peace, with special reference to case law and arbitral decisions 
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applying the CISG, as well as scholarly publications collected by UNCITRAL, have 
been useful for the most part. Specific research on international sales contracts in 
Congolese law is, nevertheless, wanting. Furthermore, there is no systematic 
publication of judicial decisions in the DRC, which made the accessibility of local 
case law difficult. Owing to this situation, it was necessary to collect this case 
material at the courts and rely on foreign literature.  
 
1.9 Delimitations and Structure of the Study 
 
The international sale of goods as a research area covers several topics, including the 
formation of contracts, the rights and obligations of contracting parties, and remedies 
allowed to the injured party in cases of the breach of the contract. International 
transactions, likewise, involve numerous contracts, among which are the contract of 
sale itself, carriage of goods, marine insurance, and the issuing of bankers’ letters of 
credit. Despite their importance for international dealings, this study’s limited scope 
does not permit it to address each of these topics. The comparative study concerns 
only rules relating to the process of the conclusion of the contract, and those 
governing the obligations of sellers and buyers. Because no legal system can 
adequately be understood without looking at its historical development and 
framework, comparative chapters are, nevertheless, preceded by an overview of the 
three legal systems under consideration.  
Overall, this study contains six chapters, in addition to the introduction. 
Chapter II deals with the historical process which has shaped modern Congolese law, 
as well as the fundamental principles on which its contract and sales laws are based. 
It demonstrates that Congolese law derives from the French Napoleonic civil code 
via Belgian law. The chapter shows that colonial law has stayed alive in the DRC for 
a very long time, but has recently been supplemented by OHADA law in order to try 
to meet the needs of modern international transactions. In addition, this chapter 
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discusses the general principles of Congolese contract law, which include freedom 
of contract, party autonomy, and good faith.  
 Chapter III has adopted a framework similar to that of the second chapter with 
regard to South African law. It explains that, even though South African law has been 
influenced by Roman-Dutch and English law, its legal system has acquired its 
independence as a mixed legal system under the direction of the Constitutional Court. 
This chapter also examines the general principles on which South African law is 
founded, including consensual and reasonable reliance theories, freedom of contract, 
good faith, and compliance with public policy conditions. It is shown that, in 
accordance with public policy requirements, for a contract to qualify as one of sale, 
parties must reach agreement upon the thing sold, and the seller must transfer 
ownership of the item bought to the buyer, who, in turn, must pay for it and take 
delivery. 
Chapter IV discusses the process which led to the adoption of the Vienna Sales 
Convention, its field of application, and the impact it has had on national sales laws 
in different countries and regions. After a comprehensive discussion of reasons for a 
harmonised legal system and the advantages of such a structure, the chapter explores 
the kinds of contracts that fall within the scope of the CISG. In addition, this chapter 
demonstrates how the Convention can be applied in the DRC, despite the country’s 
lack of interest in it.  
With regard to chapters V and VI, they constitute the crux of this study. These 
chapters consist of a comparative approach whereby the CISG, South African law, 
and Congolese law are critically compared. At every stage, the Vienna Convention 
is discussed first, followed by South African law, and then Congolese law. An 
assessment of the state of current Congolese sales law is provided in concluding 
comments in order to determine the similarities among the three legal systems. In the 
case of differences, suggestions for the improvement of Congolese law are made.  
Explicitly, Chapter V deals with the formation of contracts in terms of offer 
and acceptance, and it discusses different theories relating to the time and place of 
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the contract. The chapter shows that, even if the offer and acceptance approach was 
now to form part of Congolese contract law, as in the CISG and South African law, 
historically this has not been the case. It then considers the influence that the CISG 
may have had on the OHADA Commercial Act provisions, but observes, however, 
that there are still aspects that need attention. Chapter VI focuses on the obligations 
of the seller and buyer. This chapter shows how UAGCL rules have improved 
Congolese law in order to align it with CISG provisions and South African law rules. 
On the other hand, the chapter also highlights omissions recorded in the Act which 
have resulted in gaps that need to be filled.  
Finally, Chapter VII presents a conclusion to the discussion in the previous 
chapters and ends with a proposal for the accession of the DRC to the Vienna Sales 
Convention, after having reminded us of the compatibility between the CISG and 
OHADA law. 
Chapter Two 
 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGOLESE  
CIVIL LAW AND ITS SALES LAW BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In general, the study of any legal system must include an understanding of the 
significant points in its development.1 Concerning Congolese civil law, its historical 
development can be traced back to Belgian law which originated from the French 
civil code and was brought to the DRC during the colonial period. Even many days 
after independence, the DRC continued to apply legislation inherited from the 
colonial power,2 although that law had long been adapted in its mother country. 
Because of such a lack of modernisation, Congolese civil law rules became out-
dated, insufficient, and irrelevant3 with respect to modern international sales contract 
requirements, and they needed to be improved. The first step in the reform process 
was accomplished on 12 September 2012 with the coming into force of OHADA law 
in the DRC. Since then, the basic principles provided by the OHADA Commercial 
Act have constituted one of the bases of the Congolese contract law and its sales law 
in particular. These principles include the freedom of contract, the autonomy of the 
will, and the obligation of good faith. 
In that sense, this chapter has three main sections dealing successively with 
the historical development of the Congolese civil law, the principles on which 
Congolese contract law is based, and the essential elements of a contract of sale under 
the Congolese law perspective. With such an outline, this chapter does not, however, 
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intend to provide a comprehensive study of the historical development of the 
Congolese legal system. It attempts merely to highlight a few fundamental aspects 
of the origins of the French civil code before its reception in Belgium, and explains 
how it gained recognition in the DRC through the Decree of 30 July 1888. In 
addition, this chapter intends to show that, until recently, commercial sales contracts 
were governed, in the DRC, by the same rules as civil sales contracts. This situation 
has been changed by the adoption of OHADA law. 
 
2.2 The Historical Development of Congolese Civil Law 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
At the outset it should be noted that detailed investigations into the development of 
Congolese civil law are largely wanting.4 That is to be regretted because one has to 
search in a number of different places to reconstitute the salient elements of 
Congolese legal history. What is evident, however, is that, before the coming into 
force of the colonial power in the DRC, the county was ruled largely by customary 
rules like other African countries.5 But, when the earlier Belgian settlers conquered 
the country, they substituted local customary rules considered at that time as contrary 
to the needs of public policy by their law.6 The colonisers brought with them the 
Napoleonic Civil Code they had inherited from France for, when the latter was 
enacted in 1804, Belgium was part of France. That is why, before examining the 
process of the introduction of the French Civil Code in the DRC, it is useful to go 
over the genesis of the said civil code and look at the means by which it was received 
in Belgium. After that a discussion of the characteristics of the earlier Congolese civil 
law and the impact of OHADA law upon the legal system under examination will 
follow. 
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2.2.2 French Civil Code Origin 
 
Historically speaking, the French Civil Code is a product of a long evolution which 
began during the twelfth century with the movement towards the reduction into 
writing of substantive customary law. Such a process had largely been completed by 
the end of the sixteenth century.7 Reforms to this legal system were basically 
introduced by royal ordinances during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
With regard to this background, West is of the opinion that it seems wrong to 
consider the 1789 Revolution and the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1804 as 
“representing a completely fresh start, as the Code draws heavily on the substantive 
law of pre-revolutionary times.”8 As far as the pre-revolutionary period is concerned, 
Roman law played a crucial part in the historical development of French civil law, 
especially contract law.9 Before the 1789 revolution, in effect, France had no code of 
general law governing the entire territory. In other words, there were different laws 
and legal systems generally mentioned as the “Ancien Droit” (Old Law)10 that could 
be divided into two families. South of the River Loire, on the one hand, Roman law 
remained important as a source for each region’s written laws. It was also used to 
supplement gaps in customary laws. Two written records were available for this 
purpose, the Lex Romana Visigothorum11 and the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis.12 
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North of the River Loire, on the other hand, the main source of the laws adopted by 
the feudal system was tribal customs, mostly from Germanic tribes. At that time, 
customary law dealt with private law, but covered a restricted subject area. So, 
Roman law principles had to be introduced to complete it.13 The only laws applicable 
across the whole of the French kingdom then were Canon law and King’s 
ordinances.14 
The division of the country into two principal legal systems was certainly 
noteworthy when one is aware that Roman influence was felt almost equally in the 
North and in the South. That diversity in the law, associated with the number of 
different customs,15 however, created natural and almost diverse obstacles to national 
unity. As stated by Zweigert and Kötz, for instance, the proliferation of different 
customs and the difficulty of discovering their real content naturally gave rise to great 
legal uncertainty.16 In order to unify the law on a national level, simplify it, and 
remove some of the above practical difficulties, King Louis XI recognised the 
advantages of the unification of the law.17 In this regard, he developed the plan to 
establish a uniform French law. After his death in 1588, his successor, Henri III, 
undertook to pursue the unification plan. He gave the task of gathering into one 
volume the ordinances still in effect and the plan for new laws to Barnabé Brisson. 
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 For example, Canon law influenced the development of French contract law, with its moral 
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See Tallon Contract Law 205-206. 
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This work, known as the Code Henri III, had not yet been finalised when its author 
died in civil wars.18 
After him, during the reign of Louis XIII, a new code, known as the Code 
Michaud, was enacted in 1629. The Code Michaud contained 461 articles regulating, 
inter alia, civil and commercial matters.19 Likewise, under the reign of Louis XIV, 
through the efforts of famous lawyers of the time, such as Lamoignon, Auzane, 
Fourcroy, Pussort, Savary, Colbert and Dustarlet, several important statutes were 
published among which was the 1667 statute, also called the Code civil. According 
to Ourliac and Malafosse, French law makers inherited some general principles like 
those governing the proof of contracts from this code.20 
From the different attempts of regulation referred to above, it appeared that 
the monarchy had been unable to provide France with a uniform code of law. That is 
why the 1789 French Revolution was to overcome all obstacles in the legal domain. 
Concerning civil law, for instance, an Act of 24 August 1790 expressly provided the 
possibility of reviewing and reforming the civil code in order to adapt it to the 
Constitution. In addition, the Constitution of September 1791 reaffirmed the 
principle of a civil code applicable throughout the entire kingdom,21 the civil code of 
which the codification process is briefly examined in the following section.  
 
2.2.3 The Process of the Codification of the French Civil Code 
 
As was claimed in the previous paragraph, the view developed during the eighteenth 
century was to provide France with a bill of law having national effect. One of the 
most important aims of the 1789 Revolution was, moreover, to unify private law in 
France. That is the reason why the Constitutional Assembly established by the 
Revolution decreed, “A code of civil law common to the whole kingdom will be 
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 See Seruzier Summary 11. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ourliac/Malafosse Histoire 35. 
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 See West et al Legal System 21; Elliot/Jeanpierre/Vernon Legal System 6; Seruzier Summary 16-17. 
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drawn up.”22 The first attempt at codification was carried out by Jean-Jacques Régis 
de Cambacérès23 from 1793 onwards. Cambacérès submitted three drafts of the civil 
code, unfortunately none of them being accepted by the legislature.24 
When Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in 1799, he wanted the new order 
to be legitimised by the creation of a unified legal system. He, therefore, made it a 
priority to draw up the civil code. In the Constitution introduced by him, Napoleon 
empowered three Consuls with executive and legislative competences, practising 
himself as the First Consul and the other two as assistants.25 As First Consul, 
Napoleon appointed a commission of four committed lawyers, namely Tronchet, 
Bigot de Préameneu, Malleville, and Protalis,26 in August 1800 with the task of 
drafting a civil code. The commission worked very hard. Within four months it 
produced a draft civil code inspired by the writings of Pothier and Domat.27 That 
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 Clause cited by Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 82. 
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undeniable at that time and the draft civil code commission could not manage without their ideas. 
Concerning the first named, his main works were published in Les lois civiles dans leur ordre 
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draft was then submitted for consultation to the Higher Court (Tribunal de 
Cassation), the Appeal Courts (Tribunaux d’Appel), and referred finally to the 
“Conseil d’Etat” for discussion.28 After the Council had received the draft civil code, 
its legislative group examined each of its titles in the presence of the draftsmen. The 
draft, approved title by title, was then printed and distributed to all of the “Conseillers 
d’Etat”,29 and discussed once again in a General assembly.  
In December 1801, the two Parliamentary Assemblies, the Tribunat and the 
Corps Législatif, also examined the draft civil code but rejected it. As Napoleon had, 
however, been established “Consul for life” with wide executive powers that year,30 
it enabled him to introduce a streamlined procedure bypassing the legislative 
resistance. As a result of this, the different chapters of the code were promulgated by 
a series of 36 laws passed from March 1803 to March 1804. The entire project of 2, 
281 articles entered into effect on 21 March 1804 as the Code Civil des Français (the 
Civil Code of the French People). The civil code later became known as the Code 
                                               
55.) This idea was reproduced latter in the 1804 Napoleonic civil code through Article 1134 which 
assimilates legal agreements to other lawful obligations so that contracting parties must give way 
to them.  
Regarding Pothier (1699-1772), his ideas were published in two important documents: the 
Pandectae Justinianeae in novum ordinem digestae (1748-1750) and the Traité des Obligations 
(1761). The drafting Commission inherited from him, among other things: the definition of 
agreements; the principle of freedom of contract; the method of contracting by means of offer and 
acceptance; and the subdivision of agreements according to their nature of performance. Pothier 
believed in parties’ freedom as one of the cornerstones of an agreement. He, therefore, defined a 
contract as “an agreement by which two parties reciprocally, or only one of them, promise and bind 
themselves towards the other to give something, or to do, or not to do something.” Pothier’s 
definition was replicated in Articles 1101 and 1126 of the Napoleonic civil code. (See Oosterhuis 
Performance 69 and 126-127; Imbert Histoire 89). 
Further to the impact of Pothier’s understandings on the French civil code drafters, his influence 
also overextended into Roman-Dutch law where he inspired Van der Linden (1807-1808) (See 
Wessels History 353; Wijffels Contracts 21 30; Oosterhuis Performance 202), who, in turn, heavily 
influenced early South African law. (See Du Bois in Principles 75; Thomas/Van der Merwe/Stoop 
Historical 69). The same author indirectly influenced Congolese law because, as will be explained 
later, many of French civil code provisions were merely duplicated in the DRC.   
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 For a brief overview of the French law-making procedure of that time, see Dadomo/Farran Legal 
System 9; West et al Legal System 21; Elliot/Jeanpierre/Vernon Legal System 6; Seruzier Summary 
22; Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 83. The “Conseil d’Etat” (Council of State), hereinafter the 
Council, was the final court of appeal of the Administrative court structure and also government 
advisory body. See Glossary of terms annexed to West et al Legal System V˚ Conseil d’Etat 336. 
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Napoleon31 owing to Napoleon’s active role in the drafting process and his 
involvement in the civil code implementation.32 It seems that Napoleon was himself 
satisfied by the role he had played as law-maker. Evidence of this is the observation 
he made during his exile on Saint Helena Island in the last years of his life: “My 
glory is not to have won 40 battles, for Waterloo’s defeat will destroy the memory of 
as many victories. But what nothing will destroy, what will live eternally, is my Civil 
Code.”33 The merit of the civil code consists of the fact that it unified civil law for 
all the territories comprising the French empire.34 
With regard to the content and structure of the civil code, it originally aimed 
to regulate the life of a private individual from birth to death. It was conceived, in 
the words of Marryman, as being a handbook for citizens “to determine by 
themselves their legal rights and obligations.”35 Thus, in order to achieve this 
purpose, the civil code drafters divided it into three main Books.36 Book III of these 
considers the contract as one of the ways to obtain property in addition to the law of 
successions, matrimonial property, gifts and wills, and the law of torts. As far as 
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contracts are concerned, they are dealt with in Title III37 which provides general rules 
governing all contracts. Sales contracts, in particular, are regulated by Articles 1582 
to 1701 which cover the sixth Title. As a whole, provisions governing contracts are 
based on the Republic’s principle of liberty, a principle according to which people 
were allowed the freedom to make any contract, subject only to the needs of public 
policy.38 
From this development, it is clear that one of the most notable events in all the 
legal history occurred when the French civil code came into force. At that time, the 
French civil code was considered to be “the first great modern codification of the 
law”;39 it has become, two centuries later, “the oldest surviving post-Enlightenment 
code.”40 This reputation justified its influence beyond the French territory and its 
adoption as a model for civil law in parts of Europe, especially in Belgium.   
 
2.2.4 Reception of the Napoleonic Civil Code in Belgium 
 
2.2.4.1 Dutch legal background in Belgium 
 
Politically, Belgium became independent from the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in 1830.41 Before its independence, Belgium was part of the territory 
known as the “Low Countries” that comprised the current Benelux countries.42 
Concerning its legal history, the country probably followed the pattern of the rest of 
Western Europe previous to the Napoleonic period. Its law was primarily customary 
at the beginning. But, throughout the period, the main development in private law 
lay in the interaction between custom and Roman law.43 According to a number of 
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 See Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 86; see also Article 6 Civil code wherein, “Statutes relating to 
public policy and morals should not be derogated from by private agreements.” 
39
 See Schwartz Code vii; Van Caenegem Introduction 1; see also Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 90 
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commentators, an attempt at the centralisation of customary laws was made by the 
Burgundians and Habsburgs from 1400 to 1581.44 
When Joseph II came to power in 1780, he started an ambitious programme of 
legal reform. His project was unluckily obstructed by the October 1789 revolt. 
Austrian authority was later restored, but any plan of reform had to be given up. In 
the 1795 revolution, France annexed the Southern Netherlands, i.e. today’s Belgium, 
and the principality of Liege.45 As a result of that event, all French revolutionary 
legislation was disseminated into the annexed departments as was the 1804 
Napoleonic codification a short time after.46 
In 1807, Louis Napoleon assigned to Johannes Van der Linden (1756-1835) 
the task of preparing a new draft civil code for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A 
year after, Van der Linden submitted his draft, inspired by the preceding drafts of the 
Commission of Twelve; Pothier’s works, and the French civil code, in addition to his 
personal main beliefs on Roman-Dutch law.47 In the meantime, Napoleon I ordered 
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 In 1531, for example, Emperor Charles V ordered the homologation of local customs. These 
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his young brother, Louis Napoleon, to introduce the 1804 Napoleonic code in the 
Kingdom of Holland. Louis refused to follow his brother’s suggestion, emphasising 
the need of legislation adapted to the Dutch legal tradition for the Kingdom. He then 
installed a new drafting commission with the task of preparing a Dutch version of 
the civil code inspired by Van der Linden’s draft.48 Following the King’s advice, the 
commission completed its task in one year. It submitted, in May 1808, a draft 
Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt voor het Koningrijk Holland, i.e. a draft “Napoleonic 
Code for the Kingdom of Holland,” (NCKH) which entered into force on May 1, 
1809.49 
The NCKH’s implementation was extremely ephemeral, however, because it 
was supplanted immediately after its enactment by the Code Napoleon.50 At that 
time, in fact, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was again annexed to the French 
empire. Upon that annexation, Napoleon I decreed the application of all French codes 
there. As a result, from March 1811, the 1804 Civil Code replaced the NCKH.51 
Although France withdrew two years later, its legislation survived, particularly in 
Belgium.  
 
2.2.4.2 Preservation of the Napoleonic civil code in Belgium  
 
After the French withdrawal, the great powers of Europe convened in Vienna to 
redraw the map of the old continent. At the end of the conference, Belgium and the 
Netherlands were merged under William I into the United Kingdom of Netherlands.52 
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Performance 202; citing Article 43 of the draft civil code; see also Wijffels Contracts 21 30. 
48
 Van Caenegem Introduction 152; Lesaffer History 53; Limpens “Expansion” 94; Wijffels 
Contrats 21 29-30. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 See Wessels History 241&353. 
51
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Immediately after his inauguration, King William I expressed the desire to have his 
own Dutch codes; he accordingly appointed a drafting commission on April 1814. A 
draft civil code, generally referred to as the Kemper draft, was ready three months 
after this based on the previous NCKH.53 Two other drafts followed, the first 
submitted on March 1816,54 and the second in 1820 which was finally submitted to 
Parliament for discussion.55 The Parliament worked on it for the next six years and 
produced, in 1825-1826, a draft civil code which was to enter into force on 1 
February 1831.56 
Soon after this, the above draft was amended, during the 1828-1829 
parliamentary sessions, in accordance with the three subsequent codes: the 
commercial, civil procedure, and criminal procedure codes.57 By 1829 three of the 
four codes were adopted, the criminal code being the exception. In the same way, an 
Act of 16 May 1829 claimed to abrogate the French civil codes and confirmed the 
abolition of the Roman law authority as initially stated in France from 1804. By the 
end of 1830, however, discontent between the Southern and Northern Netherlands 
led to an insurgence and subsequent Belgian independence with the country still 
having French law as its legal system. Consequently, the 1804 Napoleonic code 
remained in force in both Belgium and the Netherlands.58 
Concerning the Netherlands, however, just after Belgian revolution, the Dutch 
Parliament decided to revise the 1830 draft civil code and, to that end, published the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek in 1838, which was replaced by a new Dutch civil code in 1992. 
Compared with the 1838 civil code, which apart from some typically Dutch features, 
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was very close to the French civil code,59 the 1992 one was influenced by German 
law.60 
 As for the Netherlands, Article 139 of the 1830 Belgian Constitution called 
for a speedy amendment to the existing French codifications.61 Unfortunately the 
country limited itself to a “pious wish” and Belgium is still waiting for its fulfilment 
more than two centuries later.62 As Heirbaut and Storme have stated, the failure of 
Belgium to write a new civil code has been analysed as the most conspicuous 
feebleness of Belgian private law.63 Of course there were some attempts at revising 
the civil code which unluckily failed. Two instances can be mentioned in that regard, 
the Francois Laurent’s draft published in 1884, and the works of a draft commission 
appointed in 1889 to suggest modifications to the 1804 civil code.64 Since the1960s, 
and during the Napoleonic civil code bicentenary commemoration in 2004, there 
were once again several calls for a new civil code for Belgium.65 That has, however, 
taken a long time to happen. Owing to such shortcomings, Belgium continues to 
apply the original civil law it inherited from France.66 As Limpens has said, 
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“[Belgium] has remained more faithful to the original text of the Code Napoleon than 
most other countries. The few modifications made in the Civil Code there have been 
less far-reaching than those made in France itself.”67 
Regarding its contract law, for instance, Belgian contract law forms, as in 
France, a part of the third Book of the civil code governing the different ways of 
acquiring property.68 That law is ruled by Articles 1101 to 1369 which have remained 
almost unchanged.69 This does not mean that Belgian contract law has remained 
stationary. Enhancements have taken place outside the civil code by means of judicial 
decisions. De Bondt observes that,  
[Belgian] courts have adapted the law of contracts to the needs of time. Important 
doctrines, such as pre-contractual liability, the abuse of rights, (…) the 
acknowledgement of the complementary and corrective function of good faith, (the 
process of concluding contracts by means of offer and acceptance,70) have indeed 
been created by the judges.71 
Heirbaut and Storme specify that the actual meaning of a number of provisions of 
the Belgian civil code cannot be comprehended without a thorough knowledge of 
case law.72 In other words, currently one has to read in the provision the meaning the 
case law has given to it in order to arrive at its real interpretation, though that 
interpretation seems  to conflict with the literal meaning of the text. One case in point 
is the actual understanding of Article 1142 of the civil code relating to remedies for 
breach of contracts. Literally, this provision stipulates that “every obligation to do, 
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or not to do is resolved into damages in case of non-performance.” According to the 
case law, however, Article 1142 “means that the principal remedy is specific 
performance, unless specific performance cannot be granted because of 
impossibility, disproportionality or the personal character of the performance.”73 
 In addition to case law, modern Belgian contract and sales law have been 
enhanced by the implementation of European Regulations and the adoption of 
international sales conventions such as the CISG.74 As far as EU Directives are 
concerned, Belgium has transposed into domestic law the Directive 1999/CE of 13 
December 1999 relating to electronic signatures75 as well as the e-commerce 
Directive of 8 June 2000.76 In conformity with the first quoted Directive, for example, 
Article 1322 of the civil code dealing with handwritten signatures has, since October 
2000, been amplified by a second paragraph giving effect to electronic signatures.77 
Likewise, Belgium enacted an Act carrying out the e-commerce EC Directive on 11 
March 2003,78 particularly its Article 9, which requires all EU member states to allow 
the conclusion of e-contracts in their legal systems.79 This has as a consequence that, 
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by electronic means. 
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under contemporary Belgian contract law, a contract should not be denied legal effect 
because it was concluded electronically, a situation not consistent with the original 
1804 civil code.80 
In a few words, apart from some improvements made here and there especially 
with regard to e-commerce, the commonality of French and Belgian law is evident. 
Many of Belgian contractual law provisions remain identical in text to their French 
civil code equivalents. They bear the same article numbering as well. Furthermore, 
the Belgian civil code still has several legal clauses which duplicate provisions of the 
ancient French law. As stated earlier, Belgium has remained even more faithful to 
the original Code Napoleon than has France.  
Nevertheless, though Belgian and French texts are similar, there has 
sometimes been different interpretation and judicial treatment in the two countries.81 
Two instances should be quoted in this respect. The first is the liability of the 
professional seller for lack of conformity;82 the second is recourse to the non-
performance exception. Under Belgian case law, in contrast to French case law, the 
presumption that the seller knew of the defects is rebuttable while in France it is 
irrevocable.83 Similarly, since the end of the nineteenth century Belgian courts agreed 
with defences based on the non-performance exception, whereas French courts 
recognised it only after 1914.84 
From what has been said so far, it appears that, with the exception of some 
more recent developments, it is the contract law Belgium acquired from France 
during the Napoleonic era that it brought to the DRC through colonisation. 
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2.2.5 Export of the Napoleonic Civil Code in the DRC  
 
2.2.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section exposes, first, the background of the Congolese civil law, and an 
overview of the DRC’s administrative history. After that, it discusses what the civil 
law was before, during, and after independence. The section insists on the signs of 
the Napoleonic civil code in Congolese law, signs which have determined the DRC 
membership in the civil law family.  
   
2.2.5.2 The backdrop to Congolese civil law  
 
Congolese legal history is intimately linked to Belgian colonial power in Africa. 
When the Belgians conquered the Congo they did not, however, find a country 
without law. Before their coming, the country was divided into different indigenous 
clans, each of them with its own rules, tribunals, and legal authorities.85 In other 
words, on their arrival, Belgian colonisers found a diversity of unwritten customary 
laws in the Congo as existed in all other African countries.86 Congolese official legal 
organisation started from as early as 1885. In the meantime, the effective occupation 
of the territory spread. The personal rights of the various groups that it absorbed, 
however, remained. Political power was placed in the hands of the local authorities 
whose organisational principles were, for the first time, acknowledged.87    
Soon after this, the area of public law, i.e. constitutional law, administrative, 
criminal, and international law, was pre-eminently dominated by written law to the 
detriment of customary laws. With regard to private law, viz. family law, property 
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law, and the law of obligations and evidence, it was still widely influenced by 
customary laws.88 Such a situation was not pleasing to the colonial power which 
wanted inexorably to eradicate local customs which it then considered to be 
inconsistent with general principles of civilisation. As Lamy has said, 
(…) au début du gouvernement colonial belge à proprement parler, il y eut une 
accentuation de la méconnaissance ou du mépris des coutumes juridiques 
congolaises de la part de ceux qui, sur le terrain, auraient dû les connaître, les 
défendre et les appliquer, à savoir les territoriaux et les magistrats. De plus en plus, 
la coutume était oubliée parce qu’elle n’avait pas encore bénéficiée d’un cadre 
organique où elle aurait eu sa place précisée, son plein exercice et partant son 
autonomie.89 
Despite such a discrediting, Congolese local customary laws have survived 
throughout history by somewhat indirect legalisation. That is why Article 153 al. 4 
of the Constitution of 18 February 2006 recognises their legal effect provided, 
however, that the practice in question conforms to public policy and morality 
requirements.90 It was even ruled, with respect to international contracts, that public 
policy requirements that contest the application of local customary laws are 
international public policy requirements, not those of Congolese written law.91 
 
2.2.5.3 Overview of the Congolese administrative history  
 
From 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, European powers and the USA 
convened a conference in Berlin to discuss outstanding problems connected with the 
African continent.92 Three subjects were high on the agenda: the sharing of Africa; 
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the freedom of commerce in the basin of the Congo; and free navigation on the Rivers 
Congo and Niger.93 Fourteen states attended the conference94 which held ten full 
sessions. Its decisions were contained in a “General Act” signed and ratified by all 
the participants except the USA.95 At the end of the conference, the area currently 
known as the DRC was allocated to the Belgian king Leopold II. 
With regard to Belgium, two problems regarding it emerged before the end of 
the conference. The first of these problems was that the Belgian Parliament had to 
ratify the Berlin General Act; the second was related to Leopold II’s simultaneous 
position as king of two states.96 To overcome these problems, the first step consisted 
in ratifying the Berlin General Act which happened in the course of March 1885. The 
much more difficult matter of Leopold’s position as king of two states then followed. 
Indifferent to the colonial business at that period, Belgium’s Representatives 
opposed Belgium’s involvement in the Congo. They suggested that from then 
onwards the King’s presence in that country should be on a purely personal basis.97 
After the two Chambers met the Constitution’s Article 62 requirements, 
Leopold II had to decide what title he should carry as head of the Congo. He adopted 
that of “Roi-Souverain” (Sovereign-King). In May 1885, he appointed three 
“General Administrators”, with Strauch running the Department of Home Affairs. 
The new state was quietly inaugurated by means of a confidential decree. During 
July 1885, De Winton, one of the three General Administrators, officially notified 
local merchants and missionaries of the establishment of the new state, attaching to 
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his letter a decree allocating all “vacant lands” to the state.98 On 19 July 1885, a 
formal state birth ceremony was held in Banana Port. Finally, on the 1st August 1885, 
Leopold II notified each of the powers involved in the Berlin Conference of his 
sovereignty over the Etat Indépendant du Congo (Independent State of the Congo)99 
with the consent of the Belgian Parliament. An announcement to that effect was also 
published in the new State’s Official Gazette, the Bulletin Officiel.100 Since then, the 
date of 1st August 1885 has always been considered to be the official anniversary of 
the Congo Free State. 
As regards the Free State’s administration, it was highly centralised in Leopold 
II’s hands. He was considered to be the designer of the Congo and was accordingly 
endowed with the most absolute powers.101 All important decisions concerning the 
country were taken by him from Brussels; all the rights and duties of the government 
were summarised and incorporated in his person.102 Briefly, Leopold was titular 
sovereign of the Congo.103 He had, among other things, exclusive legislative power 
vis-à-vis the country that he could, occasionally, delegate to a “State Secretary”104 
but more often to a “General Governor”.105 
In brief, the Congo initially entered contemporary history not as a Belgian 
colony, but as the personal possession of the Belgian King. In 1908, Leopold II 
transferred his “property” to Belgium by means of a will. The Congo was then 
annexed to the Belgian state as a colony named the “Belgian Congo” until its 
independence which it gained in 1960. 
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2.2.5.4 Congolese civil law during the colonial period  
 
It was mentioned in the previous section that one of the subjects discussed in Berlin 
was the freedom of commerce in the basin of the Congo. Accordingly, one of the 
requirements imposed on Leopold II was to establish, as soon as possible, a very 
efficient judicial organisation and adequate legislation in the Congo.106 As far as the 
judicial organisation was concerned, two texts were immediately enacted: the decree 
of 7 January 1886 relating to the organisation of justice in criminal matters;107 and 
the Ordinance of 14 May 1886 regulating the jurisdiction and procedure of civil and 
commercial courts.108 
With regard to the civil legislative issue, on the other hand, the King was 
uncertain about whether it would be best to transpose Belgian laws into the Congo 
or adopt new regulations. In the French colonies, for instance, the Code Napoleon 
was immediately applicable. Without following the French option, Leopold II 
decided to enact new laws adapted to the Congolese situation. To achieve this, he 
appointed a drafting civil code commission composed of experienced Belgian 
lawyers. That commission later came to be known as the “Superior Council”.109 In 
the meantime, the Congolese General Administrator passed a “provisional civil code” 
by Ordinance of 14 May 1886.110 As stipulated by its preamble, the Principles 
Applicable to Judicial Decisions Ordinance aimed “to determine temporarily rules to 
be followed in civil and commercial matters until special rules are promulgated.”111 
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Article 1 of the Ordinance specifies that all matters not specifically regulated in 
Congolese law had to be resolved in conformity with local customs, general principles 
of law, and equity.112 To this we shall return in section 2.2.6 below. 
When it came to the drafting process of the Congolese civil code, it was 
obvious that the Superior Council had Belgian law as a principal source of 
inspiration. Nevertheless, as it was intended to produce an original law for the 
country, the Council refused to transpose Belgian laws into the Congo. The Council 
created, as was said by Verstraete, “experimental legislation”.113 This opinion is in 
conformity with Mansco’s argument according to which, although African legal 
systems resemble the legal systems of their respective settler countries, it cannot be 
deduced that legal rules in African countries are merely copies of the laws of their 
mother countries.114 There are some important differences between them. 
Concerning the Congo, in particular, its drafting commission took cognisance of the 
freshest civil codes of the time.115 It compared them with both the 1884 Laurent’s 
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draft and the works of the 1889 Belgian reform civil code commission.116 As a result 
of this, the commission produced a new law adapted to the needs of the country,117 
although it was inspired by Belgian law.  
Forced by the need to secure free trade in the basin of the Congo as required 
in Berlin, the Council gave priority to the Law of Obligations. On 30 July 1888, it 
decreed the Book relating to Contracts or Conventional Obligations,118 prior to those 
of Persons and Property adopted in 1895119 and 1912120 respectively. Similarly, 
pursuant to Article 3 of the Berlin General Act, the Congo Free State had to assure 
to the citizens of the Berlin powers a large enjoyment of their civil rights. To this 
end, the King published a decree about the status of foreigners in the Congo on 20 
February 1891.121 That statute was integrated into the Book of Persons four years 
later under a special Title dedicated to the Status of Foreign Nationals.122 The Decree 
of 20 February 1891 purported to protect economic interests of foreigners in the 
Congo; it still constitutes the basis of Congolese PIL rules.123 
When Belgium annexed the Congo in 1908,124 a problem arose about the 
application of the legislation of the mother country in the colony. Fortunately, the 
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Belgian Constitution had already rejected all attempts at legislative unification in its 
colonies through the first sentence of Article 1 al. 4, which stated that colonies had 
to be governed by particular laws.125 This rule was scrupulously followed by the 
Congolese “Colonial Charter” of 18 October 1908.126 Article 1 of this Colonial 
Charter specified that, “The Belgian Congo has a personality distinct from Belgium. 
It is ruled by particular laws.” By stating that the Belgian Congo was ruled by statutes 
of its own, the Colonial Charter logically meant that laws concerning Belgium could 
not have any effect in the colony.127 In the affirmative case, they had to be especially 
signed into law for the colony. In one decision, dated 3 June 1935, the Belgian 
Supreme Court evoked the fact that the Belgian Congo and Belgium were subject to 
distinct and independent rules, although those rules emanated from the same 
sovereignty, i.e. the King. It then ruled that statutes of the mother country should be 
invoked in the colony on the condition that they are expressly required by a colonial 
regulation.128 
Despite its legal independence, nevertheless, the Belgian Congo was subject 
to Belgian sovereignty. It could, therefore, not be considered as a foreign country 
with regard to Belgian law,129 particularly “the fundamental norms of its civil law.”130 
In conformity with this principle, the Congo had, as explained in the following 
section, to share the civil law legal system legacy with its fatherland. 
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2.2.5.5 Signs of the Napoleonic civil code in Congolese civil law 
  
As in many other civil law countries, Congolese civil law is divided into three areas, 
the Law of Persons, Property Law, and the Law of Obligations. Compared to its 
parent countries, the three traditional Books of the Congolese civil code were enacted 
at different times, as in France and Belgium, but “out of order”131 for the DRC. Under 
Congolese law, the Book concerning obligations should chronologically constitute 
the first Book of the civil code.132 In that order, the Books governing persons and 
property would respectively form the second and the third Books. This appears to 
have been the Congolese legislator’s purpose for two reasons. Firstly, the Decree of 
30 July 1888 is entitled “Civil Code - 1st Book: Of Contracts or of Conventional 
Obligations”.133 Secondly, its introductory Article stipulates explicitly, “Will form 
the ‘first book’ of the civil code: of Contracts or of Conventional Obligations, the 
titles I to XII which text is annexed to the present Decree consisting of 660 
articles.”134 
Although previous to the two others, the book of obligations was, however, 
relegated to the third position from 1929 by the first code’s publishers, Louwers and 
Kuck, after Persons (Book I) and Property (Book II).135 Those publishers were 
followed, twenty years later, by Piron and Devos, apparently in order to fit Congolese 
legal classification to Belgian law and, indirectly, to the Napoleonic Code.136 Piron 
and Devos are aware of the infringement. They confessed, moreover, to not having 
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conformed to the directions given by the legislator.137 According to them, the 
addition of two supplementary books to the civil code, viz. the Book of Persons and 
the one of Property, made the initial ordering valueless.138 
With humility, this justification gives the impression of not being convincing. 
It is believed that the Congolese civil code’s publishers could have met the initial 
legislator’s ordering without detracting from the compilation value of the existing 
texts. Currently, it is thought that the original legislator’s categorisation should be 
undervalued. Confirmation of this is the fact that, from 1987, the Book of Persons 
has been abrogated by the Family Code,139 and the Book of Property repealed by the 
1973 Land Law.140 Such being the situation, it is, therefore, incorrect that some 
people continue to refer to the Book of Obligations as the “Third Book of the Civil 
Code”, the first two books having already been revoked. 
To be precise, under current Congolese civil law, the law of persons, the law 
of property and land, and the law of obligations are independent from one another. 
Each is governed by an autonomous statute: the law of persons by the 1987 CFC; 
property law by the 1973 Land law; and the law of obligations by the 1888 CCO. 
Congolese civil law is ruled by three different civil codes, i.e. the CFC, Land law, 
and the CCO. It is the sum of the provisions of these three codes that form the 
Congolese civil law. Concerning the law of obligations, in particular, it includes 
contract law,141 torts law,142 and unjust enrichment rules143. If one considers private 
law in general, there is also, in the Congo, a “Code of Commerce”.144 This Code has, 
however, never been formally enacted as a self-governing code; it consists rather of 
loose-standing acts dealing with different commercial matters such as cheques,145 
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bankruptcy,146 and commercial companies.147 These Acts were passed at widely 
separated dates and were grouped under the CCom heading for convenience by 
editors of the Congolese codes.148 
As has been mentioned previously, all of the Congolese codes were in general 
inspired by Belgian law and the Napoleonic civil code itself. One commentator 
states, in this regard, that if the law of persons and the law of property have moved 
some distance away from the Napoleonic code,149 such is not the case with the law 
of obligations.150 This is summarised nicely by Crabb as follows:  
Although the law of Belgium as such never extended to the Congo, the form and 
techniques of the Congolese written law have naturally reflected those of the Belgian 
legal system. Since the Belgian system is largely based on the French legal system, 
the Congolese legal system in its written law component is aligned with the nations 
that follow the Napoleonic French legal tradition.151 
 Similarly, the fact that the Belgian Congo was ruled by particular laws did not 
necessarily entail the disappearance of different laws inherited from the Congo Free 
State at independence. Those statutes, including the CCO, remained in force until the 
country became independent in 1960.  
 
2.2.5.6 The Congolese law of obligations after independence 
 
It is usually accepted that a successor regime preserves in force the body of law it 
has inherited or changes it immediately. Regarding the CCO, the Congolese 
Government adopted the first option following the days of independence. The CCO 
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remained unchanged even after decolonisation. Of course, the reform of the law of 
obligations was envisaged from time to time. In 1976, for instance, Parliament 
proposed the creation of a commission that would consider the question of reform 
and the unification of Congolese law.152 This commission had the task, among other 
things, of observing legal changes registered since independence, and verifying 
whether there was any need to revise some civil code provisions in order to adapt 
them to the economic context of the time.153 
In answer to Parliament’s suggestion, a reform commission was appointed by 
Law No. 76-017 of 15 June 1976.154 The commission was led for a long period by 
Kalongo Mbikayi. That commission became later known as the Permanent 
Commission for the Reform of Congolese law. Unfortunately, the results of its work 
have never been published. As a result, the CCO, as inherited from the Congo Free 
State, has remained in force up to the end of 2012, particularly for commercial 
contracts. This situation leaves one asking whether it has some of its own features. 
  
2.2.6 Characteristics of the Congolese Law of Obligations and Gap-filling  
 
As was noted in section 2.2.5.3, from the beginning Belgium treated the Congo as a 
distinct jurisdictional entity. In legislating for this country, it avoided reproducing 
massive parts of Belgian laws. But, as “no-one can give greater rights than he has”;155 
Belgian law of obligations naturally inspired the Congolese one. Notwithstanding 
that influence, the Congolese law of obligations was different from the law of the 
mother country from time to time. One example of this is the difference between 
Article 325 CCO and Article 1648 BCC dealing with actions for redhibitory defects. 
The first provision provides the buyer with a 60-day period limit to start proceedings, 
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whereas the second requires a brief delay only.156  Further to the time limit itself, 
another difference relates to the meaning of the two provisions. According to 
Congolese case law, the Belgian law “brief delay” is supposed to run from the 
discovery of the defect, while under Congolese law it was presumed that the defect 
should be discovered within 60 days and the claim sued in the same delay.157 
Of course, there is a close similarity between the Congolese law of obligations 
and Belgian law, and, accordingly, the French law of obligations too. Many articles 
are common to these three legal systems. Nevertheless, there are some articles which 
are identical in Belgian and French laws, but which do not exist in Congolese law, 
apart from those that are merely formulated differently.158 One illustration is Article 
1107 al. 2 of the Belgian and French civil codes which is differently worded 
compared with its Congolese equivalent, Article 7 al. 2 CCO.159 Both provisions 
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 Article 325 CCO requires the notice of lack of conformity in the goods to be given in 60-days. 
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135; and Piron 126. 
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 For instances of common or different provisions between Congolese, Belgian, and French laws, 
see Mubalama Obligations 24 in Notes 67 to 70. 
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 According to Article 1107 al. 1 FCC, and Article 7 al. 1 CCO, “Contracts, whether they have a 
specific designation or not, are subject to general rules, which are the subject matter of (the Civil 
Code or CCO Title III relating to contracts and conventional obligations in general).” Concerning 
the second paragraph, however, Article 7 al. 2 CCO appears to be incomplete compared with its 
equivalent Article 1107 al. 2 FCC.  As stated by the latter provision, “Particular rules for certain 
contracts are laid down under the Titles relating to each of them; and ‘the particular rules for 
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contain the principle that, in addition to general rules governing all kind of contracts, 
particular rules for classical contracts, such as the contract of sale, are established 
under the headings relating to each of them.160 With regard to commercial 
transactions, Article 1107 al. 2 specifies, in contrast to Article 7 CCO, that 
commercial contracts are governed by “particular rules established by laws relating 
to commerce”.161 By so ruling, French and Belgian laws distinguish civil contracts 
from commercial ones. Under those legal systems, commercial contracts will be 
governed by additional or derogatory rules of the commercial code, unless the civil 
code provides to the contrary. Concerning Congolese law, given that at that time 
there was no specific provisions related to commercial contracts, Masamba put it 
that, “Congolese commercial contract law (have to) take refuge behind civil law.”162 
More specifically, in the DRC concepts such as those of “commercial sales contracts” 
were not regulated, except when borrowed from civil law provisions. 
Article 1341 of the Belgian and French civil code relating to oral evidence, 
likewise, has a different wording from the corresponding Article 217 CCO.163 Both 
provisions concede that legal acts the value of which is more than a certain sum of 
money164 legally determined must be made in writing, viz. by private writing or 
                                               
commercial transactions are laid down by the legislation that relates to commerce’.” Article 7 al. 2 
CCO lacks the last phrase determining the legal regime of commercial contracts.  
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 Cf. Part 1 of Article 1107 al. 2 FCC, and single part of Article 7 al. 2 CCO.  
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 Cf. Three hundred seventy-five Euros for Belgium; Eight hundred Euros for France; and Two 
thousand Congolese Francs for the DRC. 
55 
 
notarial document, except for commercial transactions. Compared with its equivalent 
parent civil codes’ provisions, Article 217 al. 2 CCO appears clearer than Article 
1341 al. 2 of the Belgian and French civil codes.165 In the same way, contrary to 
France and Belgium, the CCO did not initially regulate some important matters such 
as those of wills, gifts, and matrimonial regimes.166 Happily, all of these legal topics 
are now dealt with by the 1987 Family Code.167 
From the above background, it would be wrong to pretend that the Congolese 
law of obligations is not different from the one of the mother country.168 The CCO is 
“incomplete” when compared with the Third Book’s Civil Code of its mother 
country.169 The fact that the CCO did not regulate a number of matters has left 
numerous unavoidable gaps in the Congolese law of obligations. Those gaps had to 
be filled in accordance with the Principles Applicable to Judicial Decisions 
Ordinance of 14 May 1886 as indicated above. According to this Ordinance, all 
matters not specifically regulated had to be resolved in conformity with local 
customs, general principles of law, and equity. 
One may realise that the colonial legislator did not allow courts to apply 
Belgian law provisions directly when filling the gaps in Congolese law. Instead, it 
required them to refer to customary laws, general principles of law, and equity. As 
argued by Devaux, when the law referred courts to these legal sources, it indirectly 
resolved matters for which no other provision had been made.170 The author goes on 
to specify that, the direction shown by one or the other of these sources “takes a 
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legislative value that helps in filling the gaps.”171 Though the legislator lists three 
different kinds of sources, however, the 1886 Ordinance has often been interpreted 
in practice as referring mainly to general principles of law.172 
When courts are, therefore, faced with one issue for which there appears to be 
no applicable law, or for which the law is poorly conceived, they may use the general 
principles of law to enable them to reach a decision.173 That is to say, while quoting 
the “general principles of law”, the 1886 Ordinance aimed to allow courts necessarily 
to refer to a determined positive law in the case of silence of Congolese law. A 
problem emerged, however, in relation to the choice of the appropriate law in 
practice.174 The fact that Congolese civil and commercial law was inspired by 
Belgian law led judges to prefer it. General Administrators Van Eetvelde and 
Janssen, in a report dated 16 July 1891 to the Sovereign King, recognised that 
Congolese civil law was inspired by Belgian law, although it had been adapted to the 
special needs of the country.175 They concluded that, for matters not regulated under 
Congolese law, courts would refer to the general principles of Belgian law and to 
local customs.176 According to the understanding of this report, courts have to adopt 
the dominant principles of Belgian law to enable them solve any unregulated issue.177 
Advising Congolese courts to turn to “Belgian general principles of law” did 
not, however, imply that they could apply a specific Belgian legislative provision.178 
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It rather entailed the application of the legal principle of which that text was the 
expression. Such an option was justified, according to Sohier, by the fact that Belgian 
texts constituted the source of the corresponding Congolese ones.179 One illustrative 
case is the decision of the former Appeal Court of Leopoldville180 dealing with sales 
by correspondence or by representative.181 A propos of this, the court found it logical 
to presume the will of contracting parties whilst referring to the usages generally 
admitted in Belgian trade,182 without necessarily applying the provisions of the 
Belgian Civil Code, Book Three. In accordance with those usages, for sales 
concluded by mail, the contract was formed from the time acceptance reached the 
person making the offer, but not when the letter of acceptance was sent.183 
Similarly, Belgian decisions in contractual matters were not binding on 
Congolese courts. Thus, when those cases are quoted in this study, they are not being 
referred to as being authoritative, but as having an illustrative value. In other words, 
when those cases are cited, it is submitted that the principles underlying the decisions 
are common to both Belgian and Congolese legal systems.184 Congolese law has 
developed, however, so that currently one has first to look at proper Congolese 
legislation and case law before seeking elsewhere. It is only when these main sources 
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are silent on a subject that general principles of law should intervene to resolve the 
matter. That is the reason why, owing to the absence of particular rules dealing with 
commercial contracts, these resorted to civil law rules.  
Before examining other things, it is necessary to bear in mind that not long ago 
the Congolese law of obligations was still ruled by the Decree of 30 July 1888 as 
inherited from the colonial legislator. Its field of application, as stated in the 
preamble, consisted in regulating “the validity, effects, extinction, and the proof of 
obligations in general.”185 With such a goal, the CCO purports to lay down general 
principles applicable to all kinds of contracts. The Code also contains particular rules 
for certain special contracts such as the contract of sale. As far as the contract of sale 
is concerned, it is particularly regulated by the third Title of the CCO which covers 
Articles 263 to 364, an average of 102 sections. These provisions deal with both civil 
and commercial contracts.186 
The CCO, as enacted in 1888, might well appear to be unsuited to the needs 
of a modern society, many aspects of social and economic life having changed since 
the early twenty-first century. A number of Congolese provisions had become out-
dated.187 Numerous legislative modifications to the CCO have, therefore, been 
necessary in order to move towards legal modernity and security. To achieve this 
objective, the DRC experienced the need to ratify OHADA law bringing its law into 
line with that of its neighbours, rather than embarking on an effort of its own.  
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2.2.7 Adoption of OHADA Law in the DRC 
 
2.2.7.1 OHADA law and OHADA sales law framework 
 
Commercial patterns have substantially influenced African history and the 
interaction of Africans with foreigner businesspersons. Recognised as one of the 
continents empowered with vast potential resources, Africa would naturally attract 
foreigner investors. Its legal system, nonetheless, did not favour that. Indeed, most 
African countries suffered from out-dated or incomplete legal systems,188 which also 
varied from one country to another.189 The problem of this diversity of laws was 
likely to give rise to uncertainty which in turn discouraged investment.190 A propos 
of this, there is unanimity that a strong investment cannot be achieved without a 
secure legal and commercial environment.191 That is why, in the interests of a greater 
cooperation among African states, fourteen countries from West and Central Africa 
decided to harmonise192 their legal systems in the area of business law. To this end, 
they adopted the Treaty creating OHADA on 17 October 1993.  
As Mouloul has said, however,  
OHADA was not born only from the initiative of the heads of state of the African 
Franc Zone; it was above all an idea, and even a requirement from African traders 
who demanded that the legal and judicial environments of businesses should be 
improved, in order to secure their investments. Indeed, with the slowdown of 
investments, due to the economic recession, and the legal and judicial insecurity that 
prevailed in this region during the 1980s, it was necessary to restore investors’ 
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confidence, both domestic and foreign, in order to promote the development of 
entrepreneurship and to attract foreign investments.193 
Historically speaking, the idea of creating a harmonised business law on the African 
continent goes back to 1961. That idea was conceived at a meeting of Ministers of 
Justice from West and Central African French speaking countries and was later 
adopted by distinguished jurists of the same zone. The harmonisation of law idea got 
its first achievement in the African Union and Mauritius (AUM) Act, dated 12 
September 1961.194 It was developed in Yaoundé (Cameroon) in March 1963 when 
AUM was converted into the African and Malagasy Common Organisation 
(AMCO).195 As it is stated by Article 2 of the Convention establishing AMCO, “The 
High Contracting Parties undertake to take all measures to harmonise their respective 
trade laws to the extent consistent with requirements that result from the 
requirements of each of them.”196 This purpose was implemented by Article 3 of the 
Convention establishing the African and Mauritian Bureau for Research and 
Legislative Studies, dated 5 July 1975. The aim of the later institution consisted of 
assisting AMCO member countries in the manner that their applicable legal rules 
could “be worked out under conditions that permit their harmonisation.”197 It is 
regrettable that neither organisation did afford the harmonisation of law goal. 
The failure of AMCO and the Bureau did not, however, stop the harmonisation 
of business laws initiative in Africa. In effect, about sixteen years later, the 
harmonisation idea recurred in April and October 1991 following meetings of the 
Ministers of Finance of former French colonies held in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 
and in Paris (France) respectively. At the end of the Paris meeting, particularly, 
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participants constituted an ad hoc commission of seven members led by Keba Mbaye 
to require the interest of countries in the harmonisation project. It followed from the 
commission’s report presented in Libreville (Gabon) on October 1992, on the behalf 
of Ministers of Finance, that almost all countries visited were interested in the 
harmonisation of their commercial laws. In the Final Act of the Libreville meeting, 
it was clearly stated that delegates “have approved the project on harmonisation of 
business law conceived by the Ministers of Finance of the Franc Zone, and agreed to 
its immediate implementation and asked the Ministers of Finance and Justice to all 
States concerned to make it a priority.”198 At the same occasion the report of the ad 
hoc commission was adopted, another Special Commission of three members was 
established with the task to prepare the OHADA Treaty. The Draft Treaty prepared 
in this regard was submitted at the meeting of Ministers of Justice convened in 
Libreville on July 1993; finalised in Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire) on October 1993; and 
finally adopted in Port-Louis (Mauritius) on 17 October 1993. The Treaty of 
OHADA, hereafter referred to as the “Treaty”, entered into force on 18 September 
1995 after a concurrent ratification of fourteen countries pursuant to its Article 52 al. 
2.199  
The purpose of OHADA consists, inter alia, in providing member states with 
a harmonised set of business laws by elaborating and adopting simple and modern 
common rules adapted to African economies.200 By so ruling, many commentators 
have said that, the Organisation intends to make member states more attractive to 
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foreign investors from the developed world.201 It should be noted that OHADA is an 
open organisation. In accordance with Article 53 of the Treaty, its membership is 
opened to any African Union (AU) member state that is not original signatory to the 
Treaty. The membership status is also extended to non-AU member countries invited 
to accede by common consent of all existing parties.202 With regard to its functioning 
system, OHADA had initially four institutions, the Council of Ministers, the 
Permanent Secretariat, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA), and 
the Regional Training Centre for Legal Officers.203 From October 2008, it has been 
endowed with a fifth institution, the Conference of Heads of State and 
Government.204   
According to Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty, OHADA statutes are prepared by 
the Permanent Secretariat in association with governments of member states. They 
are adopted by the Council of Ministers on the advice of the CCJA. Those statutes 
are known as “Uniform Acts”,205 and they are “exclusively business-related”.206 So 
far nine various Uniform Acts have, up to the present time, been enacted under 
OHADA’s sponsorship. These include the Acts relating to General Commercial 
Law,207 and Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups;208 the Acts 
regulating Securities,209 Arbitration,210 and the Carriage of Goods by Road;211 the 
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Acts organising Simplified Recovery Procedures and Enforcement Measures,212 
Collective Insolvency Proceedings,213 and Accounting Systems;214 and more 
recently, the Uniform Act relating to Cooperative Corporations.215 Other Uniform 
Acts are still in preparation amongst which are the Uniform Acts relating to Contract 
Law, Labour Relations, and the Uniform Act on Evidence.216  
As far as the Commercial Act is concerned, the OHADA Permanent Secretary 
remarks that before the adoption of the current version of this Act, matters relating 
to general commercial law and other connected issues were ruled by the 1807 French 
Commercial Code introduced in French colonies since December 1850.217 Since this 
Code did not record significant amendment after independence,218 on the one hand, 
and that improvements encountered in France were not gradually extended to its 
former colonies, on the other hand, commercial law of the Franc Zone countries 
became increasingly out-dated and obsolete. As was claimed earlier, in effect, until 
the 1980s, only a limited number of countries located in the region under examination 
have tried to modernise their law of obligations, in general, and their commercial 
law, in particular.219 For almost all other countries, commercial subjects were ruled 
by a number of sparse regulations dated back to the colonial times.  
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 Simplified Recovery Procedures and Measures of Execution Uniform Act adopted on 10 April 
1998, entered into force on 10 July 1998. 
213
 Collective Proceedings for Wiping off Debts Uniform Act adopted on 10 April 1998, entered 
into force on 1 January 1999. 
214
 Undertakings’ Accounting Systems Uniform Act adopted on 23 March 2000, entered into force 
on 1 January 2001 for Enterprise Accounts, and on 1 January 2002 for Combined Accounts 
(OHADA OJ No. 10 of 1 January 2002).   
215
 Cooperative Corporations Uniform Act adopted on 15 December 2010 (OHADA OJ No. 23 of 
15 February 2011).  
216
 See Meyer 2008 (1/2) Unif L Rev 394; Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1 VJ 19-20; and Fontaine 
Avant-Projet 1. 
217
 See OHADA Secretariat http://perso.mediaserv.net/fatboy/cd_ ohada/pres/pres.02.en.html; see 
in the same sense Fontaine Avant-Projet 3. 
218
 Some amendments include those made in July 1852, July 1902, March 1931, and March 1955, 
but not so far reaching.   
219
 That was the case with Senegal (Law of 10 July 1963 relating to Civil and Commercial 
Obligations); Burkina Faso (Ordinance of 26 August 1981 regulating Commercial Activities); 
Guinea-Conakry (Civil Code of 1983); Central African Republic (Order of 3 October 1983 dealing 
with the Carrying on of Commercial Activities and Provision of Services); Mali (Law No. 87-
31/AN-RM of 29 August 1987 relating to General Rules of Obligations); and Congo Brazza (Laws 
of April 1981 and September 1990 regulating Accession to the Commercial Profession). See 
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Conscious that a harmonised general commercial law and corporate law 
“should foster trade and make it safe between economic operators,”220 OHADA 
members gave priority to these two topics. A seminar bringing together lawyers, 
magistrates, and businesspersons was then organised in Abidjan on April 1993 in this 
regard. With regard to what have to become the content of the Act, it was discussed 
at a second seminar held in Ouagadougou in March 1994. During these discussions, 
different working groups selected five topics to be integrated in the coming 
Commercial Act among which are commercial sale contracts.221 At the end of the 
seminar, a Special Working Group was established with the task to coordinate 
observations and comments made by different delegations, and to mould them into a 
draft Commercial Act. In 1995, a draft prepared by the Ouagadougou Special 
Working Group was discussed article by article, and adopted during a third seminar 
held in Bangui. After then, this draft was sent to National OHADA Commissions in 
different member countries for consideration.222 The draft Commercial Uniform Act 
was finally adopted unanimously by the Council of Ministers during a meeting 
organised in Cotonou (Benin) on 17 April 1997. It entered into force on 1 January 
1998 pursuant to Article 289 of the Act.223 
It is important to note that during the preparation and adoption of the OHADA 
Commercial Act, only one of the OHADA member countries was part to the CISG.224 
In addition to this, there were no specific provisions dealing with commercial sales 
in the African Franc Region. The only rules applicable in this regard were the 
provisions of Title VI of Book III of the Napoleonic civil code, i.e. Articles 1582 to 
                                               
Fontaine 2008 (1/2) Unif L Rev 633; Sossa 2008 Rev dr unif 339; Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1 
VJ 15 18-19; Dickerson 2005 (44) Colum J Transnat’l L 17 25 and 31.   
220
 Tumnde et al OHADA 31. 
221
 The other topics are: the status of commercial operators, commercial registry, commercial leases 
and business, and trade middlemen. 
222
 On the drafting of Uniform Acts process, see Articles 5 to 12 of the Treaty; see also Mouloul 
Understanding 26-27. 
223
 The Commercial Act adopted in 1997 has been revised from 15 December 2010; see OHADA 
OJ No. 23 of 15 February 2011. 
224
 As it is said in Section 4.2.4.3 below, the coming into effect of the CISG in the first OHADA 
country, viz. Guinea, dates to February 1992. See CISG Status at:  http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goo ds/1980CISG_status.html.  
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1701 regulating sales contracts. Commercial sales were, in other words, ruled at that 
time by the same rules as civil or consumer sales. It is clear that the application of 
civil law rules to commercial transactions was “generally inappropriate for a 
developing economy.”225 For that reason, the OHADA Permanent Secretariat notes 
that, “As most major international trading countries have (…) acceded to the Vienna 
Convention, it was essential to introduce in the positive law of the Contracting States 
to the Treaty a law that is as close as possible to the provisions applicable now in 
most of the States.”226 Thus, as it is observed in the following paragraphs, and mostly 
in the comparative chapters, the OHADA Commercial Act owes a significant debt to 
the CISG. Magnus remarks in this sense that, the Act “provides for rules on 
commercial sales which widely copy the CISG (emphasis added).”227 According to 
him, “a modified CISG has been made the sales law among and in the OHADA 
States.”228 
From the initial five Books, the current version of the Commercial Act 
contains eight main Books,229 in addition to the preliminary chapter,230 and the ninth 
Book laying down final provisions,231 the Book VIII of which deals with commercial 
sales.232 According to Articles 1 and 234 UAGCL, the Act applies to contracts of sale 
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 Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1 VJ 15 18. 
226
 See OHADA Secretariat http://perso.mediaserv.net/fatboy/cd_ ohada/pres/pres.02.en.html; see 
also Fontaine Avant-Projet 14. When the Commercial Act was adopted on April 1997, the CISG 
was already in effect in approximately 50 countries. See status at: http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html.  
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 Magnus in CISG vs. 4; see also Ferrari OHADA 79 80-96; and Fontaine Avant-Projet 14.  
228
 Magnus in CISG vs. 4. 
229
 Book I (Articles 2-33) relates to the legal status of traders and businessmen; Book II (Articles 
34-72) deals with the trade and personal property register; Books III and IV (Articles 73-78) are 
concerned with the  national and regional records of traders; Book V (Articles 79-100) relates to 
the computerising of the trade register and traders files; Book VI (Articles 101-168) regulates 
commercial lease and business; Book VII (Articles 169-233) is concerned with trade middlemen; 
and Book VIII (Articles 234-302) deals with commercial sales contracts. 
230
 Article 1 UAGCL. 
231
 Articles 303 to 307 UAGCL. 
232
 See Ferrari OHADA79 80; Martor et al Business 29; Huber Sales Law 950; Masamba Adhesion 
347 362; Mutenda Apport 13; Santos/Toe Commercial 339; Dieng Vente 1. See also Article 2 
OHADA Treaty which lists “sales laws” among subjects included into its operation area. 
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of goods between businessmen233 on condition that the parties have their place of 
business in one of the OHADA member states or when conflict-of-law rules lead to 
the application of the law of one OHADA country.234 Following from these 
provisions, it is clear that the eighth Book is vital in matters regarding domestic sales 
and international sales contracts alike. Its provisions govern both national and 
international sales transactions;235 they are up-to-date with regard to contemporary 
commercial law requirements.236 Book VIII provides the definition of concepts such 
as those of “offer and acceptance”, viz. rules relating to the formation of contracts.237 
It also determines the obligations of each party238 and the remedies for breach of 
contract.239 This Act also modernises the rules governing the effects of contractual 
agreements, namely the rules relating to the transfer of ownership and the transfer of 
loss in the goods bought.240  
In brief, compared to the CISG, the Commercial Act is in line with 
contemporary commercial law requirements. It regulates the conclusion of contracts 
by means of offer and acceptance, and it balances the rights and obligations of sellers 
and buyers. Such are some of the key features which justified the adoption of the 
OHADA Treaty by the DRC. They will be given further consideration in Chapters 5 
and 6 below. 
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 See Article 1 al. 1 of the Treaty which reads, “Any commercial operator, natural or legal person,  
including all commercial companies whose place of business or registred office is situated on the 
territory of one of the Contracting States to the Treaty on the  Harmonisation of Business Law in 
Africa (…) shall be subject to the provisions of this Uniform Act. ” 
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 Article 234 UAGCL. 
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 Cf. Article 1 OHADA Treaty according to which the Organisation intends to provide member 
countries with a simple and modern uniform business law adapted, among others, to “transnational 
trade transactions”. See also Dieng Vente 1; Martor et al Business 29; Huber Sales Law 950; 
Masamba Adhesion 347 362; Mutenda Apport 13; Santos/Toe Commercial 339. 
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 As is explained in Section 4.4.3 below, Book VIII of the UAGCL is primarily based on the 
CISG. See Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1VJ 15 24; Dieng Vente 1; Santos/Toe Commercial 361-
362; Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/6248/201109131645024e6f6c6e 
5b746.pdf; Bonell http://www.cisg.law.pace. edu/cisg/biblio/bonell4.html; Castellani 2008 (1/2) 
Rev dr unif 115 119; and Fontaine Avant-Projet 14. 
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 Articles 250-274 UAGCL. 
239
 Articles 281-293 UAGCL. 
240
 Articles 275-280 UAGCL. For comments, see Masamba Adhesion 347 362; Santos/Toe 
Commercial 339ff. 
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2.2.7.2 The impact and process of the introduction of OHADA law in the DRC  
 
The intention for the DRC’s access to OHADA law goes back to the end of 2003 
when the government notified the International Monetary Fund on that subject.241 
Five years after, on February 2008, it revealed the same intention to the designated 
authorised OHADA law depository, the government of Senegal.242 On 4 August 
2009, a draft law approving the ratification of the OHADA Treaty was adopted by 
the Council of Ministers. That draft was transmitted to the Parliament on October 
2009. On 12 November 2009, it was rejected by the Senate.243 But, following the 
President’s State of the Nation Address, dated 7 December 2009, prioritising the 
adoption of OHADA law issue,244 Parliament was almost obliged to allow the 
ratification on 15 December 2009. On 5 February 2010, the Draft, initially adopted 
by the Assembly, was declared  to be in conformity with  the Constitution by the 
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 On an exhaustive historical development of Congolese adherence, see Tshibende 2011 RCDA 
67 77-80; and Balingene http://www.the-rule-of-law-in-africa.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ 
Balingene1.pdf. 
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 Cf. Article 57 Treaty. Congolese letter was acknowledged in April and August 2008 by three 
affirmative letters: Letters No. 115/SP/DAJ/OHADA/2008; No.1123/SP/DDL/NC/CAB/MIN/ 
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243
 For a series of arguments against the DRC’s accession to the OHADA community, see 
Kalukuimbi 2011 RCDA 45; Balingene http://www.the-rule-of-law-in-africa.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/08/Balingene.pdf 5. 
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 As the President has declared, 
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ranking of our country in the reference directory “Doing Business” are known. The solution to 
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that a happier outcome to this matter, which is struggling to obtain legislative support, can be 
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See RDC, Discours du Président de la République sur l’état de la Nation, Kinshasa 7 December 
2009; excerpt translated by Balingene http://www.the-rule-of-law-in-africa.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/08/Balingene.pdf 5; see for the French original version, Tshibende 2011 RCDA 67 
78; and Koso http://ddata.over-blog.com /1/35/48/78/RD-Congo/Marcel-Wetsh-okonda-Koso-
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Supreme Court245 and then promulgated by the President on 11 February 2010.246 
After this, on 27 June 2012, the Government transmitted the instruments of 
ratification to the OHADA depository country,247 instruments which were finally 
registered on 13 July 2012.248 The Treaty came into force in the DRC on 12 
September 2012,249 i.e. 60 days after depository in application of Article 53 al. 2 of 
the Treaty.250 The DRC then became the seventeenth OHADA member state.251 The 
first DRC case applying OHADA law uniform acts was heard by the Commercial 
Tribunal of Lubumbashi on 21 January 2013 in an attachment procedure.252 
A short overview on the situation of the OHADA Treaty demonstrates that its 
adoption is a sign of the abandonment of sovereignty for signatory countries. 
Confirmation of this is Article 10 according to which, Uniform Acts are directly 
applicable in, and binding on all member states, notwithstanding any conflicting 
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 See Article 139 al. 2 of the Constitution; and CSJ 5 February 2010 Case No. R.Const 112/TSR 
(unreported decision). 
246
 See Law No. 10/2 of 11 February 2010 allowing the ratification of the OHADA Treaty (JORDC 
Special No. 3 March 2010). Following that promulgation, a special Commission was established 
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(last accessed 2-4-2013). 
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provisions in existing or future national laws.253 Such supremacy has been confirmed 
in one of the CCJA Advisory Opinions, dated 30 April 2001. A propos of this, the 
CCJA ruled that “the effect of Article 10 of the Treaty is to abrogate and prohibit any 
national statute or regulatory provision which has the same purpose as the Uniform 
Acts and which conflicts with them.”254 Scholars are unanimous in their views that, 
in so ruling, the CCJA has clearly confirmed the supranationalité of OHADA 
Uniform Acts.255 Simply, the meaning of Article 10 is to repeal national laws in 
matters governed by the Uniform Acts. 
As far as the DRC is concerned, on the one hand, the entry into force of 
OHADA laws implies a withdrawal of current domestic statutes business related256 
and their replacement by OHADA Uniform Acts.257 To be precise, from 12 
September 2012, the following Acts are in force in the DRC, the UAGCL, the 
Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups Act, the Securities Act, the 
Arbitration Act, the Carriage of Goods by Road Act, the Simplified Recovery 
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 Diédhiou OHADA 223-238; Martor et al Business 20; Mancuso 2006 (5) 2 JI TR LP 55 59; 
Ferrari OHADA 79 83; Abarchi 2000 (37) Revue Bourkinabé de Droit 21; Matipé History 7; Ba 
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Code (Law No. 7/2002 of 11 July 2002 JORDC Special No. of 15 July 2002); the Public 
Procurements Law (Law No.10/10 of 27 April 2010 JORDC Special No. of 30 April 2010); and 
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considers that OHADA law could erase Congolese legal history. Instead, the author suggested that 
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adopting the whole legal system. 
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Procedures and Enforcement Measures Act, the Collective Proceedings for the 
Clearing of Debts Act, the Accounting Law Act, and the Cooperative Corporations 
Act. 
Concerning civil law provisions, on the other hand, OHADA law does not 
completely exclude them from the field of commercial transactions. In effect, Article 
327 al. 1 of the Commercial Act defers commercial contracts to the general rules of 
the law of contract and sale,258 unless these rules are contrary to its spirit.259 In 
addition, Article 1 al. 3 of the Commercial Act provides that “(…) any tradesman or 
company remains subject to all laws non-conflicting with the present Uniform Act, 
which are applicable in the state where its place of business or head office is located.” 
It may be observed that the meaning of Article 327 al. 1 is not different from that of 
Article 7 CCO which determines the Code’s field of application. In conformity with 
the latter provision, contracts are regulated, firstly, by the contract law general 
principles, secondly, by specific rules relating to the alleged contract, and, thirdly, 
by the rules of the law of commerce, for commercial transactions.  
From what has been explained so far, the CCO general rules remain applicable 
to commercial contracts provided they are not in conflict with the provisions of the 
UAGCL. As specified by case law, OHADA law combines both special rules of the 
law of sale with the common principles established by the civil code providing that 
the Uniform Act is silent on the issue.260 To exemplify this, as the Commercial Act 
does not provide a definition for the concept “sale”, Article 263 CCO intervenes to 
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fill this gap.261 Likewise, the requirements for the validity of contract as provided by 
Article 8 CCO govern commercial sales as well.  
More specifically, from the coming into effect of OHADA Uniform Acts in 
the DRC, provisions of the civil code are not revoked, but rather complemented by 
the newer UAGCL rules. Legal concepts, such as “commercial contracts law” and 
“commercial sales contracts” which were known earlier in a civil law context, are, at 
the moment, regulated by specific provisions, namely Articles 234 to 302 of the 
Commercial Act. It is these provisions which currently form the main legal source 
for commercial sales contracts including international sale of goods agreements. But, 
because OHADA law is still recent in the DRC, it is early to assess its impact on 
courts. 
 
2.2.8 Conclusion on the Historical Development of Congolese Civil Law  
 
The DRC belongs to the civil law legal system family. Its law of contract and sale is 
closely linked to the French Napoleonic code brought into the country under the 
Belgian settlement influence. During the colonial period and about a half century 
after independence, commercial contract law and commercial sales contracts were 
governed by civil law rules. Before the implementation of OHADA law in the DRC, 
in effect, most of the legal concepts defined in the first legal system in a commercial 
context, were organised by the CCO in a civil law environment. Congolese 
commercial contract law was, in short, concealed behind civil law in which the earlier 
lawmaker had failed to make specific provisions for commercial sales contracts. 
Such a situation was not likely to ensure legal security and certainty. Furthermore, 
Congolese law was not any longer designed to support the country’s economic 
development.262 These reasons guided the government to adopt the OHADA Treaty. 
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 According to Article 263 al. 1 CCO, a contract of sale is an agreement whereby one party 
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Following its entry into effect in the DRC, from September 2012, within modern 
Congolese sales law, international sale of goods contracts are ruled primarily by the 
eighth Book of the OHADA Commercial Act complemented by non-conflicting 
principles of the CCO. It is these provisions that form the basis of Congolese sales 
law the fundamental principles of which follow.  
 
2.3 Basic Principles of Congolese Sales Law  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
The phrase “basic principles” is understood in the present section as abstractions 
from all the rules and as leading principles for the whole law of contract including 
sales contracts. As it is for many other legal systems, the Congolese law of contract 
contains a number of fundamental principles that represent underlying policies on 
the basis of which legislation is formulated and the law influenced. Those basic 
principles represent, according to Fu, not only the essence and spirit of the law, but 
also the guiding principles for drafting, interpreting, and studying the law.263 
As stated by Article 7 al. 1 CCO, all contracts are subject to the same common 
general rules, regardless of whether they have or do not have a special designation. 
The second section of the same provision specifies that standard contracts comprising 
sales are additionally ruled by particular provisions. The result then is that sales 
contracts are subject to the common principles of contract law, unless its particular 
rules provide otherwise. Such are also the terms of Article 265 al. 3 CCO for which 
contractual general principles also govern the effects of sales contracts.264 Article 327 
al. 1 UAGCL is of the same meaning. As mentioned above, Article 327 al. 1 
recognises the legal effect of civil law rules with regard to commercial sales 
contracts, except when they contradict commercial law rules.  
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It should be kept in mind that the CCO owes a significant debt to the French 
legal system via Belgium. The same is true with regard to OHADA law.265 That is 
why, despite the advent of OHADA law, Congolese contractual provisions still 
reflect the philosophical and political approach of the French and Belgian civil codes 
of which the substance is the freedom of contract.266 Two key provisions giving effect 
to the consent of parties can be quoted in this respect: Article 1 CCO which defines 
the contract;267 and Article 33 CCO which determines the significance of lawful 
contracts.268 These provisions lay down the fundamental principles of the law of 
contract, which are also relevant for the law of sale. Five of these principles will be 
given special attention, namely freedom of contract, autonomy of the will, binding 
force of contractual obligations, consensualism, and good faith. 
 
2.3.2 Freedom of Contract  
 
The freedom of contract constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the 
Congolese contract law in general and its sales law in particular as is the case in other 
legal systems. As claimed by Nicholas, “the classical treatment of contract is in terms 
of free will” in almost all legal systems.269 The author goes on to argue that, 
Just as legislation is a manifestation of the will of the state, so also a contract is a 
particular law made by the parties for themselves (…) by the conjunction of their 
wills. (…) the function of the general law is to give effect to this particular law, 
subject only to such restrictions as are necessary in the public interest.270 
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Following on from the above statement, what is required for a contract to enter into 
force is primarily the consent of parties, associated with their capacity, an object, and 
“a cause”.271  In that sense, the principle of freedom reflects the individual and liberal 
vision of the eighteenth century when the Napoleonic code was enacted.272 
In its basic meaning, the principle of freedom of contract covers different 
aspects. It infers, firstly, that parties are free to decide to enter into a contract or not 
to enter into a contract.273 Article 249 al. 1 of the OHADA Commercial Act makes it 
clear that, “parties are free to enter into contract and cannot bear responsibility where 
they do not reach agreement,” except when they have acted in bad faith.274 Secondly, 
the principle means that parties are free to choose with whom to contract and to 
determine the content of the contract at their own discretion,275 subject only to 
restrictions necessary in the public interest.276 In other words, the freedom of contract 
means that there is no legal duty to enter into a contract; one can conclude a contract 
or refuse to conclude it without any legal consequence. In the same way, contracting 
parties are free to define their obligations, and only the stipulations accepted by all 
of the parties would be taken into account.277 The principle of freedom of contract 
implies, finally, the freedom of parties to choose the law which will govern their 
contract, particularly with regard to international agreements278 as is the case with 
international sale of goods contracts. To use comments on the 2010 UNIDROIT 
PICC,  
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The principle of freedom of contract is of paramount importance in the context of 
international trade. The right of business people to decide freely to whom they will 
offer their goods or services and by whom they wish to be supplied, as well as the 
possibility for them freely to agree on the terms of individual transactions, are the 
cornerstones of an open, market-oriented and competitive international economic 
order.279 
In support of the above explanation, one may deduce with Rouhette that, 
[Freedom] is the heart of the contract. The obligation cannot arise unless it has been 
freely consented to – the law should not impede the freedom to contract or not to 
contract; and it arises within the framework which the contracting parties have 
construed. It is not for the legislator to substitute himself for the parties in prescribing 
the content of their contract. At the very most, and for their convenience, he can 
make them some suggestions (…)280 but the parties may decide otherwise – the law, 
in questions of contract, is merely interpreting the will. Only public policy imposes 
an external limit on the free play of the wills.281 
It is evident that some rules regulate contracts even if such contracts are freely 
concluded by the parties. As one commentator has said,  
The existence of these standard rules for the common contracts is reconciled with 
the principle that the parties are free, subject only to the restrictions in the public 
interest, to make any contract they wish, by recourse to the distinction between rules 
which apply only in the absence of contrary intention by the parties (lois supplétives) 
and those which concern the public interest and therefore cannot be excluded (lois 
imperatives).282 
As regards the lois supplétives, known also as “default rules”, first, they play a 
supplementary, derogatory, or an interpretative role. They are provided to express 
the will of the parties and are capable, thus, of being set aside by the expression of a 
contrary will.283 Simply, default rules aim for the most reasonable solution for cases 
that parties may have failed to regularise. Legal provisions that fall within that 
category apply only if the parties did not provide otherwise.284 
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A statute may itself specify those of its provisions which play the role of 
default rules by providing them with phrases such “unless there is an agreement to 
the contrary” or “unless otherwise stipulated”.285 In that sense, default rules are 
merely expected to fill the gaps left by the parties and to interpret their will. If the 
intention of parties is to exclude their application, those rules will not apply.286 
Pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract, furthermore, parties can mutually 
exclude these default rules and give to the contract different content or different 
effects from those provided by the law. Such is the meaning given by the case law 
according to which, since most of civil code provisions relating to contracts are not 
binding, parties may depart from them by choosing their own legislation.287 As 
Kalongo has stated, most of contract law rules are default rules in the DRC as in 
France and Belgium.288 
Regarding the lois imperatives, also known as “imperative norms” or 
“mandatory rules”, next, they are concerned with the public interest. They cannot, 
therefore, be excluded by contracting parties.289 With regard to them, courts have 
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always judged to be null and void any clause contrary to the public interest.290 
Compared with the first group of provisions, the notion of public interest is 
practically protected by a minor number of provisions.291 That is the case for rules 
governing the ability to contract292 or the defects in consent.293 Any provision’s 
imperative character will result from its words. To quote only Article 30 CCO, it 
specifies that “an obligation without cause, or with a false cause, or with an illicit 
cause ‘may not have any effect’ (emphasis added).”294 
To sum this up, under Congolese law, most of the rules in the contractual 
sphere, including commercial sales contracts, fall into the category of supplementary 
rules. This has as a consequence that the freedom of contact really constitutes the 
heart of contract. Of course that principle is not unique to Congolese law. It is in 
force in other jurisdictions regardless of their legal system.295 Similarly, the freedom 
of contract is not the only principle governing the law of contract; it co-exists with 
several other principles, among which is party autonomy or the autonomy of the 
will.296 
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2.3.3 Autonomy of the Will  
 
2.3.3.1  Substance of the principle of the autonomy of the will  
 
The principle of the autonomy of the will is neither explicitly expressed in the CCO 
nor in the OHADA Commercial Act as clearly as the freedom of contract is.297 It 
proceeds rather from a philosophical theory according to which the human will 
creates its own law and its own obligation.298 According to a number of scholars, the 
starting-point of the theory of the autonomy of the will “is the freedom of the 
individual, which can be curtailed only by free will, either in the original social 
contract or, within society, by individual acts of will.”299 Thus, an “autonomous will 
means a will which determines its rules for itself.”300 Specifically, “contractual 
obligation has its source in the will of the parties which alone and freely creates the 
contract and all its effects.”301 It is, thus, acknowledged that, where the circumstances 
in which the contract was formed are silent as regards the intention of the parties, the 
court should read between the lines of the contract to find what the will of parties 
was.302 
Compared to the freedom of contract, the autonomy of the will also reflects 
the individual and liberal vision of the Napoleonic era.303 It also constitutes one of 
the fundamental principles that govern the whole law of contracts. As some 
commentators have said, although the Code does not emphasise the word “will”, both 
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judicial decisions and scholarly writings insist on the fact that “the basis of the law 
of contract is la volonté.”304 Rouhette specifies this by stating that, 
The will of parties is first of all the foundation of the contract. The making of the 
legal act is regulated by the principle of consensualism – the wills can be expressed 
in any manner and they are sufficient to create a contract. In addition, they must fully 
exist, be free, and be enlightened: where they are vitiated the basis of the institution 
is absent and there is no valid contract. 
The will of the parties is, furthermore, the measure of the consequences of the 
contract. The contracting parties freely determine their respective rights and duties, 
and so, to establish the content of the contract, it is necessary to examine their will. 
Once this will is discovered, the contract has an absolute force. What was willed 
commands definitive recognition, and, in particular, the judge has no power to revise 
the contract if it seems to him to be unjust.305 
Following from the above explanation, the principle of freedom of contract and the 
principle of autonomy of the will are basically close to one another. Without any 
need to debate which of the two principles has precedence,306 it is important to note 
that both principles are based on the idea that “a man may be bound only by his own 
will; he is the best judge of his own interests; and, therefore, the best rule is that 
freely agreed by free men.”307 Such is the meaning of Article 33 al. 1 CCO which 
confers on contracts formed lawfully the same effect as is given to a statute.308 
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Pursuant to this provision, all contracts lawfully concluded shall be considered as 
law for the parties,309 regardless of whether or not they have a special designation.310 
The above makes it clear that the autonomy of the will should be understood 
as a key principle from which other principles, viz. the freedom of contract, the 
principle of consensualism, and the binding force of contracting obligations, are 
derived.311 This principle governs the contractual field as a whole, including sales 
contracts. Insofar as the law of sale is concerned, Article 237 al. 1 UAGCL and 
Article 265 al. 3 CCO defer their effects to the general principles of the law of 
contract, including the autonomy of the will. 
As it is for its predecessor, the principle of the autonomy of the will is 
sometimes shown by statutory expressions such “as required by the contract”312, “in 
accordance with the contract”,313 or “as agreed upon”314 used in the provisions 
defining the obligations of the parties. It can also be expressed by concepts like 
“unless there is an agreement to the contrary” or “unless otherwise stipulated”.315 
The method of determining the will of contracting parties is defined by Article 238 
al. 2 UAGCL. This provision requires courts to take into account some factual 
circumstances of the contract, for instance, previous negotiations reached between 
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the parties, practices established among them, or practices regularly observed in the 
sector of activities concerned.316 
It is important to note that, in the same way the party autonomy principle 
governs national contracts; it is also concerned with international transactions. In 
these kinds of contracts, the principle of the autonomy of the will aims to allow 
contracting parties to choose the law to which their contract is subject as they see fit. 
To give an example of this, the freedom of choice of the law governing the contract 
results from the phrase unless when the parties provide otherwise introducing Article 
11 al. 2 PILD.317 So, parties are allowed to depart from national law provisions by 
choosing their own legislation because, as mentioned in section 2.3.2, most of 
contractual legal provisions provide merely supplementary rules.318 In other words, 
at the time the contract is concluded, or subsequently, the seller and buyer may freely 
agree upon the law which will govern their rights and obligations.319 The choice of 
the applicable law may be expressly stated; it may derive from the terms of the 
contract too. As Munoz has stated, the election of a foreign law can be articulated 
either in a clause incorporated into the contract or as a later agreement after the 
conclusion of the contract.320 In accordance with Article 238 al. 2 UAGCL, in the 
absence of an express choice of law, this can be deduced from the behaviour and 
conduct of contracting parties.321 Nevertheless, the opportunity for parties to choose 
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a foreign law is, in principle, limited to international contracts so that domestic 
contracts should normally be ruled by national law.322 
In a few words, the principle of the autonomy of the will postulates that parties 
are free to negotiate and conclude the contract according to their liking. In spite of 
its importance, however, the liberty of parties is sometimes restricted.  
 
2.3.3.2  Restrictions to the autonomy of the will 
 
The autonomy of the will is particularly limited by mandatory rules, and public 
policy and morality requirements. With regard to public policy and morality 
considerations, Article 6 of the French and Belgian civil codes emphasises that 
“statutes relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by private 
agreements”. The Congolese legislator did not insert such an express provision in the 
civil code. A similar ruling may, however, be read from Article 15 PILD which 
denies legal effects to conventions and private agreements for what they contain 
which is contrary to public law or to laws that intend to protect social interest and 
public morality.323 
In addition to this provision, restrictions to party autonomy have been ruled by 
one Appeal Court of Kinshasa earlier decision whereby, “the autonomy of the will is 
(…) subordinate to the observance of public policy or morality, as they are 
considered for the Congo by Congolese legislation.”324 In relation to the above ruling, 
as long as an agreement is suited to public policy requirements, it should prevail over 
a statute even if it is at variance with that regulation.325 The notion of “public policy 
and morals” is one of the important themes of the Congolese law that the 2006 
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Constitution quotes extensively. Although it mentions the phrase “public policy and 
morality” in eleven provisions,326 however, the Constitution does not provide any 
detailed content. In the context of the civil code, likewise, Article 32 CCO states 
merely that “A cause327 is unlawful where it is prohibited by legislation, where it is 
contrary to ‘public morals or to public policy’,” without any further comments. 
With regard to the expression “public policy”, Battifol argues that a rule is 
concerned with public policy when individuals cannot derogate from its provisions 
by contract.328 In the same way, Durieux describes the concept “public policy” as a 
sum of requirements to which the legislator did not allow parties to make an 
exception because those requirements relate to an established moral, political, or 
economic order.329 From these explanations, one may broadly define the expression 
“public policy” as a set of rules that covers the essential interests of the state or the 
community. Such would be the case for the Constitution, criminal, administrative, 
and fiscal statutes, or for private law statutes considered essential for the protection 
of the individuals, the family, and property.330 It is authoritatively stated that the 
needs of public policy refer,  in the field of  private law, inter alia, to rules which 
regulate the legal bases on which  the economic, social, and moral values of that 
society are constructed.331 
 As regards the concept “morality”, it consists of a set of moral values 
considered indispensable for any community’s development. Like for public policy, 
the requirements of “morality” may vary from community to community and from 
time to time.332 Usually, the notion “morality” is included in the concept of “public 
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policy”. Thus, owing to the fact that the autonomy of parties is subject to public 
policy and morality requirements, the Appeal Court of Kinshasa has ruled, since 
1924, that “all agreements in conflict with the needs of morality and public policy 
are valueless and void.”333 
With regard to the meaning of the phrase “public interest”, one has to bear in 
mind the fact that most contractual norms are default rules aimed at filling gaps in 
the contract. Contracting parties can, therefore, legally depart from them without 
penalty. In contrast to this, other provisions are mandatory rules which cannot be 
excluded by parties. It is this last category of norms that covers what is known as 
“public interest”; private agreements that interfere with them should not have legal 
effect.334 
In brief, as is for freedom of contracts, the autonomy of the will is one of the 
cornerstones of the law of sale. Pursuant to that principle, the seller and buyer freely 
regulate their respective rights and obligations; they establish the content of the 
contract so that it is always necessary to examine what their will was. The only 
restrictions to that freedom are the requirements of public policy, morality, and 
public interest. The autonomy of will, furthermore, appears to be the foundation of 
all other contract law principles, among which is the principle of consensualism. 
 
2.3.4 The Principle of Consensualism 
 
2.3.4.1 General remarks  
 
This section intends to explain the different theories of contract before examining the 
specific approach to contract under Congolese law. Before doing so, it is necessary 
to note immediately that the issue of theories of contract seems to have attracted 
much less debate in the French, Belgian and Congolese academics. South African 
law literature will, thus, be useful in this regard. 
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At the outset, the basis of a contract is either consensus, viz. “an actual meeting 
of the minds of the contracting parties, or the reasonable belief by one of the 
contractants that there is consensus.”335 Article 54 CCO states in this regard that, 
when interpreting a contract, it is necessary to seek out what the “common intention” 
of the parties was rather than adhere to the literal meaning of their words. The ruling 
in Article 54 CCO is in conformity with the general belief that consensus forms the 
basis of the modern law of contract. Following on this statement, the principle of 
consensualism means that contracts are concluded by mutual consent.336 As Van der 
Merwe and others have said, “a contract comes into existence if the parties are agreed 
(…) on creating between themselves an obligation (…), as well as on all its 
particulars, such as its content and subsidiary features.”337 The way to determine the 
consent of parties has given place to a general theory known as the will theory. There 
is a rule, however, that the intention of contracting parties is not the only ground on 
which their responsibility should be based. Accordingly, the first theory has been 
complemented by further contractual theories, namely the declaration theory and the 
reliance theory.338 
With regard to the will theory, also known as the “consensual theory,”339 
“subjective theory” or “intention theory”340, it locates the foundation of any contract 
in the individual will. According to this theory, the enforceability of contracts is 
subject to the intentions of parties. Thus, contracting parties are bound by their 
agreement because they have intended to be bound in that way. Owing to the fact 
that the intention of the parties forms the basis of contract liability, any contract 
should be construed as to have validity.341 To use the words of Joubert, “The parties 
                                               
335
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 17. 
336
 See Zimmerman Obligations 559; Van der Merwe et al Contract 19. 
337
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 19; see also Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 402; Herbots Contract 47. 
338
 See Hutchison in Contract 15; Christie/Bradfield Contract 1; Van der Merwe et al Contract 19. 
339
 See Joubert Contract 79. 
340
 Christie/Bradfield Contract 1; Kritzinger 1983 SALJ 47. 
341
 Read Article 54 CCO with Article 55 CCO. Article 55 declares that, in circumstances where a 
clause is likely to admit a double reading, it should be understood in the sense with which it may 
have some effect, “rather than in the meaning with which it could not produce any.” 
86 
 
must not only intend to be bound by their statements but must also agree as regards 
the contents of the contract.”342 Such being the principle, the purpose of the law of 
contract should then be to endorse the wills of the parties.343 In the case of doubt, any 
ambiguous clause should be interpreted in the way that best suits the subject matter 
of the contract.344 That is to say that, when seeking to determine whether a contract 
has been formed or not, the will theory requires finding out whether the minds of the 
parties actually met.345 This theory postulates, in other words,  
(…) an extremely subjective approach to contract: consensus is the sole basis of 
contractual liability, with the result that if there is no genuine concurrence of wills, 
there can be no contract. Thus, whenever a party is mistaken about a material aspect 
of a proposed agreement, there is no binding contract.346 
The intention theory has, however, been criticised on the grounds that it fails to 
protect the reasonable expectations of a party who has relied on the objective 
appearance of consensus created by the other party’s conduct.347 Hutchison remarks 
that this approach appears to be economically inappropriate for it disregards the need 
for legal certainty in business transactions.348 In order to overcome such 
disadvantages, additional theories, such that of the declaration or objective theory 
have been advocated.  
 In its general understanding, the declaration theory is perceived as the 
opposite of the intention theory. The declaration theory assumes that the wills of the 
parties alone are insufficient to determine their contractual liability. According to this 
rule, the assessment of an agreement rests on the concurrence of the declared 
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intentions of the parties.349 To use Hutchison’s words, “what is important for contract 
is not what the parties think, but what they say or do: the external manifestations of 
their wills. Thus, the true basis of contract is to be found in the concurring 
declarations of the parties.”350 
Further to the will and the objective theories, scholars have established a third 
theory of contract, the so-called reliance theory. By way of definition, Cockrell says, 
“To rely on someone is to alter one’s position in the belief that another person’s 
words or acts can be depended upon with confidence: it is to ‘count on’, or to ‘trust’, 
another person.”351 Thus, with regard to the reliance approach, the basis of a contract 
is to be found in the reasonable expectations of a party who has relied on the objective 
communication of consensus displayed by the other party’s words or conduct.352 
According to the reliance theory, an agreement is not constituted by the consent of 
parties alone but rather by their external manifestation of consensus as well.353 In this 
respect, the method in view should be comprehended “as a supplement to the will 
theory, correcting its deficiencies, and affording an alternative basis for contract in 
circumstances where the minds of the parties have not truly met.”354 
The preceding development leaves one with the question of which of the 
subjective or the objective approach prevails under Congolese law.  
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350
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In determining whether agreement has been reached, one should adopt a position of detached 
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2.3.4.2 The Congolese law approach to contract in detail  
 
In dealing with the issue of the enforceability of contract under Congolese law, the 
OHADA Commercial Act, the CCO, and case law appear to have favoured the will 
theory also known as the subjective approach. In the DRC, the consensual principle 
is expressed by Article 54 CCO which speaks of the “common intention of the 
parties”, and by Article 240 UAGCL which states that commercial sales contacts 
“are not subject to any requirements as for form.”355 Consequently, these types of 
contacts may be proven by any means. It does not matter whether the contract be in 
writing or made orally; what is important is the meeting of the will of parties, viz. 
their consensus ad idem.356   
It should be noted that the ruling in Article 240 UAGCL is greatly linked to 
the rules under civil law as stated by Articles 37 al.1 and 264 CCO. As regards the 
first provision, it formulates as a principle that any obligation which purports to 
delivery “is formed by the sole consent of contracting parties.”357 Thus, given that 
sales contracts impose upon the seller, among other obligations, to deliver the 
property sold and transfer ownership to the buyer,358 Article 264 CCO emphasises, 
“[The sale] is completed between the parties and ownership is automatically acquired 
by the buyer as soon as they have agreed upon the thing sold and the price, although 
that thing has not yet been delivered nor the price paid (highlights added).”359 
Following from these provisions, the meeting of consents appears then to be a 
yardstick to determine whether or not a contract was concluded.  
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 As stipulated by Article 240, “The Commercial sales contract may be in writing or oral; it is not 
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Further to the Code, the requirement regarding the consent of the parties is 
also supported by the case law. On the subject, the former Appeal Court of 
Elisabethville,360 ruled for instance that three elements are essential for the validity 
of any contract of sale, the thing to be sold, the price, and “consent of the parties”.361 
According to the same Court, once parties have reached agreement on these 
fundamentals, the contract is immediately valid so that the buyer cannot revoke it 
unilaterally anymore without the acquiescence of the seller.362 The Supreme Court is 
of the similar opinion too. In one of its decisions, dated 20 November 1976, the 
highest court of law held that the sale is fulfilled subsequent to consensus on the thing 
sold and the price.363 Hence, a clause whereby the transfer of ownership is delayed 
until payment of the entire price constitutes a mere conditional clause lacking effect 
in the enforceability of the contract.364 
 From the details above, it is clear that Congolese law has traditionally adopted 
the subjective approach to contract.365 Under that legal system, sales contracts enter 
into force by the single meeting of wills or the mutual consent of the parties. In other 
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words, the consent of the parties must be professed. It cannot, in principle, be derived 
from the conduct or silence of one party.366 To give an example of this, an offeror 
should know that the offeree has expressed his/her consent to the proposed contract 
only at the time that the letter of acceptance reaches him/her;367 otherwise, there is 
no validly concluded contract.368   
As mentioned in the precedent section, the subjective approach gives the 
impression of not being economically suitable for it neglects the need for legal 
certainty in business transactions. Owing to such shortcomings, some legal systems 
have supplemented it by a more objective approach such as the reliance theory.369 
According to the latter theory, the intention of parties is not necessarily 
communicated; it may well be deduced from their actions or conduct. Two provisions 
of the OHADA Commercial Act should be quoted in this regard: Article 242 al. 3 
relating to the reliance on the offer in case of irrevocability;370 and particularly Article 
244 al. 2 relating to the acceptance by conduct.  
As far as Article 244 UAGCL is concerned, it starts off by saying that an 
acceptance becomes effective when it reaches the offeror. Its second section 
accompanies this general rule with an exception giving effect to acceptances by 
conduct. As stipulated by that section, if, by virtue of the provisions of the offer, the 
practices established between the parties, or usages,371 the offeree may, without 
notification to the offeror (i.e. without communicating  his/her consent expressly), 
“indicate assent by performing an act, acceptance is effective at the moment the act is 
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performed.”372 As one may see, the ruling under Article 244 is a simple application of 
the last sentence of Article 240 UAGCL. This provision allows the conclusion of 
contract to be proved by any means, including conduct, silence, inaction,373 and legal 
presumptions.374 The same provision is also connected to Article 243 al. 2 UAGCL 
dealing with acceptance by any other conduct.375 
To summarise this, under modern Congolese law the approach to defining the 
enforceability of a contract remains the consensual theory. In that sense, a contract is 
concluded when there is a meeting of minds of contracting parties. With OHADA law 
influence, however, it is now accepted that the basis of a contract may also be found in 
the conduct of a party if the other party was reasonable in relying on such behaviour. 
Specifically, in modern Congolese sales law, the subjective theory is now 
complemented by the reliance theory, particularly with regard to commercial 
transactions. So, a contract will bind the parties independently by the means it was 
formed.  
 
2.3.5 Binding Force of Contractual Obligations 
 
2.3.5.1 Introduction  
 
The principle of the binding force of contractual obligations means that parties must 
perform the obligations into which they have entered.376 Thus, although parties are 
not obliged to take part in contract, once they have concluded one, they are bound by 
their commitments. This rule is expressly stated by Article 33 al. 1 CCO for which, 
“Agreements lawfully formed take the place of the law for the parties.” Two headings 
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that may need further scrutiny under the provision above are “agreements lawfully 
formed” and “take the place of the law”. 
 
2.3.5.2 Meaning of the phrase “Agreements lawfully formed” 
 
First of all, an agreement lawfully made is one that meets the requirements for 
validity. Those requirements are provided by Article 8 CCO which envisages four 
conditions for a contract to be valid: (a) the consent of contracting parties; (b) their 
capacity to contract; (c) an object which forms the subject matter of the agreement; 
and (d) a lawful cause.377 
The consent 
It was mentioned in the previous section that consensus is the central substance in 
the existence of a contract. As a result of this, Article 8 CCO requires the existence 
of consent as a first condition for the validity of contract. The provision speaks, 
however, of the “consent of the party who commits himself”, viz. the party who is 
obligated. This phrase has been interpreted as referring to “the consent of each party 
having an intention to be legally bound.”378 Hence, a contract is formed when there 
is meeting of consent of both contracting parties. 
Consent may exist, but it may be defective. Such is the meaning of Article 9 
CCO according to which the requirement for valid consent is met only if there are no 
defects in its statement; otherwise it is damaged.379 The provision enumerates some 
events that may vitiate the intent, namely mistake, duress, and fraud. As specified by 
it, “a consent given by mistake or the one extorted by duress or fraud” cannot amount 
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 Article 8 CCO stipulates,  
Four conditions are essential for the validity of an agreement: 
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to valid consent. In effect, where the consent is vitiated, the contract is voidable; such 
circumstances give rise to an action in nullity.380 Alternatively, when there is no 
consent at all the contract is void.381 In any case, the classical way for a party to 
express its consent will derive from the process of contracting by means of offer and 
acceptance as explained in Chapter 5 below.  
Capacity 
In general, everybody has legal capacity to enter into contract.382 This principle is 
formulated by Article 23 CCO which recognises that any person is legally capable 
of contracting except where he/she has been declared incapable by a specific 
statute.383 Normally, the legal capacity issue is dealt with in the law of persons and 
family, viz. the 1987 Family Code.384 Article 215 CFC declares as “incapable” 
particularly non-emancipated minors and majors of unsound mind. These categories 
of people are deprived of their capacity to take part in contract unless they are assisted 
or represented.  
A question occurs of whether people with restricted capability may be 
involved in commercial transactions. The answer is negative. In effect, Article 6 of 
the Commercial Act makes it clear that any person or corporation undertaking 
commercial transactions must have the legal capacity to do so. Article 7 compliments 
this by excluding minors from becoming commercial operators and from carrying 
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out business.385 In the same way, Article 234 al. 1 UAGCL limits its field of operation 
to contracts of sales of goods between “traders, natural, or legal persons.”386 In other 
words, the key condition required to be subject to the Commercial Act is being a 
merchant,387 viz. a person whose regular occupation consists in carrying out 
commercial transactions.388 Only people with legal capability may acquire such a 
quality and then perform officially commercial contracts. With regard to legal 
persons, they obtain legal capacity from the day they are registered.389 
Existence of an object 
The third condition required by the civil code for a contract to be valid is the presence 
of “an object which forms the commitment subject matter.” This requirement is well 
explained by Article 25 CCO which describes the object of a contract as anything 
that one party promises to transfer, to do, or not to do.390 General rules relating to the 
contract subject-matter are established under Articles 25 to 29 CCO. Pursuant to 
these provisions, the object of a contract is essentially the answer to the question, 
“What is owed?”391 In that sense, the object of a contract of sale will be the thing 
sold,392 and, more recently, goods.393 As far as the property sold is concerned, Article 
275 CCO formulates as general principle that any item subject to commercial 
exchange may be sold, except when its alienation has been prohibited by specific 
                                               
385
 For a list of incompatibilities between commercial dealings and other professions, see Articles 
8 to 12 UAGCL. 
386
 For implementation, see Cote d’Ivoire First Instance Abidjan 25 April 2001 Case No. 327 Sitbai 
v Cfcd-CI [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-02-111.html] (accessed 2-4-2013). 
387
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 339. 
388
 See Article 2 UAGCL.  
389
 See Burkina Faso 4 April 2004 Grande Instance Bobo-Dioulasso Case No. 74 Société 
d’Affrètement et de Transport (SAT) v A Barro [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-
05-234.html] (accessed 2-4-2013); applying Article 98 of the Commercial Companies and 
Economic Interest Groups Uniform Act. 
390
 Article 25 CCO says: “Any contract has for object a thing which one party is obligated to 
transfer, or which one party commits to do, or not to do.” 
391
 See Tallon Contract 205 216. 
392
 See Article 263 CCO. 
393
 See Article 234 al. 1 UAGCL.  
95 
 
laws.394 The principle so stated is one of mandatory rules that “the sale of a thing 
prohibited is void albeit the buyer was aware of the defect.”395 Further to the 
prohibition of things out of commerce, the thing to be sold must also be in existence, 
determined or at least determinable,396 and belong to the seller.397 With regard to the 
concept “goods”, it is discussed in Section 2.4.3 below. 
The cause  
In contrast to the previous conditions, the concept of “cause” is not easily described. 
This is a contentious notion which has sometimes been referred to as “one of the 
most uncertain ideas of civil law”.398 Despite such difficulty, this concept may 
objectively be understood as “the reason for the making of the contract or the purpose 
pursued by the obligation.”399 To exemplify this, under a bilateral contract the cause 
of the first party’s obligation is represented by the other party’s obligation. In the 
case of sales contracts, “the cause of seller’s obligation to deliver the goods or to 
transfer their property is constituted by the buyer’s obligation to pay the price of the 
goods”400 and vice versa. The legal regime of “cause” is determined by Articles 30 
to 32 CCO for which the cause must exist, be real, and licit;401 otherwise the contract 
would not produce legal effect.402 Simply, the requirement for “cause” has a double 
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purpose: denying validity to contracts which pursue an illegal or immoral purpose; 
and ensuring that in bilateral contracts the obligations of parties are 
interdependent.403 
Associated with its equivalent conditions, it is only contracts which comply 
with the requirements for consent, capacity, object, and “cause”, meaning contracts 
formed in a statutory manner, that may qualify as agreements legally formed. These 
types of contracts bind contracting parties404 as it is for legislation. It should be said, 
however, that the OHADA Commercial Act looks as if it does not require any cause 
for the validity of commercial sales contracts. Within its ambit the common intention 
of parties resulting from an exchange of offer and acceptance405 suffices to generate 
the contract.  
 
2.3.5.3 Agreements have force of law for the parties 
 
The second phrase within Article 33 al. 1 CCO is that “agreements take the place of 
the law”. Asserting that contracts take the place of the law means that each of the 
contracting parties is bound by the contract as it would be by law. Each must perform 
its obligation at the risk of being forced to do so.406 The norm in question is supported 
by case law for which conventions legally or statutory formed take up a legal meaning 
independently of the means parties may have named them.407 
It should be noted that the principle according to which agreements take the 
place of the law binds both parties and judges.408 With regard to parties, they are 
generally bound by what they have really agreed, i.e. the real content of the 
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contract.409 As between them, Article 33 al. 2 CCO specifies that “[contracts] may 
be revoked only by mutual consent or on grounds authorised by law.” The Supreme 
Court has ruled on the subject that, “as long as a contract has not yet been modified 
by a new agreement, it remains irrevocable for the parties.”410 Applied to sales 
contracts, the principle under examination means that a buyer cannot terminate a sale 
without the consent of the seller.411 
As to judges, they are also bound by the contract as they would be by the law. 
They must conform to the intent of the parties;412 they cannot modify a contract on 
the pretext of fairness, for instance.413 Judges and arbitrators are as affected by the 
binding force of contracts as contracting parties themselves. A propos of this, the 
Supreme Court has stated, in a decision dated 3 April 1976, that because “the contract 
constitutes the law that governs the interpretation and performance of the obligations 
of the parties, a judgement that underestimates this principle (...) must be repealed in 
this respect.”414 Such was also the case for a decision which approved a buyer’s 
conduct when he resorted to violence to suspend a contract.415 
To sum this up, in restricting its application to contracts legally formed, Article 
33 al. 1 CCO indicates that the civil law attaches legal consequences only to 
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agreements which it allows.416 Thus, when it is prescribed that contracts legally 
formed have force, or take the place of law, a legal agreement cannot be a declaration 
simply recognising the autonomous effectiveness of individual wills. Instead, it must 
be an agreement which meets legal terms, i.e. a contract wherein consent was freely 
given by parties endowed with legal capacity, and where object and cause are legally 
admitted. Where these requirements are not met, the contract is void or at least 
avoidable; alternatively, when they are encountered, the contract so concluded must 
be performed in good faith. 
 
2.3.6 Principle of Good Faith  
 
2.3.6.1 Conceptualisation of the “Good Faith” duty  
 
The concept “good faith” is considered to be one of the subjective legal concepts of 
which the content is not always easily circumscribed. On the whole, the duty of good 
faith can be defined as “an expectation and obligation to act honestly and fairly in 
the performance of one’s contractual duties.”417 According to one commentator, the 
principle of good faith introduces into contractual dealings “a moral rule of an 
abstract nature that often covers other duties such those of trusty conduct, probity, 
cooperation, information, honesty, loyalty; and antonyms such as bad faith, 
incidental fraud, or negligence.”418 This obligation has existed for a long time. 
During the development of Roman contract law, the concept of bona fides was 
associated with honest conduct and was then required in all commercial 
transactions.419 As a number of scholars have said, the central role the expression 
bona fides occupied in the reform of Roman law is found in Cicero’s writings.420 In 
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the words of Cicero, “good faith or bona fides expresses all the honest sentiments of 
a good conscience.”421 
Without a need to review the exhaustive development of the concept, suffice 
it to call to mind Domat’s position on the subject.422 As Domat has stated, “by the 
law of nature (...), every contract is bonae fidei, because honesty and integrity hath 
and ought to have in all contracts the full extent that equity can demand.”423 It is, 
nevertheless, with the German philosopher Kant (1724-1804) that the requirement of 
good faith acquired a philosophical basis. Kant regarded the principle in view as “a 
categorical imperative wherein acts consistent with the status of people as free and 
rational beings are morally right and need to be carried out to inspire mutual 
confidence in society.”424 Since then, the principle of good faith has to date been 
granted such respect that it is known in almost all legal systems, though its meaning 
may differ in scope and application depending on which legal tradition governs the 
contract.425 To illustrate this, under the common law legal system, a contract is 
regarded from a single transactional perspective of parties without room for good 
faith,426 whereas in civil law it creates a duty which should be performed in good 
faith.427 In other words, the principle of good faith is well established in civil law 
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by Strahan The Civil Law in its Natural Order Vol. I 45; quoted by Zimmerman/Whittaker Good 
Faith 7 32 Fn150; and Fu Contract 62 Fn324. 
424
 Quoted by Fu Contract 62 Fn325, referring himself to Lando 2007 (6) European Review of 
Private Law 842. 
425
 On a general overview of the concept in different legal systems, see MacQueen in 
MacQueen/Zimmermann Contract 43-73. As regards international sale of goods contracts, e.g. 
Article 7(1) CISG wants the Convention to be interpreted and applied in the way to promote the 
observance of “good faith in international trade”. 
426
 For an outline of the common law attitude in relation to the good faith obligation, see Section 
3.3.4 below.  
427
 See Eiselen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 14 19; Zeller http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
4corners.html (last accessed 27-6-2012). 
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countries428 rather than in common law jurisdictions. Fu argues that the principle of 
good faith has been considered in many civil law countries “as the highest guiding 
principle for the law of obligations; (...) a vitally important ingredient in modern 
contract law.”429  
In the DRC, in particular, the concept of good faith is one of the fundamental 
principles of the law of obligations in the same way as are the freedom of contract, 
party autonomy, consensualism, and the binding character of contracts. This 
expression is even abundantly referred to in both the CCO430 and the OHADA 
Commercial Act,431 specifically with regard to commercial sales contracts. To give 
an example of these, Article 33 al. 3 CCO requires all contracts to be performed in 
good faith.432 The requirement of good faith dealt with in connection with the 
performance of contracts played, in its first sense, a mere interpretative role.433 
Contracts, therefore, had to be interpreted according to the common intention of the 
parties as required by Article 54 CCO.434 The field of application of the obligation of 
good faith has grown since the 1980s. The principle has so far acquired a much 
greater significance in that the good faith governs today both the formation and 
performance of contracts. 
 
 
                                               
428
 Cf. Article 1134 al. 3 FCC; Article 242 BGB; Article 6:2 Dutch civil code; Article 33 al. 3CCO; 
and Articles 237 and 249 UAGCL. 
429
 Fu Contract 46&61. 
430
 See, among others, Article 33 al. 3 (performance in good faith); Article 39 (possession in good 
faith); Article 138 (payment in good faith); Article 256 (reception in good faith); Article 550 (third 
party acting in good faith); Article 648 (acquisition in good faith); Article 650 (presumption of good 
faith); and Article 651 (time of existence of good faith). 
431
 See, inter alia, Article 8 al. 4 (third party acting in good faith); Article 12 al. 2 (presumption of 
good faith); Article 237 (compliance with good faith); and Article 249 al. 2 & 3 (bad faith). 
432
 Compare Article 33 al. 3 CCO to Article 1134 al. 3 FCC; for application, see Tricom Kin/Gombe 
28 February 2012 RCE 2183 Kabala Katumba v Socimex. 
433
 See De Bondt Contracts 233; Herbots Contracts 72. 
434
 See comments in Section 2.3.4.1 above; see also, for application, under OHADA law 
perspective, Burkina Faso 13 June 2007 Grande Instance Ouagadougou Case No. 83/2007 Société 
de Gestion du Patrimoine Ferroviaire du Burkina v I Guigma & R Ouedraogo Sabane 
[http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-06-39.html] (accessed 20-3-2013).  
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2.3.6.2  Good faith duty during negotiations  
 
With regard to the real meaning the good faith duty plays during the negotiation 
process stage, Munoz argues that, during this phase, the duty of good faith pursues a 
double objective.435 It requires, firstly, that the parties negotiate with clear and trusty 
voices, and, secondly, imposes on them the obligation not to abandon negotiations 
unexpectedly or arbitrarily.436 
Parties are normally granted freedom to enter into contract and cannot bear 
responsibility if they do not reach agreement.437 Though parties are free to negotiate, 
however, and even to reach agreement, Article 249 al. 2 UAGCL holds liable for the 
losses caused to the other party “a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in 
bad faith.”438 In this sense, bad faith conduct includes, in addition to sudden and 
arbitrary breach of negotiations, the fact that one party enters into negotiations and 
continues with them without being committed to concluding a contract with the other 
party.439  
Following from these provisions, it is clear that three attitudes may amount to 
bad faith during the formation of contract stage: breaking-off negotiations without 
warning; entering capriciously into negotiations; or continuing them by whim. The 
enumeration above seems to be illustrative as evidence of the use of the conjunction 
“or” in Article 249 al. 3 UAGCL. In addition, the requirement for good faith entails 
an information supplementary obligation, viz. the duty of always upholding the truth 
and revealing any fact susceptible to determining the other party’s decision.440 In 
other words, where a party does not intend to conclude a contract, it must 
                                               
435
 Munoz Contracts 224; see also Whittaker Obligations 333. 
436
 Munoz Contracts 224; see also Mubalama Obligations 47; Kalongo Obligations 55. 
437
 See Article 249 al. 1 UAGCL. 
438
 Article 249 al. 2 UAGCL is inspired by Article 2.1.15(2) PICC. Owing on the fact that during 
the negotiation process step the contract is not formed yet, party’s pre-contractual liability will be 
governed by torts liability rules, viz. Articles 258 to 260 CCO. For a similar reasoning under French 
law, see Ghestin Droit Civil 295; quoting Cass F Comm 20 March 1972 JCP 1973 II 17543 
whereby, a sudden breach of negotiations was judged conduct contrary to good faith. 
439
 See Article 249 al. 3 UAGCL; compare to Article 2.1.15(3) PICC. 
440
 See Munoz Contracts 226. 
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immediately stop the negotiations and let the circumstances relevant to the case be 
known to the other party,441 otherwise it may bear responsibility. 
Good faith is always presumed in all contractual obligations.442 It is thus 
sufficient to show that honesty existed at the time the contract was concluded for it 
to be acknowledged.443 Such being the principle, it follows that the party that alleges 
bad faith bears the burden of proving that irregular behaviour.444 In the same way, 
the duty of good faith governs the conclusion of contract; it is also required for its 
performance. 
   
2.3.6.3 Good faith requirement during the carrying out of contract  
 
The duty of good faith in the performance phase is specifically provided for by 
Article 33 al. 3 CCO whereby, all contracts must be performed in good faith. The 
same duty is also expressly contained in the second sentence of Article 237 UAGCL 
with regard to commercial sales contracts. This provision obliges contracting parties 
“to comply with the requirements of good faith” while carrying out their contractual 
obligations.  
It must be remembered that the requirement for good faith as regulated by 
Articles 33 al. 3 CCO and 237 UAGCL with regard to the implementation of the 
obligations of parties played a simple interpretative role at the outset.445 Following 
that understanding, “as circumstances often change considerably in practice, and 
there are often some ambiguities in the contract, good faith (…) (was) thus regarded 
as a yardstick for the interpretation to protect the justified expectation of contractual 
parties.”446 On the subject, the effort was to discover what the common intention of 
contracting parties was at the time they concluded the contract447 because an 
                                               
441
 Ibid. 
442
 See first part of Article 650 CCO, and Article 12 al. 2 UAGCL. 
443
 Article 651 CCO. 
444
 Cf. second part of Article 650 CCO.  
445
 See De Bondt Contracts 233; Herbots Contracts 72. 
446
 See Fu Contract 63. 
447
 Cf. Article 54 CCO. 
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obligation of good faith was imposed on them. Further to its traditional interpretative 
role, the duty of good faith is today described as an objective standard that intends to 
supplement the content of the contract.448 In the same way, this principle may be 
mentioned as an objective standard, “regarding one party’s state of mind that may 
limit the liability or the effects of the unwinding of the contract.”449 
As far as the supplementation character is concerned, one may note that many 
default obligations purporting to prevent unfair results are based on the principle of 
good faith. To illustrate this with some of the obligations of parties to a contract of 
sale, we can state that seller’s duty to package the goods in a manner adequate to 
preserve and protect them450 and to deliver them at the right time and place451 is 
consistent with the requirement of good faith.452 The same principle applies to a 
buyer’s obligation to notify the seller in good time if there is any non-conformity of 
goods.453 Moreover, pursuant to Article 138 CCO, a payment made in good faith is 
valid; it releases the buyer from his/her obligations.  
 With reference to the details above, it is clear that the principle of good faith 
is really a fundamental duty for parties carrying out a contract. This principle is 
concerned with both the seller and buyer’s rights and obligations that stem from the 
contract of sale. The principle is very important for commercial dealings in that 
                                               
448
 See Munoz Contracts 269. 
449
 As Munoz has said, “the debtor of the obligation in good faith is only liable for the damages 
and loss of profits that he foresaw or could have foreseen at the conclusion of the contract, while 
the debtor in bad faith is also liable for unforeseeable damages.” See Munoz Contracts 271; see, in 
the same sense, Article 312 CCO which holds the seller in bad faith liable for losses paid by the 
injured buyer. In addition, under Article 276 CCO, it is only a buyer in good faith, viz. one who 
was unaware of third party ownership in the goods that may claim remedies available for sale of 
third party’s goods.  
450
 Cf. Article 255 UAGCL; for comments, see Section 6.2.3.2.4 below. 
451
 See Articles 251-254 UAGCL, and Articles 281-301 CCO; for comments, see Section 6.2.2 below.  
452
 Thus, the fact that a seller refuses to deliver to the buyer 1 200 tons of machinery bought without 
legal reason constitutes proof of bad faith on his part. See Tricom Kin/Gombe 7 June 2011 RCE 
1618 Society Fonderie de Kinshasa Sprl (FDK) v Society Siderurgie de Maluku (SOSIDER) 
(unreported decision). That is also the case for a seller who retains both the thing sold and the price 
paid by buyer. See Tricom Kin/Matete 18 April 2012 RCE 569 Society Batiment Commerce 
(BACOM Sprl) v Society Bureau d’Analyse et d’Assistance Technique (unreported decision). 
453
 See Articles 258-259 UAGCL, and Article 325 CCO. All of these provisions have as common 
feature that where the buyer fails to give a timely notice of lack of conformity of the goods, he/she 
loses his right to rely on non-conformity remedies. For further comments, see Section 6.2.3 below.   
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Article 237 UAGCL prevents parties from excluding or limiting the good faith duty 
significance in their business.454 In other words, provisions dealing with the principle 
of good faith are mandatory rules for which exclusion, limitation, or infringement 
entails the invalidity of the contract. 
Succinctly, the requirement for good faith has been included at every stage of 
the contract, from formation till performance. During the conclusion phase, 
negotiations must be conducted consistent with good faith. As a result of this, 
breaking-off negotiations, entering into negotiations, and continuing them without 
the real intention of reaching a contract amount to bad faith conduct. Similarly, at the 
performance stage, parties are obliged to comply with the good faith requirement 
while fulfilling their obligations. The seller must deliver the goods in good faith, and 
the buyer pay for them and take delivery of them in good faith. Given that parties 
must collaborate for a good completion of the contract, they are not allowed to 
exclude the duty of good faith or to restrict its effects.  
 
2.3.7 Conclusion on the Basic Principles of Congolese Sales Law  
 
The Congolese law of obligations, in general, and its sales law, in particular, are 
guided, as in other legal systems, by some basic principles which represent the 
essence and spirit of the law, the guidelines for understanding, interpreting, and 
studying the laws. These principles include the freedom of contract, the autonomy of 
the will, the binding force of contractual obligations, the consensual principle, and 
the requirement of good faith. 
Pursuant to the principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy, the 
seller and buyer freely regulate their respective rights and obligations, establish the 
content of their contract, or determine the law which will govern it. Parties are limited 
in their business only by the requirements of public policy, morality, and public 
                                               
454
 As stipulated by the second and third sentences of Article 237, “Parties are expected to comply 
with the requirements of good faith. They may not exclude, nor limit this duty.”  
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interest. Any contract contrary to these requirements is null and void. Concerning the 
consensual principle, it assumes a contract has been concluded only when there is a 
meeting of minds of contracting parties. Thus, it is only where there is lack of consent 
that the basis of a contract should be searched for in one party’s conduct, especially 
if the other party was reasonable in relying on such conduct. This leads us to conclude 
that, in modern Congolese contract law, both the subjective and reliance theories 
govern commercial dealings. With regard to the binding force of contracts and good 
faith principles, they postulate that a contract is valid where it complies with legal 
conditions, which are consent, capacity, the existence of an object, and legal cause. 
Every contract which meets these requirements has the force of law for parties, who, 
in turn, must perform it in good faith. Parties cannot exclude or limit the effects of 
the good faith duty without the risk of bearing responsibility for losses caused to the 
misled party.  
 
2.4 The Essential Elements of a Commercial Sales Contract 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
As was said in Section 2.2.7.2 above, the UAGCL legislator did not find it necessary 
to describe a contract of sale. Pursuant to Article 263 al. 1 CCO, however, a sale is 
an agreement whereby the seller commits to deliver the goods and the buyer to pay 
for, and take delivery off.455 Compared to their equivalent civil code provisions,456 
UAGCL Articles dealing with commercial sales contracts457 appear to have restricted 
the field of application of the notion of “commercial sales”. Such restriction results, 
                                               
455
 See Article 263 al. 1 CCO; read with Articles 250 and 262 UAGCL. It was ruled in Elis 21 
September 1912 Jur Congo 1914-1919 260 that, no matter how parties may name their contract, any 
transfer of goods in exchange of money constitutes a sale, even if it is concealed under the 
appearances of rent (see Léo 21 January 1929 Jur Col 1930-1931 68). It should be remembered that, 
usually, a contract requires the presence of three elements, i.e. consent, thing sold, and price, for it to 
amount to a sale. Where parties have reached agreement upon the thing sold and the price, the contract 
is valid. (See Elis 19 November 1932 RJCB 352; Elis 6 December 1913 Jur Col 1924 166). 
456
 See Articles 263 to 349 CCO. 
457
 See Articles 234 to 302 UAGCL. 
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firstly, from the skills required to parties who may conclude the contract, viz. 
businessmen and commercial corporations, and, secondly, to the sales contract 
subject-matter which are the goods. Thus, after a few comments of the subject and 
the object of the contract, a word will be said about the way the price is determined. 
   
2.4.2 The Aptitude of Parties in regard to Commercial Sales Contracts  
 
The main point of departure from the Commercial Act and the CCO is based on the 
fact that the first of these confines its field of operation to contracts of sales of goods 
between “traders, individuals or companies.”458 In other words, the key condition 
required to acquire the aptitude to negotiate commercial sales contracts is to be a 
“commercial operator” or a merchant.459 The concept “merchant” is described by 
Article 2 UAGCL as a person whose regular profession consists in carrying out 
commercial transactions. Accordingly, commercial sales contracts’ parties may be 
individuals or corporate bodies provided that their place of business is established in 
one of the OHADA member countries.460 By restricting its applicability to “traders” 
or “commercial operators” only, provisions of the UAGCL intend to govern what are 
so-called “business to business sales” in contrast to consumer contracts entirely ruled 
by the CCO. A witness to this is Article 235(a) ruling which excludes from the Act’s 
sphere of application “sales of goods bought for personal, family or household 
use.”461 Consumer transactions should amount to commercial sales contracts, and, 
therefore, be subject to the UAGCL, on condition that “the seller, at any time before 
                                               
458
 Article 234 al. 1 UAGCL reads, “The provisions of this Book (i.e. Book VIII) apply to contract 
of sale of goods between traders, individual or companies, as well as to contracts for supply of 
goods intended for manufacture and production of services.” See, for application, Cote d’Ivoire 
First Instance Abidjan 25 April 2001 Case No. 327 Sitbai v Cfcd-CI. 
459
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 339; Martor et al Business 31. As it is explained in Section 4.3.5 
below, this approach is different from the one adopted by Article 1(3) CISG whereby, “(…) the 
civil or commercial character of the parties or of the contract” is irrelevant in determining the 
Convention’s applicability.   
460
 See Article 234 al. 2 UAGCL, and Article 1 OHADA Treaty. 
461
 Compare this with Article 2(a) CISG. 
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or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known” that the 
goods were bought for consumer purposes.462 
As the parties’ commercial character is decisive in determining the 
applicability of the UAGCL, moreover, sales contracts between merchants and 
consumers are beyond the field of operation of the Commercial Act.463 That is also 
the case for sales contracts in which the preponderant obligations of the party 
furnishing “the goods consist in the supply of labour or other services”. There are, 
furthermore, no grounds for a security obligation required by the buyer because both 
parties are presumed to be professional dealers acting in full knowledge of their 
commitments.464 In spite of this, parties are bound by the requirements of good faith, 
and by trade practices and usages established between themselves.465 
 
2.4.3 Main Features of the Thing Sold 
 
It is a rule that every contract must have a certain object for it to be valid. The contract 
subject matter is generally described as whatever one party commits to transfer, to 
do, or not to do.466 Applied to sales, a number of conditions are required for an item 
to constitute a valid sales contract subject matter. Firstly, it is required that the thing 
                                               
462
 Article 235(a) UAGCL. 
463
 But, Tricom Kin/Matete 20 April 2011 RCE 438/469 case, which was adjudicated by the 
Commercial court despite the plaintiff’s civil character. Cf. Article 17 al. 1 (4) of the Commercial 
Courts Law No. 2/2001 of 3 July 2001 (JORDC No. 14 of 15 July 2001 4) which allows the 
jurisdiction of commercial courts with regard to mixed issues whereby the defendant is a 
businessman. If not, the LTJ case should be ruled by the CCO though it was brought before a 
commercial court if that time the UAGCL was already in force in the DRC. 
464
 See Tricot 2011 (281) Droit et Patrimoine 75. In a civil law perspective, the seller’s obligations 
to deliver the thing sold, transfer ownership of it, and guarantee it against eviction and defects are 
preceded by a general obligation of information dealt with in Article 279 CCO which requires the 
seller to explain in detail the content of the contract. (highlights added) If the seller fails to do so, 
he/she will assume consequences subsequent to any obscure or ambiguous contractual clause 
contained in the contract. 
465
 See Article 238 al. 2 UAGCL for which, “In determining the intent of a party (…), due consideration 
is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including (…) any practices which the parties 
have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.” 
466
 See Article 25 CCO; see also comments in Section 2.3.5.2 above in relation to the existence of 
the object. 
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to be sold must be in existence, be merchantable, determined or at least determinable, 
and belong to the seller. Secondly, UAGCL provisions dealing with commercial 
contracts regulate things which may be involved in business transactions by 
excluding those which may not.   
To start with the existence of the thing sold requirement, it results from general 
rules provided by Article 8 CCO. According to this provision, for a contract to be 
validly formed it must, inter alia, have “a definite object which forms the subject-
matter of the agreement.”467 It follows then that where the thing sold does not exist, 
there would logically not be a valid contract of sale. This general principle is, 
however, assorted with an exception with regard to commercial contracts. In this 
regard, Article 234 UAGCL states expressly that the Commercial Act applies to 
contracts for the supply of goods intended for manufacture and production activities. 
In so stating, Article 234 makes it clear that contracts for which goods are still to be 
manufactured of produced should qualify as sales contracts.468 Similarly, the 
principle regarding avoidance of a sale because of the absence of the thing is softened 
if that item was in existence but perished later. If at the moment a contract of sale 
was concluded the thing sold was completely perished, it is obvious that there is no 
sale.469 But, where the material goods are partially perished, Article 278 al. 2 CCO 
grants the buyer the right to give up the contract or to claim the part saved and reduce 
the price accordingly. Likewise, pursuant to Article 29 al. 1 CCO, future things may 
be sold if there is a probability that they will come into existence. An eloquent 
illustration of sales of future things is the sale of goods to be manufactured or 
produced as announced above. 
Secondly, the thing to be sold must be in commercium. The merchantability 
condition is contained in Article 275 CCO. This provision stipulates that anything 
                                               
467
 See the fourth sentence of Article 8 CCO; see also Articles 25 to 29 CCO.  
468
 Unlike the CISG, the Uniform Act does not exclude from its sphere of influence “contracts for 
the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced where the party ordering the goods ‘undertake 
to supply a substantial part of the materials’ necessary for such manufacture or production.” Cf. 
Article 234 in fine of the UAGCL contra Article 3(1) CISG; see also Ferrari OHADA 79 82.   
469
 See Article 278 al. 1 CCO. 
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subject to commercial exchange dealings may be sold, except where its alienation is 
legally prohibited.470 Thirdly, the thing sold must, in principle, belong to the seller. 
Article 276 CCO states with reference to the subject that “the sale of a third party 
thing is null and void.” As stated by the case law, the sale by non-owners is void 
because it supposes a transfer of other people’s rights.471 Such avoidance, however, 
may occur only if the buyer believed wrongly that the seller had ownership of that 
thing. Hence, if the buyer did not know that the goods belonged to a third party the 
sale may give rise to damages.472 
Lastly, the property sold must be determined, or at least be determinable. The 
requirement for the definiteness of the thing sold is the application of a general rule 
posited by Article 28 CCO whereby, “an obligation must have as object a thing 
determined in respect to its type.” Where the thing is individualised, the contract is 
valid subsequent to the meeting of the minds of parties. For some kinds of things the 
determination shall validly be made by reference to weight or to a measure unit 
without losing their legal effect.473 
In general, parties must determine the quality and the quantity of the thing sold 
at the negotiation stage. It is possible, however, at that stage that the quantity is 
uncertain. If this is determinable, the contract is valid. If, alternatively, such 
uncertainty hides completely the intention of the parties, the obligation is void for 
lack of certainty of the object. To paraphrase Article 239 al. 1 UAGCL, if usages and 
practices established between the parties are expected to determine the quantity of 
the goods, then the sale is valid. Confirmation of this is the fact that “parties are 
considered to have implicitly made applicable to the formation of the contract usages 
                                               
470
 Article 275 CCO is a simple application of Article 27 CCO for which only things subject to 
commercial dealings may form objects of individual transactions.  
471
 See Goma 12 September 2007 RCA 1586 Katsuva Lubuno & Kambale Matumo v Kakule Byabu 
(unreported decision) wherein, the sale was annulled by application of the maxim: Nemo plus iuris 
as alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet. 
472
 Article 276 CCO, second part. 
473
 See Article 266 CCO. 
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that they knew or ought to have known and which are widely known in the trade 
sector in question.”474 
It is important to note that, pursuant to Article 234 al. 1 UAGCL, the subject 
matter of commercial sales contracts is “goods”. The Act does not, however, define 
the concept “goods”. As will be explained in Section 4.3.2.3 below, that concept is 
not a technical legal word. Thus, with a view to covering all objects which form the 
subject matter of commercial sales contracts, it is admitted that that notion must be 
interpreted flexibly and widely.475 In this sense, anything which may be exchanged 
may qualify as goods.476 Nonetheless, though it is not indispensable that goods be 
corporeal, “they must be moveable at the time of delivery.”477 
It is noteworthy that, despite the wide interpretation that the concept “goods” 
may have, Article 236 UAGCL excludes from the field of application of the Act 
some sales, such as those of stocks, shares,478 investment securities, negotiable 
instruments or money; and sales of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft, and sales of 
electricity.479 As far as ships, hovercraft, and aircraft are concerned, they were 
certainly excluded from the scope of the Commercial Act because they are often 
subject to registration formalities. In the DRC, for example, no ship can be used in 
service480  and no aircraft can fly in national air space481 if it is not registered. Thus, 
                                               
474
 See Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL; for a case of the application of trade usages, see Tricom 
Kin/Gombe 20 March 2007 RCE 13 Family Holding Foundation Society v Blattner & Cinat Sarl. 
475
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34; see also Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 32; Germany 17 September 1993 Oberlandesgericht 
Koblenz, CLOUT case No. 281(Computer ship).   
476
 Compare this with Articles 1 and 2 CISG. For comments, see Section 4.3.2.3 below. 
477
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 35; Ferrari OHADA 79 81. 
478
 For a case of sale of shares which would not be governed by the UAGCL, see Tricom 
Kin/Gombe 20 March 2007 RCE 13 Family Holding Foundation Society v Blattner & Cinat Sarl. 
479
 See Article 236 (c)-(f) UAGCL; compare with Article 2(c)-(f) CISG. 
480
 Articles 3 and 16 of the “Code de la Navigation Fluviale et Lacustre” Ordinance Law No. 66-
96 of 14 March 1966 (MC 1966 902). 
481
 Article 8 of the Code of Civil Aviation Law No.10/014 of 31 December 2010 (JORDC Special 
No.16 January 2011).  
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by excluding particularly registered property, the legislator intended to characterise 
it as intangible or immovable things rather than goods.482 
Briefly, it is obvious that the UAGCL is largely inspired by the CISG on the 
matter relating to commercial sales contracts’ subject-matter and items excluded 
from them as well. Subsequent to the exclusions above, likewise, it has become clear 
that sales contracts governed by the UAGCL are sales of corporeal, movable, 
tangible, and personal property between expert buyers and sellers.  
Further to the property sold, another salient element for a sale to be valid is the 
determination of the price. 
 
2.4.4 Determination of the Price 
 
In general, the price consists of the sum of money that the buyer hands to the seller 
in exchange for the thing sold. As stated by Article 264 CCO, the contract is 
enforceable between the parties the moment they have agreed, inter alia, upon the 
price. It should be noted that, as it is for the item sold, the price also requires 
particular characteristics for it to have legal effect. A propos of this, Article 272 CCO 
specifies that the price must be determined and stated by the parties. Commentators 
have complemented this by stating that the price must be certain too.483  
To require the price to be certain means that it must be real and serious.484 
Because the double character of “realism and seriousness” is of the essence of sales 
contracts, the Commercial Act legislator did not find it necessary to reintroduce this 
obligation. In effect, it appears abnormal for parties to agree on a fictional or a 
derisory price as sales are concluded for valuable consideration. Thus, given that the 
price is the counter-obligation of the buyer, it must be in keeping with the object sold 
as delivered by the seller.  
                                               
482
 Cf. Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-25, but Santos/Toe Commercial 345. Santos and Toe 
comments were made before the UAGCL be amended. The original Article 203 UAGCL does not 
expressly exclude these items from its ambit.  
483
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 382; Mweze Vente 22. 
484
 Ibid. 
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Additionally, the price must be determined or at least determinable.485 The 
requirement  for the determination of the price in commercial sales contracts results 
from Article 241 al.2 in fine UAGCL, and the first sentence of Article 263 al. 1 of 
the Commercial Act.  Article 241 al. 2 declares that a proposal for concluding a 
contract amounts to an offer on condition that, among others, it fixes the price or 
makes provision for determining it. With regard to the first sentence of Article 263 
al. 1, it obliges the buyer to pay the price agreed upon, viz. the price determined in 
the contract. As can be observed, the provisions being invoked have, as a common 
feature, the proscription of sales without price. Consequently, where parties fail to 
reach agreement on the price, there is no sale. Likewise, an offer without price is 
irrelevant. There are authorities that state that, when parties have agreed on the price, 
the contract remains valid even though the price is paid in part.486 
The principle according to which the price must be determined aligns with the 
civil law rule under Article 272 CCO which obliges the seller and buyer to determine 
the price and state it. In principle, the price is fixed upon perceptions of economic 
self-interest. The Appeal Court of Lubumbashi has ruled on the subject, however, 
that, “In commercial transactions for the price to be determined, it is sufficient that 
parties expressed the intention to make reference to a market price.”487 Such is also 
the meaning of Article 263 al. 2 UAGCL whereby, if the price is to be determined, 
parties may “make reference to the price generally charged at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in 
the same sector of activity.”488 The rule under the Appeal Court of Lubumbashi case 
                                               
485
 See Com Tournai 9 December 1947 Pas 1949 III 31; Belg Col 1950 79. 
486
 See First Inst RU 22 February 1946 RJCB 149. 
487
 Translated from, “En matière de vente commerciale, pour que le prix de la vente soit determiné, 
il suffit que les parties aient exprimé l’intention de se référer aux cours pratiqués sur le marché.” 
See L’shi 13 December 1966 RJC No. 1 54. Thus, a buyer who receives without protestation 
invoices submitted to him recognises himself to be the debtor. See L’shi 1 December 1970 RJC 
1971 No. 1 33. 
488
 Compare this with Article 55 CISG. 
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and Article 263 al. 2 UAGCL proves the acceptance of the so-called open price terms 
under modern Congolese law.489 
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the Commercial 
Court of Tournai has ruled that “the price must be determined or at least be 
determinable by a process agreed upon but which does not leave its fixing to the 
power of only one of the contracting parties.”490 Notwithstanding this principle, the 
first part of Article 273 CCO allows the price to be determined by a third party 
provided that the person appointed is able to fix it; otherwise there is no sale.”491 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion on the Basics of Commercial Sales Contracts   
 
Commercial sales contracts are important for any economic sector. Their 
performance depends, however, on some restrictions linked to the aptitude of parties 
admitted in the area, the characteristics of the contract subject matter, and the way 
the price might be fixed. With regard to the parties, they must be professional dealers, 
viz. people whose regular occupation consists of running a commercial business. As 
regards the thing sold, it must exist, be subject to exchange transactions, and be 
determined or at least determinable. That thing has to be regarded as goods and not 
fall into the list of items legally excluded from commercial transactions. Regarding 
the price, it must be certain, real, and serious, and be fixed, or at least be determinable.   
 
                                               
489
 It should be noted immediately that open-price terms are familiar to Common law legal system 
countries. In that legal family, where a contract is silent with respect to the price, an agreement to 
pay a reasonable price will be implied. See s 9 of the 1893 English Sale of Goods Act, and §2-305 
UCC; see also comments by Ziegel/Samson http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/ 
english2.html; Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11. For further comments, see Section 5.2.3.2 below.  
490
 See Com Tournai 9 December 1947 Pas 1949 III 31; Belg Col 1950 79. 
491Article 273 CCO, second part. The Belgian Cour de Cassation ruled in this regard that,  
An agreement whereby a party declares to sell and the other to buy a thing at a price being fixed 
by experts, but that does not contain fundamental elements for the determination of the price or 
the elements by relation with which the price may be fixed, does not amount to a perfect sale 
and does not entail, consequently, transfer of property of the thing to the purchaser.   
Cass B 5 June 1953 Pas 769; quoted by Katuala Code 167; see also Cass F 1st Civ  24 November 
1965 JCP 1966 II 14602 whereby, “when it is agreed that the price will be evaluated by experts 
designated by the parties, as long as the price is not determined there is no sale.” 
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2.5 Conclusion on Chapter Two  
 
Congolese legal history is linked to the Belgian civil law which, in turn, originates 
from the French civil code. This influence has had as a consequence that the DRC 
belongs to the civil law legal family with a similarity of provisions between the CCO 
and Book III of the Belgian and French civil codes. For a long time, the Congolese 
law of obligations rules were  governed by the 1888 CCO which provides, in addition 
to general principles, a number of particular rules regulating some classical contracts 
of which the contract of sale is one. The code as inherited from the colonial power 
continued to govern commercial contracts for about half a century after 
independence. Owing to a lack of modernisation, Congolese civil law rules were 
becoming out-dated and were no longer suitable for modern international trade 
requirements, and, consequently, required improvement. This occurred with the 
ratification of the OHADA Treaty which came into effect in the DRC in September 
2012. Subsequently, the UAGCL has become the main source of law for commercial 
sales contracts including international sale of goods, in addition to non-conflicting 
CCO provisions.  
A consideration of both the OHADA Commercial Act and CCO provisions 
reveals that the modern Congolese law of contract, in general, and its sales law, in 
particular, is governed by a number of basic principles that represent fundamental 
policies on the basis of which legislation is formulated. These principles include 
freedom of contract, autonomy of the will, the binding force of contractual 
obligations, consensualism, and good faith. Freedom of contract means that parties 
are at liberty to enter into a contract and to define their obligations; they are free to 
choose the law applicable to their contract as well. Most of the time, the principle of 
freedom goes together with the autonomy of the will. This allows parties to conclude 
any contract they wish and regulate its effects freely, provide that they comply with 
the needs of public policy, morality, and public interest. With regard to the 
consensual agreement rule, it entails that contracts are concluded by mutual consent. 
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Such a subjective approach has been completed by the reliance theory by which a 
contract may result from the conduct displayed by one party. In any event, though 
parties are not obliged to enter into contract, any regular contract concluded by them 
constitutes the law for their rights and the obligations that they are obliged to perform 
in good faith. 
In conclusion, Article 7 al. 1 CCO and Article 237 al. 1 UAGCL specify that 
all contracts are subject to common general rules provided by the civil code, in 
addition to commercial law supplementary provisions, whether they have or do not 
have a special designation. This means that the common principles analysed above 
apply also to international sale of goods contracts. Considered in this sense, chapter 
two has set the background scene for the more specific comparative discussions in 
chapters five and six.  
Chapter Three 
 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
AND THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN  
LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The historical development of South African law is largely linked to the coming of 
the early Dutch settlers to the Cape and, to a certain extent, to the influence of English 
common law. This history has been exhaustively written by eminent scholars.1 This 
chapter, therefore, does not aim to rewrite a comprehensive discussion of the 
historical development of South African law. Its goal rather is to give a succinct and 
rough idea of that evolution, before summarising the fundamental principles of South 
African contract law and the essential elements of its sales contracts. It is necessary 
to say immediately that the basic principles of the law of contract in South Africa 
include, inter alia, the need for an agreement, the freedom of contract, the 
requirement of good faith in contracts, and their consistency with public policy. 
Concerning the foundations of sales contracts, they consist of agreement on the thing 
sold and the payment of the price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 See among others, Wessels History; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 329-596; Hahlo/Kahn Union; 
Edwards History; Edwards Outline 268-375; Fagan Historical Context 33-64; Van der Merwe et al 
South Africa Report 95.  
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3.2 The Historical Development of South African Law  
 
3.2.1 Introduction  
 
This section deals successively with the reception of Roman-Dutch law into South 
Africa, the reasons  for its preservation in spite of English colonisation, and the 
impact that  colonisation has had on modern South African law. It also discusses the 
South African law legal family membership as a mixed jurisdiction, and the means 
by which South African law has acquired its independence under the direction of the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
3.2.2 Reception of Roman-Dutch Law into South Africa 
  
To start with, South African law “rested on Germanic custom, substantially modified 
and supplemented by the compilations of Justinian.”2 This law was largely connected 
with the arrival of Dutch colonisers in the Cape. According to South African law 
historians, three ships of the East India Company, named the Vereenigde 
Geoctryeerde Oost-Indische Companie (VOC), arrived in Table Bay on 6 April 1652 
to establish a refreshment station for ships on their way to the Indies.3 Shortly after 
this, Jan van Riebeeck, the first commandant of the Cape settlement, arrived and with 
him the Dutch India Company took possession of the Cape of Good Hope on behalf 
of the United Netherlands.4 When he arrived at the Cape, Jan van Riebeeck certainly 
did not find virgin territory.5 There were indigenous inhabitants in the Cape whose 
                                               
2
 Schreiner Contribution 5; see also Joubert Contract 2; and Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 329-565. 
3
 Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46; Fagan Historical Context 33 35; Hahlo/Kahn Union 10; Edwards 
History 65; Edwards Outline 268 337; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 9; Kleyn/Viljoen 
Guide 32; Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95. 
4
 See Kahn Doctrine 224; Fagan Historical Context 33 35; Hahlo/Kahn Union 2. 
5
 Fagan Historical Context 33 35, but Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97 98 for whom, Dutch 
settlers occupied the Cape and established their communities as if the Cape was entirely 
uninhabited. 
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law was, unfortunately, never recognised as the law generally applicable in that area.6 
So, Jan van Riebeeck and his Dutch companions “introduced the general principles 
and rules of law prevailing at that date in the Netherlands, whether in the shape of 
custom, legislation, treatises on law, or judicial decisions,”7 and transplanted them 
into the Cape.8 The legal system brought by them was soon known as the “Roomsch-
Hollandsche Recht”,9 translated in English as the “Roman-Dutch law”.10  
Initially, Roman-Dutch law was the product of the fusion of the law of Holland 
and Roman law.11 As far as Roman law is concerned, it had begun to influence Dutch 
law in the thirteenth century. Its influence increased in the fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries. It is fair to say that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Roman-
Dutch law acquired a semblance of autonomy. This occurred via “the writings of 
practising lawyers and teachers of law and the decisions of the courts in Holland and 
its associated provinces of the United Netherlands.”12 In spite of such apparent 
                                               
6
 See Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69; Edwards Outline 268 338 in Fn11. 
7
 Hutchison Principles 27; see also Roos/Reitz Principles 2. 
8
 Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46; Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1  Lesotho LJ 97 98; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 
7; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 9; Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95.  
9
 Schreiner Contribution 5; Kahn Doctrine 224-225; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 74; 
Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46; Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97 98. The expression 
Roomsch-Hollandsche Recht was inherited from Somon van Leeuwen in 1664. See Joubert 
Contract 2; Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46. 
10
 Schreiner Contribution 5; see also Du Bois Principles 67; Hutchison Principles 1; Lotz Sale 361; 
Eiselen http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eiselen2.html (last accessed 3-7-2012); Oosthuizen 
Rights 4; Kleyn/ Viljoen  Guide 19. According to Kahn, the expression “Roman-Dutch law” “is 
not an accurate translation of the phrase “Roomsch-Hollandsche Recht”. The latter expression 
should be correctly translated as the “Roman-Hollands law” because there was no law of the 
Netherlands as a whole at that time. The author specifies that Roman-Dutch law refers rather to 
“the law of Holland that was taken over.” Kahn justifies his position by the fact that the Netherlands 
was a confederation of seven independent provinces. See Kahn Doctrine 224 225; Kahn 1985 (1) 
1 Lesotho LJ 69 74; see also Wessels History 356-357; Hahlo/Kahn Union 10; Visser Daedalus 6; 
Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97 98. It is necessary to say that under Southern African 
influence,  Roman-Dutch law is also the legal system applicable in the countries that surround 
South Africa, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Angola and 
Mozambique follow the civil law legal system, whereas Malawi and Zambia belong to the common 
law legal family. See Saurombe 2009 (21) SA Merc LJ 695 698; Hawthorne 2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 
71; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 324; Zimmerman Roman law 41 44-45; Edwards Outline 268 
360; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 578; Kleyn/Viljoen Guide 32. 
11
 Kahn Doctrine 224 225; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 483; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 7. 
12
 Ibid.  
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independence, Roman-Dutch law was, from the outset, civil in nature because of the 
effect of Roman law on Dutch law.13  
It should be noted that during the seventeenth century, the Kingdom of the 
United Netherlands was very prosperous.14 The Kingdom was amongst the most 
economically important world powers and had some of the greater scientists and 
philosophers of that time, particularly Grotius, Voet, Vinnius, Ulrich Huber, Van 
Groenewegen, and Van Leeuwen.15  Owing to that proficiency, the United 
Netherlands became involved in the adventure of exploration. When Dutch settlers 
came to the Cape, they carried with them “their own native legal system.”16  From 
their arrival, the rules of law in force in Holland were recognised in the Cape as well, 
so that Roman-Dutch law was at times accepted to be “the common law of the 
Republic of South Africa.”17 Wessels has written on the subject that,  
The common law of the province of Holland was accepted as the common law of 
the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope. All ordinances, therefore, of the States-
General and of the States of Holland which were not of purely local application were 
recognised as law at the Cape of Good Hope. Of the ordinances passed either by the 
States-General or by the States of Holland, those which were enacted for the Dutch 
Republic and its dependencies or for the province of Holland undoubtedly applied 
to the Cape as well.18 
The Netherlands was a confederacy of seven Provinces, each with its own laws. 
Thus, in order to introduce a measure of certainty in the colonies, it was important to 
designate, among those provinces, one whose law would govern the Cape. Given that 
Holland was the most influential member province of the VOC; its legal system was 
                                               
13
 Roos/Reitz Principles 2; Kahn Doctrine 224 225; Schreiner Contribution 5; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 
Lesotho LJ 69 72; Joubert Contract 1; Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis 
Introduction 234; Wessels Contract xviii. 
14
 Zimmerman Roman law 41 45; Wessels History 249; Hahlo/Kahn Union 2; Edwards History 65; 
Edwards Outline 268 337; Kleyn/Viljoen Guide 32. 
15
 Zimmerman Roman law 41 45; Wessels History 249-350. 
16
 For a better understanding of the reception of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, see Kahn 1985 
(1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69-95; Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97-120; Fagan Historical Context 33-
64; Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46; Edwards Outline 268 338. 
17
 See Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 578; Wessels History 356; and Du Bois Principles 67. The phrase 
“common law” as used in this study refers to “a non-codified legal system” based on customary 
and judicial precedents. 
18
 Wessels History 356-357. 
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preferred.19 With regard to the law of contract, Roman-Dutch law brought to South 
Africa was, however, essentially Roman.20 As Joubert has stated, Roman contract 
law received in Holland and carried to South Africa through the Roman-Dutch law 
label was the law set out in the Justinian “Corpus Iuris Civilis as accepted, explained, 
and modified by Glossators, Commentators and other writers”21 in different countries 
such as Germany, and Holland. 
During the nineteenth century, the Netherlands was forced to adopt the French 
Code Napoleon.22 In 1838, the country adopted its own civil code linked to the 
French civil code model.23 Concerning the Cape, it was occupied by the British 
during the course of Napoleonic wars in Europe. Roman-Dutch law, therefore, 
escaped from the codification movement of Western European countries.24 As a 
result of this, the un-codified Roman-Dutch law survived and remains the foundation 
of South African common law.25  
                                               
19
 This statement is formulated in Spies v Lombard 1950 (3) 469 (A) 481sq as follows: 
If one considers the Constitution of the Netherlands at the time of the settlement of the Cape 
and during all relevant times thereafter, it must be obvious that enactments of the Estates of the 
province of Holland could have had no application proprio vigore to other provinces of the 
Netherlands or to the Dutch possession beyond the seas. It was always the conscious policy of 
the East India Company to avoid all suggestion that any particular province of the Netherlands 
or its laws enjoyed a kind of hegemony in the overseas possessions (…).  
Excerpt reported in Fagan Historical Context 33 39; and Hahlo/Kahn Union 14. Van den Heever J A 
specified this in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 (1) SA 865-866 by stating that, since South 
Africa observes the law of Holland, the country “must exclude the Romanists of other countries as 
well as the pragmatists from neighbouring regions.”  
20
 See Joubert Contract 2; Christie/Bradfield Contract 2-3; Hahlo/Kahn Union 444. 
21
 Joubert Contract 2; on the general development of Roman-Dutch law, see Wessels History 13ff. 
As has been said by Hahlo and Kahn (Legal System 581), “Roman-Dutch law is one of the few 
surviving legal systems (…) of which Roman law forms a living part (...).  
22
 See Hondius Code Civil 157; Wijffels Contrats 32; Lesaffer History 53; Van Caenegem 
Introduction 152; see also Zimmerman Roman Law 41 46; Kahn Doctrine 224 228; Hahlo/Kahn 
Union 18; and comments in Section 2.2.4 above. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 According to the views of a number of commentators, the continuity of the ius commune in 
Southern Africa has not been disturbed by codification interference. See Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 
Lesotho LJ 97; Visser Daedalus 6; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 8. The Roman-Dutch law 
codification was sometimes advocated by Wessels to save the legal system from the influence of 
English law. His recommendation was unsuccessful and today it seems that no one pleads for such 
an exercise. See Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97 Fn2; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 81.  
25
 Fagan Historical Context 33 41; Du Bois Principles 67; Hutchison Principles 1; Schreiner 
Contribution 6; Wessels History 356-357; Visser Daedalus 2 and 6; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 8; 
Edwards History 89. Kahn (Doctrine 224 231) believes that, up to the present time, there is still a 
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It is evident that any legal system is subject to change in conformity with the 
traditions and the needs of the community that it regulates.26 That is to say that, 
modern South African law is obviously different from that which was introduced into 
the Cape in the seventeenth century. As is stated by case law, the “(…) country has 
reached a stage in its national development (…) (that) its existing law can better be 
described as South African than Roman-Dutch.”27 That law has, however, been 
considerably influenced by English common law.28  
Succinctly, current South African law can be defined as a mixture of English 
common law and a “pre-codal civil law” found in Holland before the adoption of 
Napoleonic style codes in the earlier part of the nineteenth century.29 One might be 
surprised by the preservation of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa despite the British 
settlement. The reasons for such survival do not lack legal justification. 
 
3.2.3 The Conserving of Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa 
 
The preservation of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa may be explained by events 
which occurred in the country at multiple steps. Firstly, the Articles of the Capitulation 
of 1795, giving effect to what is considered to be the first South African British 
Occupation, which ended in 1803, allowed the settlers to “retain all the privileges 
which they now enjoy.”30 Three weeks  after the occupation, General Craig instructed 
                                               
general resistance to the codification of the entire South African law in the strict sense of being 
self-contained, not allowing for reference to earlier law.  
26
 See Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 7; Edwards History 89. 
27
 See Ex parte De Winnaar 1959 (1) SA 837 (N) 839; R v Goseb 1956 (2) SA 696 (SWA) 698; 
see also Du Bois Principles 67. 
28
 See Schreiner Contribution 6; Edwards History 80&89; Wessels History 386ff; Van Warmelo 
Vicissitudes 8; Visser Daedalus 3; Kleyn/Viljoen Guide 32-33.  
29
 See Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 836; Lotz Sale 361 362; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69; 
Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97; Sanders 1981 (14) CILSA 328; Hahlo/Kahn Union 42. In 
the words of Kahn (Doctrine 224), South African law is a “cross-bred jurisdiction composed of 
civil and common law”, with the predominance of the civil law. But, Visser believes that the role 
fulfilled by both English law and Roman-Dutch law, in respect of South African law, is identical. 
See Visser Daedalus 2; see also Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 1&9. 
30
 See Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 70; Edwards History 75; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis 
Introduction 10. 
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the former Court of Justice, to “administer justice (…) in the same manner as has been 
customary until now (…), and in accordance with existing laws, (including Roman-
Dutch law), statutes and ordinances,”31 in both civil and criminal matters.  
Secondly, though the Cape was retroceded to the Batavian Republic from 1803 
to 1806, the ordinances of the Government of Batavia appear to have retained 
Roman-Dutch law as well.32 By the time the British took over the Cape, however, 
“the law showed few marks of its prolonged sojourn in South Africa. Such changes 
as there were (not many or very important ones) had been made in the Netherlands, 
not in South Africa or Batavia.”33 Thirdly, when the second British permanent 
occupation took place in 1806, the Articles of Capitulation of 10 and 18 January 1806 
once again allowed Roman-Dutch law to continue to have application.34 This 
inference has been deduced from Article 8 of the 1806 Articles of Capitulation which 
authorised citizens to continue to enjoy their existing rights and privileges. There is 
unanimity that the preservation of Roman-Dutch law during the first and the second 
British occupations was the consequence of British constitutional practice laid down 
in the Calvin,35 and Campbell v Hall cases.36 In the Campbell v Hall case, for 
instance, Lord Mansfield ruled that, “in lands acquired by conquest or cession from 
a civilized power the existing law remains operative unless and until altered by the 
new sovereign.”37 Insofar as South Africa is concerned, the King, and later the 
                                               
31
 Ibid; see also Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 104. 
32
 In his book relating to Roman-Dutch law history, Wessels (History 358-359) doubts whether or 
not the Code of Batavian law was applicable in the Cape.  If not, it is then implied that the law 
applicable at that period was Roman-Dutch law.  
33
 Fagan Historical Context 33 40. 
34
 See Hahlo/Kahn Union 17 Fn32 for a controversial point of view.  
35
 See Calvin (1608) 7 Coke’s Reports 1 (ER 377 398); reported in Fagan Historical Context 33 
56; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 8. It was ruled in this case that, “for if a King come to a Christian 
Kingdom by conquest, seeing that he hath vitae et necis protestatem, he may at his pleasure alter 
and change the laws of that Kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient 
laws of that kingdom remain.” 
36
 See Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowper 204; 98 ER 1045 1047; reported in Zimmerman Roman 
Law 41 46; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 70; Fagan Historical Context 33 55; Van Warmelo 
Vicissitudes 8; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 10-11; Van der Merwe et al South Africa 
Report 95 109; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 575; and Hawthorne 2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 71 72. 
37
 Compell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowper 204; 98 ER 1045 1047. Such is also the modern public 
international law approach in respect of conquered territories. As Bouvier (Dictionary 213) has 
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Queen, did not alter the legal system in force in that region which was dominantly 
Roman-Dutch law. Thus, Roman-Dutch law again remained operational. 
When Great Britain occupied the Cape following the general peace settlement 
concluded by the Convention of London of 13 August 1814, likewise, the existing 
Roman-Dutch law legal system stayed, once more, having application. The same 
situation prevailed following the First and the Second Charters of Justice in 1827 and 
1832.38 Furthermore, the 1857 Commission of Enquiry recognised the prevalence of 
Roman-Dutch law in its report, dated 10 November 1858.39 The Commission 
reported, “(…) the Roman-Dutch law which consists of the Civil or Roman laws as 
modified by the law passed by the legislature of Holland, and by the customs of that 
country, forms the great bulk of the law of the colony.”40 From the Cape, Roman-
Dutch law was subsequently approved in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and 
Natal.41 
As Zimmermann summarises,  
Within the next few decades the territorial sphere of influence of Roman-Dutch law 
grew considerably, for it was adopted in the three independent Republics, Natal, 
Orange Free State and Transvaal, created by the ‘Boers’ who emigrated from the 
Cape Colony; and as in the Cape, it remained in force even when these Republics 
became British territories. It is therefore not surprising that after the South Africa 
Act of 1909 had brought about the unification of the four colonies in 1910, Roman-
Dutch law was generally taken to have become the common law of the new Union 
                                               
said, “It is a general rule (of Public law) that where conquered countries, have laws of their own, 
these laws remain in force after the conquest, until they are abrogated (…),” or changed by the new 
sovereign.  
38
 A propos of this, s 31 of the 1832 Second Charter of Justice allowed the Supreme Court of the 
Cape to administer justice in accordance with “the laws now in force within our said colony, and 
all such other laws as shall at any time hereafter be made (…).” See Hahlo/Kahn Union 17; Kahn 
1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 70. 
39
 See Report of the Commission of Enquiry upon the state of the law in the Cape, published in the 
Preface to Statute Law of the Cape of Good Hope (1862) vi; known as the Colebrook-Bigge 
Commission.  
40
 Excerpt quoted in Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 72; Hahlo/Kahn Union 17. 
41
 See Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 576; Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 99-102. 
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of South Africa.42 This position was perpetuated under the Constitutions of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1961 and 1983.43  
The new South African Constitution Act No. 108 of 1996 did not derogate from that 
principle. Its Schedule 6, s 2, relating to the continuation of existing law, maintained 
all the laws that were in force at the time the Constitution took effect.44 Pursuant to 
this provision, previous laws, which included Roman-Dutch law, had to remain in 
force until they were amended or repealed, or unless they were judged by the 
Constitutional Court to be in conflict with the Constitution.45 
It is clear then that Roman-Dutch law survived the British occupation. This 
does not mean, however, that colonisation was without impact on South African law.  
 
3.2.4 The Effect of the English Settlement on South African Law 
 
In 1821 the Deputy Colonial Secretary, Henry Ellis, compiled a circumstantial report 
on the means by which justice was administered in the Cape. Subsequent to this 
report, the need for a progressive “Anglicisation” of local law appeared to be ever 
more insistent. Accordingly, two Commissioners, namely Bigge and Colebrook, 
were given the task of thinking through the necessity “of a gradual assimilation of 
the forms and principles of English jurisprudence to the Roman-Dutch” law.46  In 
their report, dated 6 September 1826, Bigge and Colebrook suggested that “South 
African legal procedure be based on that of England; that future enactments be 
                                               
42
 See s 135 of the South Africa Act (9 Edw. 7, c.9) in which, “Subject to the provisions of this Act, 
all laws in force in the several colonies at the establishment of the Union shall continue in force in 
the respective provinces until repealed or amended (…).” 
43
 Zimmerman Roman Law 41 47; on the Roman-Dutch law progressive insertion in provinces 
other than the Cape, see Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 71; Edwards History 84-87. 
44
 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996, Sch. 6 amended by s 3 of 
Act No. 35 of 1997; by s 5 of Act No. 65 of 1998; and by s 20 of Act No. 34 of 2001. The first 
paragraph of the above provision specifies: 
2. (1) All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force, subject to- 
a) any amendment or repeal; and 
b) consistency with the new Constitution. 
45
 See Sch. 6, s 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution Act No. 108 of 1996.  
46
 Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 72-74; see also Edwards History 79; Edwards Outline 268 352; 
Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 32. 
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framed in the spirit of English jurisprudence; and that gradually the English common 
law be adopted”,47 except for the Dutch law of property.48 With regard to commercial 
matters, the Colebrook-Bigge Commission realised that Roman-Dutch law was 
singularly deficient,49 so that it necessitated a thoughtful improvement. 
 On receipt of the Bigge report, Goderich, then Secretary of State for the 
colonies, sought how to avoid legal litigation in South Africa. In his guiding 
principle, dated 5 August 1827, to Major-General Bourke, acting Governor, 
Goderich warned British government against making any premature legal change. 
He said,  
His Majesty’s Government have however found themselves constrained to dissent 
from the immediate adoption of a measure of so much importance and difficulty. I 
am fully prepared to admit the propriety and importance of gradually assimilating 
the Law of the Colony to the Law of England. But, still, it is obvious that the Roman-
Dutch Law adequately provides for all the ordinaries exigencies of life in every form 
of Society. (…) An entire change in all the Rules of Law respecting Property, 
Contracts, Wills and descents, must unavoidably induce extreme confusion and 
distress; nor (…) is it very evident what compensatory advantage would be 
obtained.50  
Despite this precaution, English law started to gain access into South African law 
progressively. Its influence was either straightforward, through legislation, or 
incidental, through judicial decisions and legal practices. A number of commentators 
have compared the method by which English law influenced South African law to 
the way Roman law entered European law.51 To illustrate this with Hahlo and Kahn’s 
statement,  
The process by which English doctrines and principles infiltrated into the law of the 
Cape resembles in many respects the reception of Roman law on the Continent 
during the fifteen and sixteenth centuries. Some English institutions marched into 
                                               
47
 Ibid; see also Kahn Doctrine 224 226; Hahlo/Kahn Union 18; Christie/Bradfield Contract 8. 
48
 Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 74. It was suggested that the law of property remained intact 
because that law was known “so simple and efficient.” See, in addition to Khan, Van der Merwe et 
al South Africa Report 95 105 in fine. 
49
 As will be mentioned later, mercantile law is one of the fields where the direct influence of 
English Statutes was most obvious.  
50
 Report extract quoted by Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 72; and Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 32. 
51
 These commentators include Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 76; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 576; 
Hahlo/Kahn Union 18; Zimmerman Roman law 41 48. 
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our law openly along the highway of legislative enactment, to the sound of the brass 
bands of royal commissions and public discussion. Others slipped into it quietly and 
unobtrusively alongside-roads and by-paths.52 
In general, English law had greatest influence where private Roman-Dutch law was 
least developed, unclear, or old-fashioned.53 Its favourite domains included criminal 
law and criminal procedural law, constitutional law, and the law of evidence.54 
Another group of fields of English law with important influence, under the private law 
environment, included the law of domicile and aspects of choice of law in the conflict 
of laws, the law of the formation of contract, and the law of remedies for breach of 
contract.55 Insofar as the formation of contract is concerned, numerous scholars admit 
that the contemporary South African law model of contracting by way of “offer and 
acceptance” is an approach that owes much to the English common law.56  
Additionally, other branches where the influence of English law was very 
noticeable included company law, merchant shipping, insurance, and negotiable 
instruments, and, in short, mercantile law.57 In effect, by contrast to South African 
law, English law had already been influenced by the continental jus mercatorum. 
Thus, in matters regarding mercantile law, English statutes were merely adopted 
“with only such minor changes to suit local conditions or to fit into existing South 
African law.”58 In practice, when applying those acts, the courts were of a mind to 
                                               
52
 Hahlo/Kahn Union 18; confirmed by Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 76; and Zimmerman Roman 
Law 41 48.  
53
 Kahn Doctrine 224 229; Hahlo/Kahn Union 21. 
54
 For an illustration, the Cape Constitution was framed in Britain. With regard to the law of evidence, 
there were provisions that, in the case of silence of the existing law, English law was to be applied. 
See Schreiner Contribution 10; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 9; Kleyn/Viljoen Guide 33; Palmer Mixed 
Jurisdictions 79; Van der Merwe South Africa Report 95 108. For a series of statutes similar to 
English law enacted in different South African legal fields, see Hahlo/Kahn Union 18-19. 
55
 See authorities quoted by Kahn Doctrine 224 229-230; Schreiner Contribution 10; but Wessels 
Contract xviii for whom South African contract law is nearer civil law countries than the English 
law of contract.  
56
 Schreiner Contribution 41; Christie/Bradfield Contract 31. 
57
 See Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 576; Edwards History 81; Hahlo/Kahn Union 19. Hahlo and Kahn 
describe mercantile law as the field where English influence was strongest because in that field, 
“Whole statutes were taken over, by reference or by re-promulgation as Cape statutes, from the law 
of England.”  
58
 See Schreiner Contribution 10; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 11-12; Edwards History 81; Palmer 
Mixed Jurisdictions 82. Amongst South African statutes based on their equivalent English law 
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rely on English authorities as a matter of course. As ruled in Mutual and Federal 
Insurance Co Ltd v Municipality of Oudtshoorn, for instance, “the reference to 
English decisions [was] usually justified on the basis of the similar wording of the 
acts, but just as often the English cases [were] quoted as if they were South African 
decisions.”59  
In contrast to the first group of legal fields above, English law did not have a  
noticeable  influence in branches where Roman-Dutch law was clearly developed, 
such as the law of property, the law of succession, family law, and, above all, with 
regard to specific contracts like sales and lease.60 Several of these legal fields had 
already been elaborated on by civil law principles borrowed from Roman law.  
When it comes to the role of judicial decisions, the greatest contribution of 
English law is encountered in the adherence, by South Africa, to “the principle of 
precedent” known also as the doctrine of stare decisis.61 The stare decisis principle 
implies that regular previous judicial decisions are binding on the court which 
actually pronounced them, and also on lower courts which are subordinate to the one 
                                               
regulations, mention should be made of the 1855 Merchant Shipping Act; the 1861 Cape 
Companies Limited Liability Act; and the 1893 Bills of Exchange Act. See all these acts as quoted 
by Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 76-77; Hahlo/Kahn Union 19-20; Van der Merwe South Africa 
Report 95 149-160. Nowadays, recent South African Acts dealing with commercial matters have 
been influenced by international instruments. That is the case for the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (ECT Act), influenced by the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce (EC Model Law). Cf. Eiselen 2007 (10) 2 PER/PELJ 48; Coetzee 2006 (18) 
SA Merc LJ 245 258; Van der Merwe et al Contract 62. That is also the case for the Consumer 
Protection Act No. 68 of 2008 (CPA), influenced to a certain degree by the CISG. For an overview, 
see Van Eeden Guide 1ff. 
59
 See Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Municipality of Oudtshoorn 1985 (1) SA 419 (A).  
60
 See Kahn Doctrine 224 230; Visser Daedalus 3; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 12. This does not 
mean that these fields escaped the influence of English law at all. As a whole, the latter legal system 
influenced almost all the departments of South African law, of course, to different degrees. See 
Wessels History 236.  
61
 See Schreiner Contribution 11;  Zimmerman Roman Law 41 48 & 52; Edwards Outline 268 355; 
Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 836; Hahlo/Kahn Union 20 & 29; Edwards History 82; Van 
Warmelo Vicissitudes 10; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 11; Kleyn/Viljoen Guide 33; 
see also authorities quoted by Du Bois Principles 76  in Fn63. The stare decisis rule is generally 
defined as “the English doctrine of a rule established by the binding authority of a single case.” See 
Butte in Dainow Decisions 311. 
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which handed down the relevant judgements.62 To give an example of this, pursuant 
to s 166 of the Constitution, the South African judicial system comprises the 
Constitutional Court (CC), the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), High Courts, 
Magistrates’ Courts, and other courts. Within this structure, the CC is the highest 
court in all matters, whether constitutional or not.63  
In the application of the doctrine of the precedent, the CC is bound by its own 
decisions. The highest court must at all times follow its own previous decisions on 
the same point of law, unless it is convinced that any such decision was wrong.64 In 
the same way, the decisions of the CC bind the SCA and other lower courts in the 
classification which must follow their ruling.65 The reason for such an approach is 
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 See Hutchison Principles 31; Schreiner Contribution 11-12; Hahlo/Kahn Union 30; Du Bois 
Principles 76; and Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 136.  
63
 See Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 120 & 173; see also s 167(3) (a) Constitution; 
and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (CCT 105/10 [2011] ZACC 
30 (17 November 2011) 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). In the Everfresh Market Virginia case, for instance, 
the CC ruled on the enforceability of a contract of lease, though it is purely a civil matter. When 
the CC came into existence in the 1994s, it was the highest court for all constitutional issues, 
whereas the SCA (then Appellate Division –AD) enjoyed the same privilege for civil, commercial, 
penal, and all other matters (Cf. Second sentence of s 168(3) of the Constitution). As Van der 
Merwe and others have said,  
From 1994 to 1997 (when the interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, was in effect), the 
Appellate Division was precluded from hearing any constitutional matter. Any appeal from a 
provincial division of the Supreme Court, (now called the High Court) on a constitutional 
question had to bypass the Appellate Division and go directly to the Constitutional Court. Since 
1997 and the coming into effect of the “Final Constitution” (Act 108 of 1996) (…), the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (…) has been brought back into the constitutional loop, but its decisions on 
constitutional matters, unlike its decisions in all other cases, can still be appealed to the 
Constitutional Court. 
See Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 120. For one illustrative case, see Napier v 
Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) which was appealed before the CC in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 
5 SA 323 (CC). 
64
 In Habib Motan v Transvaal Government 1904 T.S. 404 413, Innes CJ said, with regard to the 
former AD, that, “It is a lesser evil for a court to override its own legal opinion, clearly shown to 
be wrong, than indefinitely to perpetuate its error.” For further authorities in respect of the same 
Court, see Hutchison Principles 31-32 in Fn39 to 43; Hahlo/Kahn Union 30 in Fn18 and 25. The 
doctrine of precedent distinguishes the common law from the civil law. Contrary to common law, 
under civil law, previous judgements play only an illustrative meaning to the way in which the 
latter case has to be decided. They are, in other words, merely taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of legal rules. As Carbonnier has said, previous judgements are in practice, 
“authorities given respect in fact, if not in law.” Carbonnier Authorities 91; see also Van Warmelo 
Vicissitudes 10. 
65
 As  ruled in Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA), [2001] 11 BCLR 
1197 (CC), 2001 2 SACR 197 (SCA),  
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given in one of the CC’s decisions in Ministry v Interim Medical and Dental Council 
of South Africa and Others.66 In this case, the Court stated, “Each case that is decided, 
adds to the body of South African law, and establishes principles relevant to the 
decision of cases which may arise in the future.”67 Because case law create the law, 
it follows that judicial decisions “may only be departed from by courts higher than 
the court that gave the earlier decision, (…) or by the same or an equivalent court, 
when the second court must be satisfied that the earlier decision was wrong.”68 
Moreover, s 173 of the Constitution mandates higher courts, viz. the CC, the SCA, 
and the High Courts “to develop the common law” by making it uniform throughout 
the country.69 One of the ways suggested by the Fundamental Law is to devote 
attention to the interests of justice, particularly by giving effect to the rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights.70 
                                               
High Courts are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the Supreme Court of Appeal, whether 
they relate to constitutional issues or to other issues, and remain so obliged unless and until the 
Supreme Court of Appeal itself decides otherwise or [the Constitutional] Court does so in 
respect of a constitutional issue. 
See also Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC), [2002] 7 
BCLR 663 (CC); Kerr 2008 (125) SALJ 241 246; Hawthorne 2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 71 85-86. 
66
 Ministry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 
(CC) §3 per Chaskalson P. 
67
 See Ministry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 
1127 (CC); supported by Langa DP in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 
1999 (2) SA 83 (CC) §9.  
68
 See National Chemsearch (SA) v Borrowman and Another 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) 1101; see also 
Schreiner Contribution 11; Hahlo/Kahn Union 32. But Strydom v Afrox 2001 4 All SA 618 (T) 
whereby, Mavundla AJ argued that High Courts could depart from pre-constitutional decisions of 
the AD when exercising their powers in terms of s 39(2) of the Constitution. Mavundla’s decision 
was revoked on the grounds that, even in similar circumstances, High Courts are bound by all pre-
constitutional AD decisions as long as these have not been amended by the CC or the SCA. See 
also Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC), [2002] 7 
BCLR 663 (CC); Hawthorne 2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 71 79, 82, and 85. 
69
 As stipulated by s 173 of the Constitution, the CC, SCA, and High Courts “have the inherent power 
to protect and regulate their own process, and ‘to develop the common law’, taking into account the 
interests of justice.” See also sections 8(3), 39(2) and (3) of the Constitution which  require the same 
courts to develop the common law when interpreting legislation, or when they are called to apply a 
constitutional right. For an illustration, see the Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd case. With regard to the role played by their predecessor AD in developing South 
African common law, see cases quoted by Edwards History 90-92; Kahn Doctrine 224 231 Fn16.  
70
 See Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 326E-F; see also Hawthorne 2006 
(12) 2 Fundamina 71 82; Hawthorne 2003 (15) Merc L J 271. 
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Requiring supreme courts to develop the common law, or to take into account 
the wellbeing of justice, suffices to show the interests modern South African law 
attaches to the stare decisis principle.71 For that reason, one commentator was right 
to describe the recourse to the doctrine of precedent as “the most significant 
connection between South African law and Anglo-American law, and the most 
divergence from the Roman-Dutch law as well as the other legal systems that grew 
out the ius commune.”72 In application of the principle of the precedent, decisions of 
the CC make the law in the same way as statutes passed by the Parliament in civil 
law jurisdictions do.73 
Lastly, with regard to legal practice, the main English law influence seems to 
be the introduction of English as the language of the court.74 Owing to the limited 
number of legal scholars in the Cape, the mother country was obliged to appoint 
English lawyers for South African courts. These had a little knowledge of the Dutch 
or Latin languages. Furthermore, translations into English of Roman-Dutch and Latin 
authorities appeared slowly, whereas English books and reports were easily 
accessible.75 Owing to this situation, South African advocates and judges liked to 
refer to English law sources for inspiration. In addition, the preference for English 
material “was often justified with the specious argument that the Roman-Dutch law 
authorities were either silent on the point in question or advocated a solution identical 
to the one in English law.”76 Thus, in order to make the work easier for lawyers 
trained largely in England; English was adopted as the official language of the court. 
As a result of this, English rules and concepts were gradually introduced into South 
                                               
71
 On the basis and practical field of operation of the doctrine of precedent, see Du Bois Principles 
76-92. 
72
 See Du Bois Principles 76; finding support from Coetzee J in Trade Fairs and Promotions (Pty) 
Ltd v Thomson 1984 (4) SA 177 (W) 184.  
73
 To use the words of Palmer at 44-45, “judges are simultaneously “law-creators and policy 
makers.” In connection with the earlier AD, see Visser Daedalus 2; Hutchison Principles 31.  
74
 See Hahlo/Kahn Union 20; Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 78; Zimmerman Mixed System 41 
49; Kahn Doctrine 224 229. 
75
 See Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 78; Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 578; Edwards Outline 268 
355; Zimmerman Mixed System 41 49; Hahlo/Kahn Union 20; Joubert Contract 3; Edwards 
History 82; Wessels Contract xix. 
76
 Zimmerman Mixed System 41 49; see also Wessels Contract xviii - x. 
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African law so that, according to Hahlo and Kahn, Roman-Dutch law was assuming 
an anglicised aspect.77 
To conclude this with Wessels’ words,  
Roman-Dutch law has been influenced by English law far more than people think. 
Sometimes the influence has been open and overwhelming, as when (…) English 
law (…) was introduced by legislation, first at the Cape and afterwards throughout 
the whole of South Africa. At other times English legal ideas have crept in 
insidiously and, as it were, almost by accident.78 
The coexistence of Roman-Dutch law and English common law in South Africa has 
constituted the main characteristic in defining the modern South African law legal 
system membership as a mixed jurisdiction.  
 
3.2.5 Modern South African Law Legal Family – a mixed legal system  
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, each country in the world has its own law. For 
comparative purposes, however, scholars have tried to gather those different laws 
into legal families79 among which two are preeminent for this study, the civil law 
family and the common law family. Most of the countries belong to either one of 
these legal systems. South Africa, in particular, belongs to a legal system which is 
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 Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 575; supported by Zimmerman Mixed System 41 49. As Hahlo and Kahn  
have said at 585, 
If one accepts  (…) that the term ‘Roman-Dutch law’ originally denoted the whole of the legal 
system that prevailed in Holland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, (…), it will 
be seen that the area within which  Roman-Dutch law applies has been considerably narrowed 
down. Today Roman-Dutch law constitutes an important part of South African law, but it is not 
all of it. By legislation and otherwise, important areas of the law (…) have been either 
completely or partially refashioned on English lines. The same holds true of the organisation of 
our courts, the judiciary, and the profession. 
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 Wessels 1920 or 1929 (37) SALJ 265; cited in Hahlo/Kahn Union 18; see also Wessels History 
386ff. 
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 Several classifications of legal families have been proposed depending on the criteria chosen by 
the author. Without a need to recall those criteria, it is necessary to note that the major modern 
legal families are the “Romano-Germanic family”, generally referred to as the civil law legal 
family, the “Anglo-American family”, also known as the common law family, the “Socialist legal 
family”, and the “Religious legal family” which includes Islamic and Hindu laws. For a 
comprehensive classification of contemporary legal families in the word, see David/Brierley Legal 
Systems 1ff; Saidav Comparative 141-337; Zweigert/Kötz Comparative 63-319; see also Klimas 
Contract 1; Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 1. 
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neither fully civil law nor Anglo-American common law. That system is known as 
“Roman-Dutch law”; it is a mixed or hybrid legal system.80 In other words, because 
of the concurrent influence of English and Roman-Dutch law on South Africa, 
contemporary South African law incorporates both civil law legal system rules with 
Anglo-American common law legal family principles. As was mentioned above, as 
in Anglo-American common law countries, South African law has “a healthy respect 
for ‘case law’ and judicial precedent.”81 With regard to civil law nations, it shares 
the influence of principles and rules based on Roman civil law.82 As several 
commentators have said, South African law derives its origin from the civil law 
family.83 But, given the political events of the 1806s between Holland and England, 
that legal system “acquired numerous features characteristic of common law 
systems.”84 This situation is confirms Smith’s definition according to which a mixed 
jurisdiction is “a basically civilian system [that] has been under pressure from the 
Anglo-American common law and has in part been overlaid by that arrival system of 
jurisprudence.”85   
Insofar as South Africa is concerned, the Roman-Dutch law civilian character 
was earlier acknowledged by the Colebrook-Bigge Commission of Enquiry in the 
nineteenth century. That Commission demonstrated that Roman-Dutch law was 
predominantly formed by principles and rules generated from Civil and Roman 
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 See Hahlo/Kahn Legal System 585-586; Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Zimmerman Mixed System 41 
48; Quinot Contract 74-75; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 2 and 243; Du Bois Principles 
33. South Africa shares the “mixed legal system” status with countries and regions such as 
Scotland, Louisiana, Quebec, Philippines, and Israel. See Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 5; Hawthorne 
2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 71; Dainow Decisions 1; and Saidav Comparative 326-337. 
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 Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 836; see also Schreiner Contribution 11; Zimmerman Roman 
Law 41 48; Hahlo/Kahn Union 20 and 29; Edwards History 82; Du Bois Principles 76-77. 
82
 A propos of this, Joubert recognises, for instance, Roman law as the main source of South African 
contract law. Joubert Contract 1; see, in the same sense, Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Wessels History 
566. Owing to the combination of both civil and common law rules, Hawthorne (2006 (12) 2 
Fundamina 71-2) describes South African law as an “exceptional” legal system.  
83
 Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Wessels Contract xvii. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 Smith T B “The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed Jurisdications (sic)” in 
Yiannopoulos A N (ed) Civil Law in the Modern World (Louisiana State University Press 1965) 5; 
quoted by Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 23. 
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laws.86 The same idea was later confirmed by Joubert with regard to contract law. 
Joubert argues that, despite the English settlement, “in the field of (…) contract, the 
law retained its essentially Roman character but received some permanent glosses 
and embellishments from the English law.”87 Thus, given that international sales 
form part of contract law, the same may be said with reference to South African 
international sales contracts.  
However, though South African law is a “hybrid legal system”, it constitutes 
a legal system apart with its own peculiar traditions.88 Compared with other civil law 
countries, on the one hand, South African law is not codified.89 Even in fields where 
statutes have been enacted, the interpretation of those statutes is that of a common 
lawyer rather than of a civil lawyer.90 On the other hand, though South African law 
has adopted the stare decisis principle, it applies it in a tempered form by contrast to 
how it is applied in England.91 Similarly, South African law has now and then 
adopted opposite views compared with those of the law of the fatherland.  
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 See Footnote 38 above. 
87
 Joubert Contract 2. The author mentions as signs of English law, inter alia, the rules relating to 
implied terms, repudiation of a contract by the offeror, and the notice of rescission.  
88
 See Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 13; Sanders 1981 (14) CILSA 328 329; Hahlo/Kahn 
Legal System 586. 
89
 See Zimmerman 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 97; Visser Daedalus 6; Van Warmelo Vicissitudes 8; 
Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Kahn Doctrine 224 231. Within the mixed legal family, Louisiana, Quebec, 
and Israel have codified their laws in contrast to South Africa and Scotland. See MacQueen Good 
Faith 43 48ff; Palmer Mixed Jurisdictions 55. 
90
 See Hahlo/Kahn Union 42. Under civil law jurisdictions, “legislation is treated as a complete and 
coherent system and judges are less mechanistic in their approach to it.” See Youngs Comparative 
68. Under South African law, in contrast, the courts would historically “have adopted either a 
literalist (…) or purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation.” Of course, the situation 
has currently changed with the coming into force of the Constitution. As said earlier, s 39(2) of the 
Constitution obliges courts to promote the spirit, purpose, and objectives of the Bill of Rights when 
interpreting any legislation. See Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 144; see also 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd. 
91
 In South African law, courts have long been allowed to depart from their own decisions, 
particularly when they believe they are wrong, whereas in England the House of the Lords 
permitted that power only in 1966. As ruled by Centlivres CJ in Fellner v Minister of the Interior 
1954 (4) SA 523 (A) 529,  
The rule stare decisis has been applied with great rigidity in England, the reason probably being 
that the English common law has been built up largely on decided cases: hence the reverence 
for judicial decisions. But with (…) (South African law) the position is different: our common 
law rests on principles enunciated by the old writers on Roman-Dutch law. Consequently there 
is no reason why we should apply the rule with same rigidity as it is applied in England.  
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To illustrate this, before 1919 the Cape Supreme Court, under the dominating 
influence of Lord De Villiers CJ, assimilated the Roman-Dutch law requirement of 
justa causa (redelijke oorzaak, i.e. a reasonable cause)92 to the common law 
requirement of “consideration”.93 In Alexander v Perry, the Court ruled that the 
requirement for consideration in the English meaning of a quid pro quo was 
necessary for the enforceability of contracts under South African law.94 In Conradie 
v Rossouw, however, the AD rejected the necessity of “consideration” as a 
requirement for valid contract.95 Since then it has been admitted that the English law 
consideration rule is beyond South African contract law.96 Currently, “any serious 
                                               
See also Trade Fairs and Promotions (Pty) Ltd v Thomson 1984 (4) SA 177 (W) 184 186; 
Hahlo/Kahn Union 42; Schreiner Contribution 11; Du Bois Principles 77; and Van der Merwe 
South Africa Report 95 136. To use the words of Botha J, in the National Chemsearch (SA) v 
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 See Wessels Contract §71. 
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 See discussion by Christie/Bradfield Contract 9; Zimmerman Obligations 556-557 and authorities 
quoted by them. The consideration rule has been established under English law since Payne v Cave 
(1789) 3 Term Rep 148; quoted by Owsia Contract 442. The basic notion underlying that doctrine is 
that, in order to be entitled to enforce a promise as a contract, the promisee must have given 
“something of value in the eyes of the law” in exchange for the promise. (See Thomas v Thomas 
(1842) 2 QB 851 859; quoted by Birks Contract 16; and Kadner Contrat 135-136. See also s 1CPA 
which defines the concept “consideration” as “anything of value given and accepted in exchange for 
goods or services.”  
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 See Alexander v Perry (1874) 4 Buch 59; confirmed in Malan and van der Merwe v Secretan 
Boon & Co (1880) Foord 94; Tradesmen’s Benefit Society v Du Preez (1887) 5 SC 269; Mtembu v 
Webster (1904) 21 SC 323 337. See also Christie/Bradfield Contract 9; Joubert Contract 32; 
Hutchison in Contract 12; Hutchison Formation 165 167; Van der Merwe et al Contract 169; 
Hutchison/Du Bois  Contract 733 753; Zimmerman Obligations 557; Van der Merwe South African 
Report 95 183.  According to these authorities, a party was not compelled to perform a contract for 
which there was no “valuable consideration”, which means recompense by both parties.   
95
 In the Conradie v Rossouw case, the AD made it clear that, “A good cause of action can be 
founded on a promise made seriously and deliberately and with the intention that a lawful 
obligation should be established.” See Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; as commented on by 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 10; Joubert Contract 32; Kahn Doctrine 224 231; Edwards History  90; 
Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 245; Van der Merwe et al Contract 169; Schreiner 
Contribution 45; Zimmerman Obligations 557.  
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 See Christie/Bradfield Contract 10; Hutchison in Contract 7; Van der Merwe South African 
Report 95 183 and 200. It does not, however, mean that the doctrine has been definitively 
eliminated from South African law. The doctrine of consideration was revived in Malilang v MV 
Houda Pearl 1986 2 SA 714 (A), and through s 76(2)(b) CPA. As is the case under English law, 
the latter provision allows consumers “to recover money paid if the consideration for the payment 
of it has failed.”  For a sceptical view of the reintroduction of the consideration doctrine in 
consumer contracts, see Van Eeden Guide 302. 
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and deliberate agreement made with intention of creating a legal obligation is a 
binding contract, provided only that the agreement is lawful and possible of 
performance, and that the parties have the requisite capacity to contract,”97 without 
the need of any consideration at all.  
Briefly, today’s “South African law has acquired its own identity which is 
neither purely Roman-Dutch law (nor civil law) nor purely English law.”98 As Van 
der Merwe and Du Plessis have stated, “(…) a distinctly South African common law 
had emerged through the blending of Roman-Dutch and English law by the Courts 
and legislators.”99 Contemporary South African common law derives its authority 
from the Constitution which is now the Republic’s supreme law.100 Hawthorne 
remarks that South Africa is a unique situation where, though the legal system is not 
codified, the “Constitution instructs as to how the law should be developed and 
interpreted. All law, including common law, must be interpreted and developed to 
give effect to constitutional rights and values.”101 This is also Harms DP’s opinion, 
in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank, for whom modern South African common law “is 
                                               
97
 As was said by De Villiers, 
According to our law if two or more persons, of sound and mind and capable of contracting, 
enter into a lawful agreement, a valid contract arises between them enforceable by action. The 
agreement may be for the benefit of the one of them or of both (Grotius at 3.6.2). The promise 
must have been made with the intention that it should be accepted (Grotius at 3.1.48); according 
to Voet the agreement must have been entered into serio ac deliberato animo. And this is what 
is meant by saying that the only element that our law requires for a valid contract is consensus, 
naturally within proper limits – it should be in or de re licita honesta.  
See Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 320; see also McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD 
204 206. 
98
 Zimmerman Roman Law 41 51; see also Hahlo/Kahn Union 444. 
99
 Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 13; see also Du Bois Principles 33 and 64. 
100
 In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: in re Ex parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) §§46-49, Chaskalson P made it clear that, “There is only 
one system of law (in South Africa). It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and 
all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to 
constitutional control.” See, in the same sense, African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v 
Dreams Travel and Tours CC 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) [15] [16]; Du Bois Principles 64 Fn1 and 
65 Fn2; and Bhana/Pieterse 2005 (122) 4 SALJ 865. 
101
 See Hawthorne 2006 (12) 2 Fundamina 71 83; see also s 39(2) Constitution; and the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: in re Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa case.  
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only ‘valid’ to the extent that it complies or is congruent with the Constitution.”102 
The common law of contract does not depart from the principle above either. As 
ruled by Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier,103 all the aspects of South African law, 
including the law of contract, are currently subject to constitutional regulation.104 
Owing to the fact that contract law is subject to constitutional control, courts are 
obliged to “take account of fundamental constitutional values in carrying out their 
duty of developing a law of contract that reverberates with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution.”105  
     
3.2.6 Conclusion on the Historical Development of South African Law 
 
Historically speaking, South African law originates from Dutch and English law. 
Nevertheless, though it was influenced by Roman-Dutch and English law earlier, 
South African common law has now acquired its individuality being led by the 1996 
Constitution and the jurisprudence of the CC. Moreover, South Africa is a mixed 
legal jurisdiction which combines both civil law and common law principles. Its legal 
independence may be read, as far as this study is concerned, through the discussion 
of fundamentals governing the law of contract and the basics of sales contracts 
respectively.  
 
 
                                               
102
 See Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA). 
103
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [15]. 
104
 It was ruled in the Barkhuizen case that,  
All law, including the common law of contract, is now subject to constitutional control. The 
validity of all law depends on their consistency with the provisions of the Constitution and the 
values that underlie our Constitution. The application of the principle pacta sunt servanda is, 
therefore, subject to constitutional control.  
See comments by Kerr 2008 (125) SALJ 241; Bhana/Pieterse 2005 (122) 4 SALJ 865. For a similar 
ruling, see Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) 35G-H; and the Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) 
Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd case. 
105
 See Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [6] as commented on by Bhana 2007 (124) SALJ 
269 271 and 273, together with s 39(2) of the Constitution. On the manner how the Constitution 
should apply to contractual relationship, see Rautenbach 2011 (74) THRHR 510 515.  
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3.3 Fundamental Principles of South African Contract Law   
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
A contract is generally considered to be an agreement between two or more parties 
which gives rise to a legal obligation.106 As Christie and Bradfield have said, one 
must first look for the agreement between two or more parties to decide whether or 
not a contract exists.107 It  follows that, for a legal relationship to be called contract, 
the first condition required is the presence of two parties at least as the will of one 
party is insufficient to generate a contract.108 All agreements are, however, not 
necessarily contracts.109 An agreement acquires the quality of a contract only if it 
meets a number of essential elements prescribed by the law. As a rule, a contract 
leads to performance by one or both of the parties.110 In addition to the prospective 
implementation, other indispensable requirements include the intention of parties to 
                                               
106
 See Wessels Contract §18; Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 736; Hutchison in Contract 4; 
Hutchison Principles 409; Joubert Contract 21-22; Van der Merwe et al Contract 7; Kritzinger 
1983 SALJ 47. For case law, see Portion 1 of 46 Wadeville (Pty) v Unity Cutlery (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) 
SA 61 (A) 69; Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v SA Brake CC 1995 (3) SA 806 (A) 812; Etkind 
and others v Hicor Trading Ltd 1999 (1) SA 11 (W) 126.  
107
 Christie/Bradfield Contract 23; see also Zimmerman Obligations 546 for whom: “A contract is 
based on the consent of the parties thereto.”  
108
 See authorities quoted by Kerr Contract 4 in Fn16; Joubert Contract 21 and 36; 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 23; Wessels Contract §55. After he had admitted that “A contract 
includes a concurrence of intention in two parties”, Pothier specified that one of these parties 
“promises something to the other, who on his part accepts such promise.” See Pothier Obligations 
4; quoted by Wessels Contract §58. 
109
 Hutchison in Contract 6; Joubert Contract 22. 
110
 In principle, any contract is required to be physically possible of performance. If, when it is 
concluded, a contract is not able to be performed the agreement is null and void. Such is the 
application of an earlier Roman maxim which is still accepted in modern law: “Impossibilium nulla 
obligatio est”, translated as “A contract the performance of which is impossible is void”. See 
Wilson v Smith 1956 (1) SA 393 (W) 396; Peters Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 
427 434; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [75]. An instance of a contract impossible of 
implementation is the sale of goods already destroyed at the time a contract is concluded. For 
comments, see Du Plessis Possibility 205-210; Joubert Contract 124-128; Hutchison/Du Bois 
Contract 733 753-754; Zimmerman Obligations 686-697. 
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create an obligation,111 their capacity112 and freedom, certainty and legality, 
conformity with statute law, public policy or moral values of the society, and, if 
necessary, the meeting of prescribed formalities.113 Since it is not possible within the 
limited frame of this section to discuss each of these conditions, only some deserve 
attention, namely the need of an agreement, freedom, certainty, good faith, and public 
policy.  
 
3.3.2 Necessity of an Agreement  
 
3.3.2.1 Introduction  
 
Generally speaking, almost all legal systems wish to found contractual liability on 
agreement.114 Despite such a global understanding, the enforceability of contract has 
                                               
111
 Save the case of enforceability of contract based on reliance expectations as discussed in Section 
3.3.2 below.  
112
 See Rood v Wallach 1904 TS 187 201; Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 320; see also 
comments under Section 2.3.5.2 above.  
113
 See Wessels Contract §47; Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 737; Hutchison in Contract 6; Van 
der Merwe et al Contract 7; Lubbe/Du Plessis Contract 243 245. In conformity with the 
characteristics above, Hutchison defines a contract as “an agreement entered into by two or more 
persons with the intention of creating a legal obligation or obligations.” See Hutchison in Contract 
6.  And together with Du Bois, the same author describes a contract as “an agreement for an 
ascertainable and possible future performance or non-performance made by persons capable of 
contracting seriously, sometimes with special formalities, and without any illegality.” See 
Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 736. It should immediately be noted that, under South African 
law, a contract needs not to conform to certain specific formalities for it to be valid and enforceable. 
The absence of formalities is the rule and their prescription the exception. See Conradie v Rossouw 
1919 AD 279; Christie/Bradfield Contract 109; Eiselen E-Commerce 7. It was held in Goldbatt v 
Fremantle 1920 AD 123 128 that, “Subject to certain exceptions, mostly statutory, any contract 
may be verbally entered into; writing is not essential to contractual validity.” 
114
 See Hutchison in Contract 17; Kritzinger 1983 SALJ 47; and a wealth of authority quoted by 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 24 in Fn7.  English courts have had an opposite point of view. In Smith 
v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, after stating that “if the parties are not ad idem, there is no contract, 
unless the circumstances are such as to preclude one of the parties from denying that he has agreed 
to the terms of the other”, Blackburn J said, 
If, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would 
believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon 
that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally 
bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.  
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generated a number of methods gathered in both subjective and objective approaches. 
As explained in Section 2.3.4.1 above, the most usual of these approaches are the 
consensual theory, the declaration theory, and the reliance theory. This section aims 
to discover which of these theories has precedence in South African law.  
 Immediately, throughout the historical development of South African law, 
courts give the impression of not having applied any single theory of contract 
constantly.  According to Hutchison, the legal system under view  
 (…) has since the earliest times vacillated between a subjective and an objective 
approach to contract. As late as 1958, the Appellate Division could say that our law 
follows a ‘generally objective approach to the creation of contracts.115 However, 
more recent pronouncements of that court suggest that our approach is 
fundamentally subjective, though tempered by objective considerations in cases of 
dissensus.116  
This statement leads one to believe that the heart of a contract is either the consent 
of the parties, or the reasonable expectations by one of them that there is an 
agreement. Thus, after a discussion of each of these theories, it will be necessary to 
compare them to show how agreements emerge. 
 
3.3.2.2 Agreement based on consensus  
 
Consensus has been largely considered to be the main foundation of contract. When 
the earlier South African judges came to address the issue of contract liability, they 
admitted immediately that there could be no contract without consensus.117 Wessels 
has noted in this regard that, “Although the minds of the parties must come together, 
courts (…) can only judge from external facts whether this has or has not occurred. 
                                               
Excerpt reported by Hutchison in Contract 17; Van der Merwe et al Contract 30 Fn88; Van der 
Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 181. As it will be seen later, this dictum has been quoted with 
approval in a number of contemporary South African cases. 
115
 See National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 
(A) 479E. 
116
 Hutchison in Contract 17.  
117
 See among others, Rose-Innes Diamond Mining Co Ltd v Central Diamond Mining Co Ltd 
(1883) 2 HCG 272 308; Potgieter v New York Mutual Life Insurance Society (1900) 17 SC 67 70; 
Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 23. 
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In practice, therefore, it is the manifestation of (…) (parties’) wills and not the 
unexpressed will which is of importance.”118  
The necessity of the intention of the parties for concluding a contract has also 
been supported by modern case law. In Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works,119  
for instance, Centlivres JA put it that, in order to resolve a question relating to the 
contract, one must first search for “what was the intention of the parties at the time 
they entered into the contract.”120 A similar ruling was given by Potgieter JA in 
Jonnes v Anglo-African Shipping Co (1936) Ltd with regard to the interpretation of 
contracts.121 Potgieter JA said on this subject that, “(…) in the interpretation of a 
contract the general rule is that the court should determine what the true intention of 
the parties was.”122  
Subsequent to the details above, it is clear that the South African legal 
approach to contract is essentially subjective. Yet, the AD has already stated an 
opposite view in Pieters & Co v Salomon, in the 1911s.123  At that time, the Court 
tried to adopt an objective method, relying on the English law approach in Smith v 
Hughes.124 Usually, when it is perceptible that parties have reached consensus, there 
is no problem; contractual responsibility is based upon the will of the parties. If there 
is a doubt on the coincidence of their minds, however, then the second meaning of 
the concept “agreement” enters into account. There, the task will consist of seeking 
                                               
118
 Wessels Contract §62; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 24. 
119
 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Woks 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 435. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 Jonnes v Anglo-African Shipping Co (1936) Ltd 1972 2 SA 827 (A) 834 D. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 See Pieters & Co v Salomon 1911 AD 121 137 per Innes J.  
124
 It was ruled in Pieters & Co v Salomon that, 
When a man makes an offer in plain and unambiguous language, which is understood in its 
ordinary sense by the person to whom it is addressed, and accepted by him bona fide in that 
sense, then there is a concluded contract. Any unexpressed reservations hidden in the mind of 
the promisor are in such circumstances irrelevant. He cannot be heard to say that he meant his 
promise to be subject to a condition which he omitted to mention, and of which the other party 
was unaware.   
Excerpt reported by Hutchison in Contract 18. 
141 
 
whether, by his/her words or conduct; one party may have led the other party to 
believe that consensus had been reached.125 
Under this second approach, an agreement is not constituted by the consensus 
of the parties, but by the external manifestation of their consensus. A comparable 
ruling was adopted in the South African Railways & Harbours case.126 In this case, 
Wessels JA stated that, “The law does not concern itself with the working of the 
minds of parties to a contract, but with the external manifestation of their minds.”127 
Such a ruling has been criticised, however, on the grounds that it looks as if it propels 
the declaration theory as the major basis of South African contract law instead of the 
consensual rule.128 Hence, advice was given to take it with caution.129 Moreover, 
suggestions that Wessels’ ruling should be taken with reservations were confirmed 
about a half century later in the Saambou-Nasionale case130 which indirectly 
supported the reliance theory as a substitute to consensus.  
 
3.3.2.3 Agreement based on reasonable reliance  
 
To use the words of Kritzinger, the Saambou-Nasionale case seems to be the first 
instance where “(South African) courts have thought it necessary to express any sort 
                                               
125
 Hutchison in Contract 19; Kritzinger 1983 SALJ 47. 
126
 See South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704 per 
Wessels JA.  
127
 It was held, in details, that, 
The law does not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a contract, but with 
the external manifestation of their minds. Even therefore if from a philosophical standpoint the 
minds of the parties do not meet, yet, if by their acts their minds seem to have met, the law will, 
where fraud is not alleged, look to their acts and assume that their minds did meet and that they 
contracted in accordance with what the parties purport to accept as a record of that agreement. 
This is the only practical way in which Courts of law can determine the terms of a contract.  
See South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704 715-16. 
128
 See Christie/Bradfield Contract 25; Hutchison in Contract 18; Van der Merwe Contract 33. 
129
 As one commentator has said, “A theory which disregards the mental attitude of every 
contracting party is insupportable.” See Kerr Contract 20; quoting Kahn Contract Vol. 1 17. 
130
 See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 991G per Jansen JA.  
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of view on the issue of contractual theory, and it is certainly the first time that the 
AD has done so in a reported decision.”131 In this case, Kritzinger continues,  
Jansen JA expressed obiter the view that the consensual theory (‘wilsteorie’) is 
generally regarded in our law as the starting-point for an inquiry into the issue of 
formation of an agreement, and that only in the event of true (‘werklike’) dissensus 
(…) should another approach be applied, an approach which would be some form of 
the reliance theory (‘vertrouensteorie’) (…).132   
In Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer,133 likewise, the 
same Jansen JA disproved the significance of the declaration theory as a means of 
establishing contractual liability. The learned judge, in a dissenting opinion, again 
supported the consensual theory efficiency as the way to determine contractual 
liability. He admitted, by way of exception, that the effects of that theory should at 
times be tempered by recourse to the reliance theory.134 More specifically, Jansen JA 
reiterated the fact that “the true basis of contractual liability in (…) (South African) 
law (…) is not the objective approach of the English law, but is – save in cases where 
the reliance theory is applied – the real consensus of the parties.”135 It should be 
remembered that the reliance theory is an approach according to which the 
enforceability of contract may depend on the words or conduct displayed by the other 
party.136 Pursuant to this principle, an agreement needs not necessarily to be 
expressed; it may implicitly result from one party’s conduct. In this regard, the 
Saambou-Nasionale decision has the merit of having invoked, for the first time, the 
relevance of the reliance theory under South African law.  
                                               
131
 See Kritzinger 1983 SALJ 47 50; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 1; Hutchison in Contract 18.  
132
 Ibid. 
133
 See Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A). 
134
 In addition to the Saambou-Nasionale and the Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap cases, the issue of 
contract theories was also dealt with in Deventer v Louw 1980 (4) SA 105 (O) 110A-E, and in Spes 
Bona Bank v Portals Water Treatment 1981 (1) SA 618 (W) 631C-D; see comments by Kritzinger 
1983 SALJ 47 50-51. 
135
 See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 991G; see also 
Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A); and Société 
Commerciale de Moteurs v Ackermann 1981 (3) SA 422 (A) 428. 
136
 See Christie/Bradfield Contract 1; Joubert Contract 80; Van der Merwe Contract 33; Kerr 
Contract 23; Kritzinger 1983 SALJ 47. 
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Initially, the reliance theory was presented as “a fifth wheel” used in order to 
control the shortcomings of the consensual theory. Since then, it has been endorsed 
by recent decisions, particularly the so-called Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis 
case137 and the Steyn v LSA Motors case,138 and promoted as an independent approach 
to contract. In the Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis case,139 Harms AJA actually 
approved the significance of the reliance theory by answering the following main 
question, “Did the party whose actual intention did not conform to the common 
intention expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his 
declared intention represented his actual intention?”140  
By way of response, the learned judge held that the key inquiry in matters of 
the kind of the Sonap Petroleum case requires a triple investigation: seeking first 
whether there is a misrepresentation as to one party’s intention; searching next to 
discover who the party is who made that representation; and finally trying to find 
whether the other party was misled thereby.141 Quoting with approval the rule in Spes 
Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd,142 the learned judge 
                                               
137
 See Sonap Petroleum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd) v Haralabos Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) per Harms AJA.  
138
 See Archibald Douw Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) per Botha JA.  
139
 This case was concerned with a lease of a 20-year period limit formed in February 1975 in terms 
of a duly registered notarial deed. In 1987, an addendum to the principal contract was signed by 
Pappadogianis and Sonap’s managing director.  Through an error of the former’s attorney, 
unfortunately, the initial term of 20 years appeared in the addendum as being reduced to 15 years. 
At the time the error was detected, Sonap sought rectification of that error, or if that was not 
possible, to declare the postscript void. Its claim was dismissed with costs on first instance, and the 
dismissal confirmed on appeal. A propos of this, the AD assumed that the respondent should have 
read the addendum carefully and was then supposed to have realised that the duration has been 
reduced. According to the court, “the respondent was not misled by the appellant to believe that it 
was its intention to amend the period, but, on the contrary, that he was alive to the real possibility 
of a mistake and that he had, in the circumstances, a duty to speak and to enquire.” So, given that 
it failed to meet these requirements, but preferred to “snatch the bargain”, the Court deduced that 
there was no consensus, actual or imputed in the case. It consequently annulled the statement of 
the addendum which was about to change the duration from 20 to 15 years. For a critical 
interpretation, see Steyn Critical Appraisal 11. 
140
 Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis 239 I-J. 
141
 Ibid 239J-240B, whereby Harms AJA referred to Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 
893 (A) 906 C-G; and to Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A) 316 
I-317 B.  
142
 Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A) 984 
D-H; 985 G-H. 
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specified that the last sub-question postulated a double possibility, i.e. examining 
whether a party was actually misled, and whether a reasonable man would have been 
misled.143 Applying this test to the case, Harms said, “If the respondent realised (or 
should have realised as a reasonable man) that there was a real possibility of a 
mistake in the offer, he would have had a duty to speak and enquire whether the 
expressed offer was the intended offer. Only thereafter could he accept.”144 The judge 
concluded, therefore, that, though the duty to speak may be relative, bringing a claim 
in the knowledge of a possible denunciation requirement is contrary to good faith 
considerations.145  
What is important from the case being considered is that the AD reached the 
conclusion that the requirement as for fault is irrelevant for cases of direct application 
of the reliance theory.146 In addition, if the Saambou-Nasionale decision has initiated 
the reliance theory as an alternative to the consensual approach, the Sonap Petroleum 
v Pappadogianis ruling has introduced its direct application as a basis for contractual 
liability in cases of dissensus. This seems to be the reason for which its ruling was 
adopted by Botha JA two years later in the Steyn v LSA Motors case,147 and, more 
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 Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis 239 I-240 B; see also Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v 
Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) [17]; Van der Merwe et al Contract 34-37; 
Hutchison Formation 165 192-193.  
144
 On the latter aspect, the learned judge relied on Sherry v Moss WLD 3 September 1952 
(unreported case); and Slavin’s Packaging Ltd v Anglo African Shipping Co Ltd 1989 (1) SA 337 
(W) 342 I-343 E. 
145
 Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis 241 D. 
146
 See Steyn Critical Appraisal 13. 
147
 This case deals with a competition held in 1989, in Durban, whereby both amateurs and 
professional players participated. Steyn, an amateur golfer, also participated in that championship. 
On the seventeenth hole, a brand new motor car was on display and alongside it a board advertising: 
“Hole in one prize sponsored by LSA Motors Ltd (then Reeds Delta).” Steyn holed in one. 
Surprisingly, when he went to be awarded his prize, Steyn was refused the car on the grounds that 
only professional players qualified for the reward. Justification for such an attitude resulted from the 
explanation of the LSA Motors’ director that the advertising company had never intended to contract 
with people taking part in the competition by pleasure. The Court inferred from the evidence 
submitted before it that there was no consensus between the parties, but rather dissensus. Even though 
the lay-golfer tried to demonstrate that what was important in the case were not the intentions of the 
parties, but rather the content of the advertisement; his claim was dismissed. As  a means of 
motivations, the AD stated at 61C - E that, “an argument which treats the other party’s subjective 
intention as irrelevant, and postulates the outward manifestation of his intention as the sole and 
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recently, in the Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource case,148 and a number 
of other cases.149 In the Steyn v LSA Motors case, when dealing once more with a 
                                               
conclusive touchstone of the respondent’s contractual liability is fundamentally fallacious and 
contrary to legal principle.” 
148
 See Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) [17] to [23]. 
This case is a faithful illustration of Harms AJA’s rule. A propos of this, Constantia, an insurance 
company, issued two post dispute insurance policies to Compusource through an agency broker. 
The policy was novel in South Africa. The contract contained, furthermore, two litigated clauses 
the insured claimed to having ignored at the time the contract was concluded. Its defence in the 
case was hence one of misrepresentation by the insurer’s representatives in the form of an omission. 
At the beginning, the case led along an investigation into tort responsibility rules. Brand JA did not 
agree with that approach, arguing that the true issue in the case was not one of misrepresentation 
by omission, but rather one of dissensus. As observed by him, “Constantia’s representatives thought 
that Rust had agreed to clause 3.5 read with clause 3.3.2, whereas in fact he had not. The reason for 
the misapprehension on the part of the former was that Rust created the impression that he did agree 
to clause 3.5 by accepting the quotations that were made subject to the provisions of a standard policy, 
including that clause.” Finding support in the Sonap Petroleum v Pappadogianis case, Brand borne in 
mind the fact that under similar circumstances the principle in South African law of contract is that, 
Rust’s principal would, despite this lack of actual consensus, be bound to the provisions of the 
clause if Constantia’s representatives were reasonable in their reliance on the impression created 
by Rust. If a reasonable person in their position would have realised that Rust, despite his 
apparent expression of agreement, did not actually consent to be bound by the clause, this clause 
could not be said to be part of their agreement. 
Finding advice in Harms’ threefold inquiry; Brand found that the two first questions would be 
answered in favour of the Insurance Company, but not the last. According to him, the outcome of 
the case was dependent on the third question worded as follows: “Would a reasonable person in 
the position of (…) (the insurer’s representative) also have laboured under the same 
misapprehension?” Answering this question, the judge gave seven instances which would deny to 
Constantia and its representative the status of reasonable person with regard to the issue in question. 
The learned judge concluded subsequently that, 
In all the circumstances, I am therefore satisfied that the reasonable person in the position of 
(…) (the insurer’s representative) would not have inferred simply from the fact of (…) (the 
insured’s representative)’s acceptance of the quotations that his true intention was to bind (…) 
(the insured) to the provisions of clause 3.5. I believe that the reasonable person would thus have 
enquired from (the insured’s representative) at the time whether he appreciated the meaning of 
the clause. If his answer was in the negative, as we now know it would have been, the reasonable 
person would have explained the clause to him. The legal consequence of the failure by (…) 
(the insurer’s representative) to follow this approach is that (…) (the insured) cannot be held 
bound by the provisions of a clause to which its representative did not and could not reasonably 
have been thought to agree. 
A brief comparison reveals that in the Steyn case, the reasonable person character was considered 
in the light of a layperson, whereas in the Constantia Insurance decision it was made with regard 
to the status of a professional businessman. It is believed then that, whether or not one party is a 
reasonable man is a matter of fact dealt with on a case-by-case basis.   
149
 See among others, Investec Bank Ltd v Lefkowitz 1997 (3) SA 1 (A) 8-9; HNR Properties CC v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA) 480-481; and Davids v ABSA Bank Bpk 2005 (3) 
SA 361 (C).    
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matter of dissent, the AD found support in the English law dictum in Smith v Hughes 
as well as in the Sonap Petroleum decision; it ruled then, 
Where it is shown that the offeror’s true intention differed from his expressed 
intention, the outward appearance of agreement flowing from the offeree’s 
acceptance of the offer as it stands does not in itself or necessarily result in 
contractual liability. Nor is it in itself decisive that the offeree accepted the offer in 
reliance upon the offeror’s implicit representation that the offer correctly reflected 
his intention. Remaining for consideration is the further and crucial question whether 
a reasonable man in the position of the offeree would have accepted the offer in the 
belief that it represented the true intention of the offeror (…).  Only if this test is 
satisfied can the offeror be held contractually liable.150 
To summarise this, the reliance theory applies in the context of dissensus. With 
regard to the way it is applied under South African law, this theory assumes that “a 
contract is based on the intention of one party to an agreement and the reasonable 
impression or reliance on his part that the other party had the same intention.”151 Such 
being its general understanding, it is then logical that the reliance theory was at times 
observed as playing a supplementary role to the intention theory.152 With regard to 
the enthusiasm with which the reliance theory has recently been accepted, it should 
be advocated as an equivalent of consent so that modern South African contract law 
has a double basis.  
 
3.3.2.4 Double source of contractual responsibility in current South African law 
 
It is acknowledged that South African law recognises a twofold basis on which to 
found a contract, viz. consensus and reasonable reliance.153 As several scholars have 
admitted, the primary basis of contract is consensus.154 Thus, in order to decide 
whether or not a contract is enforceable, one must look first for the common intention 
                                               
150
 See Archibald Douw Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) 61 C-E.  
151
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 33; see also cases discussed above dealing with reasonable 
reliance protection. 
152
 See Hutchison in Contract 19; Van der Merwe et al Contract 33; Christie/Bradfield Contract 25. 
153
 See Hutchison in Contract 19; Van der Merwe et al Contract 45 Fn182; Kerr Contract 23; see 
also, Cecil Nurse (Pty) Ltd v Nkola 2008 (2) 2008 SA 441 (SCA). 
154
 Ibid; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 1 and 24-25. 
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of the parties. If it is inferred that contracting parties reached agreement, there is no 
need to enquire about any other reason for holding the parties bound by their 
commitments.155 Where there is a lack of common intention, nonetheless, the second 
step will consist in investigating whether one party, by  his/her conduct or words, 
may have, in a reasonable manner, led his/her partner to believe that consensus had 
been reached. If the answer is positive, the contract will then be based on the reliance 
theory.156 
To conclude this with the words of Hutchison in relation to South African law, 
“[the] will theory may be the point of departure, but, in cases of dissensus, it is 
tempered by an application of the reliance theory.”157 The relevance of the latter 
approach is confirmed, in practice, by the fact that, if in each instance a spotless 
consent was required, it could be difficult for commercial dealings to prosper.158 But, 
because parties form themselves their contractual legal pledge, their intention is 
vital.159  
 
3.3.2.5 Materialisation of agreements  
 
Introduction 
The agreement on which a contract is based may be actual or apparent. As a number 
of scholars have said,  
                                               
155
 Hutchison in Contract 19; Van der Merwe et al Contract 33. 
156
 See in addition to cases already referred to, Ridon v Van der Spuy & Partners (Wes-Kaap) Inc 
2002 (2) SA 121 (C) 135 138-139; Pillay v Shaik 2009 (4) SA 74 (SCA); Slip Knot Investments 
777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 (4) SA 72 (SCA) [9]. In the Slip Knot Investments case, Malan FR 
explained clearly that, “Contractual liability (…) arises not only in cases where there is consensus 
or a real meeting of the minds, but also by virtue of the doctrine of quasi mutual assent. Even where 
there is no consensus contractual liability may nevertheless ensue.” 
157
 Hutchison in Contract 20. 
158
 Cf. Irvin and Johnson (SA) Ltd v Kaphan 1940 CPD 647 651 per Davis J whereby, if “[all] kinds of 
mental reservations, of careless unilateral mistakes, of unexpressed conditions and the like, would 
become relevant and no party to any contract would be safe: the door would be opened wide to 
uncertainty;” but, Christie/Bradfield Contract 26-30.     
159
 Kerr Contract 3. Kerr relies on the classic doctrine of Roman law in Ulpian’s statement whereby, 
“In stipulations and other contracts we always follow that which the parties intended.” See Ulpian 
D. 50.17.34; Voet 23.2.85; see also Joubert Contract 81. 
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(The agreement) is (…) (real) when there is a true meeting of the minds of the parties 
on all material aspects of the contract. It is apparent when, despite the lack of 
subjective consensus between the parties, there is an objective appearance of 
agreement which the law will uphold as a binding contract.160  
On the one hand, the existence of a particular intention is, normally, a matter of fact. 
On the other hand, the conclusion of a contract requires some external facts from 
which the existence of the alleged intention may be inferred.161 Those attitudes may 
consist of words, writing, conduct, or, occasionally, silence,162 depending on the case. 
What is important is that the two declarations of intention accord with each other, so 
that in the absence of such a concurrence there is no agreement at all.163  
 In addition to the manifestation of consensus, the duty to reach agreement also 
involves the idea of co-operation in order to achieve mutual goals.164 To co-operate 
means that parties must work together while negotiating an agreement. In ordinary 
circumstances, one party will make some declaration of his/her intention; at the end 
the other party will express a coinciding intention in response. Frequently, the first 
statement is called an “offer”, and the second is known as the “acceptance of the 
offer”.165 With regard to the person making the offer, he/she is called the “offeror”, 
and the one accepting the offer known as the “offeree”.  
As stated by Watermeyer ACJ in Reid Bros (SA) Ltd v Fischer Bearings Co 
Ltd, “a binding contract is as a rule constituted by the acceptance of an offer.”166 Van 
                                               
160
 See Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 737; Hutchison in Contract 13; Kerr Contract 3-17 and 181. 
161
 See Estate Fuchs v D’Assonville 1935 OPD 85; Reid Bros (SA) Ltd v Fischer Bearings Co Ltd 
1943 AD 232; Joubert Contract 36. 
162
 On the manifestation of intention by silence, see Donaldson v Morris 1912 CPD 339; Parsons v 
Langemann 1948 (4) SA 258 (C); East Asiatic Co (SA) Ltd v Midlands Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 
1954 (2) SA 387 (C); Senekal v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1978 (3) SA 375 (A); McWilliams v First 
Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (2) SA 1 (A). 
163
 Joubert Contract 36; Zimmerman Obligations 560. 
164
 Ibid; see also Hawthorne Contract Theory 137 142.  
165
 On the implementation of the offer and acceptance theory, see Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and 
Acceptance 45; Hutchison Formation 165; Van der Merwe et al Contract 46-85; Christie/Bradfield 
Contract 31-74. The manifestation of intent by means of offer and acceptance is discussed in detail 
under Chapter 5 below dealing with the formation of contract.   
166
 See Reid Bros (SA) Ltd v Fischer Bearings Co Ltd 1943 AD 232 241; see also National and 
Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A) 479E. In the latter 
case, Schreiner JA said, “If the respondent had been a natural person who had accepted a tender 
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den Heever JA completed this opinion by saying that, “Consensus is normally 
evidenced by offer and acceptance.”167 Subsequent to these cases, it became clear 
that South African law is largely forward-looking with regard to the offer and 
acceptance rule in determining consensus.168 This does not, however, mean that every 
case of consensus has to be confined to an offer and a corresponding acceptance. In 
the Estate Breet v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board case, Van den Heever JA showed 
that in the same way every accepted offer does not necessarily constitute a contract, 
a valid contract can also be concluded independently of the offer and acceptance 
process.169  
The offer  
An offer is simply defined as a proposal to contract.170 For it to be valid, an offer 
requires, primarily, the “declaration of the will of one party which is of such a nature 
(…) that acceptance thereof will be sufficient to constitute an agreement.”171 The 
expression of intention will, nevertheless, be regarded as sufficient for the purposes 
of a legally binding offer on condition that it meets a certain number of requirements. 
These requirements include the fact that the offer must be firm, complete, clear, and 
certain.  
Firstly, the offer must be firm. Requiring an offer to “be firm” means that it 
must be proposed with the intention of creating an obligation once it is accepted.172 
                                               
according to its terms, there is no doubt that a contract would have been made when the acceptance 
was communicated to the tender (…).” See, in the same sense, Kerr Contract 61. 
167
 See Van den Heever JA in Estate Breet v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1955 3 SA 532 (A) 
532E; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 30. 
168
 For further comments, see Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and Acceptance 45; Hutchison 
Formation 165. 
169
 See Estate Breet v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1955 3 SA 532 (A) 532E.  
See also Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1996 (3) SA 320 (W) 331; Couve 
v Reddot International (Pty) Ltd 2004 (6) SA 425 (W); AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd v Titaco 
Projects (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 639 (SCA); and comments by Van der Merwe et al Contract 54; Kerr 
Contract 65. 
170
 See Jurgens v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1993 (1) SA 214 (A) 218-19; Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 
733 741. 
171
 See Joubert Contract 37; see also Reid Bros (SA) Ltd v Fischer Bearings Co Ltd 1943 AD 232. 
172
 It was held by Levy J in Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633D that, “It is fundamental 
to the nature of any offer that it should be certain and definite in its terms. It must be firm, that is, 
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To recall one of the familiar expressions on the subject, the offer shall be made with 
animus contrahendi.173 In other words, “An agreement becomes a contract only if the 
parties enter into it with the serious and deliberate intention of constituting an 
obligation binding on (…) them at law.”174 In the particular case of sales contracts, 
Van Winsen J said, in Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd v R, that, “a statement of 
the price by the dealer must be made with the intention of being bound by the 
offeree’s acceptance,”175 for it to amount to an offer. Otherwise, the offer is said to 
lack animus contrahendi and is not, therefore, binding.   
Further to firmness, the offer must, secondly, “be complete”.176 Calling for the 
offer’s comprehensiveness means that in order to constitute a valid offer, a proposal 
must contain all the essentials and material terms which the party making the offer 
envisages to incorporate into the contract.177 In other words, an offer must be 
                                               
made with the intention that when it is accepted it will bind the offeror.” See also Christie/Bradfield 
Contract 32; Joubert Contract 39; Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and Acceptance 45 48. There are 
authorities that contend that where “the offer is vague and indefinite, and the vagueness is not 
determinable, an acceptance of it does not constitute a contract.” See Namibian Minerals 
Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 (2) SA 548 (A); Westinghouse Brake & 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 (A) 574; Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Corbitt 1986 (4) SA 523 (C) 525-526; all these cases are referred to by Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 
733 741. It was judged that the use of expressions such as, “the following general clauses can be 
discussed,” does not amount to a firm offer. See Finestone v Hamburg 1907 TS 629 632; Cassimjee 
v Cassimjee 1947 (3) SA 701 (N); Roode v Morkel 1976 (4) SA 989 (A); Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Corbitt 1986 (4) SA 523 (C) 525-526.  
173
 See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 991G per Jansen JA; 
see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 31. 
174
 See Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 752; citing in Fn134: Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; 
Tobacco Manufacturers Committee v Jacob Green & Sons 1953 (3) SA 480 (A) 492-493; De Jager 
v Grunder 1964 (1) SA 446 (A) 463; Froman v Robertson 1971 (1) SA 115 (A) 121; Gordon Lloyd 
Page & Associates v Rivera 2001 (1) SA 88 (SCA); and Africa Solar (Pty) Ltd v Divwatt (Pty) Ltd 
2002 (4) SA 681 (SCA).  
175
 See Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd v R 1956 1 PH K22 (C); see also Lamprecht v 
McNeillie 1994 3 SA 665 (A) 670 C.  
176
 See Joubert Contract 37-38; Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and Acceptance 45 48; and authorities 
quoted by Van der Merwe et al Contract 49 in Fn19. 
177
 But, Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 (4) SA 72 (SCA) [12] whereby, a party 
is generally not bound to disclose to the other party all the terms of the proposed agreement, unless 
“there are terms that could not reasonably have been expected in the contract.” See, in the same 
sense, Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource [19]; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 
(6) SA 21 (SCA) [36]. 
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“unequivocal” in the sense that an ambiguous proposal cannot qualify as a valid 
offer. In Wasmuth v Jacobs, Levy J stated clearly that, 
The rules applicable to the interpretation of an offer, or, for that matter, of an 
acceptance of an offer, are not necessarily the same as the rules which are applicable 
in the interpretation of contracts. (…) Thus, although a contract, even if it be 
ambiguous, may be and generally is binding, the acceptance of the offer (or for that 
matter the offer itself) must be unequivocal, i.e. positive and unambiguous.178 
To illustrate this, an offer related to a contract of sale must at least mention the thing 
sold and the price in order to decide whether or not it is complete.  
Thirdly, an offer must be “clear and certain”.179 As Du Plessis says, “It is a 
general requirement for the creation of contractual obligations that their contents 
must be certain (…).”180 To say that an offer must be clear and certain means that its 
content must be drafted in terms which express fluidly the significance and extent of 
the rights and duties of the parties.181 In other words, a proposal purporting to be an 
offer cannot be vague. An offer can be described as vague when, for instance, it aims 
to create a contract different from the one expressed in the terms of the proposal; the 
proposal uses a vague language; or it is full of gaps.182  
In summary, in order to amount into a valid offer, the offer should not be 
limited to an expression of the will of the parties; it has, rather, to be firm, complete, 
clear, and certain.183 An offer which fails to meet each of these requirements is 
invalid. 
 
 
                                               
178
 See Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633 E-G. 
179
 See Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and Acceptance 45 48; and Joubert Contract 38. 
180
 Du Plessis Possibility 204 210. 
181
 See authorities quoted by Joubert Contract 38 in Fn19; but Note 176 above. 
182
 See Du Plessis Possibility 204. 
183
 Sections 22(a) & (b) and 25 CPA introduce further conditions in respect of valid offers of 
consumer contracts. According to them, an offer must, inter alia, be “in plain and understandable 
language” and “disclose whether goods are reconditioned or gray market goods”. A comment of 
these provisions is, however, beyond this study. For further comments, see Hawthorne/Hutchison 
Offer and Acceptance 45 49; Van Eeden Guide 177. 
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The acceptance   
The acceptance is basically described as a declaration of will, which indicates 
acquiescence to the proposal contained in the offer and which is communicated by 
the offeree to the offeror.184 Hawthorne and Hutchison complement this by saying 
that “an acceptance is a clear and unambiguous declaration of intention by the 
offeree, unequivocally assenting to all the terms of the proposal embodied in the 
offer.”185 From these definitions, it appears that, for the matter to end in the 
conclusion of a contract, an acceptance is also subject to some requirements like its 
corresponding offer. One of those requirements consists of the fact that acceptance 
must be given by the person to whom the offer was made.186 It is obvious that, where 
the offer is addressed to the public, any member of that public should accept it. When 
the offer is addressed to a particular person, or to a group of persons, however, only 
that person or a member of the group can express acceptance.  
Additionally, in the same way as applies to the offer, an enforceable 
acceptance must be “clear and unequivocal or unambiguous”;187 and made by the 
offeree’s “intention to be bound” by his/her commitment.188 As Van der Merwe and 
others have stated,189 
                                               
184
 See Lowe v Commission for Gender Equality 2002 (1) SA 750 (W); see also Van der Merwe et 
al Contract 52; Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 742. 
185
 Hawthorne/Hutchison Offer and Acceptance 45 55. 
186
 See Levin v Drieprok Properties (Pty) Ltd 1975 2 SA 397 (A) 407C-F per Corbett JA; Blew v 
Snoxel 1931 TPD 226; both cases are commented on by Christie/Bradfield Contract 61. See also 
cases quoted by Joubert Contract 43 in Fn62 or by Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 743 in Fn42 
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 See Men’s Fair (Pty) Ltd v Bible Society of SA 1976 (4) 12(T); Ebrahim v Khan 1979 (2) SA 
498 (N); Breytenbach v Stewart 1985 (1) SA 149 (T); Joubert Contract 43. See also Cunningham 
v C and S Estate Agency 1945 TPD 440 443; Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 
413 (A) 421-422; Boerne v Harris 1949 1 SA 793 (A); Christie/Bradfield Contract 64. 
188
 See Boerne v Harris 1949 1 SA 793 (A); Van Jaarsveld v Ackerman 1974 (3) SA 664 (T) and 1975 
(2) SA 753 (A); Kuhn v Raatz 1975 (4) SA 164 (C) and 1976 (4) SA 543 (A). Joubert specifies that the 
offeree’s need to commit intentionally is a mere application of the general principle that parties must 
act animo contrahendi. Joubert Contract 43; see also Hutchison/Du Bois Contract 733 752. 
189
 See Van der Marwe et al Contract 53.  
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An intention to enter into obligations with the offeror is an essential element 
of the acceptance.190 The consensual basis of contract implies that acceptance 
should be by way of conscious reaction to the offer191 and that for acceptance 
to be effective it should correspond with the terms set out in the offer.192 The 
acceptance must be unambiguous, so that it is clear to the recipient, using 
ordinary reason and knowledge that the agreement is complete.193 
The acceptance must, furthermore, be communicated to the offeror and until 
communication takes place there is no constituted contract.194 The general rule, in 
this regard, is that contractual liability arises only when the offeror has had 
knowledge of the acceptance.195 Thus, if the offeror has prescribed a form for 
acceptance in the offer, the acceptance must conform to that form,196 unless there has 
been special dispensation.197 If there is a doubt on the question of whether or not 
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 See Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1996 (3) SA 320 (W) 331; Roberts 
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Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A) 479E.  
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dispensation has been given, the communication of the acceptance is indispensable. 
In that case, there is a presumption that the contract will be completed once the 
acceptance of the offer is communicated to the offeror.198  
In short, for it to be effective, the acceptance is also subject to preliminary 
conditions as is the offer; it must be transmitted by the offeree, be clear and 
unequivocal, and be brought to the offeror’s attention; otherwise it is unenforceable. 
 
3.3.2.6 Conclusion on the necessity of an agreement 
 
The agreement of the parties plays an important role in the field of the law of contract. 
The parties must reveal their intention to be bound by the content of the contract. 
Where consensus has not been reached, nevertheless, their agreement may be 
inferred from acts performed by one or another. Van der Merwe and others state, in 
this regard, that,  
The South African law of contract seems to have reached the point where, on the 
basic assumption that a contract is primarily an expression of the actual intention of 
the participants, the objective considerations which serve to recognise and protect 
the reasonable expectations of those participants, and which have over many decades 
been expressed in various alternatives, are being assimilated into a unitary 
qualification of consensus.199  
As has been mentioned earlier, contractual liability is based, under contemporary 
South African jurisdiction, upon a double theory, the will theory and the reliance 
theory. Thus, though the requirement regarding the consent of the parties remains 
noteworthy, with the way in which the reliance theory has been welcomed in the case 
law, one might be attempted to consider it to be the modern leading approach to 
contract. In any case, the intention of the parties is usually made known by the offer 
                                               
Commercial and Industrial Properties (Pty) Ltd v Sibermna 2001 (3) SA 952 (SCA) 958; Ideal 
Fasteners Corporation CC v Book Vision (Pty) Ltd [2002] 1 All SA 321 (D) 325; Withok Small 
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and acceptance method of contracting as will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. At 
present, it is necessary to analyse other fundamental principles of the law of contract, 
viz. freedom and the sanctity of contract, good faith, and public policy 
considerations.  
 
3.3.3 Freedom and the Sanctity of Contract 
 
Apart from consensus and reliance, the other ground rules of contract law include 
freedom and the sanctity of contracts. The freedom of contract rule is naturally linked 
to the individual and the liberal vision of the eighteenth century.200 In the context of 
South African law, the idea of freedom goes together with the notion of sanctity. This 
dual notion “reflects a concept of contract, and a body of legal doctrine, that English 
writers generally refer to as the classical law of contract.”201 Hence, the case law and 
scholars admit that the law of contract, in South Africa, has as one of its central 
principles the freedom of contract.202 
As a rule, the freedom of contract “entails a general freedom to choose whether 
or not to contract, with whom to contract, and on what terms to contract.”203 Freedom 
means, in other words, that the parties have the right to negotiate and discuss the 
content of the contract according to their aspirations without any external 
interference. In that sense, the principle of freedom is given meaning by means of 
the expression of “consensus to contract”. With regard to the concept “sanctity of 
contract”, it “entails holding the parties bound to their agreement, once it has been 
properly reached.”204  
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 See explanation under Section 2.3.2 above; see also Bhana/Pieterse 2005 (122) 4 SALJ 865.  
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The interaction between the principles of freedom and sanctity is well 
described through an earlier dictum borrowed from Sir George Jessel MR in Printing 
& Numerical Registering Company v Sampson whereby it is stated that, 
If there is one thing that more than another public policy requires, it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred 
and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public 
policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of 
contract.205 
The ruling in the Printing & Numerical Registering Company v Sampson case means 
that the fundamental assumptions of individual autonomy connected with the liberty 
to consent to a contract form the foundations of the principle of sanctity of contract. In 
other words, according to the freedom and sanctity principles, once it is clear that a 
contract has been freely negotiated and that its terms are not immoral, illegal, or 
contrary to the public interest, the contract should be enforced pacta sunt servanda.206 
More specifically, owing to the fact that contracting parties are lawmakers for 
themselves, any judicial interference in their businesses must be viewed with 
scepticism.207 Such are also the approaches of the modern CC and SCA,208 for which 
the principle pacta sunt servanda is consistent with constitutional standards of 
autonomy and dignity.209 
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In Barkhuizen v Napier, the CC ruled, however, that the principle according to 
which a valid contract must be enforced pacta sunt servanda is not “a sacred cow that 
should trump all other considerations.”210 That is to say that, the freedom of contract 
rule is not applied absolutely; rather it has some limits. As Zimmerman has 
demonstrated, in all modern legal systems, including South African contract law, “the 
freedom of the parties to determine the content of their transaction is limited not only 
by statutory prohibitions but also by certain extra-legal standards.”211 Insofar as extra-
legal standards are concerned, they include concepts such those of public policy, 
public interest, morality, and good faith. Thus, if a contract is at variance with the 
needs of public policy as stipulated by the Constitution,212 or if it is judged contrary to 
the public interest, that contract should not be enforced.213 The unenforceability, in this 
case, is justified by the fact that a contract which contravenes the rules of public policy, 
public interest, or morality is void.214 
Moreover, the freedom of contract may be limited by the use of “standard-
form contracts” in business transactions. As Sachs J said, in Barkhuizen v Napier, 
standard form contracts are kinds of contracts that are drafted in advance in a “take-
it-or-leave-it” nature and which thus remove the opportunity for hands on 
negotiations.215 In these types of contracts, the negotiation of the terms of an 
agreement occurs only in a limited number of clauses related to basic matters such 
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as the price, quality of the goods, and their delivery.216 For any other issues, it simply 
refers to standard business conditions and terms which limit the freedom of the 
parties.217 It has been estimated that around 95 per cent of all transactions are formed 
in this manner these days.218  
Briefly, although the law recognises the value of principles such those of 
freedom of contract, sanctity, and pacta sunt sevanda, these theories are not absolute 
at all. They are, instead, limited either by legal prohibitions, the practice of business, 
or as  discussed in detail below, by certain external ideals such  public policy, public 
interest, and good faith.  
 
3.3.4 Good Faith in Contracts 
  
3.3.4.1 Introduction  
 
The duty of good faith is generally understood as a hope and obligation that people 
act honestly and fairly in negotiating and carrying out contractual obligations. 
Hutchison specifies that, the norm of good faith has played, from the outset, “a 
significant role in the development of the Roman law of contract and helped breathe 
an equitable spirit into the body of the civil law throughout the course of the ensuing 
centuries.”219 Recently, there has been much debate about the role it “might play in 
modern law of contract, as a counterweight to the dominant idea of freedom of 
contract.”220 Thus, a further aspect of consensus as the basis of contract is that all 
contracts must be executed in good faith.   
 One is reminded that the modern theory of contract derives from the 
consensual principle of Roman law. Under that legal system, contracts were 
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governed by the principle of bona fides.221 But, because modern South African 
contract law is a mixed legal system,222 it is important to look first at the role the 
good faith duty plays under Anglo-American common law countries before 
discussing its place in South Africa.  
 
3.3.4.2 Good faith duty in Anglo-American jurisdictions   
 
Historically speaking, the principle of good faith was not known in countries that 
belong to the common law legal system. With regard to English contract law, for 
instance, Goode said, in one of his addresses in Italy, that in England they find it 
difficult to adopt as general a concept as “good faith” the meaning of which, in 
addition, they do not know.223 In 1989, when establishing a comparison between 
English and civil law systems, Bingham LJ specified, 
In many civil law systems, (...) the law of obligations recognises and enforces an 
overriding principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in 
good faith. (...) English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such 
overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to 
demonstrated problems of unfairness.224  
Lord Ackner put it, likewise, that,  
[The] concept of a duty to carry negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to 
the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to 
the negotiations is entitled to pursue his own interest, so long as he avoids making 
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misrepresentations. A duty to negotiate in good faith is unworkable in practice as it 
is inherently inconsistent with the position of the negotiating parties.225   
A similar situation is also observed in relation to the execution of the contract. As for 
negotiations, parties are entitled to exercise their contractual rights and obligations 
for whatever reason they choose during the implementation stage.226 Shortly, as 
Potter LJ pointed out in James Spencer & Co Ltd v Tame Valley Padding Co Ltd, 
“there is no general doctrine of good faith in the English law of contract. The 
plaintiffs are free to act as they wish provided that they do not act in breach of a term 
of the contract.”227  
By contrast to English law, an eloquent illustration of the good faith 
requirement is found in §1-203 of the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
which reads, “Every contract or duty within the UCC imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement.”228  In the perspective of American law, §1-
201(11) UCC defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transactions 
concerned.” This definition has been criticised as being narrow and making the UCC 
§1-203 very weak.229 To complete it, §1-201(11)230 and §2-103(1)(b) provide a 
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broader definition of good faith particularly with regard to the sale of goods. As 
stated by these provisions, good faith in the case of a merchant means, “honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.”  With reference to this definition, one commentator has stated that the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing pursue among other purposes, “the faithfulness to an 
agreed common purpose, consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party, and consistency with community standards of decency, fairness, or 
reasonableness.”231 Such being its goal, it is then judicious that American sellers and 
buyers cannot expressly exclude the duty of good faith while negotiating or 
performing a contract.  
The USA is not the only common law country to have adopted the principle 
of good faith. Australia and Canada have also done so. As regards Australia, many 
commentators, scholars, and judges, have suggested that Australian contract law is 
heading towards recognising good faith and fair dealing duties.232 The first stage of 
approving the relevance of these values in the performance of contracts was made by 
Justice Priestley JA in Renard Constructions v Minister for Public Works.233 In the 
case, Priestly considered that a duty that parties act in good faith in running their 
contractual obligations should generally be implied into contracts.234 He stressed the 
opportunity for Australia to compel “in all contracts a duty upon the parties of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance.”235 After referring to the development of the 
theory of good faith, particularly in the USA and Canada, Priestley considered that 
the recognition of such a duty is in line with existing community standards.236 Since 
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then, other courts237 have often approved his position in acknowledging the existence 
and enforceability of express and implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing 
under Australian contract law.238 Furthermore, in a number of single Justice Supreme 
Court decisions, it has been assumed that a duty of good faith would be implied in 
all commercial contracts.239  
With regard to Canada, it has also expressed its approval of the good faith 
principle. One Canadian lawyer has, besides this, described this standard as “a vital 
norm in contract law.”240 As Farnsworth argues, “the pervasiveness of good faith in 
contracts has important implications for theories of contract law, for the relationship 
between law and society, and for the law in its practical day-to-day operation.”241 
O’Byrne describes good faith as an improvement instrument of contract law because 
“it brings clarity and simplicity.”242 In a few words, Canadian courts have also, these 
days, frequently made reference to the duty of good faith which is established there 
as a basic principle of contract law.243  
                                               
237
 For a list of decisions in which good faith was implied, see Willmott/Christensen/Butler 
Contract 280-283. 
238
 Peden 2003 (15) 2 12 Bond Law Review 186. 
239
 Willmott/Christensen/Butler Contract 285. 
240
 Reiter “Good faith in Contracts”; quoted in Farnsworth Good Faith 153. The interest of 
Canadian common law lawyers in the good faith obligation seems to have been influenced by two 
of the Ontario Law Reform Commission reports, namely the Report on Sale of Goods (Ottawa 
Ministry of the Attorney General 1979), and the Report on the Amendment of the Law of Contract 
(Toronto Ontario Law Reform Commission 1987); both reports referred to by McCamus Contracts 
781 Fn8 & 9; and Farnsworth Good Faith 153 Fn27.  
241
 Farnsworth Good Faith 153. 
242
 O’Byrne 2007 (86) 2 Canadian Bar Review (The) 193. That seems to be the reason why Article 
1375 of the Quebec Civil Code has provided an express obligation of good faith relevant to three 
distinct areas, the negotiation of contract, its performance or execution, and its enforcement. It has 
been ruled in this respect that, a seller who seeks to terminate a contract must exercise his/her right 
reasonably and in good faith as he/she would act for its performance and negotiation. See Mason v 
Freedman (1958) SCR 483 487; quoted by Grossman/Na http://www.fmc-law.com/upload/en/ 
publications/archive/Good Faith_in_Real_Property Law_Nov2001.pdf 2. 
243
 For an analysis of the leading cases making reference to the good faith duty under Canadian 
law, see McCamus Contracts 784 to 803. The author distinguishes three categories of authorities 
in relation to good faith: those imposing a cooperation duty between the parties; those which limit 
the exercise of contractual discretionary powers; and authorities which prevent parties from 
evading contractual obligations.  
163 
 
Succinctly, though England is unreceptive to the good faith obligation, its 
value has been acknowledged in other leading common law legal family nations, 
including the USA, Australia, and Canada. There, the duty of good faith governs both 
the conclusion and performance of contracts as it does under South African law.  
 
3.3.4.3 Good faith duty in the South African law of contract  
 
Modern South African case law and writers agree with the general principle that the 
concept of bona fides or “good faith” was one of the most important ideals in the 
development of Roman contract law.244 The principle gained its influence in relation 
to the iudicia stricti iuris maxim “as a result of a specific standard clause, inserted 
into a procedural formula at the request of the defendant. That clause was known as 
the exceptio doli.”245 With time, the distinction between stricti iuris and bonae fidei 
contracts became meaningless.  
With regard to Roman-Dutch law, it is only towards the eighteenth century 
that Roman-Dutch authors specified, for the first time, that all contracts were based 
on consent and that they were, therefore, bonae fidei.246 The latter expression meant 
that all kind of contracts were based on the principle of good faith so that contracting 
parties were required to conclude their contract in a way consistent to it. Modern 
South African law has adhered to this novel approach too. As stated by Joubert JA 
in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas, “(…) contracting parties were 
bound to everything which good faith reasonably and equitably demanded.”247 
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Accordingly, “the courts should have had wide powers to read into a contract any 
term that justice required.”248  
It should be noted that one of the main instruments employed by South African 
courts to introduce the good faith requirement into the law of contract was the 
Roman-law defence of “bad faith” referred to before as the exceptio doli.249  In the 
words of Glover,  
[The] exceptio doli [generalis] had been viewed as an equitable defence that allowed 
a defendant to resist a claim for performance under a contract when there was 
something unconscionable about the plaintiff’s seeking to enforce the contract (or a 
clause thereof) in the specific circumstances of that case.250 
The exceptio doli doctrine has been used by the judiciary for a long time to improve 
South African contract law with new common law principles imported from English 
law and not necessarily known to Roman-Dutch law. Those policies include the 
fictional fulfilment of conditions, rectification, and estoppel.251  
As Hutchison has said, the AD was, on a number of occasions, prepared to 
assume that a defence based on the exceptio doli “was still possible in modern law, at 
any rate in circumstances where enforcement of the plaintiff’s remedy ‘would cause 
some great inequity and would amount to unconscionable conduct on his part’.”252 The 
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question was only settled in the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 
case.253 On the subject, the majority of the AD, led by Joubert JA, came to the 
conclusion that “the exceptio doli had never been received into Roman-Dutch law and 
afforded no grounds for the recognition of a substantive defence based on equity in 
modern South African law.”254 Joubert was so sceptical about the exceptio doli clause 
that he came to lay it to rest. In the Bank of Lisbon case, when delivering the judgement 
of the majority, the learned judge stated that the time was ripe to bury, once and for 
all, “the exceptio doli generalis as a superfluous defunct anachronism.”255  He added, 
as if to confirm his decision, “Requiescat in pace”.256  
The rule under the Bank of Lisbon case was then interpreted as bringing to an 
end the implementation of the good faith principle in South African law.257 Mr Justice 
Brand is of this opinion.258  He says, “the rules of our law of contract have become 
so firmly established that there is no room for any further development so as to give 
effect to bona fides (...) even when this were to be demanded by the changing needs 
or values of society.”259  
According to Zimmerman, in contrast,  
If the modern theory of contract descends from the consensual contracts of Roman 
law, there is no longer any room for a specific procedural device such as the exceptio 
doli. The substantive content of that exceptio had been absorbed into the requirement 
of good faith underlying the operation of all consensual contracts. Therefore, 
whenever the term ‘exceptio doli’ was used, it was a mere façon de parler – a 
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convenient way for a defendant to allege that the plaintiff’s behaviour constituted an 
infringement of the principle of bona fides.260 
Zimmerman’s point of view has currently been advocated either by writers or by 
courts. In Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Africa Bpk v Saayman, for instance, 
Olivier JA explained extensively the importance and value the principle of good faith 
plays in the South African law of contract.261 He described its role as being “simply 
to actualise the convictions of the community with regard to decency, 
reasonableness, and fairness.”262 In the opinion of Olivier, “the function of good faith 
is to give expression to the community’s sense of what is fair, just, and reasonable 
(…), (so that) the majority decision in Bank of Lisbon should not be read as denying 
it this role.”263 In NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC, likewise, the 
SCA expressed its approval for the role played by modern concepts such as those of 
“(…) bona fides (or good faith) and contractual equity” in contractual dealings.264 
Regarding the CC, it has also recognised, in the Barkhuizen v Napier case, that the 
requirement of good faith underlies contractual relationships.265  
Lower courts have interpreted the behaviour of the supreme courts as a means 
of giving “the green light in the direction of the development of a concept of good 
faith in (…) (South African) law of contract which would render the body of contract 
law congruent with the values of (…) (the South African) constitutional 
community.”266 Since then, it has been admitted that, under modern South African 
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contract law, all contracts are bonae fidei.267 That is to say, contracting parties have 
a basic duty to negotiate and contract in good faith. And, as long as a contract is 
valid, each party is bound by its terms.268 To associate Harms’ opinion in 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank, with the ruling in Bank of Lisbon, both parties are 
bound to everything required by good faith and equity.269  
It is important to note that, about 40 years before the cases cited above, Jansen 
J had already explained, in Meskin NO v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd and 
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another, the time when the duty of good faith is required.270 Jansen started by 
underlining the fact that all contracts are usually entered into in good faith. He 
continued then that by asserting all contracts to be concluded in good faith “(…) 
involves good faith (…) as a criterion in interpreting a contract (…) and in evaluating 
the conduct of the parties both in respect of its performance (…), and in its antecedent 
negotiation.”271 With such an understanding, it follows that the duty of good faith 
constitutes one of the bases of South African contract law as it is in other modern 
legal systems.272 At every stage of the contract, therefore, from negotiations to the 
performance of obligations, parties have to behave in a manner consistent with that 
value.273  
 With regard to the negotiation process, first, the South African historical 
position gives the impression of lining up with that of English law according to which 
a party may freely withdraw from negotiations at any stage up the conclusion of the 
contact.274 Such a traditional approach, as illustrated by the Murray v McLean case,275 
reflects the reluctance of English and, with its influence, South African courts to 
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apply the principle of good faith as a counterweight to one party’s improper conduct. 
Similarly, the view in Hamman v Moolman276 reveals that each party to negotiations 
must safeguard his/her own interests. As regards South African law, particularly, this 
approach has happily been amended by the rule in Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Frost.277 It is specifically recognised in this case that “contractual negotiations 
between parties form part of the ‘circumstantial matrix’ that has to be considered in 
order to establish whether a party has acted wrongly” or not.278 As Stegmann J ruled 
in Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd, 
The proposition that by our law all contracts are bonae fidei is not confined to matters 
that arise after consensus has been reached; it applies to the very process of reaching 
consensus. A party, who adopts an ambivalent posture with a view to manipulating 
the situation to his own advantage, when he can see more clearly where his best 
advantage lies, has a state of mind that falls short of the requirements of bona 
fides.279  
To use the words of Bhana and Pieterse, “the presence of consensus coupled with the 
value of good faith renders (…) (the) law of contract inherently equitable.”280 It is 
admitted that the principle of good faith governs all kinds of contracts including 
sales. To give an example of this, pursuant to the principle of good faith, the seller is 
under a duty to disclose any defect in the thing sold of which he/she is aware to the 
prospective buyer.281 If not, the seller will bear responsibility for lack of conformity 
because, in that case, he/she is presumed to have acted in bad faith.  
Regarding the duty of good faith when carrying out the contract, next, South 
African courts seem to have favoured the autonomy of the parties in contracts. Courts 
do not find it equitable to alter the agreements of the parties merely because they 
consider it reasonable to do so. In a dissenting opinion, delivered by Sachs J in the 
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Barkhuizen v Napier case, the learned judge said, “The principle of freedom does 
(…) support the view that the contractual autonomy of the parties should be respected 
and that failure to recognise such autonomy could cause contractual litigation to 
mushroom and the expectations of contractual parties to be frustrated.”282 In a similar 
way, Brand FDJ said in Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties that values, such as 
good faith, reasonableness, and fairness, are not freestanding requirements for the 
exercise of a contractual right.283  
Five years before, Brand FDJ had already stated, in South African Forestry Co 
Ltd v York Timbers Ltd,284 that,  
[Although] abstract values such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness are 
fundamental to [South African] law of contract, they do not constitute independent 
substantive rules that courts can employ to intervene in contractual relationships. 
These abstract values perform creative, informative and controlling functions 
through established rules of the law of contract. They cannot be acted upon by the 
courts directly. Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a 
contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and 
equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty.285 
The duty of good faith, furthermore, does not give courts general power to refuse to 
enforce contractual obligations considered as inequitable.286 In South African 
Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd, Brand FDJ, finding support in Brisley v Drotsky 
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and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, explained the consequence that judicial control 
should produce for contractual performance and enforcement. According to him, 
constitutional values such as freedom of contract “require that courts approach their 
task of striking down or declining to enforce contracts that parties have freely 
concluded, with perceptive restraint.”287 Brand concluded, therefore, that a “palm-
tree justice cannot serve as a substitute for the application of established principles 
of contract law,”288 i.e. freedom of contract, and the autonomy of the will.  
 
3.3.4.4 Conclusion on the principle of good faith  
 
An examination of the development described above creates the impression that the 
principle of good faith has produced a rich debate within the context of South African 
contract law. At the outset, this duty moved from acknowledgement to denial,289 and 
vice versa. Today, the principle has been well established. Consequently, as it is the 
case in other legal systems, in South African law, all contracts are expected to be 
negotiated and performed consistent with good faith. In practice, however, courts 
prefer not to intervene in contractual relationships allowing parties to take care of 
their contractual rights and obligations as they understand them. The reluctance of 
the courts may lead one to deduce that, under South African law, the principle of party 
autonomy and the principle of freedom of contracts take precedence over good faith.  
The duty of good faith is not the only moral standard clause to which contracts 
are subject; another similar concept is the notion of public policy. 
 
3.3.5 Contract Consistency with Public Policy  
 
The expression “public policy” is understood as a set of rules that covers the essential 
interests of the state. These interests include the Constitution and other private law 
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statutes considered indispensable for the protection of the individuals.290 According 
to Ngcobo J, the concept of “public policy” “represents the legal convictions of the 
community; (…) (means) those values that are held most dear by the society.”291 
Values of the kind include, in the words of Cameron J, “the constitutional values of 
human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.”292 The CC complements this with the 
notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness.293 
In other words, the meaning of, and consistency with, the public policy 
requirement are determined by reference to the Constitution. As stated by s 2 of the 
1996 Fundamental Law, the Constitution is the highest authority in the country. Thus, 
courts and the CC, in particular, have the power to declare any agreement invalid if it 
is in conflict with it. As stated in Barkhuizen v Napier, any contractual provision which 
is inconsistent “to the values enshrined in (…) the Constitution is contrary to public 
policy and is, therefore, unenforceable.”294 That is to say, although the law 
acknowledges the value of principles such as freedom and sanctity, “public policy 
would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term if its enforcement would be 
unjust or unfair.”295  
 As for its comparable good faith duty, the concept of public policy is also well 
established under South African contract law. Throughout the history, courts have 
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reaffirmed their obedience to that concept “as the appropriate instrument for dealing 
with contractual unfairness that cannot satisfactorily be handled by existing rules.”296 
The reason for this is that there is a wealth of authorities which accept the notion of 
public policy as an assessment tool to weigh the validity of contracts.297 In Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes, confirmed more recently in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd, for instance, the SCA stated that South African “common law does 
not recognise agreements that are contrary to public policy.”298 According to the 
SCA, instead of giving effect to such conventions, “courts have always been fully 
prepared to reassess public policy and declare contracts invalid on that ground.”299  
It should be remembered that the party autonomy principle requires parties to 
honour in good faith contractual obligations that they have freely and voluntarily 
undertaken.300 Despite such a general rule, the needs of public policy allow courts to 
decline to enforce any unfair contractual terms even though parties may have 
consented to them. It follows then that the concept of public policy is the most 
important principle of the law of contract so that individual and public agreements 
must comply with it at the risk of being invalidated or rendered unenforceable.301 
Public policy considerations are not static; their weight may vary from time to time 
                                               
296
 See Christie/Bradfield Contract 17; quoting in Fn88, Brisley v Drotsky and Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes. 
297
 See, among others, Voet 2.14.16; Grotius 3 1 42; Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294 302 per 
Innes CJ; Magna Alloys and Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Elis 1984 4 SA 874 (A); Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A); Botha v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A); Carmichele 
v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre of Applied Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
298
 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7I-9H; and Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) [38]. 
299
 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) [38]; citing Hurwitz v 
Taylor 1926 TPD 81; see also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [11]; Den Braven SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) [25]; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd [10] 493-494. 
300
 Barkhuizen v Napier [30]; quoted with approval in African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd 
v Dreams Travel and Tours CC 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) [15]. In Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle 
Properties [124], Zondo AJ added to this that correspondingly, public policy requires that parties 
to contracts that have been freely and voluntarily concluded should respect the exercise by other 
parties of their contractual rights. Likewise, Yacoob J said, in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd 
v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) [26], that “the issue of whether a duty to negotiate in good faith is 
imposed by a contract and whether that obligation has been imposed by a particular contract is (…), 
by necessary implication, issues of public policy.” 
301
 Cf. s 2 of the Constitution; see also African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel 
and Tours CC 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA) [16]. 
174 
 
depending on the circumstances.302 As Joubert has said, opinions relating to public 
policy matters may differ from society to society both in place and time.303  
 In the same way, there is a close connection between the concept of public 
policy and the principle of good faith so that it is not always easy to differentiate 
between them. Without the need to engage in a greater discussion, it is merely 
highlighted that the duty of good faith “forms an element of the umbrella concept 
that is public policy.”304 Thus, the notion of public policy is the doctrine through 
which the fundamental principle of good faith will gain recognition and 
implementation. To recall the words of Olivier, in the Eerste Nasionale Bank v 
Saayman case, the courts should apply the notion of good faith to all contracts 
because public policy demands that this should be so.305  
 Briefly, the requirement for consistency with public policy needs is really one 
of the cornerstones on which the law of contract in South Africa is built. That concept 
gives the impression of being preeminent compared with other fundamental 
principles. Thus, values such as those of freedom of contract, sanctity, and good faith 
have meaning only if they comply with public policy considerations. Similarly, any 
contract which is in conflict with the needs of public policy cannot be enforced. This 
is the position of the 1996 Constitution, and consequently the view of modern South 
African contract law, as evidenced by numerous cases heard by both the SCA and CC.       
 
3.3.6 Conclusion on the Fundamental Principles of the Law of Contract   
 
A contract is an agreement which produces legal effects. It requires a number of 
conditions for its validity. Those requirements include, save circumstances of 
reasonable belief, the need of an agreement between the parties and their 
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collaboration for it to be concluded. One of the methods used is the offer and 
acceptance means of conclusion. The offer and acceptance process does not, 
however, per se suffice to result in a valid contract. For them to produce effect, the 
offer must be firm, complete, clear and certain; and the acceptance must be 
communicated and show the intention of the offeree to be bound by the contract. 
Normally contracting parties are free to negotiate and conclude the contract 
according to their needs. A contract freely and voluntary concluded will then be 
enforced by the courts. The benefit of the freedom of contract principle is not, 
however, unlimited. Instead, freedom is subject to other fundamental principles 
which include good faith and consistency with public policy. The latter requirement 
appears to be the most important, given that almost all other principles must meet its 
terms.  
Having looked at the fundamental principles governing the law of contract as 
a whole, our attention now turns to sales contracts ground rules. 
 
3.4 Ground Rules for Sales Contracts  
 
3.4.1 The Nature and Definition of a Contract of Sale  
 
Several definitions have been proposed in connection with the contract of sale, some 
very descriptive and others simple.306 One of the commonly-recognised definitions 
is that, “when parties who have the required intention agree together that one party 
will make something available to the other in return for payment of a price, the 
contract is a sale.”307 
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This definition has, however, been criticised on the grounds that it does not 
clearly distinguish between a contract of sale and a contract of lease. In effect, 
though, in the case of sales the property is made available on a permanent basis; in 
both instances one party makes a thing available to the other against payment of 
money.308  Owing to this reproach, De Wet and Van Wyk describe a sale of goods as 
“a reciprocal agreement by which one person, the seller, undertakes to deliver an 
object (res) to the other, the buyer, and the latter undertakes to pay the former a sum 
of money in exchange for that object.”309 Sharrock has also adopted a similar 
definition. According to him, a “Sale is a contract whereby one party (the seller or 
vendor) undertakes to transfer a thing (the res vendita or merx) or the possession 
thereof to the other party (the buyer or purchaser) in return for payment of a price by 
the latter.”310  
As is clear from the above, all these definitions insist on the fact that a contract 
of sale involves an agreement on the property sold, known as the res vendita or merx, 
and the payment of the price, also called pretium.311 In other words, the reaching of 
agreement on the thing sold and the payment of the price constitute the cornerstones 
of any contract of sale,312 so that, if parties fail to agree on them, there is no contract 
of sale at all.313 Alternatively, once the consent, merchandise, and price are present, 
the sale is complete without need that the price be paid or the thing sold delivered.314  
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It should be borne in mind that under South African law all contracts, including 
sales, are consensual. Sales contracts “derive their binding force from the mere 
agreement between a buyer and a seller.”315 Thus, under the legal system in view, it 
is not a key requirement that ownership be transferred to the buyer.316 What is 
required is rather that the seller transfers an uninterrupted possession of the thing 
sold.317 So, it is important to review some general rules relating to the agreement, the 
thing sold, the price, and the transfer of ownership. 
 
3.4.2 The Need for Consent in a Sales Contract    
 
Common rules governing all kinds of contracts in respect of the agreement 
requirement also apply to sales contracts.318 What is specific to sales is that the parties 
must express their intention, the buyer to acquire the thing sold, and the seller to sell 
it.319 In other words, there must be a meeting of minds of contracting parties with the 
intention of concluding a contract of sale but not any other contract. Pursuant to the 
reliance theory, however, the manifestation of intention may be inferred from one 
party’s conduct. This is also true for a contract of sale. In effect, given that an offer 
and a corresponding acceptance may both be communicated by conduct, it follows 
that a contract of sale may validly be concluded by conduct alone.320 Such may be 
the case for a buyer who takes delivery of an excess quantity of goods and keeps 
them,321 or where goods are taken off without fixing the price. In the latter case, 
goods are presumed to be paid for at the usual price.322  
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In any event, except for sales of land,323 sales by auctions,324 and credit 
agreements,325 all other kinds of sale are not subject to any formal requirements. They 
may be concluded either orally or by writing as the parties see fit provided that they 
determine accurately the subject-matter and the price of the contract. 
 
3.4.3 Determination of the Subject-matter of the Sale 
 
As a general rule, contracting parties must reach agreement on the identity and the 
nature of the object to be sold. As a number of scholars have stated, the identity and 
the nature of the thing sold must be determined or determinable when the contract is 
concluded.326 That is to say, there must be a “defined and ascertainable subject-
matter”327 the moment a contract is formed.  
On the question of how a thing is ascertained, Bradfield and Lehmann answer,   
The property sold is ascertained if it is clear that the parties were in agreement about 
the specific item, or items, of property being sold. The property sold is ascertainable 
if it is described as being of a particular kind or class of property, or possessing 
particular qualities, or fit or suitable for a particular purpose (…), or the parties agree 
that the property sold shall correspond in quality to a specimen sample exhibited at 
the time of the sale (…).328 It is also ascertainable if what is sold is a quantity, 
expressed as a number, weight or measure, of a particular kind of thing (…).329  
In principle, when a specific type of object is known, there is no problem. Although 
parties may have difficulties in specifying the object’s particular identity or nature, 
it is their duty “to describe the object, the quantity or the nature of the goods with as 
much precision as is reasonably (...) possible under the circumstances 
(concerned).”330 According to the case law, where goods are not determined or at 
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least determinable, or if they are so vaguely described that it is not possible to 
ascertain exactly what has been sold, the contract is null.331 With regard to the merx’s 
nature, it is admitted that it may be a corporeal or an incorporeal thing, a movable or 
an immovable one,332 a specific or a generic article, an object currently in existence, 
or a future thing, and so on.333 The only exception is that the thing must be intra 
commercium or merchantable334 and not belong to the buyer at the time of the sale.335  
Insofar as the sale of future things is concerned, one clear illustration is the 
sale of items which are still to be manufactured. To illustrate by using Kerr’s 
example, “a customer may buy from a manufacturer machinery to be made to his 
(…) specifications, or something in such short supply that it has to be ordered a 
considerable time before the expected date of delivery.”336 For the validity of sale of 
future things, however, materials must be supplied by the seller himself/herself.337 If 
they are provided by the buyer, the contract will be described more as a lease than as 
a sale.338 Though contracting parties are free from determining the object of the sale, 
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Dusterwald 1981 (3) SA 691 (W) 698H-699D; see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 29 Fn178; Kerr 
Sale 22 and 60; Hackwill Sale 9; Lehmann Sale 888 891. 
332
 Noted, immovable items are often excluded from international transactions; see Article 2 (d) 
and (e) CISG. 
333
 See Kerr Sale 8; Sharrock Business 271; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 134-135; 
Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 25. For a list of sales of future things organised in South African law, see 
Lotz Sale 361 364-365; Kerr Sale 25-26. There is unanimity that the sale of future things is subject 
to the condition that such goods come into existence. See Sharrock Business 271; Eiselen in Scott 
Commerce 135; Lotz Sale 361 365; and Kerr Sale 25. 
334
 See D 18.1.6; 18.1.34; Voet 18.1.13; Wessels Contract §395; Union Government (Minister of 
Finance) v Van Soelen 1916 AD 92 101; and other authorities quoted by Kerr Sale 8 Fn3; and 
Lehmann Sale 888 890 Fn29.  
335
 See authorities quoted by Kerr Sale 8 Fn2; Lehmann Sale 888 891 Fn33; see also Hackwill Sale 
13. 
336
 See Kerr Sale 25-26; for other instances of future things, see Lotz Sale 361 364-365. 
337
 See Lotz Sale 361 364; but SA Wood Turning Mills (Pty) Ltd v Price Bros (Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) 
SA 263 (T) whereby, though the printer was supplied with descriptive matter and photographs for 
catalogues, the contract was one of purchase and sale.  
338
 See S v Progress Dental Laboratory (Pty) Ltd 1965 (3) SA 192 (T). 
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special legislation may forbid or restrict the sale of specific objects.339 An agreement 
for the sale of prohibited goods is void owing to illegality.340  
Before analysing the determination of the price, it is important to note that, 
under South African law, the seller does not necessarily need to own the goods to be 
sold for the sale to be valid. The sale of the property of third party is valid and 
binding.341 As a number of commentators have argued, the sale of goods not 
belonging to the seller may be lawfully concluded in cases such as where the seller 
reasonably expects to obtain them from his/her regular suppliers or from the 
owner.342 But, if goods have been delivered in violation of the owner’s rights, the 
latter is allowed to claim them from the actual possessor with the commonly known 
precept, the actio rei vindicatio.343 In other cases, except for some specific statutory 
prohibitions, any merchantable thing may constitute sales subject-matter. It does not 
matter whether the thing exists or not, or whether it belongs to the seller or not. What 
is essential is that the parties reach agreement upon that item and determine the price. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
339
 For explanatory cases, see:  s 18 and 35 Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969; s 6(2) and s 
12(1) Radio Act 3 of 1952; s 14, 18, 19, 22A Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 
of 1965; s 2(1) and 3(1) Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act 54 of 1972; s 5 Drugs and 
Drugs Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; s 31 Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.  It should be noted that 
a number of other former common law restrictions have been removed a long time ago. See, in the 
same sense, Surveyor-General (Cape) v Estate De Villiers 1923 AD 588 593; Consolidated 
Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd v Administrator, SWA & another 1958 (4) SA 572 (A); 
and comments by Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 25; Lotz Sale 361 364. 
340
 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 135, and authorities quoted by Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 25 
Fn150. For comments on the illegality principle and its consequences on contracts, see 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 358-417; Van der Merwe et al Contract 165-191; Joubert Contract 
129-153; Kerr Contract 18-199. 
341
 See Theron and Du Plessis v Schoombie (1897) 14 SC 192 198; Tshandu v City Council 
Johannesburg 1947 (1) SA 494 (W) 497; EBN Trading (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise 2001 (2) SA 1210 (SCA) §23; see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 25-26. 
342
 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 136; Hackwill Sale 12. 
343
 In addition to authorities quoted in the previous footnote, see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 26. 
The actio rei vindicatio is a right recognised for the real owner to claim the property sold from the 
buyer in order to recover his/her possession. 
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3.4.4 Determination of the Price 
 
The obligation for contracting parties to determine the price for the sale to be valid 
is explicitly formulated by Colman J in Burroughs Ltd v Chenille of SA (Pty) Ltd as 
follows: 
[T]here can be no valid contract of sale unless the parties have agreed, expressly or 
by implication, upon a purchase price. They must either fix the amount of that price 
in their contract or agree upon some external standard by the application whereof it 
will be possible to determine the price without further reference to them.344 
This ruling was repeated later by Corbett JA in Westinghouse Brake & Equipment 
(Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd in almost similar words.345 These cases show 
that the price is an essential term of any contract of sale. Thus, for a contract to 
amount to one of sale, parties must expressly, or by implication, agree upon the price.  
With regard to its characteristics, the price must be serious, certain or 
ascertainable, and stipulated in money or partly in money.346 As far as the currency 
is concerned, it is admitted that the price must be in current money or in foreign 
money reducible in terms of current money.347 If parties agree to exchange objects 
instead of money, the contract is barter or an exchange contract. If, however, the 
price is partly in money and partly in goods, the intention of the parties will prevail 
in determining whether the contract is one of sale or a barter contract.348 The price 
                                               
344
 See Burroughs Ltd v Chenille of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 669 (W) 670C-D, per Colman J taking 
council on Mackeurtan Law of Sale 3rd ed 18, and Margate Estates Ltd v Moore 1943 TPD 54.  
345
 Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 
574D-C; see also cases quoted by Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 31 in Fn187 and 188. 
346
 See Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 31-32; Kerr Sale 30ff; Hackwill Sale 14; Eiselen in Scott 
Commerce 141; Sharrock Business 272; see also authorities quoted by Lotz Sale 361 366 Fn43.  
347
 The assessment of price is discussed in Section 6.3.3.2 below. 
348
 See Rand Water Board v Receiver of Revenue 1907 TH 215; Pretoria Townships Ltd v Pretoria 
Municipality 1913 TPD 362. See, in the same sense, Lotz Sale 361 366; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 
141; Kerr Sale 30-32; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 31; Hackwill Sale 19. In  the words of Voet, 
If partly money and partly something else is given for a thing, we must look to see what was in 
the mind of the contracting parties, whether purchase or barter. If that matter is not clear, the 
transaction must be classified according to the leading factor. Thus if there is more in money, 
and less in the value of other things given, the contract ought to be one of sale; but the contrary 
if there is more in the thing given than in the money.  
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must, in addition, be serious. Requiring the price to be serious entails that it be real 
and correspond to the value of the goods.349 Thus, where the price is illusory and 
does not bear any resemblance the value of the goods, the contract is not a sale but 
rather a donation.  
Normally, the price must be determined by the parties, or they may agree on 
the method of its determination. As stated in the Burroughs Ltd v Chenille of SA (Pty) 
Ltd and Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 
decisions above, the determination of the price might be expressed or be implied 
from the previous course of dealings between parties.350 With regard to the question 
of whether the price could be determined by one party or a person appointed by 
him/her, the answer is negative.351 It is possible, however, that parties appoint a third 
                                               
See Voet (n 6) 18.1.22 (trans. Gane); reproduced by Lotz Sale 361 366 Fn30. This approach was 
accepted in Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mohamed 1989 (1) SA 172 (D) (purchase price 
paid partly in cash and partly by ‘trade in’ of a motor car). 
349
 See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Saner 1927 TPD 162.  
350
 In same sense, see Singh v Hulett & Sons 1924 NPD 117. 
351
 See Colman J in Burroughs Ltd v Chenille of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 669 (W) 670C-D; relying 
on Voet 18. 1.23 (trans. Gane); Deary v Deputy Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1920 CPD 541; 
Dawidowitz v van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672; see also authorities quoted by Bradfield/Lehmann 
Sale 33 Fn200. In Murray and Roberts Construction Ltd v Finat Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 
508 (A) 514, Hoexter JA said,  
It is no doubt a general principle of the law of obligations that, when it depends entirely on the 
will of a party to an alleged contract to determine the extent of the prestation of either party, the 
purported contract is void for vagueness. Obvious examples of the application of the principles 
are afforded by the law of sale. If, for example, it is left to one of the parties to fix the price the 
contract is bad. 
This ruling was recently confirmed in NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC & others 
CC 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA); and, particularly, in Friedman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) [9] when Van Heerden DCJ reminded us that any contract which authorises 
one of the parties to fix, inter alia, the price “is void for vagueness”. In Dharumpal Transport (Pty) 
Ltd v Dharumpal 1956 (1) SA 700, Colman J recognised, however, that the avoidance of a sale on 
the grounds that the price being determined by one party was inconsistent with modern 
international instruments. Colman said at 670D-E, “ (…) in our law, ‘which does not conform in 
this regard with certain other systems’, there can be no valid contract of sale if the parties have 
agreed that the price is to be fixed by one of them or by his nominee.” As if to complete the idea 
of Colman, Van Heerden DCJ argued, in NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive [16] that, 
keeping such a rule under modern South African law has appeared somewhat illogical. The learned 
judge stated in an obiter remark that, “a sale (…) containing a power to fix the price (…) is not 
only illogical but also sadly out of step with modern legal systems.” According to him [at 9], it is 
“illogical in view of the recognition that the determination of the price may validly be left to a third 
party, and that either the seller or the buyer may be accorded a power to individualise the merx in 
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person with the task of determining the price on their behalf.352 If that person refuses 
or is unable to fix the price, there is no contract. In contrast, if the person nominated 
fixes a price which is out of proportion to the object, this may be adjusted in 
accordance with the observance of good faith and fair dealing values in 
transactions.353 
Though the price is relevant for every sales contract, it is not unusual that 
goods be ordered and acquired from a seller without any mention of the price. Such 
a type of situation poses the problem of what is known, under Anglo-American 
common law jurisdiction, as the unstated or open-price term issue.354 Usually, when 
parties go without determining the price, this does not mean that the agreement is 
automatically invalid. There is an authority that, in circumstances of this kind, 
contracting parties are presumed to contract to the usual, or the customary price.355 
In other words, when the contract is silent as regards the amount to be paid, the price 
will be the one for which those types of goods are frequently sold, the price the seller 
regularly charges for them, or the current market price.356 It follows then that, 
                                               
a generic sale”. Van Heerden DCJ wondered at [16] whether modern South African law should still 
follow similar rules. He failed, however, to solve the issue.  
352
 See Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 34 and authorities quoted by them in Fn210; Kerr Sale 36-38; 
Hackwill Sale 16; Sharrock Business 273. 
353
 See Friedman J’s view in Dave White Investments (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 263 (D) as reproduced 
by Lotz Sale 361 368; and Kerr Sale 39. According to Friedman J, 
Where parties to a contract make provision for the evaluation of the subject-matter of the 
contract by a third party, neither party can be held to that valuation if it is one that is so grossly 
excessive (or in suitable cases so grossly less than the true value) that it bears no reasonable 
relationship at all to the true value of the property. The party in whose favour the valuation 
would appear to be cannot compel the other party to the contract to perform it at that valuation 
or, to put it conversely, the party aggrieved by the valuation can refuse to pay a price (...) based 
on that valuation. In the event, however, that the aggrieved party resists performance based upon 
the excessive valuation, the non-aggrieved party has the right to elect whether to resign from the 
contract or to carry it out upon the basis the valuation found by the Court to be a true or fair 
valuation of the res vendita.  
354
 See Section 5.2.3.2 below for comments, and a brief mention in Section 2.4.4 above.  
355
 See R v Pearson 1942 EDL 117; R v Berghaus 1942 EDL 188; R v Soller 1945 TPD 75; R v 
Levitas 1946 TPD 631; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 104; Sharrock Business 273.  
356
 See Erasmus v Arcade Electric 1962 (3) SA 418 T; Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 663 (T); Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd 1963 (4) SA 119 (D) 
128A-C, confirmed on appeal 1963 (4) SA 860 (A); but MV MSC Spain Tebe Trading (Pty) Ltd v 
Mediterranean Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 495 (N). See also Eiselen in Scott Commerce 
141; Sharrock Business 273; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 34; Hackwill Sale 17.  
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although the fixing of the price is an essential requirement in the sales domain, South 
African law also tolerates sales with open price terms.  
A question occurs, however, with regard to the validity of sales for a 
“reasonable price term” in the absence of a usual or a market price. A propos of this, 
there has been some controversy on the issue. According to several scholars and case 
law, these kinds of contracts are void on grounds of vagueness.357 On the other hand, 
there are other authorities in favour of reasonable price terms. In Genac Properties 
JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC, for example, Nicholas AJA found it 
difficult “to see on what principle a sale for a reasonable price should be regarded as 
invalid.”358 The learned judge took advice from the fact that, “where there is an 
agreement to do work for remuneration and the amount thereof is not specified, the 
law itself provides that it should be reasonable.”359 To exemplify this, in Compagnie 
Interafricaine des Travaux v South African Transport Services and Others,360 the 
Appeal Court acknowledged the fact that in circumstances where parties do not agree 
on the price or a method to determine it, “the law implied a right to receive a 
reasonable remuneration.”361 In addition, Macdonald JP argued, in Elite Electrical 
Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant, that the position in the Erasmus v 
Arcade Electric and Adcorp Spares decisions was supported “not by the application 
                                               
357
 See Erasmus v Arcade Electric 1962 (3) SA 418 (T); Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 (3); Eiselen in Scott Commerce 141; Lotz Sale 361 368. In Erasmus v Arcade 
Electric at 420, Bresler J judged unacceptable the use of “reasonable price terms” in sales contracts, 
because there could not be a contract to buy at a reasonable price. Bresler’s ruling was confirmed 
ten years later in Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd. It was held in the case that, 
“A market price or the usual price of an article is still an ascertainable price, but an agreement to 
pay merely ‘a fair and reasonable price’ ‘is too uncertain to give rise to a valid contract of sale’.”  
358
 Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC (previously NBC Administrators 
(Pty) Ltd) 1992 (1) SA 566 (A).  
359
 See Chamotte (Pty) Ltd v Carl Coetzee (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 644 (A) 649C-D; quoting 
Middleton v Carr 1949 2 SA 374 (A); see also Inkin v Borehole Drillers 1949 2 SA 366 (A). 
Nicholas AJA relied to the Anglo-American common law approach for which where parties fail to 
determine the price, the buyer must pay a reasonable price.  
360
 See Compagnie Interafricaine des Travaux v South African Transport Services and Others 1991 
(4) SA 217 (A). 
361
 Ibid. This view was already supported in Erasmus v Arcade Electric wherein, though a sale at 
a reasonable price might be considered as invalid, such did not mean that a contract to pay a 
reasonable sum in return for performance of services was also void.  
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of special rules relating to contracts of sale, but by the application of general 
principles of contract law.”362 He concluded, therefore, that a contract with 
reasonable price terms should be regarded as valid and enforceable.363 
It follows that, though courts have traditionally invalidated sales for a 
reasonable price for vagueness, these days the case law reveals that they do not have 
difficulty in enforcing contracts for services for reasonable remuneration. That is 
why Sharrock, who initially supported the vagueness of sale with reasonable price 
(see Business Transactions Law 7th ed 2007 233), has changed his view. This author 
believes that, nowadays, there is “no good reason why a sale for a reasonable price 
should automatically be regarded as too uncertain to be enforced.”364  
If it is accepted, the implementation of reasonable price terms, nevertheless, 
poses a dual question relating to the person who must determine that price and the 
way it may be assessed. In response, Kerr argues that when parties do not expressly 
or by implication state the price, “[The] best approach would be to consider what the 
parties meant by the words they used and then to consider whether evidence is 
available to establish the amount of money in the circumstances of the case in 
question.”365 In other words, the issue of the enforceability of sales at a reasonable 
price would be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. In the case of difficulty, the price 
usually charged, or the one used in the trade concerned, would prevail. 
To summarise this, compared to the thing sold, the determination of the price 
also constitutes an important requirement for the validity of any contract of sale. With 
regard to its characteristics, the price must be serious, certain or ascertainable, and 
fixed by the parties. When parties refrain from determining one, they are assumed to 
be concluding the sale at the usual or current market price. As regards the validity of 
contracts concluded at the reasonable price, the debate is still open. It is suggested, 
                                               
362
 Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 (1) SA 195 (RA) at 197A-
D; based on Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333 338. Macdonald highlighted that terms to be 
implied in a particular contract depended upon circumstances surrounding that contract. 
363
 Ibid 197C-D.  
364
 Sharrock Business 272. 
365
 See Kerr Sale 35; supported by Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 33; read with South African Railways 
and Harbour v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704 at 715-716.   
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however, that the rule applied to contracts for services could serve as a source of 
inspiration for sales contracts instead of calling them off for vagueness. Accordingly, 
what the reasonable price is will depend upon the circumstances of each particular 
case; where the difficulty persists, the market price will carry the contract. 
 
3.4.5 The Transfer of Ownership in the Thing Sold  
 
As announced in the introductory paragraph, under South African law, although 
parties do expect to transfer ownership in the property sold from the seller to the 
buyer, the transfer is not fundamental for the contract.366 In Lendalease Finance (Pty) 
Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola and others, Corbett JA put it that, 
“According to our law, unlike certain other legal systems, ownership cannot pass by 
virtue of the contract of sale alone: there must, in addition, be at least a proper 
delivery to the purchaser of the contract goods.”367 A justification for this is that, 
since the law allows the sale of other people’s property, a seller who does not own 
the thing sold is unable to transfer ownership of it to the buyer. So, therefore, instead 
of an essential duty of transmission of property, the seller is, instead, required to 
transfer to the buyer uninterrupted possession of the property sold. Such an approach 
has led some scholars to describe sales, as “a contract whereby one person agrees to 
deliver to another the free possession of a thing in return for a price in money (my 
italics).”368 
Restricting the definition of sale to a reciprocal obligation where the seller 
undertakes to deliver the thing sold and the buyer to pay the stated price, however, 
says very little. According to Bradfield and Lehmann, attention should rather be 
given to the seller’s obligation to undertake to transfer his/her rights in the property 
                                               
366
 See Bolan Bank Bpk v Joseph 1977 (2) SA 82 (D) 88. 
367
 Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola and others 1976 (4) SA 
464A 490; see also Kerr Sale 6; Lotz Sale 361 362 & 363; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 137. 
368
 In other words, a sale is “a mutual contract for the transfer of possession of a thing in exchange 
for a price.” See Hackwill Sale 1; Lehmann Sale 888 889; both taking support from old authorities 
such as Donellus 13.1.3; Voet 18.1.1; Huber HR 3.2.2, G 3.14.1; Domat 1.1.2.1, P V 1; Treasurer 
General v Lippert 2 SC 172. 
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sold.369 The observation of Bradfield and Lehmann originates from the fact that, there 
is a rule that, “The making of a contract of sale does not per se pass the ownership in 
the thing sold. It passes when delivery is given accompanied by an intention on the 
part of the transferor to transfer ownership and on the part of the transferee to receive 
it (…).”370  
The principle according to which the seller is not necessarily obliged to 
transfer ownership of the thing sold seems, nevertheless, not to be unconditional. 
Pursuant to the freedom of contract rule, parties may expressly or impliedly agree 
upon the passing of ownership immediately after the transfer of possession. 
Likewise, the payment of the price may be referred to as the starting point for the 
transmission of property.371 Frequently, unless otherwise stipulated, the passing of 
property does not happen until the buyer has paid the price or given credit for it.372  
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that the law has 
established different default rules in relation to the moment when ownership passes 
to the buyer. That period depends upon whether the contract involves any carriage of 
goods, the sale is for cash or by cheque, or was on credit. With regard to contracts 
involving carriage, the delivery of goods to the carrier for transmission to the buyer 
generally entails the transport of ownership of them to the buyer.373 In relation to 
sales for cash, the seller is supposed to transmit ownership upon payment.374 The 
same rule governs sales by cheque as well. As said by Holmes JA in the Eriksen 
Motors case, “In general, payment by cheque is prima facie regarded as immediate 
payment subject to a condition. The condition is that the cheque be honoured on 
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 Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 15-16. 
370
 See Commissioner of Customs & Excise v Randles, Bros and Hudson 1941 AD 369, Eriksen 
Motors Ltd v Protea Motors 1973 (3) SA 685 (A); Lendalease Finance Ltd v Corporacion de 
Mercadeo Agricola 1976 (4) SA 464 (A); referred to by Hackwill Sale 23; see also Kerr Sale 181-
182; Sharrock Business 282. 
371
 See Saflec Security Systems (Pty) Ltd v Group Five Building (East Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1990 4 SA 
626 (E) 629D 630B-C and 632E-F. 
372
 See authorities quoted by Kerr Sale 181 Fn189; see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 17-18. 
373
 See authorities quoted by Hackwill Sale 24 Fn10. 
374
 Eriksen Motors Ltd v Protea Motors 1973 (3) SA 685 (A); see also Lendalease Finance (Pty) 
Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola and others 1976 (4) SA 464A 490. 
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presentation (by the bank).”375 So, if the cheque is so endorsed, its approval produces 
the passing of ownership. Finally, with regard to sales on credit, ownership is 
expected to pass on the delivery of goods.376 
 
3.4.6 Conclusion on the Essentials of a Contract of Sale  
 
For a contract to be one of sale, it must at least meet as essential requirements: the 
agreement on the object of the sale, which matches with the transfer of ownership 
and the delivery of that item by the seller; and the payment of the price by the buyer. 
Nonetheless, it is still the rule that, under South African law, a seller who undertakes 
to deliver the goods to the buyer does not undertake to make the latter owner of them. 
For the passing of property to occur, it is required that there is an accurate delivery 
followed by the payment of the price. 
 
3.5 Conclusion on Chapter Three  
 
South African law development is largely connected to the arrival of the early Dutch 
settlers at the Cape and the influence of the English common law. When the Dutch 
colonisers came to the Cape, they brought with them their own native legal system, 
viz. Roman-Dutch law. This legal system was a combination of the law of Holland 
and Roman law developed in the seventeenth century; it was based on the civil law 
tradition. Roman-Dutch law stayed alive in South Africa as the applicable legal 
system notwithstanding English settlement. Its conservancy was justified, amongst 
other things, by the British constitutional practice of that time which advocated the 
maintenance of existing laws until they were amended or repealed. The new 
Constitution of 1996 renewed this approach; it also maintained all the laws that were 
in force the time it took effect, including Roman-Dutch law.  
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 Ibid; see also Bold v Cooper 1949 (1) SA 1195 (WLD); Pienaar v G North & Son Ltd 1979 (4) 
SA 522 (O). 
376
 Ibid. 
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The preservation of Roman-Dutch law does not mean that South African law 
was not influenced by British law. English law has had an impact on several South 
African fields of law, both public and private law. In the private law domain, for 
instance, it had a great impact on mercantile law and on rules relating to the formation 
of contract. With regard to the formation of contract, there is unanimity that the 
current South African law model of contracting by means of offer and acceptance is 
an approach inspired by English common law. Likewise, the coexistence of Roman-
Dutch law and English common law has resulted in the fact that modern South 
African law is a mixed legal system connected to both civil law and Anglo-American 
common law legal families. 
To describe South African law as a mixed jurisdiction does not, however, 
imply that that legal system is at the mercy of other legal families. South African law 
constitutes an independent legal system with its own specific characteristics. To give 
an example of this, compared with other civil law countries, South African law is not 
code-based. In addition, although South Africa has adhered to the doctrine of 
precedent, its implementation is not as severe as it is in England. South African law 
has, likewise, rejected the doctrine of consideration which is dear to Anglo-American 
common law jurisdictions. 
Following from what has been said thus, it appears that modern South African 
law has acquired its own originality which differentiates it from the earlier Roman-
Dutch law, civil law, and English law. This legal system should simply be referred 
to as South African law; it draws its authority from the Constitution. In a number of 
their decisions, both the CC and the SCA have demonstrated that all the aspects of 
modern South African law, including contract and sales law, are subject to 
constitutional regulation. A contract of sale, therefore, is valid on condition that it is 
consistent with the Constitution, or with the principles provided for by it. Among 
those principles, the most important in connection with contract law are the need for 
consensus or a reasonable reliance, freedom of contract, good faith, and consistency 
with public policy. With regard to sales contracts, constitutional values include 
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agreement on the property sold and the payment of the price. If not, the sale is invalid 
and unenforceable. As it is the case for chapter two, chapter three has set the 
background scene in respect of South African law which will be considered in 
chapters five and six. 
Chapter Four 
 
THE ORIGIN, AMBIT, AND IMPACT OF THE CISG  
ON NATIONAL SALES LAWS 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The CISG is a typical illustration of international legal cooperation. As a number of 
scholars have said, this Convention is not only the result of hard work which took 
around 50 years to be drafted and brought into force,1 but it is also “a product of more 
than two generations of international negotiations.”2 Its rich legal history is 
influenced by two major international organisations, UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL.3 
With regard to UNIDROIT, it led to the adoption of two uniform laws predecessors 
of the CISG, i.e. ULIS and ULF. Concerning UNCITRAL, it achieved the 
development of the CISG. Owing to the role it played in the Vienna Convention 
drafting process, the CISG is considered as the “child” of UNCITRAL which was 
set up to promote a “progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of 
international trade.”4 Since it entered into force in 1988, the UN Sales Convention is 
currently influencing the modernisation of numerous national laws around the 
world.5 
By reference to this brief summary, this chapter intends to achieve a triple 
objective: to explain the relevance of a harmonised legal system; to demonstrate the 
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 Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 2; Blair 2011 (21) Duke J Comp & Int’l L 269; De Ly 
2005 (25) 6 JL & Com 1; Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/6248/201109 
131645024e6f6c6e5b746.pdf (accessed 19-6-2012); McNamara 2003 (32) Colorado Lawyer 11; 
Oosthuizen Rights 9.  
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 Rosett 1988 (21) Cornell Int’l LJ 575; Williams 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 9; Zeller 2002 
(14) Pace Int’l LR 163.   
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 Nicholas 1989 (105) L.Q.R. 201. 
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 These include Scandinavian, Estonian, Dutch, German, Russian, and Chinese laws. For the 
CISG’s influence on national laws, see Section 4.4 below. 
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influence the CISG has had on national laws; and to explain the way the CISG should 
be applied in the DRC despite the country’s lack of enthusiasm for it. To attain these 
objectives, the chapter consists of four key sections in addition to the introductory 
section. Section two outlines the origins of the Vienna Sales Convention, and section 
three offers a general overview of its field of application. Section four introduces the 
CISG as a pattern for the improvement of national sales law, and section five 
discusses the attitude of the DRC vis-à-vis the CISG.  
 
4.2 Origins of the Vienna Sales Convention 
 
4.2.1 Introduction  
 
There have been many studies of the historical developments in international sales 
law.6 In the present study, only the most important highlights will be addressed. It 
must be said, at the outset, that the main question behind the harmonisation process 
was whether a uniform sales law was needed.7 In order to answer this question, this 
section looks briefly at the following issues: the needs of harmonising international 
sales law; the first attempts to harmonisation through the 1964 Hague Sales 
Conventions; and the CISG drafting process under UNCITRAL.  
   
4.2.2 The Need  for the Harmonisation of International Sales Law  
 
4.2.2.1 Historical perspectives of harmonisation 
 
Historically speaking, efforts to unify the law of international sale of goods began in 
the 1920s; they are due to the influence of Ernst Rabel.8 Rabel initiated the drafting 
                                               
6
 See, among others, Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 2-5; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 1-3; Schlechtriem Uniform Law 17; Mendes 1988 (8) JL & Com 109 112ff. 
7
 See Bonell 2001 (106) Dickinson LR 87; Schlechtriem Unification 125. 
8
 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/ 
publics/6248/201109131 64502_4e6f6c6e5b746.pdf; Cuniberti 2006 (39) 5 Vand. J. Transnation’l 
L. 1511; Coetzee Incoterms 158; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 36. Ernst Rabel (1874-1955) was active in 
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of an international uniform sales law and proposed the foundations for the unification 
of the law of sale.9 He came up with the idea of investigating the possibility of 
creating a worldwide uniform sales law.10 There are, however, also some arguments 
that, during the middle ages, the lex mercatoria had already formed a uniform sales 
code.11 At that time, in fact, the lex mercatoria was universally applied throughout 
Europe at the local fairs and markets.12 As merchants increased their trade abroad, 
that special law for the merchant class reduced local practices into regulatory codes 
and thereby encouraged the adoption of a universal system of law in specific areas.13 
Because of this, the idea of a unified international trade law seems not to be a new 
one.14    
                                               
many areas. He was not only a university Professor and an institute Director, but also a Judge, an 
Arbitrator, and an Advisor to German business. With regard to his academic carrier, Rabel was 
Professor of Law at the Universities of Leipzig, Basel, Kiel, Göttingen, Munich, and Berlin in 
Germany and Switzerland until 1937. The political situation in Europe forced him, however, to 
immigrate to America. There, he became Professor at the Law Schools of Ann Arbor and Harvard. 
Rabel’s academic interest covered a wide range of fields, including Roman law, Modern civil law, 
Conflict of laws and Comparative law. Rabel gained extensive international experience. He was 
among the first to recognise the significance of comparative law as groundwork for the unification 
law project. His treatise Law of the Sale of Goods “Das Recht des Warenkaufs” (first published in 
1936) created a model for later endeavours in this field. It was a seminal work providing an analysis 
of sales law at that time on a broad comparative basis. The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 
(1945) has become a standard work, and the Journal for Foreign and International Private Law 
(RabelsZ), which Rabel founded in 1927, is one of the most respected publications in this area. Thus, 
all modern efforts to unify private law, especially as regards the sale of goods, are greatly indebted 
to Rabel, who also served as a member of UNIDROIT in Rome. Rabel’s “master mind behind the 
draft Uniform International Sales Law” is still very much in evidence today. See Schlechtriem/ 
Schwenzer Commentary 1; Gerber Comparative Law 190. Rabel’s curriculum vitae can be found 
online at: http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=824 (accessed 18-6-2012).    
9
 See Schlechtriem Uniform Law 17.  
10
 In the Preface to his book Das Recht des Warenkaufs, Rabel wrote, “At the beginning of our 
work stood the question if and to what extent the law of sale is fit to be uniformly enacted in all 
countries of the world.” Quoted by Van der Velden Sales 46 48.  
11
 See Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323; Coetzee Incoterms 26; and Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 20. For an 
historical perspective of the lex mercatoria, see Basile et al Lex Mercatoria 123ff.  According to a 
broad point of view, the lex mercatoria is described as the law governing international trade created 
by private practice. That field of law is considered as “a set of general principles and customary 
rules referred to or elaborated in the framework of international trade, without reference to a 
particular system of law.” See Goode Lex Mercatoria 73; Goldstajn Lex Mercatoria 241; De Ly 
2005 (25) 6 JL & Com 1 5; and Berger Merchant 1. 
12
 See Eiselen Globalization 97 99; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323. 
13
 Butler Guide 1-5. 
14
 Chronologically, international commercial law has developed in three stages. The first, called 
“Old Law Merchant”, dated back to the middle ages. It consisted of a body of customary rules 
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Nevertheless, it is in the middle nineteenth century that the plan of 
harmonisation contributed to an interest in creating a uniform commercial law to 
govern global markets.15 During that period, efforts were made for the international 
unification of some important legal areas. Sales law occupied a preeminent position 
among different topics suggested in that respect.16 Numerous European codes were 
enacted then. In France, for instance, the 1807 Code de Commerce17 emphasised the 
principle of the freedom of contract and the primacy of the right to ownership.18 By 
its ruling, the French Commercial Code was expected to govern the whole European 
continent, but, shortly, this far too ambitious expectation showed itself to be 
unrealistic.19 Similarly, in Germany, most members of the German confederation had 
adopted a Uniform Commercial Code in 1861 which was described as “the legal 
reflection of the struggle for political unity.”20 Unfortunately this objective was not 
achieved either. 
                                               
governing a cosmopolitan community of international merchants who travelled throughout the 
civilised world from port to port and fair to fair. The second began when mercantile law was 
incorporated into national systems in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The third stage, 
described as “New Lex Mercatoria”, aimed at unifying international trade law on an international 
level. It was characterised by the increased involvement of the United Nations (UN). See 
Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 135-139; Felemegas in Interpretation 2 Notes 3 and 
4; Goldstajn Lex Mercatoria 241. Insofar as the Old Lex Mercatoria is concerned, it had five 
specificities that distinguished it from other sources of law and helped to preserve its uniformity. 
The lex mercatoria was transnational in nature; laws were based on mercantile customs; cases were 
adjudicated not by professional judges, but by merchants themselves; its universality was fostered 
by the activities of the Notary public; and its emphasis was placed on freedom of contract and the 
decision of cases passed ex aequo et bono. From these features, the most important is that, at that 
period of the evolution of mercantile law, laws required for commercial transactions were not 
enacted by lawyers or judges; it was rather determined by merchants. See Carr Trade 3; Butler 
Guide 1-5 to 6; Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 136; Felemegas in Interpretation 2; 
Mendes 1988 (8) JL & Com 109; and Coetzee Incoterms 155. 
15
 See Eiselen Globalization 97 99; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323. 
16
 Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 3. Of course, several other areas of international interest 
have to date also been harmonised. These include the international transport of goods, international 
payment, electronic commerce, and international arbitration and conciliation. For subsequent 
conventions, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ en/uncitral_texts.html (accessed 18-6-2012). 
17
 The French Code de Commerce is one of the five Napoleonic codes mentioned in Section 2.2.3 
above.  
18
 See Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 137. 
19
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323. 
20
 See Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 138. 
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In England, conversely, commercial matters were considered as issues of fact. 
In Pillans v Mierop21, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1756-
1788), had the honour of incorporating the lex mercatoria into the common law 
courts. He recognised that one of the main purposes of the law consists in promoting 
certainty in commercial transactions. “[He] reconciled (consequently) the conflicting 
interests of flexibility and certainty by incorporating into the common law the general 
principles of the law merchant while at the same time leaving a large number of 
subsidiary matters as questions of fact for the Jury.”22  
Considering mercantile law as being the same all over the world, Lord 
Mansfield said, “For from the same premises, the same conclusions of reason and 
justice must universally be the same.”23 Thus, Mansfield “succinctly linked reason 
and justice to the attainment of a uniform, homogenous law, and understood, thereby, 
the requirements of a successful international law well ahead of its successful 
contemporary implementation.”24  
 
4.2.2.2  Reasons justifying legal harmonisation  
 
In general, international transactions are largely concerned with sales contracts; they 
are then affected by all commercial and legal problems inherent in any sale of goods. 
The most important of these problems is the fact that the seller and the buyer are 
from different countries and, consequently, subject to different laws. Strictly 
speaking, sales contracts are governed by domestic law in different jurisdictions. 
Such a situation has led to many potential conflicts in international sales which 
needed to be coordinated by conflict rules.25 Naturally, the existence of different 
national laws of sale creates an impediment to trade between sellers and buyers from 
                                               
21
 Pillans v Mierop [1663] 3 Burr, 97 Eng Rep 1035 (KB 1765); see also Pelly v Royal Exchange 
Assurance Co [1757] Burr 341 347; quoted by Butler Guide 1-6; and Felemegas 2000-2001 Review 
of the CISG 115 138. 
22
 Butler Guide 1-6. 
23
 Quoted by Zeller 2006 (17) 3 Stell LR 466 468. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 De Ly 2005 (25) 6 JL & Com 1; Viejobueno 1995 28 CILSA 201; Griffin Trade 1. 
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different legal systems,26 which obstructs the smooth operation of international trade. 
Simply, the diversity of national laws produces conflict and legal uncertainty.27   
It should be borne in mind that, up to the present time, law remains territorial 
in nature and enforceable within a specified national territory. Consequently, other 
states are not obliged to acknowledge and apply foreign laws. Domestic laws, 
moreover, differ from one country to another or from one legal system to another. 
One case in point is to determine the exact moment when a contract between parties 
who are not in each other’s presence is concluded. Countries with a civil law system 
consider that kind of contract to be formed when acceptance arrives at the offeror. 
With regard to those based on the common law, they assume the contract to be 
concluded immediately after the offeree has placed its letter of acceptance in the 
hands of the Post Office.28  
 Because domestic laws vary from one legal system to another, either the seller 
or the buyer may be faced with the application of an unknown foreign legal system, 
unless there is a specific choice of the law applicable to the contract.29 In order to 
prevent such uncertainty in international trade, the unification of international sales 
law became indispensable.30 This mechanism was intended to simplify issues relating 
                                               
26
 Lehmann 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 317; Davis 2001 (106) Commercial Law Journal 457; 
D’Arcy/Murray/ Cleave International Trade 409.  
27
 Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 130-131; Van der Velden Sales 46; Ziegel 
Harmonization 131.  
28
 For similar differences with regard to the notification of lack of conformity in goods, see Eiselen 
Globalization 97 98 referred to in Section 1.3 above.  
29
 See Chuah Trade 10; Coetzee Incoterms 2. 
30
 There are, of course, some sceptical voices with regard to the harmonisation process. According 
to Rosett, for example, the paths to unification, harmonisation, codification, and reform run in 
parallel directions, but this is not necessarily so. For the learned author, recent experience suggests 
that the unification of law does not always produce harmonisation; the codification can be “the 
enemy” of reform and substantive improvement in the quality of justice. (Rosett 1992 (40) Am J 
Comp L 683; Rosett 1984 (45) Ohio St LJ 265). In the same way, Stephan considers the unification 
and harmonisation of international commercial law as a “futility”. According to him, “much of the 
effort directed at unifying international law is unnecessary, and some produces rules that hinder 
rather than promote international business”. (Stephan 1999 (39) Virginia Journal of International 
Law 743; see also Chuah Trade 10). As Chuah has stated, given that traders and lawyers are slow 
to support the process of harmonisation, it could be argued in their favour that although the 
intention of harmonisation endeavours is usually most noble, the reality is that it is difficult to agree 
on the interpretation of terms in these international rules.  
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to international transactions by creating a unique applicable law for all contracts.31 
To use the words of Bonell, “a true harmonisation of sales law was required in order 
to provide a framework within which diverse legal systems could work and grow 
together and within which all nations are encouraged to develop compatible rules 
through common experience.”32 The ambitious idea of creating a unified sales law 
was, moreover, becoming increasingly important owing to the steady growth in 
international trade.33 While such a common legal framework was long considered to 
be no more than a dream, its realisation has more recently been advocated as a 
veritable necessity for establishing a uniform law.34 Its first attempts led, in 1964, to 
the implementation of The Hague Sales Conventions. 
 
4.2.3 The 1964 Hague Sales Conventions (ULIS and ULF) 
 
When nations embarked, in the earlier 1920s, on the unification journey, it was to 
remedy deficiencies which were slowing down the smooth development of 
international trade. The real intention of unifying the law of sale was achieved in 
1926 when the League of Nations established UNIDROIT in Rome. Throughout the 
1920s, Ernst Rabel’s involvement was widely acknowledged. Owing to his prestige, 
Rabel suggested to the UNIDROIT President, Mr Scialoja, to concern himself with 
the unification of international sale of goods law.35 At the first meeting of 
UNIDROIT, he proposed that a project limited to uniform sales law would be better 
than pretending to unify the whole commercial law.36 His proposal was approved. 
Rabel was then assigned the task of composing a draft in this respect, together with 
                                               
31
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 328. 
32
 Bonell Contract Law 4; see, in the same sense, Ackerman 1988 (21) Cornell Int’l LJ 535. 
33
 See Zeller 2006 (17) 3 Stell LR 466 468; Oosthuizen Rights 10. 
34
 Bonell Contract Law 4; Rosett 1984 (45) Ohio St LJ 265.  
35
 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/ 
publics/6248/20 110913 164502_4e6f6c6e5b746.pdf.  
36
 Quoted by Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 334; Oosthuizen Rights 9; see also Coetzee Incoterms 
158 Fn125. 
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other distinguished European scholars of that time.37 They started the first project in 
1929.38 
In 1935, the drafting committee submitted a preliminary draft of international 
sales law based on the basic principles of private law through a comparison of 
national law rather than commercial practice.39 After its approval by the UNIDROIT 
Governing Council,40 that proposal was transmitted to the League of Nations in order 
to receive comments from member states.41 In 1939, the committee submitted a 
revised report for adoption. Unfortunately, tensions in Europe and World War II 
events interrupted the process.42 
The growth of international trade after the Second World War certainly 
impacted on the law governing international business. That is why, in 1951, the 
government of the Netherlands undertook the initiative of stimulating efforts that had 
been broken up by previous political events. It convened a diplomatic conference in 
The Hague on the international sale of goods aimed at reconsidering the draft 
prepared by UNIDROIT and settling on how the unification work could be led to a 
satisfactory completion.43 Through the meeting, participants decided in favour of 
continuing the harmonisation work. They appointed a Special Commission with the 
task of amending the original Rabel draft.44 Rabel, now living in USA, was again 
                                               
37
 These include Cecil Hurst JB, Bragge A, Capitant H, Fehr M, Gutteridge HC, and Hamel J. See 
Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 140; Farnsworth 1984 (18) 1 Int’l Law 17; Bonell in 
Bianca/Bonell Commentary 3; Eiselen Globalization 97 101; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 5. 
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 See Eörsi 1979 (27) Am J Comp L 311; Butler Guide 1-12; Zeller 2002 (14) Pace Int’l LR163.  
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 For the structure of UNIDROIT, see Article 4 UNIDROIT Statute, available at: 
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 See Goldstajn Lex Mercatoria 241 243; Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127. The 1951 Hague 
Conference was attended by representatives from 21 governments, mainly Western European, and 
some observers from Japan, the USA, and certain Latin American States. See Oosthuizen Rights 11. 
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member of that commission and had a considerable influence on its work until his 
death in 1955.45  
In 1956, the commission presented a new Draft Uniform Sales Law which was 
finally published in 1958.46 Since that time, work towards a unified law of sale has 
increased and more drafts have followed, one of which was published in 1963. In 
1964, the Government of the Netherlands organised another diplomatic conference 
to which it submitted the last draft for approval.47 In the meantime, UNIDROIT was 
preparing a separate draft dealing with the formation of international sales 
contracts.48 This was also submitted at the 1964 Hague Conference.49 Twenty-eight 
states attended that conference assisted by observers from four states and six 
international organisations.50 Two conventions dealing with international sales 
contracts were adopted at the end of the meeting, namely ULIS and ULF.51 Both 
instruments, commonly referred to as The Hague (Sales) Conventions or Uniform 
Laws, were opened for signature on the first of July 1964 and came into effect in 
August 1972.52  
Unifying and codifying international sales law, as done by ULIS and ULF, 
raises numerous problems. Differences between various domestic sales law systems 
were enormous, both in principle and in technical elaboration. In addition, there was 
no unanimity or uniformity in international commerce.53 Despite the number of states 
which attended the 1964 Hague conference, furthermore, ULIS and ULF were 
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ratified by only nine states,54 seven of them being Western European countries.55 
Apart from Israel, moreover, all of the signatory countries made use of the 
reservations allowed by Articles III to V ULIS. 56   
Subsequent to the limited number of contracting states, the number of 
reservations made against their implementation, and for several other reasons, the 
1964 Hague Sales Conventions did not achieve the unification of international sales 
law project.57 This failure has largely been attributed to the limited role played by 
Third World and Socialist countries in contributions towards those Conventions. 
Accordingly, ULIS and ULF were perceived to be too Eurocentric, and they were 
reproached for not having taken into account the interests of the countries above in 
                                               
54
 These include: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Gambia, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, San Marino, and the United Kingdom. See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 3 F10; Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 140, Eiselen Globalization 97 
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legal literature. For the reasons above, Williams is of opinion that ULIS and ULF could be seen in 
the UK from the beginning as a “dead letter everywhere else”. (See Williams 2000-2001 Review 
of the CISG 9 16; see also Nicholas 1989 (105) LQR 201; Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-12). In 
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the drafting process. Many emerging and socialist states believed that these 
Conventions favoured sellers of developed countries rather than buyers from 
developing countries.58 They advocated, therefore, “the need for general conditions 
of sale and standard contracts in order to enable their countries to negotiate 
international sales transactions on a footing of parity with developed nations.”59  
Notwithstanding the criticism advanced against them, the ULIS and ULF basic 
structure provided a solid basis which influenced the drafting and contents of the 
CISG under UNCITRAL auspices60 as discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2.4 UNCITRAL and the Development of the CISG 
  
4.2.4.1 A brief overview of UNCITRAL  
 
The failure of the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions did not stop efforts being made to 
achieve a worldwide unification of international sales law. Even before they had 
received sufficient adoptions, efforts were already being made under UN sponsorship 
to produce their revised version that would be more widely acceptable.61  For that 
reason, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established UNCITRAL on 17 
December 1966,62 which entered in effect in 1968.  
Section I of the Resolution 2205 states that UNCITRAL is a UN Permanent 
Commission, the essential task of which is “to promote a progressive harmonisation 
and unification of international trade law.” Scholars have specified this by saying 
that the role of UNCITRAL “consists in unifying and harmonising international trade 
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 See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 4; MacNamara 2003 (32) Colorado Lawyer 11 
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law” “in order to eliminate legal obstacles to international trade and to ensure an 
orderly development of economic activities on a fair and equal basis.”63 Owing to 
this mission, Castellani put it that UNCITRAL is “the core body in the UN system 
for the modernisation and the harmonisation of international trade law.”64 Its 
membership reflects, not only the principal economic and legal systems of the world, 
but also a coalition of developed and developing countries.65 Regarding its 
representatives, they should be appointed by member states from persons endowed 
with as much experience in the field of international trade law as possible.66 As 
Flechtner has said, UNCITRAL representatives prove to be, “in practice, a 
wholesome mix of academic specialists in commercial and comparative law, 
practising lawyers, and members of government ministries with years of experience 
in international law-making.”67   
Since its coming into force in 1968, UNCITRAL has accomplished concrete 
legislative work in several fields. It has produced a number of harmonised 
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the terms of half of them expiring every three years. Further information on UNCITRAL 
composition can be found at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last accessed 
19-6-2012). 
66
 See Resolution 2205, Section II, paragraph 4; see also Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 7; 
Honnold Uniform Law 51; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 337. 
67
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 7; see also Honnold Uniform Law 51. 
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Conventions and Model Laws in different areas with international sales interest.68 As 
far as conventions are concerned, they are “the most obvious instrument or method 
for achieving (…) harmonisation.”69 Their biggest advantage is that conventions 
become binding law in all member states.70 Owing to the fact that conventions bind 
all contracting states and displace their domestic rules in the field concerned, the use 
of the convention is commonly referred to as “hard law”.71 Amongst conventions 
adopted under the patronage of UNCITRAL one may mention: the 1974 UN 
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods;72 the 1978 
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea;73 the 1980 CISG, object of the 
present chapter; and the 2005 UN Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts (UNECIC).74 
                                               
68
 For a number of Conventions and Model Laws concluded under UNCITRAL sponsorship, visit: 
http://www. uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts.html (last accessed 19-6-2012); see also 
Castellani 2011 (3) BLR 28 29. 
69
 Eiselen Globalization 97 107. 
70
 Ibid at 108. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 UN Convention on the Limitation Period in International Sale of Goods, New York 14 June 
1974, as amended in Vienna on April 1980, recorded U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/15 1974. The official 
records of the 1974 conference are published in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/16 (Sales No.E.74.V.8). 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/limit/ limit-conv.pdf (last accessed 19-6-2012). 
The Final Act of the conference and the text of the Convention are reproduced in UNCITRAL 1974 
(V) YB 209-215. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/YBs/yb-1974-e/yb_1974 _e.pdf (last 
accessed 19-6-2012). For commentaries on the Limitation Convention, see http://www.uncitral. 
org/pdf/ english/YBs/yb-1979-e/vol10-p145-173-e.pdf (last accessed 19-6-2012). For the Protocol 
amending the Limitation Convention, see (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex II) reprinted in the 
Official records of the 1980 Vienna Conference (A/CONF.97/19; Sales. No. E.82.V.5). According 
to commentators, the Prescription Convention establishes unified rules for the operation of the 
limitation or prescription period in international sale of goods. It aims to avoid the sharp contrasts 
in approaches between common law and civil law countries in matters relating to the prescription. 
See Sono in Galston/Smit Sales 4-3; Butler Guide 9-14. The Limitation Convention as amended 
has been adopted by 21 States, see status available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ 1974Conventionstatus.html (last accessed 19-6-2012).  
73
 Known as the Hamburg Rules, the UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea is recorded 
in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/13, Annex I; reprinted in the Official records of the 1978 Hamburg 
conference (A/CONF.89/14; Sales No.E.80.VIII.1). http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
transport/hamburg/hamburg_rules_e.pdf (last accessed 19-6-2012).  
74
 See UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 
General Assembly Resolution 60/21 of 23 November 2005. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook. pdf (last accessed 19-6-2012). For a summary of the 
scope of UNECIC as well as the principles underlying this Convention, see Eiselen Principles of 
the UNECIC 106-133; Eiselen 2007(10) 2 PER/PELJ 48.  
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With regard to Model Laws, they have as a goal “to indirectly harmonise the 
law in a particular area by providing a standard text which can be adopted or modified 
by individual countries as part of their domestic law.”75 As commented on by 
UNCITRAL secretariat, Model Laws constitute “a sound basis for the desired 
harmonisation and improvement of national laws.”76 They are well referred to as 
“soft law instruments” because of their non-binding character.77 As for conventions, 
UNCITRAL has enacted several Model Laws, including the 1985 Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration.78 Similarly, owing to the impact the 
implementation of new technologies of communication and information has had 
upon the international business sphere, UNCITRAL has created two important 
instruments:79 the 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce,80 and the 2001 Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures.81  
                                               
75
 Eiselen Globalization 97 111; see also Faria 2009 Unif L Rev 5; Callies/Zumbansen Consensus 
123-124. 
76
 See Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ 
ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook. pdf (last accessed 15-6-2012). 
77
 Eiselen Globalization 97 111; Callies/Zumbansen Consensus 139. 
78
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments, 
as adopted in 2006, General Assembly Resolution 61/33 of 4 December 2006. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last accessed 
15-6-2012). 
79
 See Preamble of the UNGA Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996 relating to the Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook. 
pdf (last accessed 19-6-2012). For ample comments, see Eiselen 1999 (6) EDI Law Review 21; 
Eiselen 2002 (6) VJ 305. 
80
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 with additional article 5bis as adopted 
in 1998, Recorded in U.N.Doc. A/51/628; Sales. No.E.99.V.4., hereafter EC-Model Law. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf (last accessed 19-6-
2012). The EC Model Law is not directly applicable nor a convention to be adhered to by countries. 
It serves rather as a reference for use by national legislators on which to model their legislation as 
South Africa has done through the 2002 ECT Act. See Eiselen 2002 (6) VJ 305 306; Eiselen 
Globalization 97 112 Fn82; Christie Law of Contract 59 67; and Pillay DJ in SB Jafta v Ezmvelo 
KZN Wildlife 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC) 71. 
81
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Resolution A/56/588, 56/80 adopted on 
12 December 2001. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf (last 
accessed 19-6-2012). It is noted that there are also “soft law” instruments that may be adopted by 
individual commercial parties, or referred to in private agreements. For further comments, see 
Eiselen Globalization 97 111. 
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Given the range of instruments above, it is clear that UNCITRAL has 
accomplished an enormous amount of work for the harmonisation and unification of 
international trade law. Its work is reported in a series of Yearbooks that have 
appeared since 1971. Its most successful instrument, the drafting process of which is 
discussed below, is the Vienna Sales Convention.  
 
4.2.4.2 The CISG drafting process under UNCITRAL 
 
When UNCITRAL started its work in January 1968, there were already two main 
international organisations engaged in the unification of PIL, namely the Hague 
Conference on PIL and UNIDROIT. Neither of them had truly a global 
representation. UNCITRAL had, thus, a responsibility to promote wider participation 
in the existing international conventions and a wider acceptance of existing model 
and uniform laws.82 Its first session took place in New York, from 29 January to 26 
February 1968.83 Participants agreed on the rule that all decisions relating to the 
unification of international trade law should be reached, as far as possible, by way of 
consensus, and, exceptionally, by vote.84 With regard to the choice of topics, priority 
was given, by common consent, to the international sale of goods.85   
Following the choice of topics, the next problem was whether UNCITRAL 
should promote a widespread adoption of ULIS and ULF or whether it should 
alternatively prepare new texts that would obtain consensual acceptance.86 It should 
be remembered that Uniform Laws were ratified by a limited number of states. 
Objections  to their acceptance were  owing to several reasons, among which was the 
                                               
82
 Resolution 2205, Section II, paragraph 8. Some of those international instruments were: the 1955 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods; the 1958 Hague 
Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of Goods; 
the 1958 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; and 
the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions. 
83
 UNCITRAL 1968-1970 (I) YB 73. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 Two other topics within the priority list were international payments and international arbitration. 
86
 Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 4; Honnold 1979 (27) Am J Comp L 201 205; 
Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 9; UNCITRAL 1968-1970 (I) YB 79. 
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inadequate participation by representatives of different legal backgrounds in their 
preparation, and the use of standard and complex concepts drawn from civil law 
which could not easily be understood by common law lawyers and businessmen.87 
In order to avoid these objections, participants to UNCITRAL’s first session 
considered it to be better to assess the attitude of states with regard to the Hague Sales 
Conventions.88 Through the feedback of states, it became clear that only a small 
number of countries considered ULIS and ULF to be suitable instruments,89 what 
meant that they would hardly receive adequate approval. On 4 March 1969, 
UNCITRAL appointed a fourteen-member Sales Working Group90 to determine 
whether Uniform Laws could be modified to increase their acceptability or whether 
completely new texts were needed.91 The Working Group achieved its task in nine 
annual sessions by approving a “Draft Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods” in January 197692 dealing with the rights and obligations of parties. The 
following year, it also submitted a new Draft Convention dealing with the formation 
                                               
87
 See UNCITRAL 1971 (II) YB 5; Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 3-4; Flechtner 
Honnold’s Uniform Law 9; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 335; Bernasconi 1999 (46) Netherlands 
International Law Review 137; German 1995 Review of the CISG 117 119; Mendes 1988 (8) JL & 
Com 109 114; Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127 134-135; Réczei http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/reczei2.html#65; Wesiack http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/wesi ack.html. 
88
 Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-13. 
89
 UNCITRAL 1968-1970 (I) YB 98-99; UNCITRAL 1971 (II) YB 5; see also Honnold 1979 (27) 
Am J Comp L 201 205; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 9; Germain 1995 Review of the CISG 
117 119. 
90
 Its membership was established as follows: six states from Africa and Asia, two from Eastern 
Europe, two from Latin America, and four from Western Europe and other states. See UNCITRAL 
Report on the second Session 1968-1970 (I) YB 81.The initial Working Group members were 
Brazil, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia, USSR, the 
UK, and the USA. Later, the Group was increased to fifteen members with the coming of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone. See Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 10; 
Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 6. 
91
 Cf. Official Records of the General Assembly, 24th Session, Supplement No. 18 (AI1618), 
paragraph 38, subparagraph 3 (a) of the Resolution contained therein (YB 1968-1970 (I), part two, 
11, A); UNCITRAL Report on the Second Session 1968-1970 (I) YB 99-100; Winship in 
Galston/Smit Sales 1-13; Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 5; Farnsworth 1984 (18) 1 
International Lawyer 17 18. 
92
 See UNCITRAL 1977 (VIII) YB 111; see also Report of the Working Group on the International 
Sale of Goods on the work of its seventh session (Geneva, 5-16 January 1976) (A/CN.9/116), in 
UNCITRAL 1976 (VII) YB 88-96 publishing the new Draft Convention on International Sale of 
Goods with commentary. See also Honnold 1979 (27) Am J Comp L 201 206; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 10; Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 6. 
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of contracts.93 In 1978, UNCITRAL decided to combine both Draft Sales 
Conventions into a single document.94 One ad hoc drafting committee constituted in 
this respect produced a new “Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods”95 which was, finally, considered at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Sales 
Conference.96  
The Vienna Sales Conference was attended by delegations from 62 nations, 
including all countries with significant commercial interests, and eight 
organisations.97 The main work was accomplished there by two committees, the first 
charged with international sales law substantive provisions,98 the second with final 
provisions.99 The Conference worked intensively for five weeks. At the end, drafts 
                                               
93
 Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as approved 
by the Working Group at its eighteenth session U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, Annex I in UNCITRAL 
1977 (VIII) YB 88. 
94
 UNCITRAL 1978 (IX) YB 83; see also Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 5; Bonell in 
Bianca/Bonell Commentary 6. 
95
 Honnold 1979 (27) Am J Comp L 201 206; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 10; Bonell in 
Bianca/Bonell Commentary 6; Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-1. 
96
 The UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods was held in Vienna from 
10 March to 11 April 1980. 
97
 The 62 Nations which attended the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference were: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brasilia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelo-Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic of (then 
Zaïre ), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic 
Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
North Ireland, The USA, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Venezuela was represented by an observer. 
International Organisations were as follows: The World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, 
Central Office for International Railway Transport, Council of Europe, European Economic 
Community, the Hague Conference on PIL, UNIDROIT, and ICC. See UNCITRAL 1980 (XI) YB 
149; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 11; Schlechtriem Uniform Law 19; Butler Guide 1-14; and 
the Pace Law School Institute website at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html 
(last visited 20-6-2012). 
98
 Cf. Articles 1 to 88 CISG. 
99
 Cf. Articles 89 to 101 CISG. The second committee also prepared a Protocol Amending the 1974 
New York Convention on the Limitation Period. In addition to the two main committees, there 
were also a Drafting and a Credentials Committee. See Note by the Secretary-General: UN 
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (A/CN.9/183) in UNCITRAL 1980 
(XI) YB 37 and 151-152; see also Schlechtriem Uniform Law 19-20; Gichangi 2007 (1) Kenya Law 
Review 305. 
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prepared by committees were discussed article by article in a plenary session and the 
Convention as a whole submitted then to a roll-call vote.100 In the final vote, 42 
countries voted for the convention, while ten abstained.101 On 11 April 1980, the 
Conference adopted the Final Act of the CISG.102 
 
4.2.4.3 Current status of the CISG   
 
In the terms of Article 99, the CISG had to enter into force twelve months after ten 
states had deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. This requirement 
was fulfilled on 11 December 1986 with the concurrent ratification by China, Italy, 
and the USA.103 As a result of this, the Convention entered into effect on 1 January 
1988 in eleven states.104 Currently, the CISG contracting states represent every major 
legal, social, and economic systems of the world, so that the Convention is said to 
have gained worldwide acceptance.105 As of July 2013, the CISG has been adopted 
                                               
100
 Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 6; Schlechtriem Uniform Law 20. 
101
 These included the following: Burma, China, Columbia, the DRC, Iran, Kenya, Panama, Peru, 
Thailand, and Turkey. See Adoption of a Convention and other Instruments deemed appropriate, 
and the Final Act of the Conference (Agenda item 11) in UN Conference on the CISG Official 
Records 230; see also Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 3; Schlechtriem Uniform Law 20. 
102
 April 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc.No.98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S.3, reproduced in UNCITRAL 
1980 (XI) YB 151-162. The Convention was then opened for signature and accession until 30 
September 1981, pursuant to Article 91. 
103
 Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 7; Nicholas 1989 (105) LQR 201. 
104
 The original eleven CISG contracting states are Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Lesotho, Syria, the USA, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See Bonell in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 
6; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 11-12; Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 1. 
105
 Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 8; Schwenzer/Hachem 2009 (57) 2 Am J Comp L 457; 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1; Eiselen 2011 (14) 1 PER/PELJ 1; Hofmann 2010 (22) 1 
Pace Int’l LR 145 146; Castellani 2009 (13) 1VJ 241 245. In particular, owing to the increasing 
number of contracting states, the CISG is considered to have grown steadily to become “one of the 
most successful instruments Uniform Commercial Law worldwide”. (Grebler 2007 (101) American 
Society of International Law 407; supported by Kokoruda 2011 (6) The Florida Bar Journal 103; 
and Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181; see also McNamara 2003 (32) Colorado Lawyer 11; Krieger 1989 
(106) SALJ 184). Scholars are unanimous in their views on the fact that the Convention has, in its 
short life, already proved to be “a wonderfully effective instrument” so that it is regarded as “a 
great success story in the harmonisation of international trade.” See Bridge 2003 (15) Pace Int’l 
LR 55; Eiselen Globalization 97 103; Bonnell 2001 (106) Dickinson LR 87; Lehmann 2006 (18) 
SA Merc LJ 319. 
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by 79 states,106 comprising most important trading countries as the USA, China, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Brazil, and most EU countries.107 On the African continent, 
the CISG has been adopted in eleven countries,108 excluding the DRC. Those 
countries are Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Uganda, and Zambia.109 Among the most important CISG non-contracting countries, 
one may mention the UK, India, and South Africa.110 
As far as the UK is concerned, its reluctance to ratify the CISG has come in 
for criticism. According to a number of scholars, by distancing itself from the CISG, 
England “is becoming increasingly isolated within the international trading 
                                               
106
 For an updated list of CISG contracting states, visit the UNCITRAL website at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/ uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html, or the Pace 
Law School website at: http://www. cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last visited on 
30-7-2013). The last state to adopt the Convention is Brazil where the CISG will become effective 
on 1 April 2014. Brazil accessed the Convention on 4 March 2013. Before this event, there were 
many voices from scholars calling for its ratification, because, according to them, there was nothing 
in the CISG that offended the fundamental principles of Brazilian contract law. See, among others, 
Castellani 2009 (13) 1 VJ 241; Grebler 2005-2006 (25) JL & Com 467; Vieira in Ferrari CISG 28; 
Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §80-1; Eiselen Globalization 97 103. 
107
 See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 1; Brunner CVIM 91 111; Gärtner 2000-2001 
Review of the CISG 59; for the particular case of Japan, see Schwenzer/Hachem 2009 (57) 2 Am J 
Comp L 457. 
108
 But, for Kritzer and Eiselen (Contract §80:1) there are ten African CISG countries, Egypt having 
been listed as a Middle East country together with Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.  
109
 Benin is the last African-acceded country; the CISG came into effect there on 1 August 2012. 
Other African countries are also invited by scholars to ratify or approve the Convention. See, in 
general, Date-Bah http://www.acicol.com/temp/Prof.pdf (accessed 8 October 2013); for the case 
of Ghana, see Laryea 2011 (19) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; for 
Kenya, see Gichangi 2007 (1) Kenya Law Review 305; and for Nigeria, see Anyamele 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/anyamele.html. For Eastern and Southern African States, 
see Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 256; Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 853; Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 
Lesotho LJ 127 151. For the particular case of South Africa, see the next footnote.  
110
 See Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §80-4; Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 1-2. For South 
African invitation to accede to the CISG, see Eiselen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 14 and 25; Eiselen 
1999 116 SALJ 323 369; Hugo 1999 (11) 1 27; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 108; Oosthuizen Rights 
182. Lehmann belives, however, that the CISG’s apparent success is much exaggerated. She is, 
therefore, among those who discourage South Africa from ratifying the CISG, and advises the 
country to wait. See Lehmann 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 317 328. 
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community”111 and its “businessmen placed at a disadvantage in international 
commerce.”112  
As Nicholas advises, 
[There] are indeed grounds for an English lawyer to feel disquiet about the 
Convention and the way in which it is developing. But this is no longer a ground, if 
it ever was one, for refusing to ratify the Convention. On the contrary, it is a ground 
for ratifying quickly, so that the experience of English lawyers and of the English 
Commercial Court may influence the way in which the Convention is applied.113 
As for meeting these suggestions, the Department of Trade and Industry published, 
in 1989 and 1997, two consultation documents with the view to inviting the UK to 
access the CISG owing to its popular acceptance internationally.114 Based on the 
responses it received, the government indicated, in February 1999, its commitment 
to bringing the Vienna Convention into national law when there is time available on 
the legislative agenda. Unfortunately, up till now, this is yet to happen.115 It seems, 
in addition, that the government does not any longer see the ratification of the CISG 
as a legislative priority.116 In order to avoid isolation, it is currently important for the 
UK to include a discussion of the CISG in its programme since it is likely to affect a 
great many international sales contracts concluded by English traders.  
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 See Azzouni http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azzouni.html; Goode 2001 (50) 4 Int’l 
Comp. L. Q. 571; Nicholas 1989 (105) LQR 201; Bridge Bifocal World 277-278; Williams 2000-
2001 Review of the CISG 9 19. 
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 Carr Trade 59. 
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 Nicholas http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas3.html. 
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 Azzouni http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azzouni.html; Carr Trade 59; Williams 
2000-2001 Review of the CISG 10-11. 
115
 For reasons or unreasons for the UK not ratifying the CISG, see, particularly, Hofmann 2010 
(22) 1 Pace Int’l LR 145; Azzouni http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/azzouni.html; Williams 
2000-2001 Review of the CISG 9 19; Goode 2001 (50) 4 Int’l Comp. L. Q. 571; Forte 1997 (26) 
University of Baltimore Law Review 51; Carr Trade 58-60. 
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 See Moss 2005 (25) 1 JL & Com 483. 
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4.2.5 Conclusion on the Origins of the CISG 
 
The underlying policies behind the Vienna Sales Convention are that the Convention 
intended to improve uniform laws on the international sale of goods in order to give 
wider acceptance to international trade law.117 In effect, when establishing 
UNCITRAL in 1966, it was recognised that disparities in national laws created 
obstacles in international trade. The CISG was then considered to be an appropriate 
instrument to reduce or remove those obstacles.118 With regard to the number of 
member states, and the number of available judicial decisions dealing with the 
Convention, the CISG appears to have achieved that objective. This statement is 
supported by the views of some commentators for whom, the Vienna Convention is 
“arguably the greatest legislative achievement aimed at harmonising private 
commercial law.”119 Thus, as for other “hard law” instruments, when it is adopted, 
the CISG automatically forms part of the national law of the contracting state.120 Its 
availability is facilitated by the number of languages in which it is published and the 
development of several databases dedicated to it.121  
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 Cf. Resolution 2205, Section II, §8; see also Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 8; Bonell 
in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 7; Ndulo Lesotho LJ 127 135; and cases quoted in UNCITRAL 
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 Cf. CISG Preamble, Paragraph 3; Preamble Resolution 2205, Paragraphs 5 and 9 in UNCITRAL 
1971 (I) YB 65. 
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 Lookofsky 1991 (39) Am J Comp L 403; Ferrari 2005 (25) International Review of Law and 
Economics 314.  
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 See Zeller 2002 (14) Pace Int’l LR 163; Eiselen Globalization 97 108; Chappuis CVIM 183 187. 
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LR 403 407; Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 17. It has currently compiled over 2 600 
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easy to use because case law is organised either by country, CISG articles, or by theme. Given the 
abundance of sources it provides, it seems to be the first site for any researcher attempting to deal 
with the CISG. See Eiselen Globalization 97 105; Eiselen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 14 23; Williams 
2000-2001 Review of the CISG 9 21. 
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4.3 The Vienna Sales Convention’s Sphere of Application  
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
When dealing with the sphere of application of the CISG, the initial question is 
whether the Convention governs the contract as a whole, or whether it regulates only 
some specific contractual issues. The answer to this question is provided by its first 
six articles which determine what is included or not in the ambit of the Convention.122 
Article 1 occupies a preeminent place among these provisions.123 It lays down 
general rules for determining the way the Convention contains substantive rules 
relating to international sales contracts and their formation.124 More specifically, 
Article 1 stipulates that, 
[The CISG] applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of 
business are in different States: 
a) when the States are Contracting States; or  
b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State. 
As specified by one American Federal District Court, in Innotex Precision Ltd v 
Horei Image Products, Inc., “the CISG applies to all contracts between parties from 
Contracting States. (…) It also governs contracts between parties from non-
Contracting States if conflict-of-law rules lead to the application of the law of a 
                                               
122
 UNCITRAL Secretariat Explanatory Note; Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115 145; 
Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 63; and Brunner CVIM 91 111. As the 
CISG governs only contracts for international sale of goods (Article 1), Article 2 identifies the 
kinds of contracts excluded from the field of application of the CISG. Article 3 provides a series 
of supplementary requirements relating to the Convention’s applicability to contracts for goods to 
be manufactured and a number of mixed contracts. Articles 4 and 5 describe the legal nature of 
certain issues which may arise in connection with sales transactions, and Article 6 regulates the 
way parties may opt in or out of the provisions of the CISG. See UNCITRAL Digest 3; 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 32; and Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 
182. 
123
 See Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 838; Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 
23-24.  
124
 Secretariat Commentary, Official Records, Doc.A/CONF.97/5 in Honnold Documentary 405; 
see also Jayme in Bianca/Bonell Commentary 27. 
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Contracting State.”125 It is important to note immediately that Article 95 allows a 
state, when ratifying, to exclude the application of the CISG by virtue of PIL rules.126 
Article 95 is given further comments in section 4.3.4.3 below. 
Simply, Article 1 explains how a contract may acquire an international 
character, and what relation a transaction must have with a CISG member state 
before the Convention applies.127 Article 1, in other words, describes the nature of 
transactions governed by the CISG, the means the Vienna Sales Convention may 
autonomously or indirectly apply, and it outlines the area of operation of the 
Convention. Each of these subjects is commented on further in the following 
sections. Because no legislator can pretend to be perfect, the issue of interpretation 
of the CISG is also addressed.  
 
4.3.2  Nature of Transactions Governed by the CISG 
 
4.3.2.1 Introduction  
 
In accordance with Article 1, the first requirement to be satisfied is that the Vienna 
Sales Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods which are international in 
character. By reason of this requirement, it is important to discuss the types of 
contracts governed by the CISG, to explain the meaning of the concept “goods” in 
CISG understandings, and provide details about the international nature of an 
agreement.  
 
 
 
                                               
125
 See USA 17 December 2009 Federal District Court Georgia Innotex Precision Ltd v Horei 
Image Products, Inc., et al. [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/091217u1.html] 
(last accessed 21-6-2012).  
126
 For comments, see Section 4.3.4 below dealing with the Application of the CISG by virtue of 
PIL rules.  
127
 See Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-20; Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 166.  
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4.3.2.2 The contract must be a “contract of sale”  
 
Meaning of a contract of sale under the CISG 
The CISG does not expressly define what constitutes a contract of sale.128 Despite 
such a shortcoming, courts and scholars admit that a definition may be implied from 
the provisions of Articles 30 and 53 dealing with the obligations of the seller and the 
buyer.129 Article 30, on the one hand, obliges the seller to “deliver the goods, hand 
over any documents relating to them and transfer the property in the goods.” Article 
53, on the other hand, requires the buyer to “pay the price for the goods and take 
delivery of them.” Accordingly, sales contracts covered by the CISG are contracts in 
which the seller is bound to deliver the goods sold and transfer the property in them, 
and the buyer obliged to pay the price and accept the goods.130  
                                               
128
 See Austria 10 November 1994 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Chinchilla Furs case 
[http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/941110a3.html] (last accessed 21-6-2012). See also Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 28; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 31; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:15; Huber/Mullis CISG 43; Ott/Matthey Commerce 
22; Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 182; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 4; Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 
835; Nicholas 1989 (105) LQR 201 206; Ziegel http://www.cisg.law. pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/ 
4ziegel.html (accessed 15-4-2013); Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 65; see also authorities quoted in 
UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn66.  
129
 See Italy 10 January 2006 District Court Padova Merry-go-rounds case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/ 060110i3.html] (last accessed 21-6-2012); Netherlands 1 November 2001 
Rechtbank Rotterdam Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 2002 No. 114; Switzerland 11 
March 1996 Kantonsgericht Wallis Clay; Italy 26 November 2002 Tribunale di Rimini Porcelain 
Tableware case, CISG-Online 737 (Pace); in UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn68. For scholars, see Mistelis 
in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 28; Schwenzer/Hachem  in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 31; Huber/Mullis CISG 43; Ott/Matthey Commerce 22; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 65; 
Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181182; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 4.  
130
 See Italy 16 February 2009 Tribunale di Forli Cisterns and Accessories case, CLOUT case No. 
867 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090216i3.html]; Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale di Forli, 
CLOUT case No. 916 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081211i3.html]; Italy 11 January 2005 
Tribunale di Padova Ostroznik Savo v La Faraona soc coop arl [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/050111i3.html] (last accessed 28-6-2012); Italy 25 February 2004 Tribunale di Padova, 
CLOUT case No. 608 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html]; Italy 26 November 2002 
Tribunale di Rimini Al Palazzo Srl v Bernardaud di Limoges SA case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/021126i3.html]; Switzerland 25 February 2002 Kantonsgericht Schaffhausen 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/020225s1.html]; in UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn68. See also 
Switzerland 11 March 1996 Appellate Court Vaud Aluminum Granules, Case No. 
01930661[http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/960311s1.html]. See, in the same sense, Austria 10 
November 1994 Oberster Gerichtshof Chinchilla Furs case; Belgium 2 May 1995 Rechtbank 
Koophandel Hasselt Vital Berry Marketing v Dira-Frost [http://cisgw3.law. 
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It follows with this inference that the CISG’s concept of “sale” corresponds 
with that of South African131 and Congolese laws.132 In all of the three legal systems, 
a contract requires the delivery of goods, on the side of the seller, and payment, on 
the side of the buyer, to qualify as one of sale. In other words, the CISG covers that 
basic contracts for sale of goods mean goods delivered against payment.133 This 
being the general principle, it follows that the legal nature of sales does not change 
though parties may have stipulated their duties differently as stated in the 
Convention. To give an example of this, contracts involving the carriage of the 
goods134 or sales by sample or model135 fall within the scope of application of the 
CISG. The same is also true for contracts modifying an initial contract,136 or those 
providing for the delivery of the goods sold directly from the supplier to the seller’s 
customer, i.e. the buyer,137 and instalment contracts.  
Legal aspects of sales by instalment 
Instalment contracts are regulated in Article 73(1) CISG by reference to the phrase 
“a contract for delivery of goods by instalments”. The Convention does not, however, 
                                               
pace.edu/cases/950502b1.html] (last accessed 21-6-2012); and Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas 
UN Convention 28. 
131
 Cf. Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 4; Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 228; Ng’ong’ola 1992 
(4) RADIC 835 839; and comments in Section 3.4.1 above. 
132
 See Article 263 al. 1 CCO for which a sale is a contract whereby one party undertakes to deliver 
a thing and another to pay for it, together with Article 250 al. 1 and Article 262 of the OHADA 
Commercial Act. See also Tricom Kin/Gombe 28 February 2012 RCE 2183 Kabala Katumba v 
Socimex; and comments under Section 2.4.1 above. As for the CISG, the OHADA Commercial 
Act does not also define a contract of sale. 
133
 Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 22; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 31; see also Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 28 who describes a 
contract for the sale of goods as “a contract where goods are exchanged for money.” 
134
 Cf. Articles 31(a) and 67 CISG. 
135
 Cf. Articles 35(2) (c) CISG; see also Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 32. 
136
 Cf. Article 29 CISG; see also Germany 21 January 1998 Appellate Court of München 
[http://cisg3.law.pace. edu/cases/980121g1.html]; ICC Arbitration Case No. 7331 of 1994 
[http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/947331i1.html], in UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn73. 
137
 See Article 3 CISG; Germany 12 February 1998 Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) Air 
Cleaning Installation case [http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212g1.html]; Switzerland 20 
February 1997 District Court of Sanne [http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cases/970220s1.html], in 
UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn72; see also Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 28 
Fn32. 
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explain what instalment agreements are. According to several commentators and case 
law, an agreement amounts into an instalment contract if it “requires or authorises 
the delivery of goods in separate lots.”138 That is to say, for a contract to qualify as 
an “instalment contract” there must be at least two separate deliveries at different 
points of time. With regard to their legal status, it is commonly admitted that the 
CISG applies to instalment contracts.139 But, when it comes to instalment contracts, 
ownership in the goods does not pass to the buyer until he/she has paid the final 
instalment.140  
It is important to note that instalment contracts should not be confused with 
“framework” and “distribution agreements”. Wih regard to framework contracts, the 
predominant view is that they are beyond the sphere of application of the CISG,141 
unless they oblige contracting parties to conclude a sale. That is the case when “the 
framework contains the main rights and duties without having to refer to them in the 
main contract.”142 Regarding distribution agreements, the prevailing opinion is also 
                                               
138
 Saidov in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 970-971; Fountoulakis in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 936; see also a series of authorities quoted in UNCITRAL 
Digest 339 Fn6.  
139
 See France 22 February 1995 Cour d’Appel Grenoble BRI Production ‘Bonaventure’ v Pan 
African Export [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950222f1.html]; Germany 18 November 2008 
Appellate Court Brandenburg Beer case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081118g1.html]; 
Netherlands 15 October 2002 Netherlands Arbitration Institute  Case No. 2319 Condensate Crude 
Oil Mix case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html]; Denmark 17 October 2007 
Supreme Court  Zweirad Technik v C Reinhardt A/S [http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/ 
071017d1.html]; China October 2007 CIETAC Arbitration Proceeding CD-R and DVD-R 
Production Systems case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071000c1.html]; China August 2006 
CIETAC Arbitration Proceeding Chilling Press case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060800c1. 
html]; Belgium 26 April 2000 Appellate Court Gent BV BA JP v S Ltd [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/000426b1.html];  Austria 1 February 2005 Appellate Court Innsbruck Powdered 
Tantulum case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050201a3.html] (all of them last accessed 21-6-
2012). See also cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn71.  
140
 See Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 23; but Ziegel http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4ziegel. html.  
141
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 58; and China 21 September 2005 Supreme Court of the PRC [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/050921c1.html] in UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn75.  
142
 See Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 29; see also France, ICC Court of 
Arbitration Arbitral award No. 12713, (holding that a framework agreement was governed by the 
CISG) [http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/0412173i1.html]; Switzerland July 1999 Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce Zurich Arbitral award No. 9448, CLOUT 
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that they do not fall within the field of application of the CISG.143 The exclusion of 
both framework contracts and distribution agreements is motivated by the fact that 
these types of contracts focus on “the organisation of the distribution”, which consists 
of the performance of a service, rather than the transfer of property and the delivery 
of goods.144  
As for framework and distribution contracts, the CISG does not also cover 
“barter agreements”.145 Their exclusion is inspired by the fact that the Vienna Sales 
Convention requires sales contracts to be an exchange of goods against money,146 
whereas barters entail interchange of goods alone. Similarly, the application of the 
Convention should be seen as being doubtful for a number of contracts where the 
delivery of goods is associated with the supply of labour or other services. The legal 
                                               
case No. 630 (holding that a framework agreement was governed by the CISG, because the contract 
provided for future sales and deliveries). 
143
 See Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 187-188; Mistelis  in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 
30; Schwenzer /Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 58; Janssen in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 132; Magnus in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 214-
215. For case law, see Germany 23 July 1997 Supreme Court [VIII ZR 130/96] Benetton I Fashion 
Textiles [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970723g1.html]; USA 29 August 2000 District Court 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Vina Vino Import v Farnese Vini [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000829u1.html]; USA 21 July 1997 District Court Southern District 
of New York Helen Kminski (Pty) Ltd v Marketing  Australian Products Inc. [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/wais/dbcases2/ 970721u1.html]  (all of these cases last accessed 22-6-2012); Italy 
14 December 1999 Supreme Court Giustizia Civile 2333 (2000), and similar cases quoted in 
UNCITRAL Digest 6 Notes 74 to 76.  
144
 See Switzerland 8 January 1997 Obergericht des Kantons Luzern, CLOUT case No. 192 in 
UNCITRAL Digest 6 Fn76; Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 30 Fn42; Perovi 
2011 (3) BLR 181 187-189. 
145
 Russia 26 May 2003 Arbitration Court (Appellate Court) for the Moscow Region [http://cisg3. 
law.pace. edu/cases/03052r1.html] (last accessed 21-6-2012). See also, Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 29; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 32; Butler Guide 2-25; Schlechtriem Uniform Law 24; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 
1 4; Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 191. But, Flechtner (Honnold’s Uniform Law 57 §56.1) who believes 
that exchange of goods agreements should be governed by the CISG unless the parties so choose. 
Flechtner found support in the fact that the Convention does not state any restrictions as to the price 
(Cf. Articles 53, and 55 to 59); and it authorises parties to determine the form of their contract 
freely. Flechtner’s approach is to be taken with reservations.   
146
 See authorities quoted in footnote 132 above. In one of its Arbitral awards, the Russian Tribunal 
of International Commercial Arbitration made it clear that the CISG is not applicable to barter 
contracts which do not involve any monetary payments between the parties. See Russia 9 March 
2004 Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 91/2003, CISG-online 1184; referred to by Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 191 
Note 47. 
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regime of those kinds of contracts is determined by Article 3 which regulates 
“contracts for the sale of goods to be manufactured or produced”, and the so-called 
“mixed contracts”.  
Status of sale of goods to be manufactured or produced and mixed contracts  
As stipulated by Article 3(1), contracts for the sale of goods to be manufactured or 
produced are to be considered as sales contracts, unless the buyer undertakes to 
supply “a substantial part” of the materials necessary for such manufacture or 
production.147 Pursuant to this provision, contracts for goods to be manufactured or 
produced come, in principle, within the sphere of influence of the CISG as pure 
contracts for sale.148 It is only cases where the buyer supplies a “substantial part” for 
the manufacture or production of the goods that are excluded from the area of the 
Convention. Under Article 3(2), likewise, where services and goods are supplied in 
the same transaction, the CISG does not apply if the “preponderant part” of the 
obligation of the seller consists of the supply of labour and services.149 By so ruling, 
Article 3(2) excludes mixed contracts from the scope of the CISG.150 
One decision of the German Appellate Court in the Window Production Plant 
case is very remarkable on the issue of manufacture and mixed contracts. This case 
was concerned with both the sale of goods to be manufactured and the supply of 
                                               
147
 For interpretation, see CISG-AC Opinion No. 4, Contracts for the Sale of Goods to Be 
Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 3 CISG), 24 October 2004 (hereafter 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 4). http://www.cisg.law. pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op4.html (accessed 15-
4-2013). For leading cases on this subject, see Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:21 84-64 to 84-66; and 
for comments Brunner CVIM 91 111-112. 
148
 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 4 §1.1; see also Magnus in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 211; Felemegas 
2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 
62; Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 54ff; Schlechtriem/Butler 
International Sales 23ff; Kritzer/Eiselen  Contract §84:22; Huber/Mullis CISG 44; Perovi 2011 (3) 
BLR 181 182. 
149
 See Switzerland 7 May 1993 District Court Laufen Canton Berne Automatic Storage case 
[http://cisg3.law. pace.edu/cases/930507sl.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In this case, the 
obligation of the Finnish seller to furnish a number of different services to a Swiss buyer was judged 
to be not preponderant; the CISG then applied. 
150
 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 4 §3.1; see also Winship in Galston/Smit Sales1-23; Schroeter 2001 
(5) VJ 74; Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 57; Schwenzer/Hachem 
in Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 67; Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 183. 
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additional services by the seller.151 The Higher Regional Court of Munich stated that, 
where the parts for the unit to be provided by the buyer are not substantial in value 
or function, the contract is a contract for sale of goods governed by Article 3(1) 
CISG.152 According to the court,  
The mere fact that the machine is to be assembled by seller’s technicians at buyer’s 
place of business does not constitute a preponderant part of seller’s obligations if the 
value of the labour of installation only amounts to a small part of the total value of 
the contract, and the main interest of the buyer stills the machine itself and not its 
installation.153 
It appears from the case law that the main issue in Article 3 turns on the meaning of 
the expressions substantial part and preponderant part. By means of explanation, 
Schlechtriem and Butler put it that the Convention is applicable even where the seller 
has to manufacture or produce the goods out of his own materials.154 But, if the buyer 
supplies a “substantial part” of the materials necessary to manufacture or produce the 
                                               
151
 Germany 3 December 1999 Appellate Court (Oberlandesgericht) München Window Production 
Plant case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991203g1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). A propos 
of this, 
A German manufacturer of windows ordered from an Italian seller a window manufacturing 
unit. It was agreed that some parts for the unit should be provided by the buyer. Moreover, the 
unit was to be modified according to buyer’s specifications and to be delivered to the buyer’s 
place of business, where it was to be assembled by seller’s technicians. When the seller declared 
that it would not be able to deliver the manufacturing unit by the agreed time, the buyer fixed 
an additional period of time for delivery. After that time had lapsed, he declared the contract 
avoided.  
See also, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Partial Award of 17 May 2005 and Final Award of 5 
July 2005 Machines case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/050517n1.html] (last 
accessed 22-6-2012). 
152
 Germany 3 December 1999 Window Production Plant case; see also Schroeter 2001 (5) VJ 74 
76. 
153
 Ibid. In a similar case, a Finnish seller, producer of automatic storage systems, concluded with 
a Swiss buyer, a metal-works company, a number of agreements, such as those of non-disclosure 
agreement, license agreement, and various contracts “for the supply of goods to be manufactured”. 
Later, the seller sued the buyer for the outstanding balance of the purchase price on several of those 
agreements. The court found that the parties had entered into contracts for the supply of goods to 
be manufactured and that they were to be considered sales under Article 3(1). In the view of the 
court, though the seller had to collaborate with services, his intervention was not preponderant. See 
Switzerland 7 May 1993 Automatic Storage System case; see also Italy 16 February 2009 Tribunale 
di Forli (District Court) Cisterns and Accessories case http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/ 
db/cases2/090216i3.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012).  
154
 Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 23. 
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goods, such as “raw materials for processing into finished brushes and brooms,”155 
the CISG does not apply. In effect, in situations of the kind of the Brushes and 
Brooms case, “the seller is a provider of services rather than a seller of goods.”156  
It is noteworthy that the interpretation of the phrase “substantial part” has been 
controversial. This expression has, moreover, given rise to considerable discussions 
among scholars and courts as is the case of the term “materials”.157 As regards the 
concept “materials contributed by contractual parties”, three factors are often 
suggested to decide whether or not they were substantial for the end-product. These 
criteria include the economic value,158 the volume or the weight,159 and the 
importance of the respective contribution.160 The majority seems to favour the 
economic viewpoint by establishing a comparison between the economic value and 
the price of the respective materials.161  
                                               
155
 See Austria 27 October 1994 Supreme Court Brushes and Brooms case http://cisgw3. 
law.pace.edu/cases/ 941027a3.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In this case, an Austrian company 
entered into an agreement with a Yugoslav company and a Yugoslav State Agency. Under the 
contract, the Austrian company had to provide the Yugoslav company with raw materials for 
processing into finished brushes and brooms. Finished goods were then to be delivered back to the 
Austrian company by the Yugoslav State Agency. The court found, in this instance, that the CISG 
was not applicable because the party ordering the goods supplied a “substantial part of the materials 
necessary for the production of the goods.” It concluded that the obligation of furnishing the goods 
consisted mainly in the supply of labour and services than in a sale of goods.  
156
 Ibid. 
157
 For some terms such “major part” or “important part” being used to evade the problem, see 
Schwenzer/ Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 56; Khoo in Bianca/Bonell 
Commentary 42; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 5; for a comprehensive interpretation, see  CISG-
AC Opinion No. 4 §2.1-10. 
158
 In this sense, materials provided by the buyer compared to those provided by the seller ought to 
be higher in value in order to exclude the CISG. See CISG-AC Opinion  No. 4 §2.3; Window 
Production Plant case; Butler Guide 2-29; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 65; 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 64; Kritzer/ Eiselen  Contract 
§84:24.   
159
 This factor relies on the French expression ‘part essentielle’ which implies an interpretation 
based upon the essentiality or the quality of the materials provided. See Butler Guide 2-30; 
Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 55. 
160
 Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 65. 
161
 Ibid; see also Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 24; Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/ 
Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 55; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:24; Butler Guide 2-29; Hugo 
1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 5. This is also the view of the CISG-AC Opinion No. 4 for which: “In 
interpreting the words ‘substantial part’ under Article 3(1) CISG, primarily an ‘economic value’ 
criterion should be used. An ‘essential’ criterion should only be considered where the ‘economic 
value’ is impossible or inappropriate to apply taking into account the circumstances of the case.” 
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Regarding their nature, there is unanimity that the term materials includes raw 
materials and semi-finished materials, fungible or non-fungible goods, and standard 
or custom-made goods.162 The French Cour d’Appel de Chambéry tried, in AMD 
Electronique v Rosenberger, to extend the term material to “plans and instructions 
that the buyer transmitted to the seller.”163 Its decision was severely criticised.164 The 
issue of the demarcation between sales and services arises, in fact, only if the buyer 
contributes to the manufacture or the production of the goods. Immaterial 
contributions such as “plans, designs, know-how, and licenses to use industrial 
property rights,”165 therefore, are not considered as necessary materials within the 
meaning of Article 3(1),166 except where they intend to enhance the value of the 
materials.167 In modern transactions, in effect, a seller’s obligations are not confined 
to the delivery of goods only. The seller has often to perform some other services, 
                                               
Thus, if, for instance, the value of the materials provided by the buyer is only about 10% of the 
total value of the goods, the CISG will apply. See Hungary 5 December 1995 Arbitration Court of 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Budapest (VB/94131); see also cases quoted in CISG-
AC Opinion No. 4 comments §2.3 Note 10.  
162
 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 4 §6; see also Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 54§3. 
163
 See France 25 May 1993 Cour d’Appel de Chambéry AMD Electronique v Rosenberger 
(Adaptors case) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930525f1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In 
the case, an Italian producer of electronic components ordered adaptors from a French company. 
According to the contract, the adaptors had to be produced following the buyer’s specifications and 
design. The Court held wrongly that the contract was not an international sale because the buyer 
had contributed substantially to the manufacturing of electronic components, and Article 3(1) CISG 
did not apply.  
164
 The ruling in the Adaptors case was criticised as an instance of the CISG misapplication by the 
simple transposition of French domestic law rules relating to the distinction between sales contracts 
and contracts for services. For comments, see Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 181 184; Schlechtriem/Butler 
International Sales 24; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 66; Hugo 
1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 5. 
165
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 66; see also Switzerland 10 
February 1999 Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich, CLOUT case No. 331, in UNCITRAL Digest 
20 Fn8.  
166
 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 4 §2:13; see also Switzerland, CLOUT case No. 331. But, Germany 
17 September 1991 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main 1991 RIW 950, CLOUT case No. 2, 
where the CISG was applied to a contract for the supply of shoes according to buyer’s design. 
According to one commentator, since materials were not supplied by the buyer who provided only 
simple devices, the court ruled properly. See Karollus 1995 Cornell Review of the CISG 51 57.  
167
 See Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:24 84-73; Butler Guide 2-21; see also Switzerland 17 October 
2000 Federal Supreme Court Severin Wagner AG v Günter Lieber [http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/001017s1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). 
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such as installing the machine sold and instructing the buyer’s personnel on its use. 
In such situations, Article 3(2) provides for the application of the CISG unless the 
“preponderant part” of the contract consists in supplying services.168  
As for its comparable notion of “substantial part”, the Convention is silent as 
to the content of the concept “preponderant part”. Thus, as stated by the CISG-AC 
Opinion No. 4 § 9, the same test used for the first expression will also apply to the 
“preponderant part” requirement, viz. the prevalence of the economic value 
criterion.169 To illustrate this, the CISG will not apply to contracts where the 
obligation regarding the supply of labour or services amounts to more than 50% of 
the other party’s obligations.170 In the Window Production Plant case, by contrast, 
one German court concluded that assembling the machine by seller’s technicians was 
not “a preponderant part of the contract,” and applied the CISG. In a similar case, the 
Swiss Commercial Court of Zürich observed, in the Computer Software and 
Hardware case, that “neither the work carried out, nor the performance of other 
                                               
168
 See Netherlands 27 April 1999 Appellate Court Arnhem Mainzer Raumzellen v van Keulen 
Mobielbouw Nijverdal, known as the Movable Room Units case, as commented on by Janssen in Ferrari 
Quo Vadis CISG 129 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990427n1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). It 
was held in the case that, “though the contract contained elements of both work and sales contracts, it 
had to be considered as a sale under the CISG.” See also Germany 18 April 2011 Oberlandesgericht 
Stuttgart Fire Trucks case [http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/110418g1.html]; Switzerland 14 
December 2009 Kantonsgericht Zug [http://globalsaleslaw.com/ content/api/cisg/urteile/2026.pdf] 
(both last accessed 22-6-2012); and similar cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 20 Fn16.  
169
 See, in the same sense, Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 71; 
Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 66-67; Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 25; 
Mistelis/Raymond in Kröll/ Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 58; Schroeter 2001 (5) VJ 74 77-
78; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 5. 
170
 See Switzerland 14 December 2009 Kantonsgericht Zug [http://globalsaleslaw.com/ 
content/api/cisg/urteile/ 2026.pdf];  Russia Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Award No. 5/1997 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980305r1.html]; Switzerland 18 May 2009 Bundesgericht 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In the last case, the 
CISG applied to a contract of sale of “a packaging machine consisting of ten individual devices as 
well as several transportation and interconnection systems, which also imposed upon the seller the 
obligation to install the packaging machine and prepare its operation at the buyer’s works”; quoted 
in UNCITRAL Digest 20 Fn14.  
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ancillary services, prevail in the (...) contract.”171 It inferred that the contract was not 
predominately one of service and applied the CISG.  
Following from cases above, it follows that a comparison between the value 
of the services supplied and the goods delivered is essential in deciding whether the 
contract is substantially for sale or for services.172 In other words, the phrase 
“preponderant part” has to be appreciated on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether or not the Vienna Sales Convention is applicable.  
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note that, further to Article 3, 
the field of application of the CISG is also restricted by Article 2 which excludes a 
number of different types of contracts, including consumer contracts, from the sphere 
of the Convention. 
Exclusion of consumer sales  
In principle, any sale of goods is covered by the CISG as long as the requirements of 
Article 1(1) are met, unless the parties exclude it. If the Convention has to govern all 
types of contracts, however, its application would be unreasonable in a number of 
circumstances.173 Such is the meaning of Article 2 which was introduced in the 
Convention to exclude some kinds of contracts from its ambit. As Spohnheimer has 
stated, “The general underlying rationale of Article 2 is to limit the Convention’s 
sphere of application, and to remove those transactions that would otherwise – but 
unreasonably – be governed by the CISG.”174 Spohnheimer goes on to specify:  
                                               
171
 See Switzerland 17 February 2000 Commercial Court Zürich Computer Software and Hardware 
case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000217s1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012).  
172
 Belgium 24 November 2004 Appellate Court Ghent Srl Orintix v NV Fabelta Ninove case 
[http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/041124b1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). Held in the same 
sense that, installing four sliding gates (Switzerland 30 June 1995 St Gallen Judicial Commission 
Oberrheintal Sliding Doors case [http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/950630s1.html]; one container 
(Switzerland 26 April 1995 Commercial Court Zürich Saltwater Isolation Tank case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950426s1.html]); or assembling materials for a hotel (ICC 
Arbitration 1992 Case No. 7153, Hotel Materials case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
927153i1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012) are not preponderant to exclude the CISG.  
173
 See Spohnheimer in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 40; see allso Brunner CVIM 
91 111. 
174
 Ibid.  
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Article 2, therefore, provides for several exceptions which should not be covered by 
the CISG, even if these transactions meet the requirements for the CISG to be 
applicable according to Article 1. These exceptions can be classified in three main 
groups (…): first, exceptions based on the purpose of the transactions for which the 
goods are sold (Article 2(a)); second, exceptions based on specific types of 
transactions (Article 2(b) and (c)); and third, exceptions based on the kinds of goods 
sold (Article 2(d) - (f)).175 
 
In accordance with Article 2(a), a specific sale should fall outside the CISG if goods 
are bought “for personal, family, or household use.”176 It is only if the seller was 
unaware of such a use that the CISG would apply.177 As one commentator has said, 
the exception to the exclusion of consumer sales “is only based on the intended 
purpose the goods are bought for and applies irrespectively of whether the buyer is 
businessman or not.”178 Consequently, for a contract to be excluded from the CISG’s 
sphere of application of the CISG the intended personal use of the goods must be 
known to the seller; otherwise, the CISG will apply.179 The seller, in addition, is not 
obliged to ask as to whether the goods are to be used for consumer purposes or 
                                               
175
 Ibid. See also UNCITRAL Digest 17§2; and Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 49. Schwenzer and Hachem attribute to Article 2 a dual function, restricting the scope 
of the CISG, and clarifying the notion of “goods”, which, as discussed in the following section, is 
not defined in the Convention. 
176
 For an illustration, see Netherlands 27 May 1993 District Court Arnhem Hunfeld v Vos 
[http://www.cisg. law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/930527n1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). 
According to commentators, consumer sales are excluded from the coverage of the CISG because 
similar transactions are usually governed by mandatory national rules designed to protect 
consumers. Consumer sales, in addition, occur infrequently in international commerce. See 
Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-23; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:12 84-51. 
177
 Article 2(a) in fine. 
178
 See Spohnheimer in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 41. 
179
 In illustration of this is Germany 31 March 2008 Appellate Court Stuttgart Automobile case 
[http://www. cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg /wais/db/cases2/080331g1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In 
the case, a German professional car dealer advertised a car on the Internet. An employee of a 
Latvian corporation showed an interest in that car and negotiations took place via telephone. The 
parties concluded the contract via exchanging faxes without any prior inspection of the car and 
without giving notice to the seller that an employee intended to use it. The court concluded that, at 
the time the contract was formed, the seller was entitled to assume that the buyer intended to 
purchase the car for professional purposes. It then applied the CISG. Because the seller did not 
know the legal form of the buyer at this point in time, it was obvious that the latter acted as a 
business company.  
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commercially.180 What is relevant is the intention on the buyer the moment the 
contract is formed. 
 Briefly, although the commercial character of the transaction is not directly 
required for its application,181 the practical consequence from Article 2(a) is that the 
CISG will mainly regulate commercial contracts.182 By the expression “commercial 
contracts”, one may understand contracts concluded by professional dealers for 
business purposes, in contrast to consumer contracts. It does not matter whether 
goods are delivered by instalments or whether they are already made or to be 
manufactured or produced, for the CISG to govern the contract. The only exceptions 
are where sales contracts are mixed with labour or other services, and those services 
occupy a substantial or preponderant part of the transaction.   
  
4.3.2.3 The meaning of the concept “goods”  
 
Article 1(1) states that the CISG applies in respect of contracts of “sale of goods”. 
Although Article 2 enumerates some varieties of goods excluded from the field of 
application of the CISG, the Convention does not define what the term “goods” 
means.183 Despite such a failure, it is undisputed that CISG goods are essentially 
“moveable and tangible objects”.184 Scholars and case law are, furthermore, 
unanimous that the term “goods” has to be interpreted autonomously in accordance 
with Article 7(1) CISG.185 This provision requires, in the interpretation of the 
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 Germany 2 April 2009 Appellate Court Hamm [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
090402g1.html]; Netherlands 17 February 2009 Gerechtshof Appellate Court Gravenhage US 
party v Restauratiebedrijf BV [http://cisgw3.law.pace .edu/cases/090217n1.html] (last accessed 22-
6-2012). 
181
 Cf. Article 1(3) CISG. 
182
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 50; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract 
§84:12 84-50; Huber/Mullis CISG 48-49. 
183
 See Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 31; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:6 
84-26; Butler Guide 2-26, Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 55; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 70; 
UNCITRAL Digest 6 §27.  
184
 Cf. authorities cited in Fn189 below. 
185
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34; Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 31; UNCITRAL Digest 6 §27; and Perovi 2011 (3) BLR 
181 193.  
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Convention, that regard “be had to the international character of the CISG and the 
need to promote uniformity in its application,”186 rather than referring to domestic 
law.187 A German Court has ruled in the Computer Ship case that, in order to cover 
all objects which may form the subject matter of commercial sales contracts, the term 
“goods” must be flexibly and widely interpreted.188 To illustrate this, examples from 
the case law include in goods defined by the CISG, “items that at the moment of 
delivery,189 are ‘moveable and tangible’,190 regardless of their shape and whether they 
are solid, used or new, inanimate or alive.”191 A German decision in the Market Study 
case is enlightening in the interpretation of what constitutes goods for the CISG. In 
this case, the Court held that, although it was envisaged that the report of a research 
market would be put on paper, this did not amount to a sale of goods “as the main 
concern of the parties was not the tangible piece of paper but the intangible 
contents.”192  
                                               
186
 Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34; Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 31; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 5. On Article 7 
interpretative role, see Section 4.3.6 below. 
187
 See UNCITRAL Digest 6 §27. 
188
 See Germany 17 September 1993 Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, CLOUT case No. 281(Computer 
ship); see also Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 34. 
189
 See Italy 16 February 2009 Tribunale di Forli [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
090216i3.html]; Italy 25 February 2004 Tribunale di Padova [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/040225i3.html]; Italy 26 November 2002 Tribunale di Rimini Porcelaine Tableware case, 
CLOUT case No. 608; France 26 April 1995 Cour d’Appel de Grenoble Marques Roque v Manin 
Reviere (Second hand portable warehouse shed), CLOUT case No. 152; in UNCITRAL Digest 6 
Fn84. 
190
 Switzerland 21 October 1999 Kantonsgericht des Kantons Zug, CLOUT case No. 328; Italy 29 
December 1999 Tribunale di Pavia, CLOUT case No. 380; Germany 21 March 1996 
Oberlandesgericht Köln, CLOUT case No. 168; Austria 10 November 1994 Oberster Gerichtshof, 
CLOUT case No.106; Italy 26 November 2002 Tribunale di Rimini, CLOUT case No. 608; in 
UNCITRAL Digest 7 Fn85. See also Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer 
Commentary 35; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:6 84-26; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 70. But, even if oil 
and gas are not tangible, they are considered as CISG goods. See Spohnheimer in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 52; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 55. 
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 See cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 7 Notes 85 to 89; see also Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 31. 
192
 See Germany 26 August 1994 Appellate Court Köln Market Study case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 940826g1.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). In the case, a 
German defendant contracted with a Swiss market research institute for a market analysis. The 
Court excluded the application of the CISG on the ground that the agreement was neither a contract 
for the sale of goods in the terms of Article 1(1), nor a contract for the production of goods as 
regulated by Article 3(1) because a sale is characterised by the transfer of property in an object. In 
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Despite the wide interpretation that the concept “goods” may have, Article 
2(d) to (f) excludes from CISG goods assets such as: sales of stocks, shares, 
investment securities, negotiable instruments or money; sales of ships, vessels, 
hovercraft or aircraft; and sales of electricity. Without any need to comment on these 
items, it is necessary to note that national sales laws do not, for instance, classify 
ships, hovercraft or aircraft uniformly. In many jurisdictions, they may be 
characterised as intangibles or immovables rather than goods.193 So, by excluding 
them from the control of the CISG, the underlying rationales were to avoid 
interference with national duties to register them and “to clarify that they are widely 
considered immovable goods.”194  
In determining CISG goods, one of the controversial issues remains computer 
software.195 According to Lookofsky, “a computer program is a real and very 
functional thing. The fact that the software is protected by copyright does not change 
the nature of this invisible and intangible good.”196 This statement was confirmed in 
the Swiss Computer Software and Hardware case as follows: “the purchase of 
software and the joint purchase of software and hardware as well constitute a sale of 
goods that falls within the ambit of the CISG.”197 Similarly, the Austrian Supreme 
                                               
a similar case, the Serbia Foreign Trade Court, in the Beer case, excluded the CISG to a part of the 
claim relating to the restitution of payment made for the purposes of “market research and 
advertising”, and not relating to sales of goods. See Serbia 28 April 2010 Foreign Trade Court 
attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Beer case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/100428sb.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012).  
193
 See Winship in Galston/Smit Sales 1-25. 
194
 See Spohnheimer in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 50; see also Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 56. 
195
 Concerning computer hardware, it is acknowledged that it conforms to the criterion of goods 
covered by the CISG. See particularly Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 60; Schwenzer/Hachem 
in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 35. The problem is posed for computer software then. 
Lookofsky (2003 (13) 3 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 263) illustrates the problem as follows:  
Suppose Merchant S in Germany supplies a computer programme to Merchant B in France. The 
programme, designed to facilitate the billing of customers, is properly installed in B’s computer 
system, but the software performs badly. It shuts down repeatedly and unpredictably, arguably 
doing B’s business more harm than good. Can this transaction be classified as a CISG “sale of 
goods”?  
196
 Ibid. 
197
 See Switzerland 17 February 2000 Commercial Court Zürich Computer Software and Hardware 
case; see also Netherlands 28 June 2006 District Court Arnhem Silicon Biomedical Instruments BV 
v Erich Jaeger GmbH [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060628n1.html]; Germany 8 February 
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Court in the Software case described “the supply of standard software programmes 
on data carriers against a single payment as a sale of moveable goods.”198 This means 
that, in defining the legal aspect of software, it does not matter whether the software 
is standard, adjusted to the customer’s needs, or fully customised.199 Neither does it 
matter whether it is delivered electronically or on a tangible object such as a drive, a 
CD or a DVD.200 Succinctly, all items not expressly excluded by the Convention, 
including software, would qualify as CISG goods irrespective of their nature.  
 
4.3.2.4 The international character of CISG transactions   
 
The international character obligation of contracts governed by the CISG is expressly 
posited by Article 1(1). According to this provision, the “Convention applies to 
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different 
states” at the conclusion of the contract.201 Normally, the CISG does not deal with 
the law governing sales contracts concluded between parties whose places of 
business are within one and the same state. These forms of contracts are governed by 
domestic law.202 It has been stated, however, that the phrase “place of business” does 
                                               
1995 District Court München Standard Software case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
wais/db/cases2/950208g4.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). 
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 See Austria 21 June 2005 Supreme Court Software case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/050621a3.html] (last accessed 22-6-2012). There are, however, other cases which consider 
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 Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 35. 
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 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 60; Loofosky 2003 (13) 3 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 263. 
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 For illustrative cases, see USA 19 August 2010 Federal District Court Arkansas Electrocraft 
Arkansas, Inc. v Super Electric Motors, Ltd and Raymond O’Gara, Individually and as Partner 
and Agent of Super Electric Motors, Ltd [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/ 
100819u1.html]; Canada 12 April 2011 Cour d’Appel de Québec Frozen Lobster Tails case 
[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/110412c4.html]; Austria 17 December 2003 
Supreme Court Tantalum Powder case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/03121 
7a3.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). 
202
  As an example of this, a Chilean company bought suits from a company that had its place of 
business in the British Virgin Islands. The relevant contract was concluded not with the defendant, 
but with another company which, although allied with the defendant, had its place of business in 
the same state as the plaintiff, namely Chile. The court excluded the CISG by virtue of Article 1(1). 
See Switzerland 15 December 1998 Ticino Appellate Court Lugano Fish case 
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not constitute a technical legal concept. The Austrian Supreme Court specified, in 
Graz Construction Equipment, that this expression “simply refers to any place from 
which one participates in commercial transactions with third parties with a certain 
degree of autonomy.”203 For that reason, it is not necessary to have the epicentre of 
commercial activities or the seat of the company at any said place.204  
 As Schwenzer and Hachem have said, nevertheless, a place of business exists 
only “if a party uses it openly to participate in trade and if it displays a certain degree 
of duration, stability, and independence.”205 Such is also the view of Honnold for 
whom a place of business must be constant, so that “a temporary place of sojourn 
during ad hoc negotiations,”206 or a place where a contract is merely signed does not 
constitute a relevant place of business in the eyes of the CISG. Honnold elucidates 
that the meaning of the concept “place of business” as a site of stable economic 
activities is evidenced by references to this notion in other CISG provisions, 
particularly, in Article 31(c) dealing with the delivery of goods.207 As stated by 
Article 31(c), where the contract does not involve carriage of the goods, or, if their 
location is not disclosed to the parties, the seller must place them “at the buyer’s 
disposal at the place where the seller had his place of business at the time of the 
                                               
[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/981215s1.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). See 
also Germany 27 November 1991 Appellate Court Köln Ticket for Soccer World Championship 
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in the DRC by Articles 234 to 302 UAGCL in addition to the CCO non-conflicting provisions. 
203
 See Austria 29 July 2004 Oberlandesgericht Appellate Court Graz Construction Equipment case 
[http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/040729a3.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012); see also Bernasconi 
1999 (46) Netherlands International Law Review 137 144. 
204
 Ibid.  
205
 Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 37; see also UNCITRAL Digest 
4§5. 
206
 See Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 34; see also Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 76. 
207
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 34; supported by Bernasconi 1999 (46) Netherlands 
International Law Review 137 145.  
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conclusion of the contract.”208 One may realise that this method of delivery is 
possible only if the seller’s place of business is constant.209 
The need of a “place of business” as a criterion to define the internationality 
of sales had already been required by the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions. Unlike 
these, which imposed additional requirements,210 the CISG refers only to contracting 
parties.211 It does not make any reference to the purchased goods or to their location 
the time the contract is concluded, nor to the nationality of the parties.212 In so ruling, 
the drafters of the CISG wanted “to reduce the search for a forum with the most 
favourable law.”213 So, even if the negotiations had taken place in a single state, the 
CISG will apply if the parties have their places of business in different states. 
It is possible that a party has several places of business. In such a situation, 
Article 10(a) provides the branch with “the closest relationship to the contract and its 
performance” to be relevant.214 The Serbian Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration 
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 For comparable clauses, see, among others, Articles 24; 42(1)(b); 57(1)(a); and Article 69(2) 
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in Honnold Documentary 404-405.  
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ruled, in the Milk Packaging Equipment case, that, since the seller had numerous 
places of business, “the branch where negotiations were conducted; the contract 
signed; the machine delivered; and the payment received was the most closely 
connected to the contract and its performance.”215 Similarly, the Federal District 
Court of California decided, in Asante Technologies v PMC-Sierra, that, though the 
buyer was invoiced by the seller’s dealer, the branch with the closest relationship to 
the contract was that from which the goods were ordered and the delivery made.216  
From the cases cited above, it is apparent that the crucial test in determining a 
closely connected branch depends on the place from where orders about the product 
came. Consequently, if the court finds from the facts of the case and the evidence 
submitted by parties that instructions regarding the goods came largely from a same 
state, the CISG will not apply “even if the parties are supposed to have their places 
                                               
judicial application, see among others, Russia 24 February 2004 Arbitration Proceeding 136/2003 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 040224r1.html]; and Belgium 13 May 2003 Commercial Court 
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030513b1.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). 
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Commerce Milk Packaging Equipment case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080715sb.html] 
(last accessed 23-6-2012). In the present case, a Swiss seller had more than one place of business; 
some were in Switzerland and others in Serbia. It was important to determine which of them was 
the most closely connected to the contract then. From the facts of the case, it appeared that the 
leading role in the conclusion and performance of the contract was played by the seller’s Swiss 
headquarters. It was at that place that negotiations were conducted and the contract signed. The 
machine was also delivered from Switzerland and the payment made to the Swiss seller’s account. 
The Serbian branch was involved only in the attempts to reach a settlement regarding an 
outstanding debt. The court held the Swiss branch to be the most relevant in the case. For similar 
decisions, see Australia 23 June 2010 Supreme Court of Western Australia Attorney-General of 
Botswana v Aussie Diamond Products (Pty) Ltd, No. 3 2010 WASC 141 §207 
[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2010/141.html]; Switzerland 19 May 2008 Cour 
Supreme du Canton [Appellate Court] Berne [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080519s1.html] 
(last accessed 23-6-2012). 
216
 USA 27 July 2001 Federal District Court California Asante Technologies v PMC-Sierra 
[http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/010727u1.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). A propos of this, a 
buyer with principal place of business in California bought from a seller represented by a dealer 
established in California too. The seller had been incorporated in Delaware and had a branch in 
California. The administration and its design and engineering functions were, however, still 
situated for the most part in Burnaby, British Columbia (Canada). Although the buyer had been 
invoiced by the seller’s Californian dealer, he had ordered directly from the seller’s branch in 
Burnaby and the delivery of the goods had been made from there. The District Court decided that 
the “closest relationship was with the seller’s branch in Canada; the contacts to the dealer in 
California were lesser importance.” 
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of business in different states.”217 In addition, the sale’s international character must 
be known to parties when they are contracting; otherwise the CISG will not apply.218  
The location of parties in different states is not, however, the unique criterion 
for the applicability of the Convention. Though the seller and the buyer may be 
located in different countries, the CISG applies on condition that their countries of 
incorporation are CISG member states, or if PIL rules point to the application of the 
law of a CISG member country as discussed in the two following sections. 
   
4.3.3 Application of the CISG in Relation to Contracting States  
 
It is stated in case law that the international character of a transaction does not suffice 
per se to make uniform international law applicable;219 a specific link with member 
states is also required. As regards the Vienna Sales Convention, Article 1(1)(a) shows 
that the CISG does not govern all kinds of international sales of goods contracts. 
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 USA 2 November 2005 Federal District Court California McDowell Valley Vineyards, Inc. v 
Sabaté USA Inc. et al [http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/051102u1.html] (last accessed 23-6-
2012). In the same sense, USA 6 January 2006 Federal District Court Pennsylvania American Mint 
LLC v GOSoftware Inc. [http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/ cases/060106u1.html]; USA 28 February 
2005 Superior Court of Massachusetts Vision Systems, Inc. v EMC Corporation 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050228u1.html]; USA 18 July 2011 Federal District Court 
Maryland MSS, Inc. v Maser Corporation [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/110718u1.html] (last 
accessed 23-6-2012). In the MSS, Inc. v Maser Corporation case, a seller whose principal place of 
business and headquarters were in Nashville (USA) entered into contract with a buyer whose 
company was incorporated in Delaware (USA) and did business through and in conjunction with 
Maser Canada Inc. located in Ontario. The agreement did not contain a choice of law provision, 
and the parties were disputing whether international or domestic contract law should govern the 
contract. According to the buyer, the CISG supplied the relevant law because principal places of 
business of the parties were in Canada and the USA, both CISG member states. The seller 
contended, on his part, that the CISG was not applicable because the execution of the agreement 
had occurred entirely in the USA between two companies incorporated in that country. The court 
excluded the CISG, regardless of the location of the place of businesses of the parties, because the 
sale was connected to one country. 
218
 See Article 1(2) CISG; see also Germany 28 February 2000 Appellate Court Stuttgart Floor 
Tiles case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/000228g1.html]; Bulgaria 16 
February 1998 Arbitration Case 59/1995 Ball Bearings case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
wais/db/cases2/980216bu.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). 
219
 See Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale di Forli, CLOUT case No. 867 [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/081 211i3.html]; Italy 12 July 2000 Tribunale di Vigevano, CLOUT case No. 378, 
in UNCITRAL Digest 5 Fn27.  
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Thus, even if parties may have their places of business in different states, the CISG 
will apply on condition that those “States are Contracting States” to the CISG at the 
time the contract is concluded.220  
The requirement with respect to the location of the relevant place of business 
of the seller and buyer in two different contracting states for the Convention to apply 
is well formulated in one Belgian District court decision, dated 25 April 2001, as 
follows:  
According to Article 1(1) (a) CISG, the Convention is applicable to contracts of sale 
of movable goods between parties whose places of business are in different States 
when these States are Contracting States; thus, the CISG determines directly the 
criteria of its territorial application so that no reference need be made to the 
otherwise applicable rules on the governing law.221 
It follows then that the question of whether a specific country is a “contracting state” 
according to the meaning of the CISG is of vital importance for the applicability of 
the Convention. 
With regard to what a “contracting state” is, Article 91(2) (3) describes it as 
any state which has ratified, or acceded to the CISG and where the Convention has 
effectively entered into force as provided by Articles 99(2) and 91(4).222 That is to 
say, if both states where the places of business of the parties are situated are 
                                               
220
 See Italy 14 January 1993 District Court Monza Nuova Fucinati v Fondmetall International 
[http://www. cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/930114i3.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). In 
the case, the CISG was excluded because the time the contract was concluded, the Convention was 
then in force only in Italy but not in Sweden. See also Italy 19 April 1994 Florence Arbitration 
Proceeding Leather/textile Wear case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ cisg/wais/db/cases2/ 
940419i3.html] (CISG not yet in force in Japan when contracting); and Netherlands 15 April 1993 
District Court Arnhem JA Harris & Sons v Nijmergsche Ijzergieterij [http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/cisg/ wais/db/cases2/930415n1.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). This case involves a 
contract between a seller from UK, a non-contracting state, and a buyer from the Netherlands, a 
state where the CISG was not yet in force at the time of the contract. For a number of similar cases, 
see UNCITRAL Digest 5 Fn33. 
221
 See Belgium 25 April 2001 Rechtbank van Koophandel (District Court) Veurne (BV BA G-2 
v. AS C.B.) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010425b1.html]; see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract 
§84:7 84-28. 
222
 See, for comments, Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 39; Mistelis 
in Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 36; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:7 84-33 84-34.  
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contracting states, the CISG will apply without recourse to PIL rules.223 In other 
words, when a state has adhered to the CISG, even if its PIL rules would indicate the 
law of a third party, the CISG will apply.224 This situation is well-known as the CISG 
“automatic” or “autonomous” application.225 It is obvious that with the growing 
number of “Contracting States” (currently 79 members); the CISG’s autonomous 
application will increase in a number of judicial decisions and arbitral awards.  
In accordance with Article 92 CISG, a state may declare not to be bound by Part 
II (formation of the contract) or Part III (provisions on the sale of goods) of the 
Convention. A state which uses such a reservation will, however, not any longer be 
considered to be a “Contracting State” with respect to matters governed by that 
respective part.226 Instead, it becomes a third party vis-à-vis the Part it has excluded.227 
This means that, in circumstances of this kind, requirements for the CISG’s automatic 
application in Article 1(1)(a) are any longer met so that the law governing the Part 
left out is to be determined by conflict-of-law rules.228 Similarly, conditions for the 
                                               
223
 Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 166-167; Huber/Mullis CISG 51; Schlechtriem/Butler 
International Sales 13; Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 35; 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 39; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 79; Saf 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/saf96.html. For an illustration, see Switzerland 12 
September 2008 Amtgericht Sursee [http://globalsaleslaw.com/content/api/cisg/ urteile/1728.pdf]; 
Italy 20 September 2004 Corte di Cassazione (Supreme Court), CLOUT case No. 650; Germany 
11 December 1996 Bundesgerichtshof, CLOUT case No. 268; in UNCITRAL Digest 5 Fn31. 
224
 Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft CISG/Document A/CONF.97/5, 14 March 1979, in 
Honnold Documentary 405. It should be rembered that the CISG is one of “hard law” instruments 
which, once ratified, become an integrated part of sales law of that specific state.  
225
 Huber/Mullis CISG 51; Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 13; Mistelis in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 35; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 39; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 78; UNCITRAL Digest 5 §9. 
226
 To date, only Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, have made use of the Article 92 
reservation upon ratifying the CISG. They declared not to be bound by CISG Part II relating to the 
formation of international sales. See UNCITRAL Digest 83 §3; Herre in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas 
UN Convention 1197; Lookofsky in Ferrari CISG 116; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 80. Until now no 
state has excluded Part III because, as Hugo (1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 11) has said, without 
provisions regulating the rights and obligations of parties, “the CISG would be substantially 
meaningless”.  
227
 Cf. Article 92(2) CISG.  
228
 In addition to the Article 92 reservation, there are two other reservations relating to Article 
1(1)(a); the so-called “federal reservation” (Article 93 CISG), and the “closely-related legal 
systems reservation” (Article 94 CISG). See, for comments, Herre in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 1202.  
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CISG’s automatic application are not fulfilled when one of the parties has his/her place 
of business in a non-contracting state. The location of the parties in non-contracting 
countries should restrict the Convention’s wide applicability. In order to prevent this 
situation, Article 1(1)(b) provides a second alternative for the implementation of the 
CISG; its application by virtue of PIL rules. 
 
4.3.4 Application of the CISG by Virtue of Private International Law Rules 
 
4.3.4.1 A short view on Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG  
 
Pursuant to Article 1(1) (b), the Convention may apply even where only one or 
neither party has its relevant place of business in a CISG member state.229 By its 
ruling, Article 1(1) (b) extends the scope of application of the CISG to contracts 
formed between parties from non-contracting states if “the rules of private 
international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.”230 It has 
been acknowledged that the introduction of this provision in the Vienna Convention 
“coordinates the rules resulting from the Convention and those of private 
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 See Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft CISG/Document A/CONF.97/5, 14 March 1979 
in Honnold Documentary 405; UNCITRAL Digest 5 §14; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:7 84-34; 
quoting Enderlein/Maskow Commentary 29; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 40; Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 166. See also Germany 2 July 1993 Appellate 
Court Düsseldorf Veneer Cutting Machine case [http://www.cisg. law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
wais/db/cases2/930702g1.html] (last accessed 23-6-2012). In this case, when the contract was 
concluded, the CISG was not yet in effect in the buyer’s country, Germany, contrary to seller’s 
country, the USA. Applying Article 1(1)(b), the Court observed that PIL rules point to the USA, a 
contracting state, and applied the CISG. This case is to be taken, however, in reserve of Article 95 
CISG. 
230
 For application, see among others: Greece 2009 Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens 
Decision 2282/2009 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/092282gr.html]; USA 20 June 2003 Federal 
Appellate Court [3rd Circuit] Standard Bent Glass Corp v Glassrobots Oy [http://www. 
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/0306 20u1.html]; France 27 June 2002 Cour d’Appel de 
Versailles Sté AMS v SARL Me et SARL Qu [http://www.cisg.law. pace.edu/cisg/wais/ 
db/cases2/020627f1.html]; Austria 20 February 1992 District Court for Commercial Matters of 
Vienna Shoes case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/920220a3.html] (last 
accessed 23-6-2012). For further similar cases, see UNCITRAL Digest 5 Fn45. CISG’s 
applicability by virtue of conflict-of-law rules is also called “indirect applicability”. See in this 
sense, Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 37; UNCITRAL Digest 5§14. 
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international law.”231 The applicability of the CISG by the operation of conflict-of-
laws rules is not as easy as its autonomous application. That is the reason why Article 
95, allowing any state to exclude the indirect applicability of the CISG, was 
introduced into the Convention. Before examining the effect of that reservation, it is 
necessary to discuss, first, the appropriate law governing international transactions.  
 
4.3.4.2 Proper law of international sales contracts   
 
When dealing with the indirect application of the CISG, there appears a question in 
relation to the exact sales law governing the contract. By way of response, Huber and 
Mullis note that the process is to be performed in two successive steps.232 During the 
first step, the court or the arbitration tribunal will apply the law of the forum. Since 
each legal system has its own system of private international law,233 throughout this 
step, the task to be undertaken is for the judge or the arbiter to apply its own PIL 
rules. Wethmar-Lemmer specifies this by saying that rules considered may be the 
domestic conflict of laws rules or PIL rules established by an international 
convention.234 To illustrate this, under most European countries, PIL rules are 
provided for by international treaties,235 such as the 1955 Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,236 the 1980 Rome 
EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,237 and, more 
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 Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 84; citing in Fn135, Ferrari “The Sphere of Application of the Vienna 
Sales Convention” (1995) 15. 
232
 Huber/Mullis CISG 52-53. 
233
 See Forsyth International Law 5; quoting Van den Heever JP in Pretorius v Pretorius 1948 (4) 
SA 144 (O) 149; see also Lord Murphy J in the Australian Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie 
Diamond Products (Pty) Ltd case.   
234
 Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 90. 
235
 See Huber/Mullis CISG 52; Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 37; 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 41; Van Calster Private Law 3. 
236
 Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, the Hague 15 June 1955. 
http://www. jus.uio.no./lm/hcpil.applicable.law.sog.convention.1955/portrait.pdf (last accessed 
23-6-2012).   
237
 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Rome 19 June 1980. http://eur-
lex.europa/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:419980126(02):EN:NOT (last accessed 23-
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recently, the EC Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations.238 As regards South African law, the heart of the relevant law is the 
common law,239 and in Congolese law the provisions of the 1891 PILD.  
The implementation of each of the legal systems above will undoubtedly 
designate a particular state. The second step will then consist for the court to verify 
whether the state selected has ratified or acceded to the CISG. If the answer is 
positive, the CISG will govern the contract, except where the country has made use 
of the Article 95 reservation.240 Alternatively, if the answer is negative, domestic 
sales law will apply.241 
It is possible that international conventions or domestic conflict-of-laws rules 
provide the fundamental principle that international contracts should be governed by 
                                               
6-2012). For a comparison between the 1955 Hague Convention, the 1980 Rome Convention, and 
the CISG, see Saf http://www.cisg.law. pace.edu/cisg/text/saf96.html. 
238
 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I) OJL July 2008. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?ur 
i=OJ:L:2008:177:0006:0016:En:PDF (last accessed 23-6-2012). 
239
 Forsyth International Law 316. 
240
 See Huber/Mullis CISG 52-53; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 
41; Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 170. For a case in point, see Germany 21 April 2004 
Oberlandesgericht (Appellate Court) Düsseldorf [15 U 88/03] Mobile phones case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040421g3.html]; in Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:7 84-34. In the 
case, the Vienna Sales Convention would not automatically apply because at the time the contract 
was concluded Israel was not yet a member state. The Appellate Court stated: 
(…) Instead, applicability of the CISG is derived from Article 1(1)(b) because the rules of 
private international law lead to the application of German law and Germany is a Contracting 
State to the Convention. 
It is not disputed by the parties that they had agreed upon application of German law and since 
Germany did not make any reservation under Article 95 CISG, Article 1(1)(b) is applicable. 
For a similar ruling, see the Austria Shoes case above. In that case, a contract was concluded 
between an Italian seller and an Austrian buyer when the CISG was in effect only in Italy. Austrian 
PIL rules referred to Italian law, a CISG contracting state; the CISG was applied by operation of 
Article 1(1) (b).  
241
 For an illustration, see China 24 March 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Proceeding Shanghai Sub-
Commission Hempseed case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/980324c1.html] 
(last accessed 24-6-2012). In the case, with a seller from China and buyer from UK, a non-
contracting state, the Tribunal held that, according to international law norms and the domestic law 
of the UK, the CISG would not be the applicable substantive law. For the effect of the CISG before 
non-contracting states, see Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165-182; and for the meanings and methods 
of application of Article 1(1)(b), see Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 90 to 102. 
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the law chosen by the parties.242 In terms of South African law, Van Niekerk and 
Schulze note, “The fundamental principle is that a contract is governed by the law 
which the parties intended should govern their contract.”243 Such is also the position 
of Congolese law in Article 33 al. 1 CCO which establishes contracting parties as 
law-givers for themselves.244 This ruling is confirmed, in the DRC, by case law which 
states that civil code provisions relating to individual conventions are default rules. 
Parties may, therefore, freely depart from them by choosing their own legislation.245  
 From a common law viewpoint, the law that creates and governs an 
international contract is well-known as the “proper law of the contract.”246 As Kutner 
                                               
242
 For European countries, see Preamble §11 EC Regulation No. 593/2008 which stipulates: 
“Parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law should be one of the cornerstones of the system of 
conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations.” This principle is confirmed in Article 
3(1) of the same Regulation as follows: 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made 
expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. 
By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the 
contract.  
For similar provisions, see Article 2 of the 1955 Hague Convention which obliges the court to apply 
the law designated by the parties; and Article 3 of the 1980 Rome Convention which recognises 
the party autonomy principle.  
243
 Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 60; see also Forsyth International Law 316. 
244
 See comments under Section 2.3.3 above. For cases applying Article 33 al. 1 CCO, see CSJ 3 
April 1976 RC 100 BA 1977 65; Kin 28 February 1967 RJC 1968 No. 1 54; Trib App Boma 4 April 
1901 Jur Congo 1890-1904 126; Cons Sup Congo 19 July 1913 Jur Congo 1913 343; Trib App 
Boma 30 December 1914 Jur Col 1925 298; Cons Sup Congo App 28 January 1921 Jur Congo 
1921 41; First Inst Elis 8 July 1932 RJCB 1933 164. 
245
 See Boma 29 September 1903 Jur EIC 284; see also Cons Sup 28 January 1921 Jur Congo 4; 
Léo 8 January 1924 Jur Col 278; Léo 31 December 1956 RJCB 1957 110.  
246
 See Forsyth International Law 316; North/Fawcett International Law 533; Spiro Conflict 151; 
Van Calster Private Law 132; Fredericks 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 75 76; Fredericks 2003 (15) SA Merc 
LJ 63 64. As stated by L Mpati AP in Ekkehard Creutzburg and Emil Eich v Commercial Bank of 
Namibia Ltd 1 December 2004 Case No. 29/04 [9], the expression “proper law of a contract” indicates 
“the appropriate legal system governing an international contract as a whole or a particular issue 
raised by the contract. (…) where parties have made an express choice of law to govern such contract 
their choice should be upheld.”  Niekerk and Schulze specify this by stating that,  
Generally, in terms of South African private international law, there is party autonomy and 
parties have a wide (…) freedom of choice of proper law. A South African court will as a rule 
give effect to parties’ choice of law, not only where they have chosen South African law but 
also where they have chosen the other party’s foreign law. Also, their choice of South African 
law will be given effect to even if the legal position under it differs from that pertaining under 
the other relevant legal system or systems.  
See Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 60; taking support on Polysius (Pty) v Transvaal Alloys (Pty) Ltd 
& Another 1983 (2) SA 630 (W). Within the CISG, party autonomy is formulated by Article 6 
which allows parties to exclude, derogate, or to vary the effect of any of the provisions of the 
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has said, the principle according to which “the validity and interpretation of a 
contract is governed by its ‘proper law’ (…) (is) as fundamental in Southern Africa 
as it is in (other) common law countries (…).”247 Insofar as South African law is 
concerned, the doctrine of proper law is explained there, inter alia, in Pretorius v 
Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd,248 and in Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v 
Establissements Neu.249  
As a civil law country, the DRC does not know the notion of “proper law”. In 
the context of Congolese law, however, the common law doctrine of “proper law” 
may be understood through the provisions of Article 33 al. 1 CCO for which contracts 
legally formed have the force of law for contracting parties.250 Article 33 al. 1 ruling 
is concerned with the contractual field as a whole, including sales contracts. In the 
particular case of international transactions, the freedom of choice of the law 
governing the contract results from the phrase “Unless when the parties have 
provided otherwise” contained in Article 11 al. 2 PILD.251  
 Simply, parties to an international sale should normally determine, either 
expressly or tacitly,252 the law governing their contract. Thus, as stated by Trollip J, 
in Guggenheim v Rosembaum, the law of the contract will be the law of the country 
which the parties have agreed or intended shall govern their contract.253 A similar 
                                               
Convention. For Congolese law, see, in particular, Boma 29 September 1903 Jur EIC 284, which 
authorises contracting parties to derogate from civil code provisions, or De Burlet Droit 
International 283.  
247
 Kutner Common Law 72; see also Corbett JA in Ex Parte Spinazze & another NNO 1985 (3) 
SA 650 (A) 665F.  
248
 Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 (3) SA 410 (W).  
249
 In Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 138 (C) 144, Grossskopf J 
describes teh proper law of the contract as “the system of law which governs the interpretation, 
validity, and mode of performance of the contract.”  See comments by Forsyth  International Law 
321 and 327-330; Kutner Common Law 70; Kiggundu International Law 269. 
250
 For an illustration, see Léo 25 February 1930 Jur Col 1932 112; and comments in Section 2.3.5.3 
above. 
251
 Article 11 al. 2 PILD in limine states, “Unless when the parties provide otherwise, agreements 
are governed, as for their substance, effects, and their evidence, by the law of the place where they 
are concluded.” See, for comments, De Burlet Droit International 283. 
252
 See Forsyth International Law 325; Van Calster Private Law 132; Schwenzer/Hachem in 
Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 41; and Article 3(1) EC Regulation Rome I. 
253
 See Trollip J in Guggenheim v Rosembaum (2) 1961 (4) SA 21 (W); see also Laconian Maritime 
Entreprises Ltd v Agramar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 509 525-530 (D); Ekkehard Creutzburg and 
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ruling is found, under Congolese law, in one Appellate Court of Kinshasa decision 
whereby, it is stated that, as long as it meets public policy requirements, “A contract 
shall prevail even if it contradicts a Parliament Act.”254  
Frequently, however, parties fail to choose the law applicable to their contract, 
focusing on matters such as the price, quality, and quantity of the goods, and the time 
and place of delivery.255 This is how the problem of the applicable law emerges. One 
illustrative case, for the DRC, is the decision of the Commercial Tribunal of 
Lubumbashi in the Finparco case.256 This case deals with a contract of purchase, 
sale, and transport of asphalt concluded in Dubai (The United Arab Emirates) in 
April 2010 between Finparco, a buyer whose place of business is located in Delmont 
(Switzerland), and Armina Gnl Trading FZE UAE Co, a seller situated in Dubai. 
Carriage had to be performed by the Tanzanian branch of one Malaysian company 
named Blijoil, and goods delivered in Lubumbashi (the DRC) via Dar es Salam 
(Tanzania). In terms of the contract, the buyer had to pay 50% of the price on 
receiving the goods in Dar es Salam, and the outstanding balance on delivery in 
Lubumbashi. The seller promised to deliver the asphalt by May 2010. A few days 
after, instead of delivering the goods, the seller imposed a new tariff unilaterally. 
This gave rise to the dispute. The parties had not determined the law governing the 
contract. Unfortunately, the plaintiff did not honour the preliminary prescribed 
judicial costs so that his action was dismissed.257 In circumstances of the kind of the 
Finparco case, since contracting parties fail to determine the law relevant to the 
                                               
Emil Eich v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 1 December 2004 Case No. 29/04 [9] [10]; Forsyth 
International Law 321; and, for English Law, North/Fawcett International Law 552. 
254
 See Léo 25 February 1930 Jur Col 1932 112. 
255
 See Eiselen Globalization 97 98; Forsyth International Law 326; North/Fawcett International 
Law 534. As several scholars contend, in 90 or even more cases out of 100, this remains the only 
interest of the parties in the transaction. See Magnus Last Shot 185 187; Sukurs 2001 (34/35) VJTL 
1481 1484; Viscasillas 1998 (10) Pace Int’l LR 97 106. 
256
 Tricom L’shi 30 March 2012 RAC 671 Finparco Co v Amina Gnl Trading FZE UAE Co, 
Chakeer and Blijoil Co (unreported decision). 
257
 Cf. Article 144 al. 1 and Article 145 of the Congolese Code of Civil Procedure as currently 
amended. In accordance with these provisions, when the claimant has provided the elements 
necessary for issuing a writ, he/she must hand over costs to the clerk of the court. No procedural 
act should be executed before the prescribed costs have been paid. 
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contract by themselves, the court must assign a proper law to it.258 Forsyth remarks, 
in this regard, that, “The best that can be done is to assign to the contract as governing 
law the law with which the contract is most closely connected. Usually, (…) this will 
be either the lex loci contractus or the lex loci solutionis.”259 
To illustrate this by reference to South African legal principles, while 
assigning a law to the contract, the traditional position in Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Efroiken and Newman was for the court to “impute an intention to the 
parties.”260 This decision was criticised on the grounds that it was “artificial to refer 
to the parties’ presumed intention.”261 The modern approach in Benidai Trading Co 
Ltd v Gouws (Pty) & Ltd;262 Ex Parte Spinazze & another NNO;263 and in Ekkehard 
Creutzburg and Emil Eich v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd,264 “is to adopt an 
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 Cf. Kleinhans v Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 1418 (LC) 29; Ekkehard Creutzburg and 
Emil Eich v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 1 December 2004 Case No. 29/04 [10]; see also Van 
Niekerk/Schulze Trade 60; Forsyth International Law 326. 
259
 Forsyth International Law 326. The phrase lex loci contractus refers to the law of the place 
where the contract was concluded; and the expression locus loci solutionis to the law of the place 
where it is performed. It is acknowledged that, where contracting parties undertake to perform the 
contract in a place other than where it is concluded, they are supposed to opt for the law of that 
place. See authorities quoted by Forsyth International Law 329 Fn80. 
260
 See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken and Newman 1924 AD 171 185. In the case, 
JA de Villiers ruled that,  
[It] must not be forgotten that the intention of the parties to the contract is the true criterion to 
determine by what law its interpretation and effects are to be governed. (…) Where parties did 
not give the matter a thought, courts of  law have of necessity to fall back upon what ought, 
reading the contract by the light of the subject-matter and of the surrounding circumstances, to 
be presumed to have been the intention of the parties. 
The rule in the case above was in line with the English common law approach of that time. See 
Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd [1938] AC 224 (PC) 240; quoted by Forsyth International Law 330. That approach was 
soon abandoned in English law in favour of the “closest and most real connection theory”. See 
Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201 219; Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder 
Charactering NV [1972] 1 All ER 451 (CA); commented on by Kiggundu International Law 270; 
Fredericks 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 75 77; Fredericks 2003 (15) SA Merc LJ 63 66; Kutner Common 
Law 73. 
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 See Fredericks 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 75 77; Fredericks 2003 (15) SA Merc LJ 63 66. See also, 
Forsyth International Law 330; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 64; Kiggundu International Law 270; 
Kutner Common Law 71. 
262
 See Benidai Trading Co Ltd v Gouws (Pty) & Ltd 1977 (3) SA 1020 (T) 147.  
263
 Ex Parte Spinazze & another NNO 1985 (3) SA 650 (A) 665F.  
264
 Ekkehard Creutzburg and Emil Eich v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 1 December 2004 Case 
No. 29/04 [9]. 
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objective approach to the determination of the proper law of a contract where the 
parties did not themselves (carry out) a choice.”265 Forsyth puts it that,  
Recently, (…) South African courts have expressed their reluctance to follow the 
dictum in (Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken and Newman), and have 
indicated their preference for the alternative objective formulation,266 stripped of any 
reference to non-existent intentions, of the legal system with which the contract has 
its closest and most real connection (emphasis added).267  
This new approach was quickly supported, among others, by Grossskopf J in the 
Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu case.268 In this case, as parties did 
not make an express choice of the law governing the contract, Grosskopf J held 
French law to be the proper law of the agreement.269 According to him, French law 
had “the closest and most real connection with the transaction,”270 so that the parties 
were taken to have intended it to apply. The contract and disputes arising under the 
contract were, therefore, governed by French law. 
It is clear from cases cited above that each contract has a legal system to which 
it is closely connected and, consequently, one assigned proper law. Moreover, there 
are many connecting factors which may enter into play in determining the closest 
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 See Benidai Trading Co Ltd v Gouws (Pty) & Ltd 1977 (3) SA 1020 (T) 147; see also Kiggundu 
International Law 270. 
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 Based, inter alia, on the English Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia case above. 
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 Forsyth International Law 330. 
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 Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 138 (C) 139 to 151. In the facts,  
A South African company, formally known as Associated Air Conditioning and Refrigeration 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd (plaintiff), entered into a written agreement on 6 December 1977 with the 
defendant, a French company, establishing an association between them. The association’s 
purpose was to submit tenders for and if successful provide air-conditioning and ventilation 
equipment for a nuclear power station in South Africa. The agreement provided for arbitration 
of disagreements concerning the interpretation and execution of the contract. The South African 
company nevertheless brought suit against the French company in South Africa. The only issue 
before the court was ‘whether the contract was governed by French law or by South African 
law’. By the way, if French law applies, the action cannot proceed and the parties’ disputes have 
to be settled by arbitration conducted in terms of French law. If, on the other hand, the contract 
is governed by South African law, the action would proceed. But the defendant did not wish to 
have arbitration if the contract was governed by South African law. This required the court to 
ascertain the contract’s proper law. 
See, in the same sense, Laconian Maritime Entreprises Ltd v Agramar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 
509 525-530 (D); and Kleinhans v Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 1418 (LC) 29.  
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 Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 138 (C) 152.  
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 Ibid. 
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link a contract has with a given legal system.271 In a specific case, the place where 
the contract was concluded may be relevant, especially “if the contract has to be 
performed in the same place,”272 or the place of performance.273 In Congolese law, 
Article 11 al. 2 PILD defers any international contract to the law of the place where 
it is concluded, unless when parties have chosen another legal system.274  
As for the DRC, the place where the contract is made was also initially the 
most important factor under South African law. The rule in Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Efroiken and Newman was that “the law of the place where the contract 
was concluded governs, except where the contract is to be performed elsewhere,”275 
in which case the law of the place of performance will prevail.276 This position was 
justified, according to one commentator, by the fact that it accords with the presumed 
intention of the parties.277 In the opinion of Fredericks, confirmed by Forsyth, “the 
most recent cases show a tendency not to use the presumption in favour of the lex 
loci solutionis, but, instead, to proceed to decide directly the legal system with which 
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 Those factors include the place where the contract was concluded or it is performed, the place 
of offer and acceptance, the place where parties carry on business, the language and terminology 
employed in the contract, the domicile and nationality of the parties, and the place of agreed 
arbitration. See Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 64-65; Fredericks 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 75 79 with 
cases quoted thereto. 
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 A semblable principle was formulated under Congolese law as follows: 
When a Belgian citizen forms a contract in Belgium with a foreign national, if the foreigner 
chooses Belgium for any dispute to arise from the contract and accepts this dispute to be heard 
by an arbitral court constituted in Belgium or by a Belgian judge, the contract is governed by 
Belgian law.  
See Com Brux 4 May 1928 Jur Col 1928 67; Boma 29 September 1903 Jur Etat I 284; and Cons 
Sup Congo App 28 January 1921 Jur Congo 1921 41 whereby, “A contract concluded in the Congo 
is governed by Congolese law unless parties’ contrary intention.” For South African law, see Van 
Niekerk/Schulze Trade 64. 
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 See Trib App Elis 28 December 1915 Jur Col 1926 242. 
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 De Burlet Droit International 283; see also Leo 8 January 1924 Jur Col 278; Trib App Boma 4 
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 As stated by JA De Villiers,  
The rule to be applied is that the lex loci contractus governs the nature, the obligations, and the 
interpretation of the contract; the locus contractus being the place where the contract was 
entered into, except where the contract is to be performed elsewhere in which case the latter 
place is considered to be the locus contractus.  
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 Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 64; Forsyth International Law 331. 
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 Forsyth International Law 331. 
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the contract is most closely connected.”278 This is the solution also adopted in Article 
10 CISG as referred to above. Congolese law, by contrast to the CISG and South 
African law, seems silent on the use of the “closest and most real connection” theory 
in the absence of choice of the law governing the contract.279  
Notwithstanding the explanations above, the principle remains that the system 
of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations hinges on the freedom 
of the parties. In that sense, if the CISG is directly selected as the proper law of the 
contract, judges or arbitrers are treaty bound to apply the Convention.280 If parties 
choose the law of a CISG member state, however, the question is whether they intend 
to include the CISG or to exclude its application as endorsed by Article 6. This 
question has received much attention in case law and scholarly writings.281 A major 
part of them believes that, since the Vienna Convention constitutes the international 
sales contract law in all member states, reference to national law of a “Contracting 
State” logically includes the CISG,282 unless there is specific reference to the 
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 Fredericks 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 75 80; Forsyth International Law 331, both commenting the 
Kleinhans v Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd case. See also, Ekkehard Creutzburg and Emil Eich v 
Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 1 December 2004 Case No. 29/04 [10].   
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 See Netherlands 15 October 2002 Arbitral Award Netherlands Arbitration Institute Condensate 
Crude Oil Mix case, CISG-Online 740 (Pace), CLOUT Case No. 720; in UNCITRAL Digest 6 
Fn53; see also Mistelis in Kröll/ Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 38; Schwenzer/Hachem in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 41. 
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 See Mistelis in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 104 §18; Schwenzer/Hachem in 
Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 108 §13; Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 15; 
Chappuis CVIM 183 187; Brunner CVIM 91 111; see also cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 34 
§11 where some authorities assume that such a choice amounts to an implicit exclusion of the 
CISG. 
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 See France 3 November 2009 Cour de Cassation Société Anthon GmbH & Co v SA Tonnellerie 
Ludonnais [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/091103f1.html]; Serbia 17 August 2009 Foreign 
Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Vegetable fats case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/0908 17sb.html]; Australia 20 May 2009 Federal Court of 
Australia Olivaylle (Pty) Ltd v Flottweg GmbH & Co KGAA [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/090520a2.html]; Netherlands 15 April 2009 Rechtbank [District Court] Utrecht Stainless 
Steel case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090415n1.html]; Netherlands 5 November 2008 
District Court Rotterdam Vigo-Pontevedra v Ibromar BV  [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
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[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071010k1.html]; USA 28 September 2007 Federal District 
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domestic sales law of that state.283 Thus, by choosing a member state’s sales law, 
parties are presumed to have chosen the CISG,284 even where commercial activities 
focus on different contracting states.285  
It should be noted, however, that from the beginning of the drafting process, 
the implementation of Article 1(1) (b) was disapproved of. It was feared that the 
Convention’s indirect applicability destabilises legal certainty that was the central 
goal of the CISG.286 In order to moderate the effect of its implementation, Article 95, 
which allows any state to declare not to be bound by Article 1(1) (b), was introduced 
into the Convention.  
 
4.3.4.3 Effect of the Article 95 reservation 
As announced above, in conformity with Article 95, any State may declare that it 
will not be bound by Article 1(1) (b) at the time it submits its instruments of 
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[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070704a3.html]; China May 2006 CIETAC Arbitration 
Proceeding Chemicals case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/060500c3.html]; 
Austria 28 April 2000 Supreme Court Jewelry case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
wais/db/cases2/000428a3.html]; France 17 December 1996 Cour de Cassation Ceramique 
Culinaire v Musgrave [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ cisg/wais/db/cases2/9612 17f1.html] (all of 
these cases last accessed 27-6-2012).  
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 Serbia 27 December 2010 Foreign Trade Court attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce 
Ice-cream case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/101227sb.html]; but Chile 22 September 2008 
Supreme Court Jorge Plaza Oviedo v Sociedad Agricola Sacor Limitada 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080922ch.html] (last accessed 27-6-2012). In the last case, the 
court wrongly excluded the CISG because parties had their place of business in contracting states, 
i.e. Chile and Argentina, and did not expressly exclude the CISG; see Jorge Oviedo-Alban’s 
comments of that decision.   
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 See cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 34 Fn46; see also Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 168.  
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 Ruled under Russian Arbitration proceeding 54/1999 of 24 January 2000 ([http://cisgw3. 
law.pace.edu/cases/ 000124r1.html] (accessed 21-8-2012)) that, 
The fact that the parties agreed on the applicability of a certain national law to their sales contract 
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 See Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 36; Honnold Documentary 735; Bell 2005 (9) Singapore 
YB of International Law 55; Bernasconi 1999 (46) Netherlands International Law Review 137 157.  
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ratification.287 Using the Article 95 reservation may produce different consequences 
depending on the location of the forum. Three main scenarios can be envisaged in 
this regard.288 Firstly, if conflict-of-law rules lead to the law of a non-contracting 
state, the CISG cannot apply.289 Secondly, if they designate the law of a contracting 
state, requirements in Article 1(1)(b) are then met; the CISG will apply.290 Lastly, if 
PIL rules lead to the law of an Article 95 declaration state, the Convention will not 
apply.291 In the Veneer Cutting Machine case, the German appellate court of 
Düsseldorf ignored the fact that the designated country (USA) made an Article 95 
declaration and applied the CISG wrongly.292 Since then, the dominant and better 
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 The CISG’s original Draft did not include what was to become Article 95. This provision was 
introduced later by the Czechoslovakian delegation during the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference 
to facilitate ratification by Socialist countries. See Bell 2005 (9) Singapore YB of International Law 
55; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/ Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1190; Honnold 
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case. The Arbitration Tribunal thereby held Chinese law as the applicable law. See also cases 
quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 442 Fn4. 
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PIL 137. 
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December 2009 Federal District Court [Georgia] Innotex Precision Ltd v Horei Image Products, 
Inc., et al.  
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[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ cisg/wais/db/cases2/930702g1.html] (last accessed 27-6-2012); 
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position has been to consider states that have made use of the Article 95 declaration 
as third party vis-à-vis the CISG.293 Thus, when the PIL rules lead to the law of a 
declaration country, the CISG is not applicable;294 instead, courts will apply the 
domestic sales law of the designated state in its place.  
In summary, the CISG applies in three different circumstances: automatically 
if both the parties are located in contracting states; indirectly by virtue of conflict-of-
law rules, unless there has been an Article 95 declaration; or, by the operation of the 
party autonomy principle, if the parties select it as the proper law of their contract. 
With the growth of the number of CISG member states, its autonomous application 
has become the prevailing means of application.  
After having discussed how the CISG should apply, the following section 
focuses on its area of operation.  
 
4.3.5 The Area of Operation of the CISG  
 
Normally, most of the questions that can arise in relation to contracts for the 
international sale of goods are addressed and answered by the CISG. The Convention 
does not, however, aim to solve all matters which may relate to a sales contract. There 
are some issues which it does not regulate, although they can be relevant with regard 
                                               
observed that PIL rules point to the USA, a “Contracting State”, and held the CISG applicable, 
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Article 1(1) (b) CISG.  
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Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 1191; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract 
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the contract. See Japan 19 March 1998 Tokyo District Court Nippon Systemware Kabushikigaisha 
v O [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ wais/db/cases2/980319j1.html] (last accessed 27-6-2012); 
USA 17 December 2009 Federal District Court [Georgia] Inotex Precision Ltd v Horei Image 
Products, Inc., et al; see also Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 170; Vieira in Ferrari CISG 12; and 
Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 137.  
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to the conclusion and performance of sales contracts.295 As specified by Article 4, 
the CISG “governs only” the formation of the contract of sale, and the rights and 
obligations of the parties arising from a contract for international sale of goods.296 
By its ruling, Article 4 delineates the “legal scope of application”297 of the CISG; it 
defines issues to which the Convention applies, and consequently limits its 
“substantive ambit.”298 In detail, the drafters of the UNCITRAL Digest emphasise 
that,  
The first sentence of Article 4 lists matters to which the Convention’s provisions 
prevail over those of domestic law, i.e., the formation of contract and the rights and 
obligations of the parties. The second sentence contains a non-exhaustive list of 
issues with which, except where expressly provided otherwise, the Convention is not 
concerned, namely, the validity of the contract or any of its provisions or any usage, 
as well as the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.299 
Firstly, Article 4, sentence one, inventories matters where CISG provisions take 
precedence over those of domestic law, viz. the formation of contract and the rights 
and obligations of the seller and the buyer. According to Huber, the above-mentioned 
terms have to be understood as covering everything that the CISG actually deals 
with.300 In that sense, the first sentence of Article 4 has to be read in connection with 
Articles 14 to 24 relating to the formation of the contract;301 and with Articles 25 to 
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 See Huber 2006 (6) IHR 228 230; Lookofsky 1991 (39) 2 Am J Comp L 403 404; Djordjevic in 
Kröll/ Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 63. 
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 Article 4 CISG states,  
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations 
of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In particular, except as otherwise 
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to 84-91. 
297
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Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 63; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:32 84-94. 
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 Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 31; Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 63.  
299
 UNCITRAL Digest 24 §1. 
300
 Huber 2006 (6) IHR 228 230. 
301
 Provisions concerning form as ruled under Articles 11 to 13 CISG would also be regarded as a 
matter of “formation” in its widest meaning. 
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88 dealing with the rights and obligations of the parties, remedies for the breach of 
contract, and the passing of risk from seller to buyer.302  
Secondly, Article 4, sentence two, lists issues which are outside the sphere of 
influence of the CISG, unless when they arise in conjunction with other CISG 
provisions. These include the validity of the contract303 and the transfer of ownership 
in the goods sold.304 The list of matters excluded from the field of application of the 
CISG as provided by Article 4, sentence two, seems not to be exhaustive as 
evidenced by the phrase “in particular”.305 This list may then be enriched by the 
provisions of Article 5 which specifically remove from the domain of the CISG “the 
liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any 
person.”306 As for validity requirements, each of the contractual matters excluded 
from the CISG’s sphere of application have to be ruled by the applicable domestic 
contract law of the forum.307 
To give the example of transfer of ownership, the applicable domestic law will 
govern questions relating to the transfer of the property in the goods from seller to 
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which may be given is that “a contract is ‘valid’ insofar as it has legal operation or meets 
requirements as for its enforceability, and ‘invalid’ insofar as it has not.” Simply, the concept of 
“validity” covers matters such as capacity to contract, consensus, mistake, cause, consideration, 
and fraud (Cf. Articles 8 to 32 CCO in the DRC). For validity in the CISG’s context, see Hartnell 
1993 (18) Yale Journal of International Law 1 8; Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 68-76; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 88-93; 
Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:34 84-107 to 84-142; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 78; Zeller 
CISG 68ff. Usually, all validity requirements are governed by the law determined by PIL rules of 
the forum. See comments in Sections 2.3.5.2 and 3.3.1 above. 
304
 See UNCITRAL Digest 24 §1; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 
94; Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 76; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:35 
84-143 to 84-145. 
305
 For additional issues not governed by the CISG, see Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §84:33 84-94 to 
84-107; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 94-95; Djordjevic in 
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 See Australia 23 June 2010 Supreme Court of Western Australia Attorney-General of Botswana 
v Aussie Diamond Products (Pty) Ltd case.  
307
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 77 §6; Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §84:33 84-94; Brunner CVIM 91 112.  
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buyer. In such a case, the law generally applied is the lex rei sitae.308 A comparable 
principle is asserted, in Congolese law, by Article 9 PILD which states, “Rights on 
movables or immovable goods are governed by the law of the place where they are 
located.” More specifically, it is the applicable domestic property law which will 
determine whether the property in the goods had already been transferred to the buyer 
with the conclusion of the contract, or whether a separate agreement was needed.309 
In systems based on the French Napoleonic civil code, as it is for the CCO, for 
instance, the obligation to deliver the property is achieved by the sole consent of the 
parties.310 Contrary to the position of the civil code, Article 275 of the OHADA 
Commercial Act locates the transfer of ownership of the goods at the time of taking 
delivery. With regard to South African law, ownership is not transferred by the mere 
conclusion of the contract.311 In addition, “there must at least be proper delivery to 
the buyer coupled with the required intention on the part of the seller to transfer and 
on the part of the buyer to receive ownership in the goods.”312  
 Briefly, matters that the Vienna Sales Convention is primarily concerned with 
include rules governing the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and 
obligations of the parties established in the contract. For all other matters, the CISG 
relies on domestic laws to regulate them.  
                                               
308
 See Forsyth (International Law 370) for whom, in South African law, corporeal immovable and 
movable properties are basically governed by the lex rei sitae, and movables, exceptionally, by the 
lex domicilii.  
309
 See Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 36. On rules relating to ownership in the DRC, see 
Articles 14 to 30 of the Land Law. 
310
 Article 37 al. 1 CCO states, in this respect, that “The obligation of delivering a thing is complete 
by the sole consent of the contracting parties.” Regarding sales contracts, Article 264 CCO 
specifies that, “The sale is perfected between the parties and ownership is automatically acquired 
by the buyer with regard to the seller as soon as they have agreed on the thing and the price, 
although the thing has not yet been delivered nor the price paid.” Compare this to Articles 1138 
and 1583 FCC respectively. For an application, see Kisangani 15 April 1980 RCA 487 Jacques 
Alber v Malisawa Tshimbalanga (unreported decision).  
311
 As discussed in Section 3.4.5 above, at the time a contract is concluded, there is only a rebuttable 
presumption of transfer of property. See Brewer v Berman 26 SC 441 443; Meyer v Retief & Co 
OPD 3 9; see also Sharrock Business 282 and 875.  
312
 See Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Marcadeo Agricola & Others 1976 (4) SA 
464 (A); Marcard Stein & Co v Port Marine Contractors (Pty) Ltd & Others 1995 (3) SA 663 (A); 
see also Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 83; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 137. 
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As stated in the introductory section, the Vienna Convention is not a faultless 
instrument.313 Owing to the fact that its provisions had sometimes to take the form of 
a compromise between divergent positions of negotiating states,314 it is possible that 
disputes can arise when they are applied. In such situation interpretation will be 
needed. 
 
4.3.6 The Interpretation of the CISG and Gap-filling  
 
4.3.6.1 Introduction 
 
The interpretation of the CISG is dealt with in Article 7 which provides:  
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles 
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.315 
Article 7 has been described, all at once, as the “interpretation” and the “gap-
filling”316 provision of the CISG.  It pursues a double objective, to provide assistance 
and standards for the interpretation of the CISG,317 and to fill the gaps within the 
Convention.318  
 
                                               
313
 Sica 2006 (1) NJCL 1; Janssen/Kiene http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
id=1595989&down load=yes (accessed 15-4-2013); Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 137 §57; and authorities quoted by Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 188 in Fn3. 
314
 According to Zeller (CISG 9-10), as the CISG is not a code, gaps should exist. Most of those 
gaps, however, are not the result of an oversight of the drafters or a lack of trying to 
comprehensively cover the subject matter, but rather the result of vested interests. 
315
 See Article 7 CISG. 
316
 Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 195 and 187. 
317
 Article 7(1).  
318
 Article 7(2).  
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4.3.6.2 Conditions for the interpretation of the CISG 
 
In accordance with Article 7(1), three conditions are required for the interpreting of 
the UN Sales Convention: to have regard to the international character of the CISG; 
to promote uniformity; and to observe good faith in international trade.319  
Firstly, the requirement that regard be had to the international character of the 
Convention means that the interpretation of the CISG from domestic law terms and 
preconceptions should be avoided.320 According to Eiselen, the considerable merit of 
Article 7(1) lays in the fact that it “proclaims an up-to-date legal policy in harmony 
with the exigencies of world trade which postulates that ‘no recourse to national law 
should be admitted in interpretation’”.321 In the learned author’s words, it would be 
meaningless to have a uniform or harmonised instrument “if there is significant 
divergence in the way it is interpreted or applied, or if courts interpret and argument 
it under the influence of their own legal system.”322 
                                               
319
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 122-123; Viscasillas in 
Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 112; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:7 85-17; and Wethmar-
Lemmer PIL 195.  Similar provisions can also be found in other international instruments such as 
Article 1.6 of the PICC (2010, 2004, and 1994); and Article 5:102(g) of the Principles of European 
Contract Law (PECL), Commission on European Contract Law 1998. 
320
 See Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 123 §8; Viscasillas in 
Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 1127; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:8 85-17 85-18; 
UNCITRAL Digest 42 §§2 and 4. 
321
 Eiselen in Galston/Smit Sales 5; see also Eörsi in Galston/Smit Sales 2-5; UNCITRAL 1976 
(VII) Yb 5. Koneru comments on that Article 7 CISG is arguably “the single most important 
provision in assuring the Convention’s future success.” Koneru 1997 (6) MJ G Tr 105; see also 
Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 112 §2; Zeller http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html. Pursuant to Article 7(1), the CISG is to be interpreted 
“autonomously”, but not in the light of domestic law. See Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:7 85-17; 
Ferrari 2009 (13) 1 VJ 15 16; Ferrari Uniform Sales 134 139; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 195. In the 
words of Zeller, Article 7 defines the boundary between the CISG and domestic law. Zeller 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 4corners.html; see also Rennert 2005 (2) MqJBL 119. 
322
 Eiselen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 14 22; see, in the same sense, Ferrari 2009 (13) 1 VJ 15; Ferrari 
Uniform Sales 134; Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 63; Ferrari 2001 (20) JL & Com 225; Ferrari 2001 (1) Unif 
L Rev 203. The UN Secretariat commentary on the 1978 Draft CISG was that, 
National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergences in approach and 
concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing constructions of the provisions of this 
Convention by national courts, each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of 
the country of the forum. 
See Commentary on the Draft CISG, Prepared by the Secretariat Document A/CONF.97/5 under 
Article 6 in Honnold Documentary 407; and Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:7 85-15. 
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Secondly, with regard to the autonomous and uniform interpretation of the 
CISG, there is consensus that judges and arbitral tribunals should consider 
interpretations from other countries when applying the Convention.323 In practice, 
there are a number of cases in which courts have referred to CISG foreign 
judgements324 and scholarly commentaries325 in different member states. Compared 
                                               
323
 See among others, Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 117; Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §85:8 85-18; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 124; Ferrari 
Uniform Sales 134 149-150; Lookofsky 2005-2006 (25) JL & Com 87 90; Felemegas in 
Interpretation 11-12; Eiselen in Galston/Smit Sales 2-6; Ferrari 2001 (20) JL & Com 225 229; 
Koneru 1997 (6) MJ G Tr 105 107; Schlechtriem/Butler   International Sales 49; Huber/Mullis 
CISG 8; Flechtner in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 93; Andersen 1998 (10) Pace Int’l LR 403; Honnold 
1988 (8) JL & Com 207. 
324
 For an exhaustive list of cases referring to foreign decisions, see UNCITRAL Digest 42 Fn23. 
It should be noted that, until 2000, the most impressive case was the Italian Vigevano District Court 
decision in Rheinland Versicherungen v Atlarex. In this case, when dealing with some of typical 
issues governed by the CISG, such those of party autonomy, notice of goods for non-conformity, 
and burden of proof, the court quoted more than 40 foreign decisions and arbitral awards from 
Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, USA, and the ICC. (See Italy 12 July 2000 Tribunale 
di Vigevano Rheinland Versicherungen v Atlarex [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
000712i3.html] (last accessed 28-6-2012). For comments, see Ferrari Uniform Sales 134 156; 
Ferrari in CISG 462; Eiselen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 24; Ferrari in Quo Vadis CISG 17; Torsello in 
Ferrari CISG 215; Ferrari 2001 (20) JL & Com 225 230-232; Ferrari 2001 (1) Unif L Rev 208 209. 
Shortly after, the Tribunale di Rimini followed the model in the Al Palazzo Srl v Bernardaud di 
Limoges SA case which quoted 35 foreign decisions and arbitral awards. (See Italy 26 November 
2002 Tribunale di Rimini Al Palazzo Srl v Bernardaud di Limoges SA 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3 .html] (last accessed 28-6-2012). In 2004 and 2005, 
the Tribunale di Padova rendered three judgements quoting successively 40, 24, and 40 foreign 
decisions. (See Italy 25 February 2004 Tribunale di Padova Agricultural Products case (application 
of good faith standards) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html]; Italy 31 March 2004 
Tribunale di Padova Pizza Boxes case (due date of payment) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/040331i3.html]; and Italy 11 January 2005 Tribunale di Padova Ostroznik Savo v La Faraona 
soc coop arl (supply of goods contract) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu /cases/050111i3.html] (last 
accessed 28-6-2012). In the same country, the Tribunale de Forli has also, more recently, taken 
into account the need of promoting uniformity in two important cases. See Italy 16 February 2009 
Tribunale de Forli [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090216i3.html] (about 30 foreign decisions 
quoted); Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale de Forli, CLOUT case No. 867 [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/0812 11i3.html] (47 foreign decisions cited); both in UNCITRAL Digest 42 Fn23. 
Instances above confirm Ferrari’s opinion that Italian decisions are  careful to “show that courts 
increasingly apply the CISG in the way that is in line with the CISG’s ultimate goal.” See Ferrari 
in CISG 420; see alo Torsello in Ferrari CISG 217; Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 63 66; Ferrari 2001 (1) Unif 
L Rev 203 205. 
325
 See among others, New Zealand 22 July 2011 Court of Appeal of New Zealand RJ & AM 
Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller  [http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/110722n6.html];  New Zealand 30 July 2010 High Court of New Zealand RJ & AM 
Small Mon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller, [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/100730n6.html] (last accessed 1-8-2012); USA 17 December 2009 Federal District Court 
[Georgia] Innotex Precision Ltd v Horei Image Products, Inc., et al; Greece 2009 Decision 
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to courts in other CISG countries, Italian courts hold the record of taking into account 
the uniform application of the CISG. Of course, the attitude is also slowly changing 
in countries like the USA,326 Germany,327 and other leading CISG countries,328 but 
not to the same extent as in Italian courts.329  
The increasing application of the CISG by itself is not, however, sufficient for 
assessing the success of the Convention. As Ferrari has said,  
                                               
4505/2009 of the Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens Bullet-proof Vest case 
[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/ cases2/094505gr.html]; USA 3 April 2009 Federal 
District Court [Washington State] Barbara Berry, SA de CV v Ken M Spooner Farms, Inc. 
[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/090403u1.html]; Netherlands 21 January 2009 
District Court Utrecht Sesame Seed case [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/0901 
21n1.html]; Australia 24 October 2008 Federal Court of South Australia District Hannaford v 
Australian Farmlink (Pty) Ltd [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/081024a 
2.html]; USA 3 September 2008 Federal District Court [Illinois] CNA Int’l, Inc. v Guangdong 
Kelon Electronical Holdings et al [http://www.cisg.law .pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/ 
080903u1.html]; Australia 17 November 2000 Supreme Court of Queensland Downs Investments 
v Perwaja Steel [http://www.cisg.law.pace .edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/001117a2. html] (last 
accessed 28-6-2012). 
326
 See, particularly, USA 17 December 2009 Federal District Court [Georgia] Innotex Precision 
Ltd v Horei Image Products, Inc., et al (two decisions quoted);  USA 16 November 2007 Barbara 
Berry, SA de CV v Ken M Spooner Farms (five foreign decisions cited); and, particularly, USA 21 
May 2004 District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division) Chicago Prime 
Packers, Inc. v Northam Food Trading Co, et al [http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases040521u1.html] 
(last accessed 28-6-2012), which cited seven foreign decisions. The Chicago Prime Packers case 
has up now referred to more foreign decisions than any other American courts’ decision. See 
Teiling 2004 Unif L Rev 431; Ferrari in Quo Vadis CISG 17. For further comments on the attitude 
of USA courts in acknowledging and obeying, or not, the Article 7(1) mandate, see Flechtner in 
Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 91-102.  
327
 According to Magnus, “(German) courts and in particular the Federal Supreme Court try avoid 
any interpretation which merely imports the domestic solution into the CISG. This holds true even 
though the courts generally do not quote foreign case law on the CISG.” See Magnus in Ferrari 
CISG 156. For illustrative cases, see Germany 2 April 2009 Supreme Court 
[www.globalsaleslaw.com/content/api/cisg/urteile/1978.pdf] (one decision); Germany 31 March 
2008 Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080331g1.html] (two 
decisions cited). See also Germany 30 June 2004 Supreme Court Paprika case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/040630g1.html] (last accessed 25-4-2013) (four foreign decisions and arbitral 
awards cited); and Germany 31 October 2001 Supreme Court, Machinery case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html] (last accessed 25-4-2013) (one decision).  
328
 For an overview on the attitude of other CISG contracting states in respect of foreign cases, see 
Ferrari in CISG 466-468; Ferrari in Quo Vadis CISG 18-19; Ferrari 2001 (1) Unif L Rev 203 207; 
Ferrari Uniform Sales 134 160; see also UNCITRAL Digest 42 Fn23; and Kritzer/Eiselen Contract 
§85:9. 
329
 Compliance with the uniformity requirement has been facilitated by the availability of CISG 
material mostly on the Internet as announced at the end of Section 4.2.5 above.  
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Instead, its success should be measured by the extent to which it is applied in 
compliance with the purpose of creating a uniform law “in action” (…). Thus, 
whether the CISG is a success depends – inter alia – on whether courts are taking 
into account the aforementioned mandate to interpret the CISG autonomously and 
in light of the need to promote uniformity in its application or whether they instead 
succumb to homeward trend, i.e., the “natural” “tendency of those interpreting the 
CISG to project the domestic law (…) onto the international provisions of the 
Convention”.330     
It is, of course, not easy for a court to transcend definitively its domestic viewpoint 
and become a new court that is no longer influenced by domestic law.331 Though this 
may characterise some CISG nations,332 the homeward trend influence is more 
noticeable in USA courts. In that country, the “backing home tendency” appears to 
have been established as a rule.333 One of the leading cases in this regard is the well-
known Delchi Carrier Sp A v Rotorex Corp case.334 According to Flechtner, “The 
Delchi Carrier court’s statement (…) constitutes an open declaration that (American) 
court(s) (are) about to ignore the mandate of Article 7(1) CISG (…) and to fall victim 
                                               
330
 Ferrari in CISG 457; quoting Flechtner/Lookofsky “Nominating Manfred Forberich: The Worst 
CISG Decision in 25 Years?” 2005 (9) VJ 199 203. See also Smits CESL 11; Ferrari 2009 (13) 1 
VJ 15 22; Dimatteo et al Sales 2 and 174-176. 
331
 Dimatteo et al Sales 3.  
332
 For the case of Argentina and Israel, see, respectively, Taquela in Ferrari CISG 5 and Sharev in 
Ferrari CISG 185, for whom Argentian and Israeli courts have shown a certain homeward trend in 
their rulings; and for the case of Switzerland, see Chappuis CVIM 183 188-189.  
333
 According to Flechtner,  
CISG decisions from US courts have not exhibited a great deal of enthusiasm for consulting 
foreign authority, although acceptance of the technique appears to be increasing. (…) (Thus), 
the examples of laudable interpretative methodology in US case law on the CISG are the 
exceptions rather than the rule. (…)  A disturbing number of US decisions that do not refer to 
foreign cases and commentary commit (not only) a methodological “sin on omission”, (…) but 
they are (also) guilty of an even more grievous “sin of commission”, (i.e.) the use of cases that 
apply US domestic sales and contract law in interpreting the Convention. (…) Worse yet, the 
courts asserting that UCC case law can guide them in interpreting the CISG actually put the idea 
in practice. (…) US decisions include flagrant and disturbing examples of the homeward trend 
in operation. 
See Flechtner in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 93, 98, 103, 105 and 111; also supported by Levasseur in 
Ferrari CISG 313 and 314; Mazzacano Reflections 4 and 5. See also, Ferrari CISG 457-458; Ferrari 
2009 (13) 1 VJ 15 26. 
334
 USA 6 December 1995 Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Delchi Carrier Sp A v Rotorex 
Corp 71 F.2d 1024; commented on, inter alia, by Flechtner in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 103; 
Levasseur in Ferrari CISG 315; Ferrari in CISG 458. In the case, while discussing the Convention, 
the court held that “case law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 UCC, may also inform 
a court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC.”  
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to the ‘homeward trend’”.335 Flechtner regrets that the dictum in the Delchi Carrier 
case has been repeatedly used in a number of subsequent American cases.336  
 Comparable to the USA, the coming into force of the CISG in Canada 
coincided with a number of legal reforms which caused the Convention to be held in 
low esteem. As result of this, instead of promoting the uniformity of the CISG, 
“Canadian courts typically invoked parochial common law language and concepts, 
and domestic case law.”337 Canadian courts also suffer from the “homeward trend 
sickness” in the same way as the American ones do.  Similarly, in countries such as 
Australia, the advantage of using international sales law also appears not to be fully 
recognised.338 There, parties prefer “avoiding the CISG at the drafting stage by opting 
out within choice-of-law clauses”339 as provided by Article 6, which justifies the 
limited number of CISG cases decided in Australia.340 Notwithstanding the fact that 
                                               
335
 For that reason, Flechtner describes this ruling as a “grievous sin of commission”. See Flechtner 
in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 103.  
336
 For a list of cases that have relied to the Delchi Carrier case, see Levasseur in Ferrari CISG 
315-318. But, USA MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, Spa, 144 
F.3d 1384, 1388-1389 (11th Cir. 1998) which constitutes real progress under American 
jurisdiction. In this case, further to American jurisprudence, the eleventh circuit referred to CISG 
scholarly commentaries as well.  
337
 See Mazzacano Reflections 2; see also McEvoy in Ferrari CISG 37; Ferrari in CISG 415. In 
Nova Tool & Mold v London Industries Inc., the first Canadian decision dealing with the CISG, for 
instance, the court ignored the Convention. See Canada 16 December 1998 Ontario Court (General 
Division) Case No. 5381; as commented on by McEvoy in Ferrari CISG 48, and Mazzacano 
Reflections 5. Ziegel describes this attitude as not being “a good precedent for the treatment of the 
Convention in future Canadian litigation,” which unfortunately seems continuing to happen.  
338
 An example of this is the Castel Electronics case, in which the claimant preferred to invoke the 
“warranties of fitness for purpose and merchantable quality implied by s 19(a) and (b) of the 1958 
Sale of Goods Act,” instead of Article 35 CISG. See Australia 28 September 2010 Federal Court 
of Australia Castel Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Toshiba Singapore (Pty) Ltd [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/100928a2.html] (accessed 1-8-2012).  See also Zeller http://www.cisg.law.pace. 
edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html; Zeller 2000 (12) 1 Pace Int’l L Rev 79 80.  
339
 See Spagnolo 2009 (10) Melbourne Journal of International Law 141 159-160; Zeller 
http://www.cisg.law.pace. edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html; and Zeller 2000 (12) 1 Pace Int’l L Rev 
79 80. 
340
 See Jacobs/Cutbush-Sabine /Bambagiotti 2002 (17) Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 
24 25; Zeller in Ferrari Quo Vadis CISG 303; Spagnolo 2009 (10) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 141 160. For CISG Australian cases, see http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
text/casecit.html#australia (last visited 9-7-2013), which lists 25 cases for Australia, eleven of them 
dating from 2008.  
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some courts lack enthusiasm for the CISG, the first criterion in Article 7(1) remains 
that its interpretation must be uniform, and avoids any reference to domestic law.  
Lastly, Article 7(1) requires that the CISG is interpreted and applied in such a 
way that the observance of “good faith in international trade” is promoted.341 The 
Convention does not, however, define what “good faith” is and that can pose a 
problem in achieving its ultimate goal. It should be remembered that the good faith 
duty is differently understood and perceived by different legal systems.342 Many 
scholars contend that the inclusion of the good faith principle in the CISG was 
controversial in that its current version constitutes a compromise between civil law 
and Anglo-American common law families.343 But, considering its actual location in 
the Vienna Convention, it is clear that the principle of good faith has to be used by 
courts as an instrument to fill the gaps in the CISG.  
Facing the absence of a specific explanation by the CISG, Viscasillas remarks 
that, “[According] to the dynamic approach of the CISG and its adaptation to present 
times, the observance of good faith in international trade ought to be considered a 
moral or ethical standard to be followed by businesspersons, projecting fundamental 
ethical values in international sales contracts.”344  Thus, for a Serbian court, in the 
Mobile Sheer Baler case, “the failure for seller to deliver the agreed machine to the 
buyer, while at the same time continuously promising that the delivery will occur 
and requesting further extensions of the time for delivery,”345 constitutes behaviour 
                                               
341
 See Magnus in Felemegas Interpretation 45; Felemegas in Interpretation 13; 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 127. For similar provision, see 
Article 1.7(1) PICC (2010).  
342
 See comments in Section 2.3.6, and Section 3.3.4 above.  
343
 See Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:11 85-29; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 127; Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 119; Magnus 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ magnus.html (accessed 15-4-2013). 
344
 Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 120. About the scope of the principle 
of good faith in the Vienna Convention, see Zeller http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
4corners.html chap 4.1.b. 
345
 Serbia 31 May 2010 Foreign Trade Court attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Mobile 
Shear Baler case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100531sb.html] (last accessed 30-6-2012). See 
also Netherlands 25 February 2009 District Court Rotterdam Fresh-Life International BV v 
Cobana Fruchtring GmbH & Co, KG (failure to provide the text of general terms and conditions 
relating to the contract) [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/ cases2/090225n1.html]; Italy 
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contrary to the principle of good faith. Similarly, the Italian Tribunale di Pavoda 
stated in the Agricultural Products case that, 
[Filing] a claim in court just few days after the expiration of the deadline seeking the 
payment of the price, without having demanded of the buyer adequate explanations 
for the delay or having conceded him a period for “cure” by providing performance 
would be considered as contrary to the principle of good faith.346  
According to the same court, however, the conduct of the seller cannot be regarded 
as unfair, “where the seller brings a claim before the judge after having waited at 
least six months for payment of the price, without the buyer having communicated 
any excuse in the meantime.”347  
To sum this up, in the interpretation of the CISG any judge or arbitrator must 
be led by three standards: having respect to the Convention’s internationality; 
promoting its uniformity; and having regard to the observance of good faith. 
 
4.3.6.3 CISG gap filling  
 
The method of filling the gaps of the Vienna Sales Convention is defined by Article 
7(2). In accordance with this provision, all matters not expressly settled in the 
Convention should be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the 
CISG is based. Subsequent to this rule, it is only in the absence of a general principle 
that judges and arbiters should resort to domestic contract law using conflict-of-law 
rules as tools.348  
                                               
11 December 1998 Appellate Court Milan Bielloni Castello v EGO Printer Device case (failure of 
buyer to take delivery after additional times) [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/ 
981211i3.html] (last accessed 30-6-2012). 
346
 See Italy 25 February 2004 Tribunale di Padova Agricultural Products case, (application of 
good faith standards). 
347
 Ibid. 
348
 See Janssen/Kiene http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595989&download 
=yes; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 188; see also UNCITRAL Digest 43 §10. The ruling in the American 
Forestal Guarani SA v Daros International, Inc. case is very enlightening in this regard. In the 
case, in order to resolve parties’ dispute relating to the evidence of a contract between a party from 
a contracting state and another located in an Article 96 declaration country, the US Federal 
Appellate court turned first to the CISG itself. It found that the CISG does not “expressly settle” 
the question of whether a “breach-of-contract claim” is sustainable in the absence of a written 
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As Felemegas has said, “the aim of Article 7(2) is not different from that of 
the interpretation rules found in Article 7(1). (...) Article 7(2) and gap-filling is 
directly connected to Article 7(1) and its interpretation.”349 This is justified, on the 
words of Wethmar-Lemmer, by the fact that “The question of whether or not a gap 
exists in a certain instance is one of interpretation.”350 In particular, Article 7(2) 
requires that CISG provisions themselves constitute the primary source for 
interpretation. Thus, where the CISG is silent on one or another issue, the second 
step will consist in resorting to general principles on which the Convention is 
constructed. 
Scholars have established a list of general principles considered as the 
foundation of the CISG.351 These include principles with general applicability such 
as those of party autonomy,352 good faith,353 freedom of form and evidence,354 and 
pacta sunt servanda,355 firstly; and, secondly, those resulting from some specific 
issues. Among principles related to particular CISG matters, one may mention, in 
Part II, the reception principle,356 and the duty to preserve the contract,357 and, in Part 
                                               
contract. Afterwards, the court turned to Article 7(2) which requires considering the CISG “general 
principles” in filling the gaps, but these also failed to solve the matter. Given that neither the CISG 
nor its general principles were of certain help, the court, finally, resorted to American PIL rules. 
See USA 21 July 2010 Federal Appellate Court [3rd Circuit] Forestal Guarani SA v Daros 
International, Inc. [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100721u1.html] (last accessed 30-6-2012). 
See also, Italy 25 February 2004 Tribunale di Padova Agricultural Products case (regulation of 
problems related to set-offs).  
349
 Felemegas in Interpretation 13; see also Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 79; Janssen/Kiene http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595989&download=yes; and Magnus http://www.cisg.law.pace. 
edu/cisg/biblio/magnus. html. 
350
 Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 195. 
351
 For an exhaustive list of CISG general principles, see Magnus http://www.cisg.law.pace. 
edu/cisg/biblio/magnus. html (26 general principles); Janssen/Kiene http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595989&download =yes (thirteen general principles); see also 
Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 135-139; Viscasillas in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 137 §58; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:14 85-50 to 85-
64; Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 63 82; Lookofsky 2005-2006 (25) JL & Com 87. On the hierarchy and the 
source of the Convention’s general principles, see Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 204-222. 
352
 Cf. Article 6 CISG.  
353
 Cf. Article 7(1) CISG. 
354
 Cf. Articles 11 and 29 CISG. 
355
 Cf. Articles 30, 53, 71-73 and Article 79 CISG. 
356
 Cf. Article 24 CISG. 
357
 Cf. Article 19(2) and Article 21(2). 
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III, the principle of cooperation.358  It should be noted that gaps to which Article 7(2) 
refers are not concerned with matters excluded from the sphere of application of the 
CISG;359 rather it deals with issues governed by the CISG, but not expressly resolved 
by it.360 
It is admitted, similarly, that other sources of law and comparative law may 
sometimes be useful in interpreting the CISG.361 A comparative approach between 
the CISG and other international instruments, such as the PICC or PECL, could, 
moreover, be undertaken.362 Insofar as the PICC are concerned, they offer that 
opportunity as they state, in the Preamble, that the Principles “may be used to 
interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments”. Their use should be 
relevant with respect to the Vienna Convention then.363 Ferrari says, however, that it 
would be wrong to confuse the PICC and PECL with the general principles as stated 
by the Convention.364 Article 7(2) CISG clearly refers to “the general principles on 
which the CISG is based”, but not to external principles.365 In this sense, external 
                                               
358
 Cf. Articles 32(3), 48(2), and 60. For further principles and cases in which they were applied, 
see UNCITRAL Digest 43 to 46 which count seventeen CISG general principles. 
359
 Cf. Articles 4 and 5 CISG; Lookofsky 2005-2006 (25) JL & Com 87 89; Janssen/Kiene 
http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595989&download=yes.  
360
 For the distinction between internal and external gaps, see Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 63 79; Sica 2006 
(1) NJCL 1 3; Janssen/Kiene http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15959 
89&download=yes. Concerning matters not governed by the CISG such as the validity of contract, 
personal injury, they can only be resolved by non-convention rules and principles. See Lookofsky 
2005-2006 (25) JL & Com 87 90; Lookofsky 1991 (39) 2 Am J Comp L 403 and 407. 
361
 See Eiselen 2005 (38) CILSA 32 33; Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 139. In one case, as the CISG does not prescribe the interest rate, a Slovak court based 
a decision on Article 4 parts 1 and 2 of the 1980 Rome Convention. See Slovak Republic 11 
October 2010 District Court in Michalovce [http://cisgw3law.pace. edu/cases/101011k1.html] (last 
accessed 30-6-2012); see also Italy 11 December 1998 Appellate Court Milan Bielloni Castello v 
EGO Printer Device case. 
362
 See Eiselen 2005 (38) CILSA 32 33; Felemegas in Interpretation 31; Bonell Contract Law 228; 
UNCITRAL Digest 46 §§33-35. 
363
 PICC (2010), Preamble 5th Paragraph; see for comments, Sica 2006 (1) NJCL 1; Ferrari 2003 
(7) VJ 63 82; Bonell Contract Law 231 and 317; Bonell UNIDROIT 30; Bonell Commercial 
Contracts 13; Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 210-214. For an illustration, see Belgium 19 June 2009 Court 
of Cassation [Supreme Court] Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes SAS 
[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/090619b1.html] (last accessed 30-6-2012). See 
also cases quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 46 §§33-35; and Bonell 2010 (17) Australian International 
Law Journal 177. 
364
 Ferrari 2003 (7) VJ 63 89. 
365
 Ibid. 
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principles could be used only to corroborate a solution reached by applying the rules 
of the CISG.  
 
4.3.7 Conclusion on the Ambit of the CISG 
 
The sphere of influence of the Vienna Convention is dealt with in Articles 1 to 6 by 
which the CISG governs international sales contracts concluded between parties 
established in contracting states primartily. It also applies to contracts concluded 
between parties located in non-contracting states when PIL rules lead to the 
application of the law of a CISG member state. Despite its relevance in international 
law making, the CISG does not claim to solve all matters which may relate to a sales 
contract. Its operational scope is limited to the regulation of the formation of sales 
contracts and to parties’ rights and obligations resulting from the sale. Concerning 
its interpretation, Article 7 directs courts and arbiters to be aware of the international 
character of the CISG; to promote uniformity in its application; and to observe good 
faith in international trade. In addition, when there is a matter not expressly resolved 
by the CISG, the same provision invites judges and arbitraters to consult first the 
general principles of the Convention. They could take recourse to domestic law only 
as a last resort when no general principle is identified. 
In conclusion, with its ruling and uniform application, the CISG has gained 
such a prestige that to date it is used as a source of inspiration for modernising 
domestic contract laws as discussed in the following section.  
 
4.4 The CISG as a Model for the Improvement of National or Regional Sales 
Laws 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
Basically, there is unanimity about the value of CISG rules and principles. That is 
why the Convention is currently the most preferred instrument used to improve 
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contract laws, whether on a domestic, regional, or an international level.366 To 
illustrate this with the case of European countries, Troiano makes it clear that “the 
existing state of EU legislation shows that many EU enactments have been, to a 
greater or lesser extent, influenced by the CISG.”367 Though the CISG has had a 
strong influence upon European sales law and the harmonisation of business law in 
Africa through OHADA, its effect seems to be limited in Southern African countries 
and in the DRC as explained below.  
 
4.4.2 Improvement within the European Union and Beyond 
 
4.4.2.1 The CISG as an inspirational pattern for EU legislation 
 
The influence of the Vienna Convention in Europe can be seen in two areas, viz. with 
regard to domestic laws of each country, and in relation to the European Union as an 
independent institution. It is acknowledged that the EU has made constant efforts to 
harmonise certain areas of contract law in the past few years. The most important 
area of intervention of the Community has been consumer protection law where 
several directives have been adopted, including the 1999 Consumer Sales 
Directive.368 As far as the latter is concerned, there is considerable consensus that it 
took its basic model from the CISG.369 The Vienna Convention was privileged, in 
                                               
366
 See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 10; Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/ 
uploads/publics/6248/ 20110913164502_4e6f6c6e5b746.pdf; Ferrari in CISG 471; Magnus in 
CISG vs. 101. 
367
 Troiano in Ferrari CISG 345; see also Huber Sales Law 937 944-945. This large influence is 
certainly owing to the number of European States that have ratified the CISG; means 23 out of 27, 
excepted Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the UK.  
368
 Those Directives include: the Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the 
protection of the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (1985 
OJL 372/31); the Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of 
distance contracts (1997 OJL 144/19), as amended by Directive 2005/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 (2005 OJL 149/22); the Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts; and the Directive 1999/44/EC 
of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (1999 
OJL 171/12), hereafter the Consumer Sales Directive. 
369
 See, among others, Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 10 Fn40; Magnus in CISG vs. 
101; Troiano in Ferrari CISG 348; Huber Sales Law 937 944; Lookofsky in Ferrari CISG 128; 
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the words of Troiano, “because it offered the model for a successful compromise 
between different European legal systems.”370 The author specifies that that choice 
was even more significant if one bears in mind the fact that the Consumer Sales 
Directive “is the most important European provision in the field of the law of 
contract, which affects the very heart (...) of the ‘classical’ law of contract and 
obligations.”371 
  Similarly, the UN Sales Convention was certainly one of the sources of 
inspiration of the PICC. This is evidenced by the fact that these were enacted at the 
time that the CISG was already in effect.372 In the opinion of Schwenzer and Hachem, 
“when the first set of PICC was launched in 1994, they closely followed the CISG 
not only in its systematic approach but also with respect to the remedy 
mechanism.”373 Such is also Bonell’s view for whom “such an important and 
universally applied instrument as the CISG was (…) an obligatory point of 
reference”374 in the PICC’s drafting process. The same is true with regard to the 
PECL which were promulgated in 1999.375 Concerning them, Lando highlights that 
its working groups obviously drew on a wide range of legal material from all over 
the world. Regarding the CISG, in particular, it “has had a substantial influence on 
the terminology and the rules relating to the formation, contents, performance, and 
                                               
Magnus in Ferrari CISG 158-159; Witz in Ferrari CISG 139; Schwenzer/Hachem 
http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/6248/201109131645024e6f6c6e5b746.pdf; and Bonell 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell4.html. 
370
 Troiano in Ferrari CISG 349. 
371
 Ibid.   
372
 See Sica 2006 (1) NJCL 1 10; see also Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 10; Magnus 
in CISG vs. 101. The CISG entered into force in January 1988 while the first version of the PICC 
was published in 1994. 
373
 Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/6248/201109131645024e6f6c6e5b 
746.pdf. 
374
 Bonell Contract Law 48 and 305; see also Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 11; and 
Zeller 2002 (14) Pace Int’l LR 163. 
375
 The PECL was drafted by the Commission on European Contract Law, known as the Lando 
Commission after President Ole Lando. Parts I and II of the PECL were published in 1999 and deal 
with the formation of contract, validity, performance, non-performance, and remedies. Part III, 
published in 2002, deals with assignment, assumption of debts, set off, prescriptions, and 
conditions. The PECL cover civil and commercial contracts within the EU. See 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 11. 
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non-performance of the PECL (...).”376 Owing to such a close influence, it is, 
therefore, predictable that all of the CISG, PICC, and PECL provisions are similar. 
Nevertheless, the two newer instruments go further than the CISG as they are more 
detailed; they have tried to develop a number of CISG provisions, and have filled its 
gaps.377  
During the most recent decade, the European Commission has initiated, in the 
field of contract law, a project leading to the preparation of a common frame of 
reference. That project was under way ever since the publication by the European 
Commission of an Action Plan in 2003. It was finally implemented in 2008 when “a 
large international network of legal scholars published an Interim Outline Edition of 
a Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)378 which was followed (a few months 
after) by the final Common Frame of Reference (CFR).”379  As in the case of its 
predecessors, the CFR is also closely connected to the CISG. Von Bar puts it that 
international instruments used in the drafting process of the CFR have included the 
1980 Vienna Sales Convention in addition to the PECL and PICC.380  
Almost all European instruments were perceived, at the outset, as being 
focused mostly on the harmonisation of consumer law. Recently, the EU firmly 
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 Lando 2005 (53) 2 Am J Comp L 379 81; see also Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas. 
ch/uploads/publics/ 6248/20110913164502_4e6f6c6e 5b746.pdf; Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 11; Magnus in CISG vs. 101; and Zeller http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
biblio/4corners.html. 
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 See Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 11. 
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 According to Sagaert, the DCFR is a result of  work done over a long period of time by two 
institutions, the Study Group on a European Civil Code (the Study Group), and the Research Group 
on Existing EC Private Law (the Acquis Group). Its Outline Edition constitutes a basis for the 
further development of European Private Law. See Preface to Sagaert/Storme/Terryn DCFR v; see 
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 Hesselink 2009 (83) Tul L Rev 919; see also Von Bar et al Principles 3; 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 11. Hesselink explains that, 
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that such a document could contribute to making (…) the existing European Community private 
law in the area of contract law more coherent and that it could provide a basis for a possible 
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See Hesselink 2009 (83) Tul L Rev 919 955; see also House of Lords Report DCFR 19 §49. The 
CFR is a comprehensive instrument which covers almost the whole patrimonial law including 
contract law in general, and the law of sale in particular.  
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 Von Bar et al Principles 11 Fn13 & 18 §25; see also Hesselink 2009 (83) Tul L Rev 919 955 & 
959; Magnus in CISG vs. 101. 
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extended the scope of European contract law to cover also commercial sales contracts 
via a new instrument called the “Common European Sales Law” (CESL) also 
influenced by the CISG.381 In the same way that the CISG has had an impact upon 
EU legislation, it has without doubt influenced European domestic sales legislation 
as well. 
 
4.4.2.2 Impact of the CISG upon European national laws 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of the CISG on European domestic sales law, it is not 
necessary for the Convention to have influenced the domestic legislation of every, or 
even most countries. A sample would be enlightening. In detail, since its coming into 
being, the CISG has been taken as a model by individual states, or groups of states, 
to reform their domestic sales laws.382 On the European continent, one may mention, 
in particular, the Scandinavian states,383 Estonia,384 the Netherlands,385 and 
Germany.386  
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 See Magnus in CISG vs. 101; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
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 See New Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek adopted in 1992; quoted by Bonell http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ bonell4.html Fn13.  
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Insofar as Germany is concerned, the initiative to reform the German law of 
obligations was undertaken from 1978. It was, among other reasons, necessary to 
adapt the law of obligations to international Conventions such as the 1964 Hague 
Sales Laws. Instead, the Drafting Commission “regarded the general concept of the 
CISG as convincing and extended it, therefore, with few exceptions to the general 
law of obligations.”387 In Germany, the influence of the Convention was not limited 
to reform discussions only; it was rather extended to the final outcome of the code.388 
Because of this impact, Bonell describes the CISG as a “fertile soil” on which the 
2002 reform of the German BGB’s general law of obligations is planted.389 
Beyond the European continent, the CISG has also impacted powerfully on 
the civil codes of countries such as Russia390 and China.391 China’s great importance 
for international trade is indisputable. As one of the eleven original CISG contracting 
states, it also gave much attention to the Vienna Convention in its process of law 
reform. According to a commentator, drafters of the Chinese civil law “have 
                                               
impact on other European countries legislators, see related reports in Ferrari CISG; see also Bonell 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ biblio/ bonell4.html; and Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas. 
ch/uploads/publics/6248/20110913164502_4e6f6c6e 5b746.pdf 124 in fine. 
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Code), as amended by the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts of 2002.  
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Simons Russian Law 7 and 83; Oda Commercial 281; and Orlov Business 138.   
391
 When China ratified the CISG in 1986, there was no codified contract law or general civil law in 
China. Suddenly, before ratification, China promulgated three important laws (the PRC Economic 
Contract Law of 13 December 1981, the Foreign-Related Economic Contract Law of 21 March 1985, 
and the PRC General Principles of Civil Law of 12 April 1986, replaced in October 1999 by the 
Contract Law of PRC) to prepare the ratification. See Yang 
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consulted and absorbed rules of the CISG (…).”392 The same tendency is to some 
extent also observed under OHADA law.  
 
4.4.3 Harmonisation of Sales Law in Africa – the case of OHADA law  
 
As was said in section 2.2.7.1, OHADA is a regional organisation founded in 1993 
between fourteen West and Central African countries to harmonise their legal 
systems in the field of business law. From fourteen original members, the OHADA 
Treaty has currently been adopted by seventeen countries, the DRC being the last 
nation to adopt it.393 Only three of those countries, namely Benin, Gabon, and 
Guinea,394  are contracting states to the CISG. The indifference of the OHADA 
member states towards the CISG confirms Ferrari’s opinion according to which, 
“some countries simply favour a more regional – rather than the CISG’s global – 
approach to the unification of sales law, as they believe that this will benefit intra-
regional commerce more.”395 Is the CISG hostile to regional uniform sales laws? The 
answer is obviously negative because there are specific CISG provisions which 
facilitate its peaceful cohabitation with regional uniform sales laws as discussed in 
section 4.5.5 below. For that reason, OHADA member states should not have to be 
afraid of their acceptance of the CISG.  
With regard to the harmonisation issue, OHADA has adopted a number of 
Uniform Acts including the Commercial Act, first enacted in 1997 and revised in 2010. 
The Commercial Act is the most important statute in connection with commercial sales 
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 See Han in Ferrari CISG 71 and 84; see also Li Remedies 3 where the author argues that many 
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matters. Its Book VIII is based primarily on the CISG.396 On the words of Magnus, 
already evoked elsewhere,397 the Commercial Act provides for rules on commercial 
sales which widely copy the CISG. With the influence of that Commercial Act, a 
modified CISG has been made the sales law among and in the OHADA countries.398 
The commercial act is described as a CISG-modified version because there are some 
variances between it and the provisions of the Vienna Sales Convention. To give a few 
examples of this, pursuant to Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL, the buyer’s obligation to 
give notice of any non-conformity of the goods is stricter than it is in Articles 38 and 
39 CISG. Where the CISG requires the buyer to give notice in a “reasonable time”, 
the Act provides a monthly or yearly delay consistent with the time the lack of 
conformity was discovered. The same may be said in respect of the Commercial Act 
silence vis-à-vis the guarantee against intellectual property rights.399  
It is noted that the UAGCL rules govern both national and international sales 
transactions. In order to focus on international sales contracts, the OHADA Council 
of Ministers, following its meeting convened in Brazzaville in February 2002, 
requested UNIDROIT to assist it in preparing a novel business contracts project 
based on the PICC. Fontaine was appointed in 2003 as the Expert responsible for that 
project.400 After consulting legal communities in nine OHADA member states, 
Fontaine conceived a preliminary draft on contracts law, the so-called Avant-projet 
d’Acte Uniforme OHADA sur le Droit des Contrats.401 Fontaine confirms that very 
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many of the provisions of the Draft Uniform Act on Contract Law are almost 
identical to their equivalent PICC provisions.402 Because the PICC are built on the 
CISG, there is ground to assume the existence of a strong influence of the CISG on 
the DUACL.403   
 
4.4.4 The CISG and Southern African Countries 
 
The area known as “Southern Africa” includes countries such as Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, The Republic of South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In most of these countries, the law of sale governing both 
national and international sales contracts has come down in a non-codified form from 
Roman law via Roman-Dutch law.404  
Though most Southern African countries belong to the Roman-Dutch law legal 
system, there is, however, no unified sales law in that region.405 As several 
commentators have observed, each country has its own legal traditions, its own 
                                               
Fontaine M, July 2007 in 2008 (13) 1/2 Unif L Rev 593-631. Translated as the “Draft Uniform Act 
on Contract Law”, hereafter DUACL, the Avant-projet contains 213 articles divided into thirteen 
chapters. It consists of a complete law of contracts that regulates the formation of contracts, parties’ 
rights and obligations, as well as remedies for breach of contracts. See Fontaine 2008 (13) (1/2) 
Rev dr unif 203 205; Sossa 2008 (13) (1/2) Rev dr unif 339 346; Bonell http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/bonell4.html  Fn105. The process of its enactment has been slowed 
down, but many of its provisions were incorporated in the revised version of the Commercial Act 
in 2010. See Fontaine Avant-Pojet 14 14; see also Articles 210 to 218 UGCL. 
402
 Fontaine 2008 (13) (1/2) Rev dr unif 203 205; Fontaine 2008 (13) (1/2) Unif L Rev 633 644; 
Fontaine Avant-Pojet 12-14; see also Meyer 2008 (13) (1/2) Unif L Rev 393 394; and Date-Bah 
2004 (2) Rev dr unif 269. 
403
 Fontaine Avant-Pojet 14; Castellani 2008 (13) (1/2) Rev dr unif 115 119; see also Bonell 
Contract Law 48 and 305; Sica 2006 (1) NJCL 1 10; Zeller 2002 (14) Pace Int’l LR 163; 
Schwenzer/Hachem http://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/ publics/6248/201109131 64502_4e6f6c6e5b746. 
pdf. An example of this is Article 208 of the Draft Uniform Act similar to Article 11 CISG. 
404
 See Section 3.2.2 above.  
405
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 324. It seems that the idea of harmonisation of law in the Southern 
African region was recently invoked at the “First African Conference on International Commercial 
Law” held in Doula (Cameroon) from 13 to 14 January 2011. For papers presented at that 
Conference, see http://www.acicol.com/Downloads-85 (accessed 8 October 2013); see also 
Fontaine Avant-Pojet 14.  
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system of legal thought, and its own method of making laws.406 This situation led 
Ng’ong’ola to argue that the absence of codified rules in the Southern African region 
may contribute to disagreements over the precise scope and content of some of the 
key rules and principles of law.407 Owing to the absence of a harmonised body of law 
in the area, likewise, businesspersons involved in international contracts are faced 
with as many legal systems as they have trading partners.408 Such a situation creates 
legal insecurity and uncertainty that may slow down international transactions. As 
Ndulo has suggested, the ratification of the Vienna Sales Convention by Southern 
African countries “would (obviously) unify the law relating to the international sale 
of goods within the region and between the region and the rest of the world.”409  
It is a good thing that two of those countries, namely Lesotho and Zambia,410 
have already consented to the CISG. When formulating comments about the 
accession of Lesotho, Lehmann said,  
Lesotho, a least developed country, was, somewhat ironically, the first country to 
have ratified the Convention. (...) Lesotho’s economy did not experience increased 
volumes of trade following the Convention’s entry in force in January 1988. Instead, 
the pattern of fluctuating growth and decline which existed before the Convention’s 
entry into force, continued thereafter.411 
Lehmann’s ironic comments are not surprising as she is one of those who advocate 
South African non-ratification of the CISG.412 In spite of Lehmann’s discouraging 
opinion, given that Zambia and Lesotho are by this time CISG member states, the 
Vienna Convention may automatically or indirectly apply to contracts concluded 
between parties established in the Southern African zone.413  
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 Saurombe 2009 (21) SA Merc LJ 695 698; Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127 129; Sanders 1981 
(14) CILSA 328. 
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 Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 225 228. 
408
 Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 324; Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127 129. 
409
 Ndulo 1987 (3) 2 Lesotho LJ 127 129; see also Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 255 256; 
Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835. 
410
 Both Lesotho and Zambia are part of the eleven original CISG member nations in which the 
Convention entered into force on the 1st of January 1988.  
411
 Lehmann 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 317 321-322. 
412
 Ibid 328. 
413
 Cf. comments in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 above. 
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With regard to South Africa, in particular, it is notable that this country has not 
yet ratified the CISG despite an abundant call from the academic community for its 
adoption.414 In effect, though the country did not participate in the CISG drafting 
process, early in 1984 the Department of Industries and Commerce requested the 
Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa to comment on the desirability 
of South African accession to the Convention.415 The importance of such ratification 
became more pertinent in 1994 when South Africa recovered its place on the 
international scene. Then, the Department of Trade and Industry promoted the idea of 
adopting the CISG as a method of harmonising international trade. Unfortunately until 
now nothing has been finalised, and one is given the impression that the CISG project 
has lost priority.416  
Even so, the need for South Africa to adopt the CISG remains very strong.417 
This is most particularly justified by its leadership in the economic cohesion of Sub-
African states through SADC. In passing, SADC is an intergovernmental 
organisation that aims to promote, among other things, the “economic growth and 
socio-economic development through efficient production systems (...) so that the 
region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and 
the world economy.”418 But, the existence of multiple laws in the SADC zone is not 
likely to achieve this purpose. Of course, two of its member states have ratified the 
Convention, which “not only helps to harmonise the region, but also brings these 
states in line with the majority of trading states abroad.”419 Simply, as long as the 
SADC has not yet acquired a harmonised legal system similar to OHADA Uniform 
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 See, among others, Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 108; Oosthuizen Rights 182; Eiselen 2007 (19) 
SA Merc LJ 14 and 25; Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 369; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 27; 
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 See the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce Bulletin of 13 February 1984 5, in Barton 1985 
(1) CILSA 21. 
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Acts, there is a legal uncertainty between SADC countries which could be avoided 
if all of them were to ratify the CISG.  
Moreover, the failure of South Africa to ratify the CISG not only compromises 
one of the SADC’s aims, but it also causes certain gaps in South African law. So, as 
has been mentioned earlier, the case for its ratification persists. Key reasons 
supporting its ratification of the CISG include the following: 
a) the wide acceptance of the CISG around the world and the fact that states which 
have adopted the CISG represent South Africa’s major trade partners; 
b) the growing rate of acceptance of the CISG, both internationally and in Africa; 
c) the fact that states which have ratified the CISG represent every continent, every 
major legal background, and the main political systems in the world; and 
d) the fact that the CISG may already be applicable to contracts entered into by South 
African  entities by virtue of the principles of private international law.420 
Amongst the above listed reasons, the last one is the most relevant. In fact, although 
South Africa has not yet ratified the CISG, it may now apply there through the 
operation of conflict-of-law rules pursuant to Article 1(1)(b). Thus, South African 
parties have to consider the CISG in their negotiations to prevent being surprised by 
its application to their contracts.  
After having discussed the Vienna Convention’s impact on OHADA law and 
Sub-African countries attitude vis-à-vis the CISG, the following section focuses on 
its proposal for the DRC.  
     
4.5 The CISG – a Suggestion for the DRC  
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section firstly discusses the DRC’s participation in the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Conference. It then briefly reviews the country’s comments on the CISG, and 
                                               
420
 See Oosthuizen Rights 5; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 27, finding advice in the New Zealand 
Law Commission Report. http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/Arts/newz2.html (last 
accessed 9-11-2012). For an exhaustive list of reasons supporting South Africa’s accession to the 
CISG, see Eiselen 1999 (116) SALJ 323 339-356; supported by Oosthuizen Rights 20-36. 
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outlines the means by which the CISG should be invoked in the DRC though the 
Congo has not yet ratified it. The last section tries to demonstrate that Congolese 
adherence to the OHADA community is not incompatible with probable adoption of 
the CISG.   
 
4.5.2 Background  to the Involvement of the DRC in the CISG Drafting Process  
 
The DRC joined the UN on 20 September 1960.421 It was elected a member of 
UNCITRAL on 30 October 1967.422 So, the DRC participated actively in the CISG 
drafting process.423 Normally, the Congolese term of office in UNCITRAL would 
expire the day before the opening of the 1980 annual session.424 That event did not 
prevent the DRC from playing a major role during the Vienna Diplomatic Sales 
Conference. The Congolese representative, in fact, was elected as one of the twenty-
two Vice-presidents of the Conference.425 In addition, the DRC was part of the 
Convention’s Drafting Committee together with fourteen other UN member 
nations.426 At the end of the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, likewise, the country 
approved the Convention’s final text and signed the Final Act of the Conference 
during its twelfth Plenary Session.427  
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 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/about/origin_history.html (last visited 27-4-2013).  
422
 See CISG Report on the work of its first session (1968), Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No.16 (A/7216), in UNCITRAL 1970 (I) YB 72. 
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 See Final Act (A/CONF/97/18), in UNCITRAL 1980 (XI) YB 149. 
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France, Libya, Republic of Korea, Singapore, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the UK, and 
the USA. See UNCITRAL 1980 (XI) YB 150; see also Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 11 Fn13. 
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 See Signature of the Final Act of the Convention (Agenda item 12) (A/CONF.97/18), in UN 
Conference on the CISG, Official Records 234. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/ 
cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e.pdf (last visited 27-4-2013). That Final Act was signed by two 
Congolese representatives.  
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Despite the eloquent involvement of the DRC in the drafting process of the 
CISG, however, the country abstained from voting. Mr Tshitambwe, the leader of 
the Congolese delegation, declared that “if he had been on time, he would have 
abstained from voting on the Convention as a whole.”428 The country has, moreover, 
up to the present time not yet adopted the Convention for reasons that have remained 
unrevealed. Such an attitude is inconsistent with the Congolese acknowledgement of 
the value of the CISG project as explained in the following paragraph.  
 
4.5.3 The Comments of the DRC with reference to the CISG Project   
 
In its comments to the 1978 Draft CISG, the DRC was particularly interested in 
Articles 10 and 11 dealing with the freedom of form and evidence in international 
sales.429 Although the Congolese representative was worried about the flexibility of 
CISG provisions, he acknowledged their relevance for international trade. He then 
endorsed Article 5 which allows contracting parties to exclude any given provision 
because of differences in their legal systems.430   
More specifically, with regard to the principle of informality of international 
sales, the Congolese delegation needed clauses such as those of “means appropriate 
in the circumstances,” and “proof by means of witnesses” contained in the former 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Draft CISG to be made more specific. According to that 
group, since there are as many means of communication as there are circumstances, 
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 The DRC abstained from voting together with nine other countries, namely Burma, China, 
Columbia, Iran, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. See Adoption of a Convention and 
other Instruments deemed appropriate, and the Final Act of the Conference (Agenda item 11), in 
UN Conference on the CISG, Official Records 230; see also Schlechtriem Uniform Law 20 Fn17. 
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 Articles 10 and 11 of the 1978 Draft CISG correspond to current Articles 11 and 12 CISG. See 
Honnold Documentary 9; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 186 Fn2; Viscasillas in 
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 See Comments by Governments and International Organisations on the Draft CISG 
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the question arises as to whether it is sufficient to use any of them for a contract to 
be valid.431 By way of response, CISG drafters posited the freedom of evidence as 
being one of the Convention’s general principles. Concerning proof by means of 
witnesses, on the other hand, the fear of the DRC was whether witnesses would not 
come from non-contracting states.432 Once again, the drafters of the Convention 
agreed with the informality of international sales, for countries whose law requires 
written agreements to make use of the Article 96 CISG declaration.  
The DRC was not alone in disapproving of the principle of freedom of 
commercial contracts. As several CISG commentators have said, some other 
delegations, particularly from countries with a requirement that the conclusion and 
evidence of sales be in writing, were also opposed to that principle.433 Consequently, 
the freedom-of-form rule in Article 11 CISG was adopted by way of compromise, 
except for the Article 96 CISG reservation. Since then, it has been recognised that 
the provisions of Article 11 displace “any domestic requirements as to form 
irrespective of whether it constitutes a requirement for the validity of the contract or 
merely a means of prescribed evidence, relevant primarily in cases where the 
existence of the contract is challenged.”434 
It is possible that the reaction of the Congo against the freedom-of-form rule 
may have been motivated by the provisions of Article 217 al. 1 CCO which enshrine 
the supremacy of documentary evidence. Article 217 al. 1 CCO requires a written 
document for the making of any contract exceeding the sum of, or the value of, two 
thousand Congolese Francs (FC 2,000.00). This kind of agreement cannot be proved 
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 See Report of the Secretary-General Analysis of Comments by Governments and International 
Organisations on the Draft CISG as adopted by the Working Group on the International Sale of 
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Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 1213; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §85:65.  
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by means of witnesses.435 If this rule applies to all civil contracts, requirements as for 
form are not, however, applicable to commercial transactions such as international 
sale of goods contracts.436 Pursuant to Article 9 CCom and case law, commercial 
contracts may validly be proved by witnesses.437  
 One may suppose that the official requirements for concluding a contract by 
writing are the reasons which caused the Congolese government’s antipathy to the 
CISG. Such reasons would be unjustified. In effect, there are a number of countries 
with similar forms or evidentiary requirements which do not have a problem about 
working with the CISG. One case in point is the USA where any contract for the sale 
of goods that amounts to USD 500.00 or more must be concluded by writing.438 This 
requirement does not prevent the USA from being one of the leading countries of the 
CISG. As in July 2013, the Pace Law School Institute website has reported 161 
American cases applying the UN Sales Convention.439  
Coming back to Congolese law, it is not long ago that commercial transactions 
were governed in the DRC by rules dating back to the colonial period. Those rules 
had become out-dated. Most of their sections were no longer adapted to business 
evolution, and this constituted a source of legal uncertainty.440 The Parliament was 
aware of that insecurity. It stated in the preamble to the law authorising adoption of 
OHADA law that, “The harmonisation of business law (...) will contribute to the 
reinforcement of legal and judicial security (...), essential conditions for the 
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improvement of business environment” in the DRC.441 Subsequent to this 
expectation, Paragraph four of the same preamble concludes that the DRC’s 
membership of OHADA will increase the harmonisation of business law in the 
country.442 Voisin and Parra add to this that the effective accession to OHADA law 
by the DRC intends to “enhance the attractiveness of DRC’s legal environment.”443 
If such a value can be recognised in a regional instrument similar to the OHADA 
Treaty, there is greater reason for the recognition of a Convention which is accepted 
internationally as the CISG is. 
A propos of this, despite its hesitation in recommending the CISG project, the 
Congolese delegate specified that CISG provisions are designed: 
To discourage parties from seeking the jurisdiction in which the law is the most 
favourable;  
To reduce the need for recourse to the rules of private international law; and 
To provide a modern law of sale that will be suitable for international transactions.444  
 Given comments of this kind, the DRC would, logically, be among the first countries 
to ratify the Convention. Unfortunately this has not yet happened. The fact that the 
DRC has not yet acceded to the Vienna Sales Convention does not completely 
exclude the applicability of the CISG to sales contracts concluded with parties 
established in the country as discussed below.  
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4.5.4 Possibilities  for the Applicability of the CISG in the Congo 
 
4.5.4.1 Applicability by operation of the lex loci contractus principle 
 
As was discussed in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 above, circumstances in which the CISG 
may apply are dealt with in Article 1 of the Convention. This provision offers a 
double way the CISG should be implemented, namely through its autonomous and 
its indirect applications. As far as the second method is concerned, Article 1(1) (b) 
envisages the possibility of the CISG applying in non-contracting states when “the 
rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting 
State.” It is obvious that the Convention does not bind non-contracting states. In spite 
of that principle, scholars and courts are unanimous in their views that the CISG may 
sometimes come into play in non-member countries if local conflict-of-law rules 
prescribe so.445  
 In the DRC, contractual obligations conflict-of-law rules are provided by 
Article 11 of the PILD which states,  
Agreements are governed as for their form by the law of the place where they are 
made. Nevertheless, acts under private signature can be passed in the forms also 
admitted by national laws of all parties.  
Unless when the parties provide otherwise, agreements are governed, as for their 
substance, effects, and their evidence, by the law of the place where they are 
concluded. 
A reading of Article 11 PILD reveals that the DRC has opted for the locus regit actum 
rule in determining the law governing international contractual obligations.446 Thus, 
if a contract is concluded outside the DRC, the law of the place where it was formed 
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2009 Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens Decision 2282/2009; USA 20 June 2003 
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will govern the contract even if it should be implemented in the DRC.447 The 
principle so stated governs all of the formation, substance, effects, and the evidence 
of any international contract.448 If one compares the provisions of Article 11 PILD 
with those of Article 1(1) (b) CISG, it is clear that the Vienna Sales Convention might 
apply in the DRC by the operation of the lex loci contractus principle.  
It is important to note that three of the countries that surround the DRC, i.e. 
Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia, are already CISG member states.449 Furthermore, the 
five main trading-partners of the DRC, China (48.1%), Zambia (21.3%), USA 
(9.5%), Belgium (5.9%), and France (4.7%)450 have already ratified the CISG. 
Assuming that a dispute arises between a businessman established in the Congo and 
another whose place of business is in one of the countries listed above in respct of 
their commercial transactions; the CISG will apply even though the DRC has not yet 
ratified it.451  
However, although Article 11 PILD submits international contracts to the law 
of the country where they are concluded, it is silent vis-à-vis a contract connected to 
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more than one legal system. One decision of the Appeal Court of Lubumbashi seems, 
in such a case, to support the law of the place where the contract is performed.452 
This case is concerned with a contract concluded in London between a Belgian 
citizen and a Congolese company. The contract had to be fulfilled in the Congo. The 
court held that the law of the place of performance, i.e. Congolese law, governed the 
contract.453  
As has ben said earlier, under the CISG and South African law, where a party 
has more than one place of business, or if the contract is to be performed elsewhere, 
the place which has “the closest relationship to the contract and its performance” will 
prevail.454 With regard to Congolese law, it is not clear about the use of the “closest 
and most real connection theory” in the case of the absence of the choice of the law 
governing the contract. To illustrate such a situation, one domestic sales contract case 
in the Kabala Katumba v Socimex decision seems pertinent on the question.455 In this 
case, the court preferred the place of business of a branch to the company’s 
headquarters to determine its jurisdiction. According to the court, though the power 
of the court of law with regard to a company depends on the location of its head 
office,456 the place where orders were given and payment performed is appropriate 
                                               
452
 See Elis 28 December 1915 Jur Col 1926 242.  
453
 Ibid. 
454
 See Article 10 CISG; for South African law, see Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken 
and Newman 1924 AD 171 185; Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 
138 (C) 139-151; Laconian Maritime Entreprises Ltd v Agramar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 509 525-
30 (D); and Kleinhans v Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 1418 (LC) 29; see also Forsyth 
International Law 330; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 64. 
455
 See Tricom Kin/Gombe 28 February 2012 RCE 2183 Kabala Katumba v Socimex. In this case, 
a party ordered, on 2 November 2011, successively, 149 sacks of rice of 50 Kg each and 701 sacks 
of semolina of 25 Kg each, and, on 16 November 2011, 980 boxes of Sardine Anny for USD 
63,654.00. On 17 November 2011, he ordered 2,000 Oki oil cans of 25 litres each and 500 boxes 
of tomato Corona for USD 100,000.00 which was paid the same day. The seller’s company was 
located at No. A/64 Inzia Avenue, Commune of Kalamu in Kinshasa, but the orders were given at 
one of its branches situated at No. 14 Bokasa Avenue, Commune of Gombe in Kinshasa. The seller 
contested the jurisdiction of the commercial court of Gombe on the grounds that the head office of 
the company was located in the Matete commercial court area.  
456
 Ruled, “En droit, (…) la compétence territoriale pour assigner une personne morale est 
déterminée par le lieu où est situé le siège social, c’est-à-dire celui qui correspond effectivement 
au centre de la décision de la réalisation des activités de l’objet d’une société commerciale.” 
(“Jurisdiction to sue a company is determined by the place where it is headofficed, viz. the epicentre 
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to determine the court’s jurisdiction with regard to third parties.457 It results from the 
Kabala Katumba v Socimex ruling that the branch where the contract was formed 
and payment received influenced the determination of the court’s jurisdiction. That 
branch was, in other words, found more closely connected to the contract and its 
performance than was the company’s main place of business.  
 As a result of this ruling one may assume that the “closest and most real 
connection theory” is also admitted by case law in the legal system under 
examination. Even if the case at hand involved a local sales contract, it is suggested 
that its ruling extends also to international sales contracts. But before this takes place, 
Article 10 CISG and the solution adopted under South African law are recommended.  
 
4.5.4.2 Applicability by means of the party autonomy principle  
 
Congolese law recognises the autonomy of the will as one of the fundamental 
principles of the law of contract.458 In the context of international sales contract, this 
principle is provided by the phrase “unless contrary intention of the parties” placed 
at the start of Article 11 al. 2 PILD. In reference to this clause, the lex loci contractus 
                                               
of its commercial activities.”) Tricom Kin/Gombe 28 February 2012 RCE 2183 Kabala Katumba 
v Socimex at 9 and 10 in limine. 
457
 It was ruled in detail that,  
Dans le cas d’espèce cependant, le Tribunal a noté que pour le demandeur, la défenderesse 
dispose au No. 14, Avenue Bokasa, Commune de la Gombe d’un siège d’operations, mais que 
pour cette dernière, à cette adresse-là, il y a absence d’administration (…); 
Or, le Tribunal a remarqué que les commandes de marchandises et le versement de la somme 
de 100.000,00$US ont été effectués sur place à cette adresse entre les mains du gérant G et de 
la caissière E faisant partie de l’administration de la défenderesse; il se deduit de telles actes 
commerciaux posés par les agents de la défenderesse que l’adresse sus-indiquée constitue pour 
les tiers un siège d’opérations déterminant effectivement pour une action en justice le juge 
compétent territorialement, ici n’etant considéré que l’intérêt des tiers (créanciers, action en 
justice, Etat). 
(“The court has noted that the defendant owns a branch of operation in the Gombe area where, 
however, there is no administration. Goods were ordered from that address and payment carried 
out there in the hands of the manager and of the teller forming part of the administration of the 
defendant. It is inferred from such acts of trade performed by the agents of the defendant that the 
address so indicated is for third party a relevant place of operations likely to determine the 
juridisction of the court, only the interests of third parties (creditors, legal action, state) being taken 
into consideration in circumstances of this kind.”)   
458
 Cf. Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3 above. 
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principle, as explained above, applies only where “the parties have not agreed 
otherwise”, meaning where they have failed to designate, explicitly or implicitly, the 
law leading the contract.459 In other words, parties concluding a sale in the Congo are 
free to choose the law governing their contract or to exclude the law of the country 
where the contract was made.460 Parties may, in addition, during negotiations or 
afterward, choose the law which will govern their rights and obligations to the 
contract by mutual consent.461 The choice of the applicable law may be either 
explicit462 or implicit.463 With regard to the significance of the party autonomy 
principle, the Appeal court of Kinshasa has ruled that “the lex loci contractus rule 
will govern any matter not otherwise regulated by the contract or not covered by a 
specific statute.”464  
                                               
459
 See Léo 8 January 1924 Jur Col 278; Trib App Boma 4 April 1901 Jur Congo 1890-1904 126; 
Cons Sup Congo 19 July 1913 Jur Congo 1913 343; Trib App Boma 30 December 1914 Jur Col 
1925 298; Cons Sup Congo App 28 January 1921 Jur Congo 1921 41; First Inst Elis 8 July 1932 
RJCB 1933 164. 
460
 This rule was formulated in Léo 8 January 1924 Jur Col 1924 278 as follows:  
Si, en principe, les conventions sont régies par la loi du lieu où elles sont conclues, cette règle 
ne consacre qu’une présomption juris tantum. Les parties sont libres de soumettre leurs 
conventions à toute autre législation qu’à la lex loci contractus. Quand (par example) elles ont 
inséré dans leur contrat passé en Belgique, une clause prohibée par la loi belge, elles ont ainsi 
manifesté leur volonté de soustraire leur convention à cette dernière. (brackets added) 
(“Even if, conventions are generally governed by the law of the place where they are formed, this 
rule provides a mere rebutable presumption. The parties are then free to submit their agreements to 
any other legislation than that law. When they have inserted in a contract made in Belgium, a clause 
prohibited by Belgian law, they have shown their willingness to exclude the application of Belgian 
law.”)  
461
 See Elis 18 December 1956 RJCB 1957 43. 
462
 As a rule, any contrary intention must be clearly stated; see Léo 31 December 1956 RJCB 1957 
110. 
463
 Cf. Léo 8 January 1924 Jur Col 1924 278. 
464
 Ibid. It was ruled in this case that,  
Si les parties sont libres de soumettre leur convention à la lex loci contractus, ou à toute autre 
législation, quelque soit leur nationalité, et si, à moins d’intention contraire elles sont censées se 
référer à la loi du lieu du contrat, celle-ci, ou toute autre législation adoptée, ne régira cependant 
leur convention que pour les points non autrement réglés dans leur contrat ou non stipulés en 
dehors de toute prévision légale. 
(“Though the seller and the buyer may submit their convention to the lex loci contractus, or to any 
other legislation, regardless of their nationality, and if, unless otherwise stipulated they are 
supposed to have referred to the law of the place of the contract, this, or any other legislation 
adopted, will govern any matter not otherwise regulated by the contract or not covered by a specific 
statute.”) See in the same sense, Katuala Code 19; Lukoo Droit Civil 91; De Burlet Droit 
International 283.  
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From what has been said thus far, it follows that the CISG may apply in the 
DRC if it is explicitly or implicitly chosen by Congolese merchants as the law 
governing the contract.465 The Vienna Convention may also apply if parties chose 
the law of a contracting state because the CISG constitutes the international sales 
contract law in all of its member countries.466 As can be seen, Congolese law 
considers the common intention of the parties as the starting-point of the 
interpretation of any contract.467 One commentator has observed, however, that the 
common intention of the parties is often of “little assistance”468 in determining the 
law governing the contract. According to him, “(…) cases in which difficulty arises 
are precisely those in which the intention of the parties is not clear or in which they 
have simply failed to provide for the matter in issue at all.”469  
As a result of this, the lack of ratification of the CISG by the DRC may give 
rise to complexity in determining the law governing international sales of goods 
contracts concluded with Congolese traders when it is not expressly chosen by 
parties, or where the contract is to be performed elsewhere. In order to exclude any 
risk of legal insecurity, accession to the CISG by the DRC is recommended. The 
accession of the DRC to the OHADA community seems to be compatible with this 
recommendation as explained below.  
 
4.5.5 OHADA Law vs. the CISG in the DRC 
Congolese accession to the OHADA zone does not conflict with a probable 
ratification of the Vienna Sales Convention by the DRC. In effect, there are a number 
                                               
465
 Cf. Article 6 CISG. 
466
 See Kadner 2011 (13) YB of PIL 165 167; Kornet CESL 6; Brunner CVIM 91 111; see also 
authorities quoted in Note 281 above. See, in the same sense, ICC Arbitration case No. 6653 of 26 
March 1993 Steel Bars case [htt p://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653i1.html] (accessed 10-8-
2012). In the case, parties opted for “substantive laws of France”, i.e. French law to govern the 
contract. The ICC inferred that, even though sales contracts are governed in France by the Civil 
Code, since the entry into force of the CISG in that country, international sales of goods are ruled 
by the Vienna Convention there. 
467
 See Article 238 UAGCL and Article 54 CCO; see also CSJ 3 April 1976 BA 1977 64 65.  
468
 Nicholas Contract 47. 
469
 Ibid.  
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of provisions within the CISG which accord with its coexistence with other regional 
uniform sales laws as OHADA law is. These provisions include Articles 6, 90, 92, 
and, mainly, Article 94.470 
With regard to Article 6, it recognises the freedom of contractual parties to opt 
in or out of any provision of the CISG.471 It means that, even if the DRC comes to 
ratify the Vienna Sales Convention, traders established in this country will keep their 
freedom to choose the law governing their contract. They could, therefore, select the 
CISG freely or not do so. If they exclude the CISG from their transactions, the 
provisions of Book VIII of the UAGCL will apply because, by reference to Article 
10 of the OHADA Treaty, all Uniform Acts are mandatory in every OHADA 
country.  
Concerning Article 90, it relates to any conflict between conventions. Article 
90 states that the CISG “does not prevail over any international agreement which has 
already been or may be entered into.” In so ruling, the provision under consideration 
entails that, where the seller and buyer have their respective place of business in 
member countries of a regional convention containing matters dealt with in the 
Vienna Sales Convention, the applicability of the CISG is displaced in favour of that 
regional sales instrument. The only condition required is for sellers and buyers to be 
established in states party to those regional agreements.472 Commentators have said, 
in this respect, that the purpose of Article 90 is to avoid any conflicts between the 
CISG and, among others, regional sales instruments.473 As was mentioned earlier, 
the eighth Book of the UAGCL deals with commercial sales like the CISG. Thus, if 
the DRC was to adopt the Convention, this Book will continue to have force of law 
                                               
470
 See Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1 VJ 15 22; Ferrari OHADA 79 86-95, for further comments. 
471
 OHADA law does not provide such an option. In the OHADA legal system, all Uniform Acts 
are directly applicable and binding in any member states pursuant to Article 10 of the OHADA 
Treaty, save for application of the party autonomy principle. Brunner believes that situation of 
exclusion of the CISG are rare in practice owing to its modernity and suitability for international 
contracts. See Brunner CVIM 91 112. 
472
 Cf. Article 90 in fine. 
473
 See Ferrari OHADA 79 86; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 1174; Herre in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 1191; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 694. 
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for contracts concluded between traders located in the Congo and their probable 
OHADA community trade-partners. For those contracts negotiated with parties not 
established in the OHADA region, however, the CISG will apply.  
Regarding Article 92(1), it authorises contracting states to exclude one or the 
other of the Convention’s two main Parts, meaning Part II dealing with the 
“Formation of Contract”, or Part III governing “The Rights and Obligations of the 
Parties”. Consistent with this provision, a country, for instance the DRC, may 
declare, at the time of accession, that a regional instrument, such as the OHADA 
Commercial Act, will prevail over the CISG for matters relating either to the 
formation of contract, or to  the rights and obligations of parties. Of course an Article 
92(1) reservation may sometimes be insufficient to guarantee the application of a 
regional instrument as Article 92(2) contests the quality of CISG member states to 
countries which have made use of the reservation. Simply, because nations which 
have exercised the right provided by Article 92 are considered non-CISG contracting 
states, the CISG may still prevail over the UAGCL with regard to countries 
belonging to both OHADA and the CISG.474 Even though the CISG may govern the 
Part not excluded, nevertheless, where conflict-of-law rules lead to the application 
of the law of a reservation country, for example the DRC, Congolese commercial 
law, constituted by UAGCL provisions, will apply.   
Finally, with regard to Article 94(1), it allows CISG member states with the 
same or closely related legal rules to declare that the Convention will not apply to 
contracts concluded between parties established in such countries.475 Applied to the 
OHADA area, Article 94(1) approves the exclusion of sales contracts governed by 
Book VIII of the UAGCL from the application of the CISG. As Castellani has said, 
Article 94(1) “is particularly important as it provides reassurance that under Treaty 
                                               
474
 Cf. Section 4.3.4.3 above. 
475
 See Ferrari OHADA 79 92; Coetzee/De Gama 2006 (10) 1 VJ 15 22-23; Castellani 2008 (1/2) 
Rev dr unif 115 121; see also Herre in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 1204ff; 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 1186ff. Article 94 
declaration has, for instance, been exercised by Scandinavian states so that Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Norway, and Sweden apply the CISG only to sales contracts formed with parties from 
outside the Scandinavia region. See De Ly 2005 (25) 6 JL & Com 1 10. 
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law and the CISG provisions, OHADA Acts and the CISG are fully compatible and 
their interaction ensures maximum harmonisation both at the global and at the local 
level.”476 Ferrari adds to this by saying that Article 94(1) is “the most relevant CISG 
provision,” much more than Articles 90 and 92(1), because it allows the declaration 
to be made “at any time” during or after accession.477  Succinctly, in keeping with 
Article 94(1), the DRC and other OHADA countries may legally agree to prefer the 
Commercial Act among them, and apply the CISG only for contracts concluded with 
parties from outside the OHADA community. 
From the provisions discussed above, it is clear that, though the DRC has 
adopted OHADA law, it does not have to fear any accession to the CISG. The two 
sources of law may peacefully coexist in the Congo. In that situation, gaps left in 
Congolese sales law, by the provisions of the OHADA Commercial Act, will be filled 
by the UN Sales Convention.   
  
4.6 Conclusion on Chapter Four  
 
A harmonised legal system is extremely beneficial to private dealers as it contributes 
to the removal of barriers and obstacles in international trade. Efforts in this regard 
started early in the 1930s when the UNIDROIT began preparing a uniform law on 
the sale of goods. As its products that are ULIS and ULF did not obtain widespread 
acceptance, the UN established UNCITRAL with the mandate to promote a 
“progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade.”478 It is 
under its sponsorships that the CISG was adopted in Vienna on April 1980. 
UNCITRAL’s success in harmonising business law has been evidenced by the 
enthusiasm with which the CISG is currently adhered to. From eleven original 
contracting states, the CISG has now been accepted in 79 countries of which eleven 
are African, the DRC and South Africa excluded.  
                                               
476
 Castellani 2008 (1/2) Rev dr unif 115 121. 
477
 Ferrari OHADA 79 94. 
478
 Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115; Felemegas 2000-2001 Review of the CISG 115. 
287 
 
Normally, the CISG governs international sales contracts formed between 
parties established in contracting states. It may, however, also apply occasionally to 
contracts concluded between parties located outside contracting states if PIL rules so 
recommend. Similarly, the Convention does not have as its goal the solving of all 
matters related to international sale of goods contracts. Instead, its scope of operation 
is limited to rules related to the formation of contract and the rights and obligations 
of the sellers and buyers which originate from the contract. Despite such a limitation, 
the CISG is currently a very successful instrument, but not a perfect code. It may, 
from time to time, need interpretation. In this regard, Article 7 CISG demands that 
courts and arbitration tribunals favour the Convention’s international character and 
uniformity rather than giving way to any “homeward trend”. Italian courts have 
faithfully followed this requirement. Of course, American courts, German courts, and 
judges in other leading member states of the CISG have also tried to take into account 
foreign case law in their decisions, but not as extensively as the Italian courts have 
done. 
In addition, the value of the CISG has to date become indisputable; the CISG 
has influenced legal reforms in many countries and regions. In Europe, the PICC, 
PECL, CFR, and the CESL are largely inspired by the CISG. National laws of 
countries, such as the Scandinavian states, Germany, Estonia, and China are, 
likewise, also founded on the Vienna Sales Convention. On the African continent, its 
influence is encountered in the OHADA Commercial Act. Outside the OHADA 
Region, the CISG’s influence seems minimal in other African nations, particularly 
in Southern African countries and the DRC. 
 With regards to South Africa and the DRC, the CISG may already apply as 
far as contracts concluded between parties established in these countries are 
concerned although they have not yet ratified the CISG. In other words, if the places 
of business of parties are located either in the DRC or in South Africa, the CISG 
would not directly apply. If Congolese or South African courts are confronted by an 
international sales dispute, however, they might apply the CISG by virtue of conflict-
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of-law rules if these rules point to the application of the law of a contracting state. 
This is evidenced by the fact that, although South African law has moved from the 
lex loci contractus principle to the proper law of the contract rule, the DRC still 
maintains the first rule in addition to the party autonomy principle. As a result of this, 
when Congolese parties fail to choose the law governing their contract, the law of 
the country where the contract was concluded will be preferred. This law should 
probably be the CISG because five of the main trading partners of the DRC and three 
of the countries that surround the Congo are CISG contracting states.  
This situation puts Congolese traders in a position where they could be bound 
by a Convention to which their country has not yet acceded and which they are 
supposed not to know about. As is recommended at the end of this study, the DRC 
would do well to adopt the Vienna Sales Convention for more legal security. Its 
adoption of OHADA law will not be in conflict with such a decision. 
Chapter Five 
 
COMPARISON REGARDING THE FORMATION  
OF INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
The formation of contract stage refers to the technical process of concluding a 
contract.1 On the subject, the fundamental basis in all of the CISG, South African 
law, and Congolese law is the agreement among contracting parties.2 A contract is 
normally formed by an exchange of consents. This means that for concluding a 
contract, it is necessary that the will of each party be made clear to the other party. 
One of the contracting parties undertakes the initiative by proposing the contract to 
the other who, in response, expresses his/her agreement. The proposal made by the 
first party constitutes the “offer”, and the answer given by the second party forms the 
“acceptance”.3  
                                               
1
 Kröll 2005 (6) 25 JL & Com 39 42. 
2
 For the CISG, see Article 6 which allows parties to opt in or out the provisions of the Convention. 
For South African law, see Saambou-Nasionale Bouverening v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 993F 
in which the consensualism theory is posited; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 1; and Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 19. For Congolese law, see Article 249 al. 1 UAGCL which establishes the 
freedom of parties to enter into a contract; and Articles 1 and 8 CCO which define the contract and 
enumerate its validity requirements, as well as Article 263 CCO which provides the definition of 
sales. 
3
 Klimas Contract 19; quoting Pineau Obligations; see also Youngs Comparative 513.  
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Part II of the CISG4 and South African contract law5 regulate the offer and 
acceptance as essential elements of a valid international sales contract.6 In contrast 
to them, though Articles 1, 8, and Article 263 CCO state that all contracts, in general, 
and sales contracts, in particular, are based on the agreement; they do not indicate 
how such an agreement should be reached. The process of concluding a contract was 
developed, in the field of the application of the CCO, as matter of fact. For that reason 
the effect of OHADA law on Congolese law will be given particular attention in this 
chapter.  
Where the sale is described as an international sale, there are factors which 
may impact on the general principles of the process of its formation. As Van Niekerk 
and Schulze have said, international sales result from complex negotiations involving 
technical implementation of the offer and acceptance rules.7 This situation is owing 
to the fact that international sales often involve “an arrangement between parties 
separated in time and space and communicating by way of anyone or more of a wide 
variety of means.”8 Because of that, the formation of international contract process 
may encounter difficulties.  
                                               
4
 Part II contains eleven provisions, i.e. Articles 14 to 24 of which, Articles 14 to 17 deal with the 
offer, and Articles 18 to 22 deal with the acceptance. The last two articles (Articles 23 and 24) are 
concerned with the time and place the contract is formed. It should immediately be noted that, 
although the CISG sets up a considerable scheme for determining the objective agreement of parties 
by means of offer and acceptance, the Convention does not deal with some important areas relating 
to the formation of the contract, for instance, the validity of a contract (Cf. Section 4.3.5 above). 
Other issues relating to the formation of the contract, but not expressly ruled by the CISG, include 
the conclusion of a contract by agency, and the inclusion of standard terms in the contract. (See Kröll 
2005 (6) 25 JL & Com 39 42; Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239; see also Schwenzer/Hachem in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 88-95; and Djordjevic in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 67-88). Under OHADA law perspectives, matters of this kind are deferred to civil code 
provisions. (Cf. Article 237 al. 1 UAGCL). 
5
 Cf. Christie/Bradfield Contract 23-108; Van der Merwe et al Contract 46-85; Kerr Contract 61-
129; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 67; Quinot Contract 74. It is remembered that under South 
African law the same principles govern both domestic and international sales contracts.  
6
 See Eiselen 2011 (14) 1 PER/PELJ 233. But, Quinot (Contract 74 75) for whom, although the 
offer and acceptance model is regarded as the basic conceptual device in analysing the formation 
of contracts under South African law, such “is only a tool and not a prerequisite for determining 
whether (or not) a contract is formed.”  
7
 Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 67. 
8
 Ibid. 
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In order to explain how to overcome those types of difficulties in Congolese 
law, it is primarily the CISG couple offer-acceptance rule that will guide us in the 
following discussion. In substance, the current chapter consists of three main sections 
dealing successively with the offer, the acceptance, and the time and place where an 
international sales contract is supposed to be formed. This chapter aims to investigate 
the extent to which UAGCL provisions may have improved Congolese sales law in 
order to align it with the CISG and South African law on the subject of the formation 
of contract. It intends also to examine the remaining shortcomings of Congolese 
contract law, and the means by which they can be filled using the Vienna Sales 
Convention and South African law as reference.  
 
5.2  Offer in International Sales Contracts   
 
5.2.1 Introduction  
 
As has been said earlier, an offer may a priori be defined as “a manifestation of 
unilateral will whereby a person makes known his intention to contract and the 
essential conditions of the contract.”9 So, after a brief explanation of the general 
principles applicable to the offer, the following discussions will focus on the 
substantial requirements of the offer, its withdrawal, and revocability conditions 
under the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law. Each of these topics will 
end with comparative assessments of the current Congolese law situation.  
  
5.2.2 General Principles  
 
An offer is usually described as an express or tacit indication of the contractual 
intention to be legally bound if the other party accepts it as it stands.10 The general 
                                               
9
 See Ghestin Droit Civil 260. Simply, an offer is a draft contract proposed by one of the parties. 
See De Bondt in Bocken Belgian Law 227; Youngs Comparative 51. 
10
 See Owsia Contract 397 and 409 whereby, the author reproduces Weil and Terré’s definition 
according to which an offer is “a unilateral declaration of will addressed by a person to another, 
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definition so stated is, however, subject to some exceptions to be addressed in 
subheadings dealing with the three legal systems under examination. Within the 
CISG, the first sentence of Article 14(1) stipulates that, “a proposal for concluding a 
contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is 
‘sufficiently definite’ and indicates ‘the intention of the offeror to be bound’ in case 
of acceptance.”11 Articles 15(2) and 16(1) complement this by allowing the offer to 
be withdrawn or revoked, as long as it has not yet reached the offeree.  
In the perspective of South African law, an offer is also considered as a 
sufficiently precise proposition put forward as the basis of a proposed contract.12 It 
is, in the words of Sharrock, “a proposal of certain terms of performance made with 
the intention of being agreed to by another person.”13 With regard to its origin, 
Christie and Bradfield have argued that, although its equivalent concept, that is 
stipulatio,14 was known to in Roman and the old Roman-Dutch law, the use of the 
specialised word “offer” comes to modern South African law by way of English 
law.15 Thus, “a person is said to make an offer when he puts forward a proposal with 
the intention that by its mere acceptance (...) a contract should be formed.”16 As for 
the CISG, in South African law an offer must reach the offeree in order to bind the 
                                               
whereby the offeror proposes to the other the conclusion of the contract.” See also Ghestin Droit 
Civil 260; De Bondt in Bocken Belgian Law 227; Youngs Comparative 51. 
11
 A similar definition is also provided by Article 2.1.2 PICC which is  worded similarly as its 
equivalent CISG Article 14(11), and by Article 2:201 PECL for which a proposal constitutes an 
offer if, “(a) it is intended to result in a contract if the other party accepts it; and (b) it contains 
sufficiently definite terms to form a contract.” For comments, see Alban in Felemegas 
Interpretation 76; and Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121 30 respectively. Article 31 CESL 
reproduces Article 2:201 PECL. 
12
 See Jurgens and others v Volkskas Bank and others Ltd 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 218J-219A.   
13
 Sharrock Business 53. 
14
 The word Stipulatio means a question requiring a straight, affirmative answer in order to create 
a contract. 
15
 Christie/Bradfield Contract 31; see also Schreiner Contribution 41. Under English law, an offer is 
defined as “an expression of willingness to contract on the terms stated in it as soon as those terms 
are accepted by the party to whom the statement is made”. See Birks Private Law 6; taking support 
from Storer v Manchester CC [1974] 1 WLR 1403.   
16
 Ibid. See also Jurgens and others v Volkskas Bank and others Ltd 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 218J-219A. 
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author, which means that from the time being sent until it is accepted, the offer may 
be revoked unless there is an agreement to keep it open.17  
With regard to Congolese law, Article 8 CCO, dealing with requirements for 
the validity of contracts, states that all contracts are based on agreements.18 
Unfortunately, the provision does not provide the content of contractual agreements. 
Yet, Article 8 is the only broad provision of the civil code defining the requirements 
for a valid contract.19 Other provisions of Chapter II of the CCO dealing with 
essential conditions required for the enforceability of the contract are, instead, 
concerned with defects to consent.20 While discussing a comparable situation under 
Belgian law, Wéry noted: 
One of the weakest parts of the (civil) code is the one pertaining to the conclusion 
of the contract. (…) There are (…) no provisions about what the doctrine calls the 
‘dynamic approach of the conclusion’, i.e. the negotiation of the contract and the 
process of its conclusion (offer and acceptance, precontractual duties, and so on).21 
As Montero has stated, when the 1804 Napoleonic civil code, on which the CCO is 
based, was drafted, “the consensual agreement principle was so well-known in the 
Old Law that the civil code did not find it useful to regulate it expressly.”22 As regards 
the conclusion of sales contracts, likewise, Article 264 CCO also merely requires 
parties to reach agreement as to the thing sold and the price without any other 
                                               
17
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 67; Christie/Bradfield Contract 55-56; Kerr Contract 82. 
18
 As explained in Section 2.3.5.2 above, Article 8 CCO provides four conditions for the validity 
of any contract; the consent, capacity, an object, and the cause.  
19
 With regard to French law, see Nicholas Contract 61 and 62; Youngs Comparative 514. Article 
8 CCO corresponds to Article 1108 FCC. 
20
 See Articles 9 to 18 CCO, which correspond to Articles 1109 to 1133 FCC. Article 9, for instance, 
denies to consent given by mistake or extorted by duress or fraud the quality of valid consent.  
21
 Wéry Contracts 21 23. In the perspective of the Napoleonic civil code, see Montero Contract 61 
78; Youngs Comparative 514. Of course, one can, here and there, under other Congolese 
regulations, find the use of the words acceptation or offre in relation to specific contracts. This is 
the case for donations (Articles 873 to 878 CFC, definition, and form of gifts, which correspond to 
Article 894 and Article 932ff Napoleonic civil code); and Agency (Article 526 al. 2 and Article 527 
al. 2 CCO, comparable to Articles 1984 al. 2 and 1985 al. 2 FCC). With regard to the word “offer”, 
it is only referred to in relation to “offers of payment and consignment” or “tenders of payment and 
deposit” (Articles 155 to 162 CCO). For equivalent provisions, see Articles 1257 to 1264 FCC.  
These issues are not discussed in this study. 
22
 Montero Contract 61 67. 
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precision with reference to the offer and acceptance, which constitutes a gap.23 
Facing this situation, courts have tried to develop a formation of contract theory 
under the impulse of commercial transactions. More recently, case law solutions have 
been supplanted by the provisions of the OHADA Commercial Act. Influenced by 
the CISG, Articles 241 to 249 of the OHADA Commercial Act are based on the offer 
and acceptance model of contracting too.24 
Subsequent to these general comments, the following paragraphs look, as stated 
before, at the ground rules of the offer, its withdrawal, and its revocability rules. 
 
5.2.3 Substantial Validity Requirements of the Offer 
 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
 
For a proposal to qualify as an offer, says Article 14(1) CISG, it must be sufficiently 
definite, and indicate the intention of the offeror to be bound in the event that it is 
accepted by the offeree.25 Article 241 al. 3 UAGCL is similarly worded. Both 
provisions state the minimum requirements for a valid offer. These consist in the 
identification of the goods, the determination of the price, and the intention of the 
offeror to be bound in the case the offeree accepts the offer. The requirements stated 
above meet, to some degree, standards formulated, under South African law, in the 
definition by Van der Merwe and others according to which, “An offer is an 
expression of will, made with the intention of creating an obligatory relationship on 
certain or ascertainable terms with another, and brought to the attention of the 
                                               
23
 Article 264 CCO states that the sale is perfect as between the parties, and ownership passes de 
facto to the buyer from the seller as soon as the property sold and the price have been agreed upon, 
although that property has not yet been delivered nor the price paid. 
24
 Article 241 al. 1 is clear that “A contract shall be concluded (…) by an acceptance of an offer 
(…).” 
25
 For an application, see Belgium 25 January 2005 Commercial Court Tongeren Scaforn 
International BV & Orion Metal BVBA v Exma CPI SA [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
050125b1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012); see also Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 
258; Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 224; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86:8 86-
22; Ott/Matthey Commerce 24. 
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addressee, so as to enable him to establish a contract by accepting the offer as it was 
made.” (Italics added)26 This introductory statement shows that a valid offer is 
established on a double basis: to be sufficiently definite; and to indicate the 
commitment of the offeror to be bound.  
 
5.2.3.2  A proposal “sufficiently definite” 
 
The CISG 
The criteria for the definiteness of the proposal are enumerated by the second 
sentence of Article 14(1). As stated by it, a proposal is sufficiently definite if it 
“indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for 
determining the quantity and the price.”27 This ruling was explained by the Austrian 
Supreme Court in the Chinchilla Furs case as follows: 
(…) the content of the proposal must be sufficiently definite. This is the case where 
a proposal indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision 
for determining the quantity and the price. The condition is fulfilled where the 
essentialia negotii are expressly fixed in the offer; however, the second sentence of 
Article 14(1) CISG also allows for an “implicit determination”, i.e. [giving] 
criterions which allow for an interpretation that results in a definite price, definite 
goods or (and) their quantity.28 
As far as the goods are concerned,29 Alban notes that the provision under examination 
does not expressly require that the offeror identify exactly the goods that are to be 
the object of the contract. Suffice it to indicate the nature and characteristics which 
                                               
26
 See Van der Merwe et al Contract 47-48; taking support on Bourbon-Leftley v WPK (Landbou) 
Bpk 1999 (1) SA 902 (C); Ideal Fastener Corporation CC v Book Vision (Pty) Ltd [2002] 1 All SA 
321 (D).  
27
 For an illustration, see USA 21 January 2010 Federal District Court [California] Golden Valley 
Grape Juice and Wine LLC v Centrisys Corporation et al [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/100121u1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). In this case, the offer was contained in an e-mail 
identifying the goods for sale, the quantity of the goods, and their price. 
28
 Austria 10 November 1994 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Chinchilla Furs case, CLOUT 
case No.106 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941110a3.html] (last accessed 21-6-2012).  
29
 For the meaning of the concept “goods”, see Section 4.3.2.3 above. 
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will allow the offeree to decide knowingly.30 That is also the meaning of the last part 
of Article 14(1) where the quantity of the goods may be determined either “expressly 
or implicitly”. Simply, the degree of the specification required by the Convention 
will depend upon the type of goods which are the subject matter of the proposal.31  
Although Article 14(1) refers to the quantity of the goods, it does not, however, 
expressly regulate the issue of their “quality”. Normally, the type of the goods should 
be determined by the parties freely in the contract. But, if the contract is silent on the 
matter regarding the quality of the goods, commentators believe that such deficiency 
should be filled by applying the provisions of Article 35 relating to the conformity 
duty. In effect, Article 35 obliges the seller to deliver goods that are of the quantity, 
quality, and description as required by the contract, and contained or packaged in the 
manner required by it.32 
Requiring the seller to deliver goods the quality of which conforms to those 
stipulated in the contract means that parties must have previously reached agreement 
upon that quality. Thus, features such as the quality of the goods have also to be 
indicated in the proposal in order to determine the approval of the offeree for the 
offer. Owing to the fact that the quality of the goods does not constitute an express 
substantial requirement for the proposal’s definiteness, however, parties are free to 
determine it as they see fit pursuant to the party autonomy principle. One German 
court, in the Test Tubes case, has ruled that, if one of the parties insists on a certain 
quality of the goods, and the offer does not express a clear agreement in that respect, 
there is no valid offer and acceptance, and, consequently, there is no contract.33 The 
                                               
30
 Alban in Felemegas Interpretation 77.  
31
 Huber/Mullis CISG 72. 
32
 For comments on the seller’s obligation of conformity of the goods, see Henschel Conformity 
221; Kruisinga Non-conformity 30; Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121 125; Alban in 
Felemegas Interpretation 78; and Section 6.2.4 below. 
33
 Germany 31 March 1995 Appellate Court Frankfurt Test Tubes case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/950331gl. html] (accessed 16-4-2012). In this case, a German glass manufacturer 
agreed to manufacture and deliver a certain quantity of test-tubes to an Italian company. During 
negotiations, parties did not agree on the type of glass to be delivered. Finally the seller delivered 
test-tubes of “Fiolax” quality, while the buyer alleged to have ordered tubes of “Duran” quality. 
The buyer refused to pay the price billed by the seller. The Court held that, since the acceptance of 
the offer was missing as the parties had not reached agreement on the quality of tubes to be 
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Russian Supreme Arbitration Court has ruled in a similar recent decision that, if a 
letter from one party does not contain specific details which might identify the kind 
and quantity of the goods, there is no reason to consider such a letter as an offer. 
Accordingly, there is, in addition, no enforceable contract.34 
In addition to the goods, Article 14(1) requires the proposal to indicate the 
price or to make it determinable for it to be sufficiently definite. Through this 
provision, the Convention considers the price as one of the salient elements of the 
validity of a contract, which means that, for a sale to be valid, it must fix the price of 
the goods or at least make a provision determining it.35 Article 14(1) provisions, 
however, give the impression of being contradicted by those of Article 55 relating to 
“open-price terms”.36 Pursuant to this article, where parties to a “validly concluded” 
contract fail to determine the price, the price generally paid under comparable 
circumstances in the trade concerned will be implied.37 As it can be understood from 
this, although Article 14(1) considers the price as one of substantial conditions for 
                                               
delivered, there was no valid contract. It concluded, hence, that there was no valid offer and 
acceptance, and no validly concluded contract either. 
34
 Russia 15 April 2011 Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 110415r1.html] (accessed 16-4-2012).  In this case, an 
agreement was signed between a German seller and a Russian buyer for a supply of three household 
appliances consignments. Before the contract was signed, the buyer paid for a consignment. The 
buyer later sued the seller, claiming that the sale should be declared not concluded on the grounds 
that the parties had not agreed on its basic conditions. The court upheld the claim in full. 
35
 Ruangvichathorn in Felemegas Interpretation 193; see also the Austrian Chinchilla Furs case.  
36
 According to Article 55,  
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or make 
provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any indication 
to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade 
concerned.  
37
  The historical drafting process of the CISG reveals that the adoption of Article 55 was 
controversial. Different groups of countries, particularly socialist, civil law, and developing 
countries, objected to open-price terms contracts. See in this sense, Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 
462; and Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ gabuardi.html (accessed 16-4-2012). 
Unlike socialist and civil law countries, “open-price terms” are familiar to common law legal 
system countries. There, the common rule in s 9 of the 1893 Sale of Goods Act, and in §2-305 UCC 
is that “if the contract is silent with respect to the price, an agreement to pay a reasonable price will 
be implied.” See Ziegel/Samson http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/articles/english2. 
html; Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 206; Farnsworth in 
Galston/Smit Sales 3-8; and Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gabuardi.html. 
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the formation of the contract, Article 55 envisages circumstances in which a sale 
should be “validly concluded” even without fixing the price. A Swiss court in the 
Oven case has approved this reasoning.38 As stated by it, when the seller fails to 
indicate the price of the goods, parties are supposed to refer to the price normally 
charged.39 
The interaction between Article 14(1) and Article 55 has generated debate 
among scholars. The question generally asked on the subject is whether these two 
provisions would be read separately or together. In answer to the question, two 
leading points of view have been advocated, one of these led by Honnold, and the 
other one by Farnsworth. The position of Honnold is that they may be read together, 
whereas the opinion of Farnsworth is that they cannot be read together.40  
On the one hand, it is a rule that, “a contract cannot be concluded under the 
requirements of Article 14(1), unless there is a sufficiently definite price term.”41 A 
propos of this, the definiteness requirement means that a proposal to amount to an 
offer, it must at least, inter alia, fix their price. Farnsworth42 believes that Article 
14(1) is not clear on the matter of whether proposals without price should or not 
constitute a sufficiently definite offer. According to him, “Although (Article 14(1)) 
                                               
38
 Switzerland 27 April 2007 Canton Appellate Court Valais Oven case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070427s1. html] (accessed 16-4-2012).   
39
 It was argued that when a buyer places an order for a new kind of product without any reference 
to the price, his order is regarded as an invitation to make an offer. The seller’s response constitutes 
an offer that the buyer approves by accepting, using, or reselling the goods. If such an offer is silent 
in regard to the price, the price normally charged will apply. 
40
 See Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 10; see also Ruanvichathorn in Felemegas Interpretation 194; 
Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121 127; Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
biblio/gabuardi.html. Farnsworth mentions the “unstated prices issue” among four “troublesome 
problems” within Part II of the CISG. Those problems include firm offers, mailbox rules, battle of 
form problems, and open-price terms. See Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales §3-8 to 3-16; see also 
Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11. The list of unresolved problems within Part II of the CISG is 
lengthened by the law of agency, and the conclusion of an arbitration agreement. For comments, 
see Kröll 2005 (6) 25 JL & Com 39 42. 
41
 Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 10; see also Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/gabuardi.html Fn22. This is also the position of a Swiss court in the Chemical Product 
case whereby, a proposal lacking the purchase price fails to fulfil the requirements of a definite 
offer. See Switzerland 11 October 2004 Canton Court Freiburg Chemical Product case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041011s1.html] (accessed 16-4-2012).  
42
 Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-9; supported by Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 8. 
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states only that a proposal “is sufficiently definite if it (...) expressly or implicitly 
fixes or makes provision for determining (...) the price,” there is an unfortunate 
implication is (sic) that it is not sufficiently definite unless it does this.”43 For this 
reason, Farnsworth does not find in Article 55 a favourable solution to the solving of 
the difficult issue of open-price terms. The author is disappointed that “article 55 
only operates if a contract has been ‘validly concluded’.”44 He concludes, therefore, 
that by its wording, Article 55 does not intend to fill gaps in the formation section of 
CISG Part II.45 
A number of scholars hold the opposite view. According to them, Article 55 
has an ambition to fill the gap for open-price terms well and truly.46 Thus, by 
expressly providing for its applicability to “validly concluded contracts”, the contract 
must have already been formed for the price term to be supplied.47 Yet, normally a 
contract cannot be validly concluded without a sufficiently definite price term. Thus, 
as Vincze has observed, following the interpretation of Articles 14(1) and 55, “a 
vicious circle” is present in the text of the CISG.48  
With regard to the second opinion, on the other hand, Articles 14(1) and 55 
complement each other. The first of these “might be read as stating that a proposal 
with the three stated elements, (i.e. the type of the goods, their quantity, and price) is 
                                               
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 See Farnsworth’s view as commented on by Reitz in Flechtner 1999 (18) JL & Com 191 204.  
46
 See, among others, Koneru (1997 (6) M J G Tr 105 147) for whom, where a contract has been 
validly concluded, the applicable price is the “market price” at the moment the contract is 
concluded. Koneru believes that, by separating Articles 14(1) and 55, Farnsworth should have 
made a literal interpretation of Article 55.  
47
 Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 420; see also Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 8; and Czech 
Republic 25 June 2008 Supreme Court Manufactured Paint case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080625cz.html] (accessed 16-4-2012).  
48
 Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 420. To elude this “vicious circle”, a number of 
commentators explain that Article 55 would be relevant in the case where the CISG is to be applied 
without Part II, e.g. when a contracting state made use of the Article 92 declaration, and the 
applicable domestic law authorises a contract to enter into effect without a price being determined. 
See, among others, Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11 Fn26; Koneru 1997 (6) M J G Tr 105 148; 
Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 8; Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 268; 
Ruanvichathorn in Felemegas Interpretation 193; and Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 420-
421.  
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sufficiently definite, without implying that the lack of one of the elements is fatal”49 
for the contract. According to Honnold, “a contract may be ‘validly concluded’ even 
though it ‘does not expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the 
price’.”50 This argument is evidenced by the fact that “the term ‘validity’ in Article 
55 relates only to requirements of validity other than the determination of the price 
upon which an offer indefinite with respect to the price can be interpreted in the light 
of Article 55.”51 Simply, according to Honnold, Article 55 serves to fill the gaps of 
an unstated price. In recent editions of his book, updated by Flechtner, Honnold 
seems to have revised his initial interpretation. According to him, the CISG Drafting 
“Committee decided to introduce an express statement into Article 55 to make it clear 
that it only applied to agreements which are considered valid by the applicable law”, 
i.e. the applicable law by virtue of PIL rules.”52 Simply, if a contract is invalid with 
regard to domestic law, Article 55 will also not apply. 
                                               
49
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 207; see also Kelso 1982/1983 (21) Colum J Trans L 529 
537; Koneru 1997 (6) M J G Tr 105 148. 
50
 Honnold Uniform Law (1982 and 1987 eds) 163-164; (1999 ed) 199-200; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 207. Honnold’s view is also quoted by Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-9; Amato 
1993 (13) JL & Com 1 8; Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11 Fn24. 
51
 Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 421. This is also the opinion of Sono according to which, 
for an offer to be valid, one needs only “a serious intent to be bound, and definiteness so that a 
court can enforce it if it becomes necessary.” See Sono’s view in Flechtner 1999 (18) JL & Com 
191 205. Of course, Honnold is aware of the controversial character of the issue relating to open-
price terms. While explaining the process which led to Articles 14(1) and 55, Honnold remarks, 
The language that became article 14 of the Convention, from the outset, was framed in terms of 
whether a communication ‘constitutes an offer’. Many of the delegates discussed the issue in 
these terms, while others felt that the issue posed by this language was whether the parties had 
the power to make a valid agreement when the agreement did not fix (or make provisions for 
fixing) the price. There is little indication in the discussions that this divergence in premises 
resulted from differences in commercial experience or in value choices. Instead, the problem 
seemed to reflect different patterns of thought derived from concepts of domestic law. In one 
legal universe it is thought that a contract of sale, in the nature of things, must provide for the 
price; in another legal universe the possibilities of contracting are conceived more broadly.  
See Honnold Uniform Law (1982 and 1987 eds) 163-164; (1999 ed) 199-200; Flechtner Honnold’s 
Uniform Law 207; see also Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gabuardi.html. 
52
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 209-210; see also Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 421. 
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Parenthetically, it is not unusual for the price not to be determined in an 
international sale.53 Owing to its importance to economic success, however, it is only 
irregularly that parties will  
[Intend] to enter into a binding contract without at least an ‘implicit’ understanding 
on the price or a means ‘for determining’ the price. Hence, rarely will it be necessary 
to face the question whether the Convention bears the parties from making a contract 
that neither ‘expressly’ nor ‘implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining (...) 
the price.54  
In the same way that scholars disagree, there is also no unanimity in the case law on 
the “open-price terms” issue. One of the leading cases in this regard is the Hungarian 
Supreme Court Malev case.55 In this case, the Supreme Court recognised the price as 
a substantial requirement of the proposal’s definiteness. It ruled, therefore, that if the 
price cannot be determined from the contract, the latter is void.56 As a means of 
motivation, the Court relied mainly on the provisions of Article 14(1) for which a 
proposal must be sufficiently definite for it to constitute an offer, viz. it must 
expressly or implicitly indicate, inter alia, the price, or make it determinable. As for 
Article 55, the Court stated that this provision could not supply the missing price 
because the goods in issue, i.e. jet engine systems, did not yet have a market price at 
                                               
53
 See Spain 27 November 2003 Appellate Court Barcelona Ski Equipment Rental case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/031127s4.html] (accessed 16-4-2012).  
54
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 210. 
55
 Hungary 25 September 1992 Supreme Court Pratt & Whitney v Malev, The Hungarian Airlines; 
translated in 1993 (13) JL & Com 31; also available online at: [http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/920925h1.html] (accessed 25-4-2012). 
56
 In the case, an American seller, a manufacturer of aircraft engines, made two alternative offers 
of different types of aircraft engines to a Hungarian buyer, without stating the price. The buyer 
chose one of the engine types proposed and placed an order.  On the issue whether a valid contract 
had been concluded, the first judge agreed. For him, because the goods were indicated, and their 
quantity, and the price determinable, there was a validly concluded contract. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court found that the offer and acceptance were vague and, consequently, ineffective since 
they failed to determine the price of the goods ordered or make provision for determining it. It 
repealed the decision of the first judge and concluded that there was no valid contract between the 
parties. For comments, see Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 11; Koneru 1997 (6) M J G Tr 105 149; 
Flechtner 1998 (17) JL & Com 187 21; Witz 1995 (15) JL & Com 175 187-191. 
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that time.57 From the discussion above, it appears that the correlation between 
Articles 14(1) and 55 is truly one of the most difficult problems raised in the CISG.58  
To summarise this, in the view of the drafters of the UNCITRAL Digest, 
despite their relative contradiction, provisions being studied provide interpretative 
guidance which depends on the intention of the parties.59 Thus, “in determining the 
applicability of the CISG Article 55, (vis-à-vis other provisions), one must refer first 
and foremost to the intention of the parties.”60 If it can be proved that parties intended 
to form a contract despite the open-price, their intent should prevail.61 A valid offer 
may, likewise, still be presumed to exist if the price can be determined by reference 
to the circumstances that surround the case. A German court in the Auto case has 
brought to mind that usually “an offer is only able to be accepted if the proposal 
expressly or implicitly sets forth the price or enables the determination of the price.”62 
A price should, therefore, be determined by reference to a listed price on the 
condition that such a list is considered as having been silently agreed on by the 
parties.63 
                                               
57
 The decision in the Malev case has been subject to several criticisms. It is reproached for having 
failed to interpret the concept “validity”, taking into account the intention of parties, and to have 
forgotten the CISG international character by favouring the national party. See Flechtner 1998 (17) 
JL & Com 187 211; Koneru 1997 (6) M J G Tr 105 149; Amato 1993 (13) JL & Com 1 16-17. For 
a list of leading cases applying Article 55, see Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:24 91-35 91-36; 
Ruangvichathorn in Felemegas Interpretation 196; and for a list of cases, in which courts declined 
to apply it, see UNCITRAL Digest 92 Fn48. 
58
 On the question of whether the PICC or the PECL should be used to interpret or supplement 
CISG provisions on “open-price terms matters”, see Alban in Felemegas Interpretation 76-84; 
Ruangvichathorn in Felemegas Interpretation 192-197; Cvetkovik in Felemegas Interpretation 
295-301; Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121-131; Vinceze in Felemegas Interpretation 
419-429. 
59
 See UNCITRAL Digest 268. 
60
 It is recognised that Article 55 does not empower a judge or an arbitrator to establish a price 
when this has already been determined by the parties, or made determinable by them. See Germany 
9 May 2000 Landgericht Darmstadt, CLOUT case No. 343; France 26 February 1995 Cour d’Appel 
Grenoble, CLOUT case No. 151, and other similar cases in UNCITRAL Digest 268 Fn4. 
61
 See Karollus 1995 Cornell Review of the CISG 51 60; Gabuardi http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/gabu ardi.html.  
62
 Germany 19 October 2006 Appellate Court München Auto case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/061019g1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012).  
63
 Ibid. 
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As is the case for the price, it is also possible that the quantity or other features 
of the goods be left open for future determination, either by one of the parties or by 
a third person. In such a situation, practices established “between the parties may 
supply the details of quality, quantity, and price left unspecified in a proposal to 
conclude a contract.”64 What is advised, however, is that the proposal states each and 
all of the essential elements legally required for it to amount to a definite offer. 
South African law  
One of the requirements for validity of the offer, in South African law, is that it must 
be unequivocal, viz. clear on the contract subject-matter. This condition was 
formulated by Levy J in Wasmuth v Jacobs as follows: 
The rules applicable to the interpretation of an offer, or, for that matter, of an 
acceptance of an offer, are not necessarily the same as the rules which are applicable 
in the interpretation of contracts. In Boerne v Harris 1949 1 SA 793 (A) at 799, after 
stating the aforesaid position, Greenberg JA added: ‘Thus, although a contract, even 
if it be ambiguous, may be and generally is binding, the acceptance of the offer (or 
for that matter the offer itself) must be unequivocal, i.e. positive and unambiguous.65 
(…) 
If an offer which is an essential element of any option is vague or capable of more 
than one meaning, it is open to the offeror to contend that it is not capable of being 
accepted and thereby converted into a binding contract. Where there is an ‘offer’ 
which provides that certain terms are to be ‘reviewed’ or to be ‘negotiated’ or ‘to 
stand over’ for decision at a later stage, then pending agreement on such outstanding 
terms neither party has any rights against the other.66 
It results from Levy’s statement that, for it to amount to an offer, a declaration of 
intention must as much as possible set out the essential and material terms of the 
proposed contract, i.e. it must be adequately definite. Where it comes to sales, for 
instance, the offer must mention the thing to be sold and the price.67 The justification 
                                               
64
 See UNCITRAL Digest 92 Fn19; see also Article 65(1) CISG; and Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) 
IHR 239 240. 
65
 As addendum, Levis J appropriated words in brackets, added with respect to the original Judge’s 
statement. 
66
 See Levy J in Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633 E-H; taking support on OK Bazaars v 
Bloch 1929 WLD 37; Wilson Bros Garage v Texas Co (SA) Ltd 1936 NPD 386; Scheepers v Vermeulen 
1948 (4) SA 884 (O); Potchefstroom Municipal Council v Bouwer NO 1958 (4) SA 382 (T). 
67
 See Section 3.4 above for appropriate comments. 
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for this requirement is that the merx and the pretium constitute the basics of any 
contract of sale.68 
As is claimed in section 3.4 above, for a contract to qualify as one of sale, the 
characteristics and nature of the merx must be determined or at least be determinable 
at the time the contract is concluded.69 Simply, there must be a defined and 
ascertainable subject-matter in the proposed contract for it to lead to a sale.70 As ruled 
in Lafrenz (Pty) Ltd v Dempers, where the contract subject matter is both in existence 
and identified at the conclusion of the contract phase, then the contract amounts to a 
sale of ascertained goods.71 It does not matter that goods are corporeal, manufactured, 
sued for, or generic.72 What is important is that parties reach agreement on them. 
Where the goods, though agreed upon, are not in existence or are not identified at the 
formation stage, the sale is one of unascertained goods devoid of legal effect.73 To 
paraphrase Bradfield and Lehmann, if the goods are so vaguely described that it is 
impossible to ascertain their nature and quantity, the offer is void.74 
With regard to the price, it must be serious, certain, or ascertainable, and 
stipulated in legal tender.75 Such being the general rule, it is logical that, for it to be 
sufficiently definite, the offer must mention the price. Parties are, however, not 
obliged always to determine an exact amount of the price to be paid during 
negotiations. If they agree on the method of its determination without further 
recourse to them, the offer, and consequently the contract, is valid.76 It follows then 
                                               
68
 Cf. Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Van Soelen 1916 AD 92.   
69
 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 134; see also Kerr Sale 8; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 21; Hackwill 
Sale 9; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 25. 
70
 See Hamburg v Pickard 1906 TS 1010; Conlon and Fletcher v Donald 1951 (3) SA 196 (C). 
71
 Lafrenz (Pty) Ltd v Dempers 1962 (3) SA 492 (A). 
72
 Kerr Sale 8; Sharrock Business 271; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 134-135; Bradfield/Lehmann 
Sales 25.  
73
 See Kriel and another v Le Roux [2000] 2 All SA 65 (SCA). But, Hackwill (Sale 9 Note 3) for 
whom the distinction between sales of specific goods and sales of unascertained goods is not rigid. 
74
 Cf. Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 29; taking support from Botes & others v Toti Investment Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1978 (1) SA 205 (T). 
75
 See Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 31-32; Kerr Sale 30ff; Hackwill Sale 14; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 
141; Sharrock Business 272; Lotz Sale 361 36.  
76
 This is the meaning of the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest (D 12 1 6; 45 1 74). As 
Colman J said in the Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd case, no valid 
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that, as long as the price is determinable by reference to standards outside the parties, 
an offer with a usual or a market price or the so-called open-price, is satisfactorily 
definite.77 As regards the issue of sales to a reasonable price, it still remains 
controversial.78 
In summary, because reaching consent about the goods and the price constitute 
the foundation of any contract of sale, where parties fail to do so there is no validly 
concluded sale.79 The requirement as regards reference to the goods and the price at 
the formation stage is justified by the fact that a regular offer needs only a 
corresponding acceptance to form a contract. As declarations contained in 
advertisements rarely meet this requirement; they, therefore, lose the status of 
binding offers.80  
Congolese law 
As said earlier, except for provisions defining failure in consent, the CCO does not 
deal with the process of concluding a contract. Despite that absence, scholars and 
                                               
contract would exist unless the parties had agreed, expressly or by implication, on a purchase price. 
Colman specified that the requirement regarding a serious and ascertained price “could be achieved 
by fixing an amount in the contract or by agreeing upon an external standard by the application 
whereof it would be possible to determine the price without further reference to the parties.” See 
also: Westinghouse Brake and Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 
555 (A) 574B-C; Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 (1) SA 566 (A) 
576I-577A; Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk 1997 (4) SA 141 (A) 158F-
159A. 
77
 Oosthuizen points out that, “The market price may be set as the purchase price either by express 
agreement or impliedly via conduct. This case often arises in the event of goods being ordered at a 
shop without the buyer first enquiring after the price. (…) In such cases a tacit agreement has been 
reached that the usual or market price will be charged.”  See Oosthuizen Rights 96 Fn435; see also 
Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333 338; R v Pearson 1942 EDL 117 121-122; R v Soller 1945 TPD 
75; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Breedt 1997 (2) SA 337 (A); but Stead v Conradie en Andere 
1995 (2) SA 111 (A) for sale of land. 
78
 See comments in Section 3.4.4 above. 
79
 Cf. Dawidowitz v van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672 676; Union Government (Minister of Finance) 
v Van Soelen 1916 AD 92; Dharumpal Transport (Pty) Ltd v Dharumpal 1956 (1) SA 700 (A) 
707C; Kennedy v Botes 1979 (3) SA 836 (A) 845F-846A; and Van der Walt v Stassen 1979 (3) SA 
810 (C) 814D-E.  
80
 See Crawley v Rex 1909 TS 1105 whereby, an advertisement for the sale of tobacco specifying the 
price was judged incomplete because it failed to indicate the quantity of goods involved  in each sale; 
see also Van der Merwe et al Contract 49 and authorities quoted by them in Fn20. For a comparative 
analysis of the effect of advertisements in other legal systems, see Kadner Contrat 67-111. 
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case law have developed a number of characteristics that a regular offer should meet 
for it to have legal effect. As Kalongo has argued, for instance, contrary to a simple 
invitation to contract, an offer must be firm, unequivocal, precise, and complete.81 
As far as the comprehensiveness and accuracy characteristics are concerned, they 
mean that an offer must cover all fundamental elements of the purported contract so 
that a mere acceptance of it suffices to generate a contract.82 To give an example of 
this, where the contract consists of a sale of goods, mention must be made upon the 
thing sold and the price, as required by Article 264 CCO.83  
It is important to note that the requirement for the draft of the contract to be 
satisfactorily definite is now expressly formulated by Article 241 al. 3 UAGCL. As 
stated by this provision, “A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or 
more specific persons constitutes an offer only if it is sufficiently definite and 
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.”84 Standards 
for a sufficiently definite offer are delineated by Article 241 al. 2 UAGCL which 
declares, “An offer is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and, expressly or 
implicitly, fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.”85 As 
it can be observed, the last provision reproduces literally the second sentence of 
                                               
81
 Kalongo Obligations 55; see also Mubalama Obligations 45. For comments on each of these 
characteristics in the context of French law, see Owsia Contract 410-411; Ghestin Droit Civil 261-
265. 
82
 It was ruled that a “proposal must be sufficiently definite to permit the conclusion of the contract 
by mere acceptance of the other party.” Cass B 23 September 1969 Arr Cass 1970 84; referred to 
by De Bondt in Bocken Belgian Law 227. 
83
 For commercial sales essential requirements, see Section 2.4 above. With regard to consumer 
contracts, Article 1(1) and (2) of the Consumer Protection Decree of 1 April 1959 (BO 1959 1284)  
allows the Government “to determine the composition, quality, and components that goods must 
comply with for them to be sold, offered or exposed for sale.” If it is possible that specific 
conditions be imposed in connection with the composition, quality, and substance of consumer 
goods, there is a greater reason for commercial transactions. For that reason there is ground to 
believe that, if a number of requirements are needed in commercial sales with regard to the 
description and quantity of the goods, any offer must conform to them for it to be valid.  
84
 Compare this with the first sentence of Article 14(1) CISG.  
85
 For an illustration, see Senegal 15 January 2002 Tribunal Regional hors Class de Dakar, Case 
No. 117 Mehsen A v Saleh J [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-05-90.html] 
(accessed 6-4-2013).  
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Article 14(1) CISG, the only difference being that the first replaces the word 
“proposal” by “offer”.  
It is vital that the proposal mentions the goods and the price, or lets them be 
determined, because these form the basics of any sale upon which agreement shall 
be reached. Owing to the similarity between Article 241 al. 2 UAGCL and Article 
14(1) CISG, comments made above in connection with the last provision apply 
mutatis mutandis with regard to modern Congolese law. The Commercial Act 
departs, however, from the Vienna Convention on the basis that it does not have a 
provision similar to Article 55 CISG. This protects Congolese law from the debate 
about the validity of contracts without price. In situations where there is a need to 
determine the price, Article 263 al. 2 UAGCL allows parties to refer to the market 
price, meaning the price generally charged at the time of formation of the contract 
for similar goods and in comparable circumstances. 
Comments  
Congolese law did not traditionally provide a definition for the offer. The situation 
has changed today with the influence of Article 241 UAGCL which reproduces 
Article 14(1) CISG. As to the latter, Article 241 states clearly the criteria for a valid 
offer among which is its definiteness. Thus, as for the CISG and South African law, 
in modern Congolese law a proposal regarding sale must also be definite, viz. 
indicating the nature and the quantity of the goods and the price in order to produce 
legal effect. Though fixing the price is important for the contract, the fact that the 
parties may abstain from determining it does not automatically invalidate the 
agreement. It is acknowledged, in all of the three legal systems under consideration, 
that, where parties who are in a regular course of business fail to determine the price, 
they are supposed to apply the price habitually paid in the trade concerned or the 
market price. Briefly, the CISG requirements as for a definite offer correspond to the 
ones in force under domestic laws.  
South African law and Congolese law, by contrast to the CISG, do not, 
however, envisage the case of a “contract validly concluded” without the 
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determination of the price. This is justified by the fact that, under domestic laws, the 
price is one of the essential elements of a sale so that its omission entails the nullity 
of the contract. The result, then, is that domestic laws seem clearer than the CISG on 
the question of open-price terms.  
Further to the certainty, an additional requirement for a proposal to constitute 
an offer is that it expresses the intention of the party making the offer to be bound by 
the offer.  
 
5.2.3.3 “Intention of the offeror to be bound” 
 
The CISG 
As stated by Article 14(1), a proposal for concluding a contract constitutes an offer 
on condition that it, inter alia, “indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound” in 
the event that his/her proposition is accepted by the other party. At first, the 
requirement for the will of the offeror to be bound in the case of acceptance aims to 
distinguish an offer from a simple invitation to submit offers. Such an intention is 
known as “the animus contrahendi”.86 As Alban has stated,   
The available doctrine distinguishes between the offer, in a strict sense, and a 
preliminary invitation to conclude a contract, holding that in the first case the offeror 
has the intention to be bound in the case his proposal is accepted by the offeree, 
whereas such an intention does not exist in an invitation to consider entering into a 
contract.87  
In general, the intention of the offeror to be bound can be ascertained from the 
language used by him/her. There is an authority that the use of phrases such as “we 
order for immediate delivery” or “we offer for sale” can be considered as evidencing 
a clear intent of the offeror to be bound.88 But, as it was ruled by an American court, 
                                               
86
 Cvetkovik in Felemegas Interpretation 295; Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121 122. 
87
 Alban in Felemegas Interpretation 81; see also Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 270. 
88
 See Huber/Mullis CISG 71; UNCITRAL Digest 91; both quoting Switzerland 5 December 1995 
Handelsgericht des Kantons St Gallen IHR 2001 44, CISG Online No. 245.  
309 
 
in Hanwha Corporation v Cedar Petrochemicals Inc., the use of expressions such as 
“no contract would enter into force unless (seller) countersigns the documentation as 
is” shows one party’s intention not to be bound.89 When there is strong purpose for 
a party to be bound once its proposal is accepted, there is no need for a proposal to 
contain too much detail. If the intent is unclear, however, the issue of whether the 
offeror was willing to be bound if the proposal was accepted will depend on 
statements and practices of parties as stated by Article 8 CISG.90  
Article 8(1) states that, “statements made by and other conduct of a party are 
to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have 
been unaware what that intent was.”91 Additionally, Article 8(2) announces that, if 
                                               
89
 USA 18 January 2011 Federal District Court [New York] Hanwha Corporation v Cedar 
Petrochemicals Inc. [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/110118u1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). In 
this case,  
[A] Korean buyer (plaintiff) and an American seller (defendant) engaged in several transactions 
for the sale of petrochemicals products. Their course of dealing had not been smooth. But in 
past transactions they agreed, either explicitly or impliedly, on all contractual terms and met 
obligations accordingly. In the disputed transaction, the defendant acknowledged plaintiff’s bid 
to purchase 1,000 metric tons of Toluene at the then current market price of USD 640 per metric 
ton. In order to conclude this market, the defendant dispatched signed documentation to the 
plaintiff, including a clause selecting New York law, the UCC, and INCOTERMS 2000 as the 
applicable law. The plaintiff did not respond, but engaged with the defendant in preparing a bill 
of lading and nominating a vessel for the ocean carriage. Later, the plaintiff sent back the 
amended documentation, with Singapore law and INCOTERMS 2000 as the proper law of the 
contract. Upon sending back the documentation, he wrote that “no contract would enter into 
force unless defendant countersigns the documentation as is.” Defendant refused to take 
plaintiff’s terms. Instead he asked him to sign and return per defendant’s terms.  
The Federal District Court deduced from the buyer’s attitude the intention not to be bound by his 
proposal and concluded to the inexistence of the contract between the parties.  
90
 Kelso1982/1983 (21) Colum J Trans L 529 533; Switzerland 3 July 1997 Bezirksgericht St. 
Gallen, CLOUT case No. 215; in UNCITRAL Digest 91 Fn10. Perillo (in Felemegas Interpretation 
49) says that the provisions of Article 8 have “special significance for agreements that have not 
resulted from detailed negotiations.” 
91
 For an application of this, see USA 8 February 2011 Federal District Court [Maryland] CSS 
Antenna Inc. v Amphenol-Tuchel Electronics GMBH [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
110208u1.html] (last accessed 27-6-2012). It was ruled, in this case, that a phrase such as “May 
we point out” is neither clear nor specific regarding seller’s intent that general conditions should 
control the term of the sale between the parties. See, in the same sense: New Zealand 22 July 2011 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand RJ & AM Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller 
§36 and 62 (buyer’s responsibility) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/110722n6.html]; Germany 
14 January 2009 Appellate Court München Metal Ceiling Materials case (application of standard 
terms and conditions) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090114g1.html]; Netherlands 21 January 
2009 District Court Utrecht Sesame Seed case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090121n1.html] 
(cases last accessed 28-6-2012).  
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the intent of one party remains obscure notwithstanding the terms of Article 8(1), 
his/her statements and conduct should be interpreted “according to the understanding 
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the 
same circumstances.”92 To exemplify this, in the Alain Veyon case, a French buyer 
pleaded with the Court to reduce the debt claimed by an Italian seller on the basis 
that his successor had benefited from lower prices. The Grenoble Appeal Court 
dismissed his request. According to the Court, since the buyer “had taken delivery of 
the goods without specifically questioning their purchase price, his behaviour has to 
be interpreted as acceptance of the price charged, pursuant to article 8(2) and (3) 
CISG.”93 The same rule was formulated by the Austrian Supreme Court in the 
Chinchilla Furs case as follows:  
For the validity of the offer [i.e., whether it can be validly accepted], it also suffices 
that the required minimum content can be understood as being sufficiently definite 
by “a reasonable person of the same kind” as the other party (offeree) would have 
“in the same circumstances” (…). According to Article 8(3) CISG, in determining 
the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due 
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the 
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.94 
As has been summarised by several scholars, Article 8 provisions recognise that 
‘usages’ suggesting the desire to trade can be given an interpretive meaning with 
regard to the will of the parties.95  
The CISG recognises, furthermore, in usages and the practices of parties a 
normative value through Article 9. As stated by this provision, “parties are bound by 
any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have 
established between themselves.”96 In addition, the Convention binds parties under 
                                               
92
 See, for application, ICC Court of Arbitration 1999 Arbitral Award No. 9187 
[http://www.unilex.info/case. cfm?id=466] (last accessed 27-6-2013). 
93
 France 26 April 1995 Appellate Court Grenoble Entreprise Alain Veyon v Société Ambrosio 
[http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/950426f1.html] (accessed 25-4-2012); see also Perillo in 
Felemegas Interpretation 49. 
94
 Austria 10 November 1994 Supreme Court Chinchilla Furs Case, CLOUT case No.106. 
95
 See Pamboukis 2005-2006 (25) 1/2 JL & Com 107 108; Schmidt-Kessel in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 146; DiMatteo 2011 (3) Belgrade LR 67 72. 
96
 Article 9(1) CISG; see Walker 2005 (24) 2 JL & Com 263 269, for comments. 
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Article 9(2) to usages widely known and observed internationally in the same trade. 
More specifically, Article 9(2) presumes the parties to have indirectly made 
applicable to the formation of the contract “usage(s) of which they knew or ought to 
have known and which in international trade (are) widely known to, and regularly 
observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned,” unless otherwise agreed. Simply, through Article 9(2), trade usages are 
considered as part of the contract so that their knowledge will be presumed even if 
there is no real knowledge. This means, therefore, that a party could be bound to a 
usage to which he has no real knowledge if that usage is internationally known and 
generally followed by merchants in that trade.97 
Thus, when determining the intent of a party to be bound by his/her proposal or, 
likewise, the understanding of a reasonable person, “due consideration must be given”, 
inter alia, to practices and usages. Circumstances to consider in the case include, but 
are not limited to, previous negotiations, any practices which the parties have 
established between themselves, and usages. The American Hanwha Corporation case 
constitutes an excellent illustration on the subject.98 
 It should be remembered that requiring an express intention to be bound aims 
to distinguish an offer from a simple invitation to do business. This practice, also 
known as the invitatio ad offerendum,99 does not bind his/her author. Such is the 
essence of Article 14(3) which denies the status of an offer to proposals addressed to 
the public. In accordance with this provision, a proposal not addressed “to one or 
                                               
97
 See Pamboukis 2005-2006 (25) 1/2 JL & Com 107; Walker 2005 (24) 2 JL & Com 263. 
98
 In the Hanwha Corporation v Cedar Petrochemicals Inc. case, the Court applied Article 8 in all 
of its three paragraphs. After it had observed that the intent of the parties as required by Article 
8(1) was missing, it performed an objective analysis of their declarations under Article 8(2). As 
this exercise was also unsuccessful, the Court analysed the course of dealing pursuant to Article 
8(3) and found that the plaintiff did not show intent to be bound by his offer. It concluded then that 
a validly formed contract did not exist. See, in the same sense, USA 9 May 2008 Federal District 
Court [Delaware] Solae LLC v Hershey Canada Inc. [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080509u1. 
html] (accessed 10-4-2012). 
99
 See Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 272; Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 
240; Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 69; Cvetkovic 2002 (14) 1 4 Pace Int’l LR 121 130. 
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more specific persons”, is “considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless 
the contrary is clearly indicated by the person making the proposal.”100  
South African law  
South African law obliges the person making an offer to declare his/her intention 
expressly or impliedly to be bound by the offer if it is accepted. Calling for the 
offeror’s express or implied intention to be bound, if the other party accepts the 
proposal, has the purpose to distinguish an offer from an invitation to deal.101 This is 
what is known in Roman-Dutch law as the animus contrahendi as it is articulated in 
the Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman case.102 As Van Winsen J said, 
in Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd v R, a statement made by a tradesperson must 
be made with the intention of being bound by the offeree’s acceptance for it to 
constitute an offer.103 Levy J specified, in the Wasmuth v Jacobs case, that, “It is 
fundamental to the nature of any offer that it should be certain and definite in its 
terms. It must be firm, which means made with the intention that when it is accepted 
it will bind the offeror.”104 Thus, if it is proved that the offeror did not intend to be 
bound by the acceptance of the other party, the offer should be described as lacking 
animus contrahendi.105  
The absence or not of the intention of the person making the offer to be bound 
by the proposal may be deduced from the wording or the circumstances surrounding 
the case.106 For instance, despite its appearance of being a record of a concluded 
contract, a note of a broker starting with the words “We hereby confirm having sold 
                                               
100
 But, Article 2:201(2) PECL whereby, an offer may be addressed to the public and produce legal 
effects. As provided by Article 2:201(3), “A proposal to supply goods (...) at stated prices made 
(...) in a public advertisement or a catalogue (...) is presumed to be an offer to sell (...) at that price 
until the stock of goods (...) is exhausted.”  Contra Article 31(3) CESL which is in conformity with 
Article 14(3) CISG.   
101
 Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 847; Christie/Bradfield Contract 35; Kerr Contract 64. 
102
 Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 991 G. 
103
 Hottentots Holland Motors (Pty) Ltd v R 1956 1 PH K22 (C); see also Roberts and Another v 
Martin 2005 (4) SA 163 (C); and Christie/Bradfield Contract 31.  
104
 See Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633 D; finding advice in Efroiken v Simon 1921 
CPD 367 370; and Finestone v Hamburg 1907 TS 629 632. 
105
 Christie/Bradfield Contract 32. 
106
 For an illustration, see Robinson v Randfontin Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168.  
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to you the goods specified below” was held to be an offer because of the surrounding 
circumstances.107  
A question of whether proposals for partial, incomplete or provisional 
agreements are sufficient to show one party’s intention was asked and answered by 
Corbett JA, in Pitout v North Cape Livestock Co-op Ltd, as follows: 
Was the understanding the offer made animo contrahendi, which upon acceptance 
would give rise to an enforceable contract, or was it merely a proposal made ... while 
the parties were in the process of negotiating and were feeling their way towards a 
more precise and comprehensive agreement? This is essentially a question to be 
decided upon the facts of the particular case.108  
Such is also the meaning in CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Entreprises, South African 
Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd in which Corbett JA stated that, “whether in a 
particular case initial agreement acquires contractual force or not depends upon the 
intention of the parties, which is to be gathered from their conduct, the terms of the 
agreement, and the surrounding circumstances.”109  
Congolese law 
It has already been said that, despite the absence of specific provisions in the CCO 
dealing with the offer, proposals, in contrast to simple invitations to contract, must 
include all the elements of the proposed contract. They must, among other things, be 
firm and show the intention of a party to be bound.110 An earlier decision of the 
Belgian Cour de Cassation, applicable then in the DRC, ruled on this subject that “in 
order to have a contract it is necessary that parties give their consent with intention 
                                               
107
 See East Asiatic Co (SA) Ltd v Midlands Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1954 2 SA 387 (C) 390F-
391A; but Ferguson v Merrensky 1903 TS 657, whereby the expression “You may write to him if 
you like to follow up the matter” was described as an invitation to do business deprived of legal 
effect.  
108
 Pitout v North Cape Livestock Co-op Ltd 1977 4 SA 842 (A) 850D.  
109
 CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Entreprises, South African Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd 
1987 1 SA (A) 92E.  
110
 Kalongo Obligations 55; Mubalama Obligations 45; Youngs Comparative 514. See, for French 
law, Cass F 3rd Civ 28 November 1968 Bull Civ III No. 507 Gaz Pal 1969 1 195. For comments on 
the characteristics of the offer under civil law jurisdictions, see Owsia Contract 410-411; Ghestin 
Droit Civil 261-265. 
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to be legally bound animo contrahendae obligationis.”111 As the ruling in the 
decision above evokes “parties” without any distinction, it is assumed that it refers 
to both the offeror and offeree. Accordingly, when a Congolese law offeror makes 
an offer, he/she must do it with the intention of being bound should the addressee 
accept. These are currently the terms of Article 241 al. 3 of the OHADA Commercial 
Act which institutes openly the offeror’s intention to be bound in case of acceptance 
as one of the characteristics of a valid offer.112 
Inspired by sentence one of Article 14(1) CISG, Article 241 al. 3 UAGCL 
denies legal effect to public offers. As stated by it, an offer must be addressed to “one 
or more specific person” for it to constitute an offer; otherwise it is considered as a 
mere invitation to make offers.113 A proposal made to the public may, however, 
sometimes bind the offeror depending on the circumstances of the case, or if such is 
the way previous negotiations were conducted. Such is the meaning of Article 238 
al. 2 UAGCL which gives effect to practices and usages established between the 
parties.114 In addition, Article 239 al. 1115 binds contractual parties by any usage to 
which they have agreed and by any practices that they have established in their 
commercial relationship.  
From what has been explained so far, it appears that, under OHADA law, and 
consequently in Congolese law, practices established between the parties become 
                                               
111
 Cass B 2 December 1875 Pas 1876 I 37; translated by Herbots Contract 38, also reproduced in 
Katuala Code 16; and Piron 99. 
112
 According to Article 241 al. 3 UAGCL, “A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one 
or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it, inter alia, (…) indicates the intention of the 
offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.” It was ruled that a proposal with retention of the title 
clause is inoperative if that clause is not publically brought to the knowledge of the offeree. See 
Senegal 15 January 2002, Mehsen A v Saleh J case.  
113
 Cf. Article 241 al. 4 UAGCL which states, “A proposal addressed to undetermined persons is 
to be considered merely as invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the 
party making the proposal.” The OHADA Draft Uniform Act on Contract does not have similar 
provision (Cf. Article 2/2). 
114
 Article 238 al. 2 stipulates, “In determining the intent of a party, due consideration is to be given 
to the circumstances of fact, including the negotiations and any practices which the parties have 
established between themselves, or even usages in force in the line of work concerned.” Compare 
to Article 4/3 of the Draft above. 
115
 Article 239 al. 1 UAGCL reproduces Article 9(1) CISG. 
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part of the contract as they do in the CISG. Parties are presumed, unless otherwise 
stipulated, “(…) to have adhered to professional usages of which they knew or ought 
to have known and that, in the commerce, are widely known to, and regularly 
observed by the parties to contracts of the same nature in the branch of activity 
concerned.”116  
Comments 
Offers, in all of the three legal systems under comparison, must be firm, which means 
stating expressly or by implication the willingness of the offeror to be bound. 
Traditionally, neither the CCO nor the case law explained the content of the firmness 
condition in the DRC, which constituted a gap. This gap has been filled in by the 
provisions of Article 241 al. 3 UAGCL which are modelled on their equivalent 
Article 14(1) CISG. Likewise, all of the three legal systems attribute to the intention 
and usages of parties an important meaning in determining whether or not a party 
intended to contract. In the perspective of Congolese law, Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL 
bears a resemblance to Article 9(2) CISG in this regard. 
Though Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL appears to have reproduced the Convention 
on the matter of dealing with commercial practices and usages, however, there are 
two slight differences between the two provisions. Firstly, unlike Article 9(2) CISG, 
Article 239 al. 2 does not expressly extend the application of professional usages to 
the formation of contract process. Secondly, it speaks of commerce in general 
without specifying that it is concerned with international trade. Of course, in doing 
so, the provision would limit the field of application of the Commercial Act which, 
contrary to the CISG, includes both domestic and international commercial 
transactions. As far as the extension is concerned, although Article 239 al. 2 is silent 
as to the applicability of professional usages to the formation of the contract, their 
application at this stage is not denied elsewhere in the Commercial Act. It is then 
expected that, in the same way that trade usages and practices should govern the 
                                               
116
 Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL; compared to Article 9(2) CISG. 
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rights and obligations of the parties deriving from the sale, they may also apply to 
the conclusion of the contract and the offer in particular.  
 
5.2.3.4  Conclusion on the substantial requirements of a valid offer 
  
In the case of the CISG, South African law, and modern Congolese law, a proposal 
for concluding a contract becomes a valid offer on the completion of a triple 
condition. Firstly, the offer must be addressed to one or more specific persons. 
Secondly, it must be sufficiently definite, i.e. indicating the goods, or making their 
quantity, and price clearly determined or determinable. Lastly, the intent of the 
offeror to be bound must be apparent from the proposal. If these requirements are 
missing, the proposal will consist of a mere invitation to contract devoid of all legal 
effects, unless trade usages and practices show the contrary.  
It should be noted, however, that for an offer to become effective, it must reach 
the offeree, viz. it must not have been withdrawn or revoked in the meantime.  
 
5.2.4 Offer Withdrawal and  Revocation  
 
The CISG  
Generally speaking, an offer becomes effective from the time it reaches the 
offeree.117 As stated by Article 24, an offer reaches the offeree “when it is made 
orally to him or delivered by any other means to him personally, to his place of 
business or mailing address, or if he does not have a place of business or a mailing 
address, to his habitual residence.”118 In order to produce legal effect, an offer must, 
                                               
117
 See Article 15(1) CISG; for comments, see Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239; and for 
comparative purposes, see Article 2.1.3 PICC which reproduces literally the same rule. 
118
 With regard to electronic communications, the CISG-AC No. 1 of 15 August 2003 indicates 
that “the term ‘reaches’ is to be interpreted as corresponding to the point in time when an electronic 
communication has entered the offeree’s server.” See CISG-AC Opinion No. 1, Electronic 
Communications under CISG, 15 August 2003. http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-
op1.html (accessed 08-5-2012); see also Article 10 UNECIC.  
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from the moment it is issued up to the time it reaches the offeree, have not been 
terminated.119 Insofar as the termination issue is concerned, the CISG distinguishes 
between the withdrawal and the revocation of the offer. If the withdrawal takes place 
before, or at the same time as the offer reaches the offeree, the revocation intervenes 
after the offer has reached him/her.120  
With regard to the withdrawal, Article 15(2) states that, “an offer can be 
withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the 
offer.” The withdrawal right is recognised even though “the offer is irrevocable”.121 
According to one commentator,  
[The] drafters of the Convention contemplated the traditional case of where the offer 
is sent by international mail, and the withdrawal takes place by fax or phone call. In 
times of electronic communication, things have changed. (In) the case of an offer by 
electronic message, a withdrawal would never be possible under the plain wording 
of Article 15(2) CISG because, technically, it always enters the information system 
and can be retrieved before the withdrawal reaches the addressee, and this fact can 
always be traced and proven.122 
Notwithstanding the above reading, the ratio legis underlying Article 15(2) is that a 
withdrawal may “be possible as long as the addressee acquires knowledge of the 
withdrawal no later than knowledge of the offer.”123 But, after he/she has known of 
it, the offer cannot be withdrawn any longer. The only remaining termination 
possibility in the offeror’s hands is the revocation of the offer, unless the offeree has 
rejected the proposal.124   
As regards the revocation of the offer, it is dealt with in Article 16 which states 
that, “Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches 
                                               
119
 Huber/Mulis CISG 80.  
120
 Ibid; see also Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 241. Article 15(2) and Article 16(1) provide 
respectively that: “An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches 
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.” “Until a contract is concluded an offer may be 
revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance.” 
121
 Regarding electronic communications, it is the time when the withdrawal enters the offeree’s 
server that will be decisive (See CISG-AC Opinion No. 1 under Article 15). 
122
 See Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 241; see also comments in the CISG-AC No. 1. 
123
 Ibid. 
124
 See Article 17 which considers that “an offer is terminated when a rejection reaches the offeror,” 
even if the offer was irrevocable. 
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the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance.”125 According to several scholars, 
Article 16 was one of the main controversial provisions of the CISG.126 The crucial 
point of discord was the opposite attitude adopted by legal systems with regard to the 
question of “whether an offer is binding and whether it may be revoked.”127 Within 
the common law legal system, on the one hand, the offeror is generally granted the 
freedom to revoke the offer at any time before the contract is concluded.128 In this 
legal family, the right to revoke the offer is recognised even if the offer is expressly 
reputed to be firm or irrevocable.129 Under the civil law legal system, on the other 
hand, the offer is normally irrevocable. Of course, in this legal system a contract is 
also concluded if the acceptance reaches the offeree. But, before that time, the offeror 
is presumed to give “the offeree a reasonable time to consider, time during which the 
offer is irrevocable unless otherwise indicated by the offeror.”130  
                                               
125
 Article 16(1) CISG. 
126
 See Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 245; Schroeter in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 302; Schlechtriem/Butler International Sales 73; 
Huber/Mulis CISG 80; Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 85. 
127
 Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 302. 
128
 See, in this sense, Zimmerman (Obligations 560) for whom the revocability principle, under 
English common law, is justified by the doctrine of consideration. Zimmerman elucidates that, “No 
consideration is normally given for the offer, and hence the latter cannot bind the offeror.” 
129
 See Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-10; Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 85; Akseli in 
Felemegas Interpretation 301; Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 455; Huber/Mulis CISG 81; Murray 
1988 (8) JL & Com 11; Kadner Contrat 185-189. See also §2-205 UCC for which an offer made  
by a merchant “in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is 
not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable 
time.”  
130
 See Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 85; see also Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 302; 
Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 455.  But, Ferrari considers it wrong to paste the irrevocability principle 
to the civil law legal system, and the revocability rule to the common law. As stated by him, “In 
France and Italy, for instance, two countries which undoubtedly belong to the civil law tradition; 
the rule is that an offer is generally revocable.” See Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 246; see also Klimas Contract 32; Youngs Comparative 516. As far as Italy is 
concerned, Article 1328 of the Codice Civile declares that, “the offer may be revoked before the 
time when the contract is concluded.” Article 1329 of the same code specifies, “If the offeror has 
undertaken to keep the offer open for a certain time; revocation will be ineffective.” (Translation 
by Beltramo and others). Contrary to Italian law, under French law the revocability principle is not 
codified; it is rather established by judicial decisions and doctrinal views. (See Cass F Civ 3 
February 1919 DP 1923 I 126; commented on by Owsia Contract 448; Youngs Comparative 516; 
Malaurie/Aynes/Stoffel-Munck Obligations 237§470; Benabent Obligations 47§59; Terre/Simler/ 
Lequette Obligations 128 §117; and Kadner Contrat 179). 
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Given these differences, the CISG drafters tried to reach a compromise 
between the two aforesaid trends through Article 16(1).131 According to this 
provision, from the time an offer is made up to the moment it is received, the offeror 
may revoke the offer provide that the revocation reaches the offeree before he/she 
has dispatched an acceptance.132 As ruled by a Slovenian court, “since the seller 
received the revocation of the offer after he had dispatched his acceptance (...), the 
statement of the buyer that he revoked his order could not produce any legal 
effect.”133  
From its words, Article 16 is obviously based on the common law principle 
that offers are revocable.134 This principle is accompanied, however, by an exception, 
according to which “an offer cannot be revoked if it indicates, whether by stating a 
fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable.”135 Also, offers on which 
“the offeree has acted in reliance” are irrevocable.136 Such are the terms of Article 
16(2)(b) whereby, even if an offer does not expressly indicate that it is irrevocable, 
it becomes irrevocable, “if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as 
being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.” Vincze remarks 
that Article 16 mixes the civil law and common law approaches with regard to the 
                                               
131
 Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 246. 
132
 By so ruling, Article 16(1) relies on the common law mailbox theory, so that the right to revoke 
the offer ends with an effective acceptance. Cf. Article 18(2); see also Farnsworth in Galston/Smit 
Sales 3-12. 
133
 Slovenia 9 April 2008 Higher Court [Appellate Court] in Ljubljana [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/080409sv. html] (last accessed 7-6-2013). In this case, a Slovenian buyer offered 
to buy goods from a German seller. The latter accepted the offer by notice to the former and 
dispatched the goods as well. Surprisingly, the seller was notified by the buyer that he had revoked 
the offer although the seller has already handed the goods over to the carrier. The Court denied 
effect to that revocation “because the seller had already entirely performed his obligations under 
the contract by handing over the goods to the carrier.”  By July 2013, the Slovenian case was the 
only decision recorded dealing specifically with Article 16(1); also reported in the UNCITRAL 
Digest 97 Fn1.  
134
 Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 303; Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 
302; Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-10; Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 
247; Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 848. 
135
 Article 16(2) (a) CISG. 
136
 Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 456; supported by Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 304. 
According to Eörsi, the two revocability exceptions above are one of civil law and the other of 
common law nature. See Eörsi 1979 (27) Am J Comp L 311 318. 
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irrevocability and revocability subject.137 Because of that combination, Akseli 
believes that the provision “lacks definitional clarity”.138 For this author, “CISG 
Article 16(2)(a) has not eliminated the controversy as to whether the mere fixing of 
a time for acceptance makes the offer irrevocable,” or not.139  
Following from this debate, Garro inferred that the so-called “compromise 
solution of article l6(2)(a) does not bridge the gap between common law and civil 
law conceptions on the irrevocability of offers that state a fixed time for acceptance: 
the compromise only covers it up.”140 Faced with this ambiguity, numerous scholars 
are desirous of suggesting the corresponding PICC or PECL provisions141 to 
supplement the CISG on the revocability theme. 
 
                                               
137
 Vincze in Felemegas Interpretation 85.  
138
 Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 301; see also Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 303. 
139
 Under civil law, if there is a fixed time for the acceptance of the offer, the offer will remain 
irrevocable until the expiration of the stated period. In common law countries, on the contrary, the 
time fixed for acceptance means only that an answer has to be given within that period, otherwise 
the offer is revocable any time. See Akseli in Felemegas Interpretation 301; Youngs Comparative 
516-517; Malaurie/Aynes/Stoffel-Munck Obligations 237§470; Benabent Obligations 47§59; 
Terre/Simler/Lequette Obligations 129 §118. 
140
 Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 456. Another commentator says, however, that the rarity of case 
law relating to the revocability matter “gives grounds for hoping that far-reaching differences 
between the legal systems on fundamental points and the copious learned debate on the subject do 
not reflect practical needs.” See Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 303. 
141
 Cf. Article 2.1.4 PICC and Article 2:202 PECL. With regard to the PICC, they regulate the 
revocation of the offer in the same words as the CISG. Because of that similarity, Vincze (in 
Felemegas Interpretation 90) believes that it should not be suitable to use the PICC in the 
interpretation of provisions of the CISG on revocability matters. According to him, as the former 
are duplicated from the latter, they are not likely to eliminate difficulties appearing in the CISG. 
Regarding the PECL, Article 2:202(1) has also adopted a similar approach to the one established 
by Article 16(1) of the CISG on the revocation issue. Here, the offer is, in general, revocable except 
in some circumstances where it should be irrevocable. In accordance with Article 2:205 (3) PECL, 
the revocation is ineffective in three hypotheses: 1) if the offer expressly indicates that it is 
irrevocable; 2) if it states a fixed time for its acceptance; or 3) if it was reasonable for the offeree 
to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer. Akseli 
(in Felemegas Interpretation 304) explains that, by its analytical approach, the provision of the 
PECL “clears any doubt in CISG Article 16(2) (a) by stating that a revocation of an offer is 
‘ineffective’ even if it merely states a fixed time for its acceptance.” The author suggests it then to 
supplement the CISG on the revocability issue. Article 32(3) CESL reproduces Article 2:205 (3) 
PECL. 
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South African law  
It is acknowledged, in South African law, that an offer may well be withdrawn or 
revoked at any time before acceptance,142 because it does not have an obligatory 
effect. As Van der Merwe and others have said, “(The) revocation is possible until 
the moment upon which the contract is concluded and is not precluded by a time limit 
set for acceptance.”143 Thus, the offer, once made, survives until it has been revoked 
or lapsed. Compared with the CISG, South African law looks as if it does not 
expressly differentiate between the withdrawal and revocation of the offer.144 It 
should be remembered that the withdrawal refers to the retraction of an offer before 
it reaches the addressee, whereas the revocation refers to a communicated offer.  
With regard to its meaning, the concept “revocation” is described in Markram 
v Scholtz and another as the manifestation of an intention not to contract.145 In order 
to produce effect, the revocation has to be communicated before the offer is accepted. 
That is to say, an offeree who receives a revocation at any time before acceptance 
loses his/her opportunity to accept.146 But, if the offeree agrees to the offer before the 
offeror notifies him/her of the revocation, there is an enforceable contract.147 There 
                                               
142
 See Christian v Ries (1898) 13 EDC 8 15; Gous v Van der Hoff  (1903) 20 SC 237 240; Scott v 
Thieme (1904) 11 SC 570 577; R v Nel 1921 AD 339 344; Union Government v Wardle 1945 EDL 
177 181; Hersch v Nel 1948 3 SA 686 (A) 693; Greenberg v Wheatcroft 1950 2 PH A 56 (W); Bird 
v Sumerville 1960 4 SA 395 (N) 400; Stewart v Zagreb Properties (Pty) Ltd 1971 2 SA 346 (RA) 
352; see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 54; Van der Merwe et al Contract 51. South African law 
considers the principle that offers are generally revocable even though it has rejected the English 
doctrine of consideration long time ago. See Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 discussed under 
Section 3.2.4 above. 
143
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 51; finding support from Oos-Vrystaat Kaap Bedryf Bp v Van 
Aswegen 2005 (4) SA 417 (O); The Fern Gold Mining Company v Tobias (1890) 3 SAR 134; Gous 
v Van der Hoff  (1903) 20 SC 237. 
144
 See Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 835 848. In the Yates v Dalton 1938 EDL 177 case, for 
instance, the two words are used interchangeably; see also Kerr Contract 73 who explains 
withdrawal by revocation, and vice versa. 
145
 See Markram v Scholtz and another 2000 4 All SA 452 (NC).  
146
 See Drifrwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 1 SA 287 (E); see also Greenberg v 
Wheatcroft 1950 2 PH A56 (W); Wissekerke and another v Wissekerke 1970 2 SA 550 (A) 557E; 
Phillips v Aida Real Estate (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 198 (A) 207H. For comments, see Kerr Contract 73; 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 55; and Sharrock Business 60-61. 
147
 See Odendaal v Norbert 1973 2 SA 749 (R); Wessels v De Jager [2000] 4 All SA 440(A). In 
Yates v Dalton 1938 EDL 177, Y made a telegraphic offer to let a café to D. The next day, D sent 
a telegram accepting the offer. An hour and a half after this, D received a telegram from Y 
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is no particular way to revoke an offer; it is sufficient to bring it to the offeree’s 
attention.148  
Despite the general principle according to which offers are revocable under 
South African law, a party making an offer may expressly or by implication make 
the offer irrevocable for a fixed period of time. It is asked, however, whether a 
unilateral irrevocability declaration is binding. Under Anglo-American law 
jurisdiction, the answer is negative owing to the doctrine of consideration. Consistent 
with this doctrine, an offer has no binding force even if it is stated to be a firm offer 
because the offeree is supposed not to have given consideration to the offeror’s 
unilateral declaration or promise.149 A comparable solution was adopted in the Cape 
when the doctrine of consideration was considered to form part of South African 
law.150 Such an approach has been abandoned following the rejection of the doctrine 
of consideration in the Conradie v Rossouw case.151 Since the 1919s, “it has been 
acknowledged that there can be a ‘unilateral obligation’ on the part of the offeror to 
keep his offer open for a given period.”152 As stated by Coetzee J in Anglo Carpets 
(Pty) Ltd v Snyman, “It is trite law that an offer can at any time before acceptance 
thereof be revoked and that the mere statement that it is irrevocable or not revocable 
for a certain period is ineffective. The only way in which this result can be achieved 
is if there is indeed a binding agreement on this respect.”153 Briefly, South African 
                                               
withdrawing the offer. The court implied that the telegram by D was sufficient to create a contract. 
It held, therefore, that, as the withdrawal of the offer was not communicated prior to the dispatch 
of the telegram, a contract between Y and D had come into existence.  
148
 Wissekerke and another v Wissekerke 1970 2 SA 550 (A) 557F-H; Meyer v Kirner 1974 4 SA 
90 (N) 93B-D.  
149
 Cf. Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch 463; and § 2-205 UCC.  
150
 See Gous v Van der Hoff (1903) 20 SC 237 240; see also comments in Section 3.2.5 above. 
151
 See Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; see also Joubert Contract 32; Kahn Doctrine 224 231; 
Edwards History 90; Van der Merwe/Du Plessis Introduction 245; Van der Merwe et al Contract 
169; Zimmerman Obligations 557; Van der Merwe et al South Africa Report 95 183; Ng’ong’ola 
1992 (4) RADIC 835 849.  
152
 See Rose and Rose v Alpha Secretaries Ltd 1948 (1) SA 454.  
153
 Anglo Carpets (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1978 3 SA 582 (T) 585 H. In this case, Coetzee J, taking 
support on Boyd v Nel 1922 AD 414; Hersch v Nel 1948 (3) SA 686 (A), described an agreement 
of this kind as an “option” or a pactum de contrahendo. An option is defined as a contract by which, 
the offeror undertakes to keep the offer open for a certain period on the behalf of the offeree. But, 
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law has adopted the same revocability principle as other common law legal family 
countries. In South Africa, an offer is usually revocable.154 By a means of exception, 
however, the right of the offeror to revoke is restrained if he/she has granted the 
offeree an “option” to keep the offer open in which event it is irrevocable. 
There are some voices that the law is ambiguous on the irrevocability subject. 
Practically speaking, “there is a line of cases expressly or impliedly accepting that 
an offer stated to be irrevocable is irrevocable from the outset,155 and another line of 
cases maintaining that an offer can become irrevocable only by agreement.”156 In the 
last group of cases, the contract is supposed to expire on a particular date or after the 
given period.157 It is believed that, by establishing a distinction between revocable 
and irrevocable offers, South African law aligns with the CISG in which the 
revocability is the principle, and the irrevocability the exception. Such being the 
position of South African law, the following discussion focusses on Congolese law. 
Congolese law 
Article 8 CCO, which contains requirements for the validity of a contract, requires 
“the consent of the obligator”, viz. the debtor or the offeror, for a contract to be valid. 
The phrasing of Article 8 has been criticised as being incorrect. As Kalongo has said, 
for instance, an enforceable contract requires the consent of both contracting parties, 
i.e. the party making the offer and the party accepting the offer.158 A problem occurs, 
                                               
see Building Material Manufacturers Ltd v Marais 1990 1 SA 243 (O) 248-249 in which, an offer 
was held irrevocable owing to the intent of the parties.  
154
 Oos-Vrystaat Kaap Bedryf Bpk v Van Aswegen 2005 (4) SA 417 (O) 419H. 
155
 See Rose and Rose v Alpha Secretaries Ltd 1948 1 SA 454 (A) 460; Reich v Stone 1949 SR 178; 
Ahrend v Winter 1950 2 SA 682 (T) 686; Phillips v Aida Real Estate (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 198 (A) 
207 G; Dhanalutchmee v Naidoo 1975 1 PH A30 (D); Musa v Fischat 1980 2 SA 167 (SE) 171B-
D; Building Material Manufacturers Ltd v Marais 1990 1 SA 243 (O) 248-249. 
156
 See Kotze v Newmont SA Ltd 1977 3 SA 368 (NC) 374E; Anglo Carpets (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 
1978 3 SA 582 (T) 585 H; Oos-Vrystaat Kaap Bedryf Bpk v Van Aswegen 2005 (4) SA 417 (O). 
Cases quoted by Christie Law of Contract 59 65.  
157
 It was held, in Oos-Vrystaat Kaap Bedryf Bpk v Van Aswegen 2005 (4) SA 417 (O), that, 
The normal rule is that an offer may be revoked at any time before it is accepted, and an offer 
stipulating that it shall lapse on a certain day is not irrevocable until that date. (However), the 
view that an obligation to keep an offer open, or not to revoke it, may arise only through 
agreement is preferable to the view that it may also arise by unilateral declaration or undertaking. 
158
 Kalongo Obligations 49.  
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however, in respect of the binding force of an offer. The question raised by the 
subject is whether or not the offer is revocable, and, if it is revocable, what should 
the legal basis for such a right be. 
In answering these questions, the CCO, as well as its parent legal systems, the 
French and Belgian civil codes, are silent on the matter. Within a civil law 
environment, the rule formulated by §145 BGB,159 and by Articles 1328 and 1329 of 
the Italian civil code,160 approves the principle of the binding effect, or the 
irrevocability, of the offer.161 Unlike the German and Italian views, the traditional 
approach in French and Belgian case law, which had long tried to influence the 
former Congolese law, supported an opposite view. In these systems, the offeror was 
allowed to revoke his/her offer at any time until it had been accepted.162 The 
revocability general approach was based on Article 932 of the Napoleonic civil code 
relating to the revocability of donations. This provision then applied to all other kinds 
of contracts as a general principle of law.163 That provision was reproduced in the 
                                               
159
 According to the German §145 BGB, “Any person who offers to another to enter into a contract 
is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being bound by it.” (Translation by Musset). 
160
 Article 1328 states that, “the offer may be revoked before the time when the contract is 
concluded.” Article 1329 compliments this by stipulating that, “if the offeror has undertaken to 
keep the offer open for a certain time; revocation will be ineffective.”  
161
 See Klimas Contract 31 and 34; Kalongo Obligations 56. As Owsia has said, the irrevocability 
of an offer has trodden a long path in the history of modern legal systems so that newer civil codes 
of countries such as Germany and Italy have codified it. 
162
 For French law, see Klimas Contract 31 and 34; Youngs Comparative 516; 
Malaurie/Aynes/Stoffel-Munck Obligations 237§470; Benabent Obligations 47§59; 
Terre/Simler/Lequette Obligations 128 §117; for Belgian Law, see Cass B 1st Chamber 9 May 1980 
Pas 1980 I 1127; quoteb by Kadner Contrat 182; for Congolese, see Kalongo Obligations 56. But, 
see also Elis 22 January 1957 RJCB 1957 116; in Katuala Code 165, and Piron 122-123 whereby, 
“A promise, perfect contract in itself, although unilateral, is different from a mere offer for sale 
susceptible to be retracted until acceptance. Unless a specific stipulation with regard to its duration, 
the promise must be kept intact, during a period of time determined in accordance with the intention 
of the parties. Withdrawing the promise one day after it is made is not valid.” Translated version of, 
La promesse de vente, contrat en lui-même parfait, encore qu’unilatéral, ne peut être confondue 
avec une simple offre de vente susceptible d’être rétractée tant qu’elle n’est pas encore acceptée 
(emphasis added). La promesse doit être maintenue, à défaut de stipulation expresse quant à sa 
durée, pendant un temps à determiner suivant l’intention des parties. Sa rétractation le 
surlendemain du jour où elle a été faite (…) n’est pas valable. 
163
 As is stated by Article 932 CC, “An inter vivos donation is binding upon the donator and 
produces effect only from the day when it is accepted in express terms.”   
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DRC by means of Article 875 CFC.164 Article 932 of the civil code, and indirectly 
an analogical interpretation of Article 875 CFC, was afterwards criticised on the 
grounds that donations do not have the same legal nature as sales.165   
Though there is no specific provision in the civil code concerning the duration 
of an offer, nevertheless, modern French judicial decisions and doctrinal views have 
remedied this shortcoming to a certain extent. French case law and scholarly writings 
have distinguished between an offer accompanied by a fixed delay in which 
acceptance is to be made and an offer not accompanied by such a delay in order to 
determine whether or not an offer is revocable.166 As stated in the case law, where 
the offeror has fixed a period for acceptance of the offer, he/she is not allowed to 
revoke it before the expiration of that period; he/she must keep it open for that 
period.167 Such was the position of the Cour de Cassation in a decision, dated 10 
May 1968. A propos of this, it was stated that, “while an offer for sale may in 
principle be revoked as long as it has not been accepted, the position is different 
where the offeror has expressly undertaken not to revoke it before a certain period of 
time.”168  
With regard to Congolese law, in particular, the principle is that offers are 
binding, viz. they are irrevocable. One decision of the Appeal Court of Lubumbashi 
deals with the subject very well. As stated by the Court, under sales contracts the 
                                               
164
 Article 875 al. 1 CFC provides that donations bind the donator from the day he/she is notified 
of the acceptance. This means that, before the date he/she is given notice of acceptance, the donator 
is free to revoke the gift.  
165
 Donations are unilateral, while a sale is a bilateral contract. Because donations bind only one 
party who is then free to release from its promise, sales contracts generate obligations for both the 
seller and the buyer; they may then be revoked only by mutual consent. Cf. Article 33 al. 2 CCO; 
and Elis 3 April 1950 JTO 1957 77. 
166
 Owsia Contract 447; Youngs Comparative 516; Klimas Contract 32; Malaurie/Aynes/Stoffel-
Munck Obligations 237§470; Benabent Obligations 47§59; Terre/Simler/Lequette Obligations 
129 §118; see also Ferrari in Kröll/ Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 246. In current French law, 
as developed, a party making an offer may revoke it at any time until it is accepted. Cf. Cass F 3rd 
Civ 7 May 2008 Bull Civ III No. 79; RTD civ 2008 474. 
167
 Owsia Contract 448. 
168
 Cass F 3rd Civ 10 May 1968 Bull Civ III No. 209 161; also Cass F 1ère Civ 17 December 1958 
D 1959 33; quoted by Ghestin Droit Civil 273; and Nicholas Contract  67 for the first case. 
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offer is usually binding, otherwise commercial transactions would not prosper.169 The 
same Court recognised that a merchant may occasionally reserve the right to resell 
the goods, i.e. to withdraw or revoke the offer. According to the Court, actions of 
that kind cannot have effect unless they are undertaken before acceptance.170 The 
same rule applies to a notice modifying the content of the original offer. A telegraphic 
communication modifying an offer should, therefore, be effective only if it reaches 
the offeree before the acceptance reaches the offeror.171 
From the development above, it emerges that, under Congolese law, the offer 
is generally irrevocable. In other words, if the offeror states a period of time during 
which the offer will remain open, that offer will still be regarded as irrevocable for 
the stated period.172 Nonetheless, in the absence of a specified period, “the offer is 
binding during a period normally necessary for acceptance, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, inter alia, the nature of the offer and the rapidity of the 
means of communication employed by the offeror.”173 Such is the meaning of an 
earlier decision of the Appeal Court of Kinshasa for which “a telegraphic offer has 
effect if accepted within a reasonable time necessary for the dispatch of the offer and 
communication of the acceptance.”174 So, therefore, with the passage of a stipulated 
time or a reasonable delay, the offer will normally lapse. What now is the UAGCL 
influence on Congolese law in relation to the subject of revocability?   
 The right of the offeror to withdraw or revoke the offer is delimited by Article 
242 al. 1 UAGCL which declares that, “the offer becomes effective when it reaches 
the offeree.”175 Pursuant to Article 242 al. 2 UAGCL, however, until it reaches the 
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 Elis 31 October 1942 Rev Jur 1943 6; in Bours Répertoire 134; Katuala Code 160; and Piron 122. 
170
 Ibid. 
171
 See Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1929 84; see also Kalongo Obligations 59; Mubalama 
Obligations 58. 
172
 Compared this to Article 16(2)(a) CISG. For a similar situation under Belgian and French law, 
see De Bondt in Bocken Belgian Law 227; Klimas Contract 35 respectively. 
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 Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1929 84; see also First Inst Elis 28 April 1913 Jur Congo 1921 
112 in which: “If the offeror did not state a delay for acceptance, it may withdraw its offer before 
acceptance reaches him”.  
174
 See Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1926 293.  
175
 Article 242 al.1 UAGCL; compared to Article 15(1) CISG. 
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addressee, “the offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he 
has communicated his acceptance.”176 The third section of the same provision 
supplies the general principle of revocability with some exceptions as in Article 16(2) 
CISG.  According to its terms, “an offer cannot be revoked, whether by stating a 
fixed time for acceptance, that it is irrevocable, or if the offeree was reasonably liable 
to believe that the offer was irrevocable and has acted in reliance on the offer.” It 
results from the above provision that, under the current Congolese law, only a delay 
or the communication of the acceptance would have an effect on the revocability of 
the offer instead of the dispatch as is the case under the CISG. 
Comments  
Traditionally, under Congolese law, the offer was in principle binding and, therefore, 
irrevocable. In contrast to the CISG and South African law, original Congolese law 
adhered to the irrevocability principle as had other civil law legal system countries. 
In the DRC, an offer was irrevocable unless there was a contrary intention that it 
would be revocable. The offer was considered irrevocable, because, even in the event 
of a promise to contract, parties were supposed to be practically committed, the entry 
into force of the contract only being postponed to a later date.177 With the coming 
into force of the OHADA law, the DRC now mixes the dual concept of “revocability-
irrevocability” as it is under the CISG. Similarly to the CISG and South African law, 
the revocability of the offer, which was the exception, has become the rule, and the 
irrevocability, which was the general rule, is now the exception. This is a good 
development because the revocability principle, as provided by the Commercial Act, 
is accompanied by an exception. To use the words of Schroeter, compliance with the 
revocability exception “not only the conclusion of the contract, but even the (…) 
                                               
176
 Article 242 al. 2 UAGCL; compared to Article 16(1) CISG. Contrary to its equivalent Article 
211 al. 1 UAGCL (1997 version), Article 242 al. 2 UAGCL replaces the verb “dispatch” by 
“express”. 
177
 Cf. Article 270 CCO which assimilates a promise of sale to a full contract of sale since there is 
reciprocal consent on the property sold and the price. See also L’shi 28 March 1967 RJC 1967 No. 
2 140.  
328 
 
(communication) of an acceptance precludes the revocation of an offer.”178 
Moreover, the revocation is not self-operating. To use the words of Ferrari, “it must 
be designed in a way to allow a ‘reasonable person of the same kind’ as the offeree 
‘in the same circumstances’ (…) to understand that it refers to the offer and is 
intended to prevent it from becoming effective.”179 Accordingly, if the offeree was 
reasonable in relying on “the offer as being irrevocable and (…) has acted in reliance 
on the offer”, the latter is irrevocable.180 
Succinctly, the CISG, South African law, and modern Congolese law have 
currently adopted a similar principle that offers are generally revocable. An offer 
should be irrevocable if such is the intention of the parties who have fixed a period 
for acceptance or if the offeree has relied on the irrevocability of the offer. But, if it 
is accepted, the offer becomes binding even though it was supposed to be revocable 
before acceptance. 
  
5.2.5 Conclusion on the Offer  
 
Congolese law did not initially rule about the offer and the way it is articulated. In 
the first stage courts struggled to fill that gap in respect of commercial transactions. 
These days, the situation has changed with the influence of the OHADA Commercial 
Act the provisions of which have duplicated those of the CISG in dealing with the 
criteria of a valid offer and its effects. Consequently, under contemporary Congolese 
sales law, for it to have effect, an offer must be sufficiently defined, which means 
indicating the goods, and determining the price or making it determinable, and  
expressing the intention of creating a binding obligation. Unlike the CISG, however, 
Congolese law and South African law do not visualise a situation of a regular contract 
without price. Because the price is one of the basics of sales contracts, its omission 
nullifies the offer unless the intention of the parties is clearly otherwise. In the same 
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 Cf. Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 303 §2. 
179
 Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 247§4. 
180
 Compare Article 242 al. 2 UAGCL in fine, to Article 16(2) (b) CISG.   
329 
 
way, the offer which was, in the DRC, irrevocable has, once again through the 
influence of the UAGCL, become revocable. Thus Congolese law today combines 
the revocability rules with the irrevocability principle. Offers which were previously 
irrevocable and occasionally revocable are now generally revocable. There is an 
inversion of the rule; what the general principle was has become the exception, and 
vice versa. This is considerable because the application of the new rule is not 
automatic.  
 
5.3 Acceptance of the Offer for the International Sale of Goods 
 
5.3.1 Introduction  
 
As a rule, a contract is finalised by the acceptance of the offer. In this sense, the 
acceptance is understood as a positive response to the offer communicated to the 
offeror with intention of concluding the planned contract.181 For it to have effect, 
however, an acceptance must reflect the terms of the offer and be communicated in 
time. So, after a brief overview of what constitutes acceptance in the Vienna 
Convention, South African law, and Congolese law, it will be necessary to explore 
the requirements for a valid acceptance, the deadline for acceptance, and the legal 
regime of additional terms in the three legal systems above. As it was the case under 
the precedent section, a comparative appraisal of what contemporary Congolese law 
states with regard to the acceptance subject will conclude each of these issues.  
 
5.3.2 General Principles  
 
It is acknowledged that parties form a contract by their mutual expressions of 
assent.182 All three of the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law admit, 
whether expressly or by implication, that, after the offer, the following step for a 
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 Van der Merwe et al Contract 52; Hawthorne/Hutchison in Hutchison/Pretorius Contract 55. 
182
 Klimas Contract 27. 
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contract to be regularly concluded is its acceptance. Despite this broad resemblance, 
each system has its specificities with regard to the acceptance topic, details which 
are considered below.  
Concerning the Vienna Sales Convention, firstly, its Article 23 states that, “a 
contract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance of the offer becomes 
effective”, i.e. when there is a coincidence between the offer and the acceptance. 
Under South African law, secondly, there is also authority that no regular contract 
can exist if the offer is not accepted.183 With regard to Congolese law, finally, 
although there is no specific provision dealing with the acceptance in the CCO, the 
intention of creating legal relations was also considered to be an accepted component 
of the Congolese conception of contract. Currently, the theory of acceptance has 
become code-based through the provisions of the OHADA Commercial Act.  
In effect, Articles 243 to 247 of the Commercial Act, dealing with the 
acceptance, give the impression of having duplicated Articles 18 to 22 CISG. 
Compared to the CISG, these provisions define the acceptance; determine the mode 
of its communication; and deal with the time and the effectiveness of the acceptance. 
In addition, the same provisions insist on the fact that an acceptance must resemble 
the offer; otherwise it will amount to a counter-offer. In practice, however, it is not 
unusual that an acceptance is accompanied by additional terms which may sometimes 
modify the original proposal mostly when parties use standard forms. Such additional 
terms have brought about the so-called “battle of forms” issue. 
Following this brief overview, this section first explains the concept of 
acceptance. In the second step, it recalls the time limit for acceptance, and, finally, 
discusses the issue of additional terms and the “battle of forms” problem. The time 
and place for the conclusion of the contract is discussed in Section 5.4. 
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 See Lowe v Commission for Gender Equality 2002 (1) SA 750 (W); Bloom v American Swiss 
Watch Co 1915 AD 100; see also Van der Merwe et al Contract 52; Sharrok Business 58; and 
authorities quoted by Christie/ Bradfield Contract 60 in Fn207. 
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5.3.3 The Meaning and Effectiveness  
 
5.3.3.1 Significance of an acceptance  
 
The CISG  
Article 18(1) describes the acceptance as “a statement made by or other conduct of 
the offeree indicating assent to an offer.” Since silence cannot be considered as a 
manifestation of assent, it is, therefore, true that mere silence may not constitute 
acceptance. Such is the meaning of the second sentence of Article 18(1), whereby 
“silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.”184  
The phrase in itself used in Article 18(1) looks as if it indicates that silence 
may, in some circumstances, be interpreted as acceptance. Such is the case with 
regard to previous agreements between the parties, their conduct, or the usages and 
practices established between them or in the trade concerned.185 Accordingly, the 
French Cour d’Appel de Grenoble denied to a seller the right “to invoke the rule laid 
down in Article 18 (providing that silence does not by itself amount to acceptance) 
because, according to practices previously established between parties, the seller 
(had been) performing the orders without expressly accepting them.”186 In the 
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 See Germany 26 June 2006 Appellate Court Frankfurt Printed Goods case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/ 060626g1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). In the case, the Court ruled that the “silence 
of the buyer to the seller’s order confirmations is not to be considered as an affirmation of seller’s 
standard terms referred to.” See also France 27 January 1998 Cour de Cassation, CLOUT case No. 
224 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980127f1.html] in which, though without quoting the CISG, 
the French Supreme Court found that the Appeal Court did not ignore the rule that silence does not 
amount to an acceptance. Almost all international commercial contracts instruments are unanimous 
that silence or inactivity per se should not be interpreted as acceptance; see sentence two of Article 
2.1.6 PICC; Article 2:204 (2) PECL; and Article 34(2) CESL. But §69 of the US Restatement (2nd) 
of Contracts dealing with Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion which recognises legal 
effect to the offeree’s silence or inaction.  
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 Cf. Articles 8 and 9 CISG; see also Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 241; Kelso 1982/1983 
(21) Colum J Trans L 529 538; Valioti http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/valioti.html.  
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 France 21 October 1999 Appeal Court [Grenoble], CLOUT case No. 313; referred to by 
Pamboukis 2005-2006 (25) 1/2 JL & Com 107 108; also reported in the UNCITRAL Digest 99 
Fn30. See also Netherlands 10 February 2005 Netherlands Arbitration Institute (interim award) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050210n1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). In this case, general 
conditions were applied to the contract despite the silence of the buyer because of the practices 
established between the parties. 
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Chemical Products case, the Swiss Supreme Court ruled that “every declaration or 
other act that expresses acceptance of an offer is deemed an acceptance, but not, 
however, mere silence or inactivity alone, unless such a practice existed between the 
parties.”187 
South African law  
An acceptance is considered, in Bloom v American Swiss Watch Co, as a positive 
answer to the proposed offer.188 In principle, an acceptance has to be manifested as 
required by the offer for it to produce legal effect.189 Van der Merwe and others190 
note, in this respect, that, because a contract requires a reciprocal agreement between 
the parties191 in order to be effective,192 an acceptance ought to be expressed by way 
of conscious reaction to the offer and correspond with it.  
A question occurs as to whether the silence of the offeree may be interpreted 
as acceptance. As response, it is generally admitted that silence per se does not 
amount to an acceptance.193 Reasons advanced in this regard are that “it would be 
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 Switzerland 5 April 2005 Bundesgericht [Supreme Court] Chemical Products case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/050405s1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). But, a German court 
ruled in the Marble Panel case that, “the fact that goods were packaged in the same way for 
previous deliveries does not constitute a tacit agreement on the type and way of packaging.” See 
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 See Bloom v American Swiss Watch Co 1915 AD 100.  
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McKenna v Shea 2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA).   
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 Cf. Section 3.3.2 above. 
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 The time when and the place where an acceptance is effective are dealt with in Section 5.4 
below. 
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 This rule was formulated by Watermeyer CJ in Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 
SA 413 (A) 422 as follows: “Quiescence is not necessarily acquiescence and one party cannot, 
without the assent of the other, impose upon such other a condition to that effect.” See also 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 69; Sharrock Business 65. Christie and Bradfield illustrate the case by 
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English legislature, (which through) the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971, limits the 
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undesirable to put the offeree who did not wish to accept the offer to the trouble and 
expense of rejecting it.”194 By way of exception, however, silence may amount to 
acceptance if circumstances compel the addressee to show his/her disapproval in the 
case he/she is not prepared to accept the offer. This is Wessels’ understanding 
according to which,  “(...) If a merchant writes to his constant correspondent that he 
will forward to him certain goods at a certain price unless he hears from him to the 
contrary, and the addressee receives the letter but neglects to reply, the Court may 
well consider that silence in such a case gives consent (...).”195   
The policy behind this exception is that parties are bound by usages or 
practices established between themselves. In McWilliams v First Consolidated 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd, Miller JA agreed that silence does not constitute acceptance by 
itself.196 The learned judge specified, however, that “when according to ordinary 
commercial practice and human expectation firm repudiation (...) would be the norm 
if it was not accepted as correct, such party’s silence and inaction, unless 
satisfactorily explained, may be taken to constitute an admission by him (...).”197 The 
rule according to which silence does not bind the offeree does not, nevertheless, mean 
that an offeree’s acceptance must at all times be expressly made. A regular 
                                               
recipient of such goods to treat them as gift, and makes the demanding of payment for them a 
criminal offence.” Similar trade practice, named as “Negative option marketing”, is also prohibited 
under South African law by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 in respect of credit agreements (see 
s 74(1)-(4) with s 89, 90(2)(d), and 90(4)). The 2008 CPA has adopted a similar ruling in respect 
of consumer contracts (see s 31 relating to negative option marketing; s 20 dealing with consumers’ 
rights to return non-conforming goods; and s 21 relating to unsolicited goods). With regard to 
unsolicited goods, however, if the recipient fails to return them, his/her inactivity should be 
interpreted as acceptance so that he/she will have to pay for them. Cf. Charles Velkes Mail Order 
1973 (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1987 3 SA 345 (A) 358F-G; in the same sense Christie/Bradfield Contract 
86; Bradfield/Lehmann Sales 96-97. 
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197
 Ibid. 
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acceptance may result from the conduct of a buyer who pays for the goods198 or 
retains them after delivery.199 Similarly, a contract of sale should regularly be 
deduced from the conduct of a seller who accepts payment200 or starts dispatching 
the goods.201  
Congolese law 
Acceptance is considered in the DRC as a definite response to the offer intended to 
conclude the contract as is the case under the CISG and South African law.202 One 
Arbitral Award stated on the subject that “whatever progress made in preliminary 
negotiations between parties, a contract cannot be definitively formed until the 
offeree brought his assent to the offeror’s attention, either by himself or by someone 
else.”203 It is clear, from this decision that, although the CCO does not contain 
specific provisions dealing with the acceptance, the intention to create legal 
relationship by means of mutual assent is also accepted in Congolese contract law. 
One should remember the decision of the Belgian Supreme Court, previously quoted, 
which requires parties to give their consent with the intention of being legally bound 
in order to have a valid contract.204 In other words, under the legal system in view, 
an acceptance must, among other things, show the offeree’s intention to be bound by 
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 Ex Acrow Engineers (Pty) Ltd 1953 1 SA 622 (T) 625E, on appeal 1953 2 SA 319 (A).  
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 See Charles Velkes Mail Order 1973 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 1987 (3) SA 345(A) 
358E-F. It was ruled in the Charles Velkes Mail Order case that: 
Where (...) (prior business relationship between the parties) is absent (...), the failure per se to 
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 Menashe v Georgiadis 1936 SR 59. 
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 Cf. Jonas & Co v Meyerthal 1912 AD 286 296-297. As stated in R v Nel 1921 AD 339-351, for 
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its acceptance. Further to the intention of the person accepting the offer, a regular 
acceptance must also be expressed definitively and unequivocally.205   
With regard to its mode of communication, an acceptance can be made by an 
express statement or result from the offeree’s conduct such as reselling the goods 
delivered.206 Article 241 al. 1 UAGCL states, in this regard, that a contract may be 
concluded “either by the acceptance of an offer, or by the conduct of the parties that 
is sufficient to show their agreement.” The first sentence of Article 243 al. 2 UAGCL 
elaborates that, “a statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent 
to an offer is an acceptance.”207 Concerning silence, however, it cannot amount to 
acceptance unless the offeree was obliged to manifest his/her disagreement 
expressly.208  
Comments  
Even before the adoption of OHADA law, Congolese law had already adopted 
similar rules to those of the CISG and South African law on the contents of the matter 
of acceptance. So, as for the offer, acceptance in all three of the legal systems may 
be expressed or implied. In the DRC this means that a proper acquiescence must be 
given to the offer so that silence is taken to mean a rejection of the offer unless this 
is contrary to the intention of the parties. Further to the meaning of acceptance, 
another close issue dealt with in the CISG is the time when an acceptance becomes 
binding. 
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 Cf. Owsia (Contract 491) for whom, “the offeree should have the real will of accepting and 
should outwardly manifest his will, in the same way as the offeror has (…) and manifest, expressly 
or tacitly, a definite contractual intention.”  
206
 Léo 30 December 1943 Rev Jur 1944 141, in Bours Répertoire 134. 
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 Compare this to Article 18(1) CISG. 
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 Second sentence of Article 243 al. 2 UAGCL; compared to the second sentence of Article 18(1) 
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acceptance if the party accepting the offer was obliged to speak. See Elis 25 October 1913 Jur 
Congo 1921 341; see also Léo 26 March 1929 Jur Col 1930-1931 346; and similar cases quoted 
by Lukoo Droit Civil 88. 
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5.3.3.2 Acceptance efficiency 
 
The CISG  
The time when an acceptance becomes effective is regulated by Article 18(2). 
According to the first sentence of this provision, an acceptance of an offer becomes 
effective when the indication of assent reaches the offeror.209 Consequently, as long 
as “the indication of assent does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, 
if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time,”210 the acceptance will be ineffective. 
This rule applies to both oral declarations and conduct indicating assent which must 
reach the offeror to produce effect.211 
Legal systems in the world have adopted opposite approaches on the issue of 
whether or not an acceptance is effective. The classical civil law approach is that an 
acceptance is not effective until it reaches the offeror. Under the Anglo-American 
common law legal system, by contrast, the acceptance is completed the moment the 
offeree dispatches his/her acceptance.212 This method is known as “the expedition” 
or “mailbox rule”.213 Within the Vienna Sales Convention, Article 18(2) seems to 
have rejected “the mailbox principle as a means of establishing when an acceptance 
becomes effective.”214 It relies rather on the civil law approach on the acceptance 
effectiveness issue. Where offers are made orally, however, the Convention treats 
them differently from ordinary offers. In conformity with sentence three of Article 
18(2), oral offers must be accepted “immediately” unless the circumstances indicate 
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 On the way an acceptance may reach the offeree, see Article 24 CISG.   
210
 Article 18(2) CISG, second sentence. 
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 See Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 325 §24; Ferrari in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 269 §13. 
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 See Garro 1989 (23) Int’l L 443 453. 
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 For a better understanding of the mailbox rule, and other theories relating to the time of 
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 Carrara/Kuckenburg in Felemegas Interpretation 312; see also Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11 
Fn81.  
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otherwise. In the view of the CISG-AC No.1, the expression “oral offer” includes 
sound transmitted electronically.215  
As Alban has stated, in addition to acceptance by assent, Article 18 CISG 
recognises the legal effect of acceptance by conduct, provided that such conduct “is 
accompanied by acts that indicate assent.”216 Such a way of acceptance is allowed as 
an exception to the general rule that an acceptance must be properly communicated 
as evidenced by the adverb “however” introducing Article 18(3). Concerning the 
time when acceptance by conduct becomes effective, Article 18(3) specifies, 
[If], by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have established 
between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by performing an 
act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of the price, without 
notice to the offeror, the acceptance is effective at the moment the act is performed 
(...).217   
It is observed that Article 18(3) illustrates the acceptance by conduct by two instances 
that can be assumed to be effective signs of contractual performance. These 
illustrations include acts relating to the dispatch of the goods by the seller, and acts 
relating to the payment of the price by the buyer. Courts have to date extended its 
applicability to conduct such as the delivery of the goods by the seller,218 acceptance 
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communication has entered the addressee’s server, provided that the addressee expressly or 
impliedly has consented to receiving electronic communications for that type, in that format, and 
to that address.” See CISG-AC Opinion No. 1, Electronic Communications under CISG.  
216
 See Alban in Felemegas Interpretation 99. 
217
 See Article 18(3) as commented on in UNCITRAL Digest 99 §6 and 100 §11. 
218
 Germany 10 November 2006 Appellate Court Dresden Meat case [http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/061110g1. html] (accessed 10-4-2012).  
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of goods by the buyer,219 a third party’s taking delivery of goods,220 and the issuance 
of a letter of credit.221  
South African law 
In South African law, an acceptance has to meet a number of requirements to produce 
legal effect. Under a general common law perspective, four conditions are required 
for an acceptance to be valid. Firstly, as it is for the offer, an acceptance must “be 
clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.”222 Secondly, it must correspond with the 
offer.223 Thirdly, the acceptance must be made in the mode prescribed by the 
                                               
219
 Switzerland 27 April 2007 Canton Appellate Court Valais Oven case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/070427s1 .html] (accessed 16-4-2012). In this case, it was held that the buyer 
assented to the offer by accepting the goods, either by using or reselling them. See also, Russia 2 
November 2010 Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/101102r1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012); Germany 13 January 1993 
Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, CLOUT case No. 292 (buyer’s acceptance of goods indicated 
assent to offer, including standard terms in letter of confirmation); reproduced in UNCITRAL 
Digest 99 Fn14. 
220
 Switzerland 10 July 1996 Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich, CLOUT case No. 193 (third party 
taking delivery was act accepting increased quantity of goods sent by seller); in UNCITRAL Digest 
99 Fn16. 
221
 USA 7 December 1999 Federal District Court Northern District of Illinois, CLOUT case No. 
417; pleading stated cause of action by alleging facts showing parties concluded contract of sale; 
in UNCITRAL Digest 99 Fn19; also referred to by Schwenzer/Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 241. Other 
similar instances include: signing invoices to be sent to a financial institution with a request that it 
finances the purchase (Argentina 14 October 1993 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en 10 
Comercial CISG-online 87); sending a reference letter to an administrative agency (USA 10 May 
2002 Federal Southern District Court of New York Federal Supplement (2nd Series) 201, 236 ff, 
CLOUT case No. 579; in UNCITRAL  Digest 99 Fn20 and 21); or preparing a bill of lading and 
nominating a vessel for ocean carriage (USA Hanwha Corporation v Cedar Petrochemicals Inc. 
case).   
222
 See Levy J in Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633 E-H in which, “(...) although a 
contract, even if it be ambiguous, may be and generally is binding, the acceptance of the offer (...) 
must be unequivocal, i.e. positive and unambiguous.” See also Christie/Bradfield Contract 65; 
finding advice in Van Jaarsveld v Ackerman 1975 2 SA 753 (A); Cunningham v C and S Estate 
Agency 1945 TPD 440 443; Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 421-422; 
and Boerne v Harris 1949 SA 793 (A).  
223
 See Christian v Ries (1898) 13 EDC 8 15; Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 29; Davis and Lewis v 
Chadwick & Co 1911 WLD 12 16; Treadwell v Roberts 1913 WLD 54 59-60; Whittle v Henley 
1924 AD 138 148; JRM Furniture Holdings v Cowlin 1983 4 SA 541 (W) 544A-C; and 
Watermeyer v Murray 1911 AD 616. See also Legator McKenna v Shea 2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA).  
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offeror.224 Lastly, acceptance must be communicated to the offeror and must show 
the offeree’s intention to be bound by the agreement.225  
Christie and Bradfield remark that, “As a general rule, a contract is not 
concluded until the offeree has not only decided in his own mind to accept the offer, 
but has communicated his acceptance to the offeror.”226 Communication of the 
acceptance is required because, as long as the party making the offer is aware that 
his/her offer has been accepted, the parties do not have proper consensus.227 In this 
sense, the communication requirement is built on the fact that the South African law 
of contract is based on agreement, so that there can be a validly concluded contract 
providing the offeror knows that it is ad idem with the offeree.228 As explained in 
section 3.3.2.3 above, pursuant to the reliance theory, it is admitted that a regular 
acceptance may also result from one party’s conduct if the other party was reasonable 
in relying on such behaviour.229  
Congolese law 
As for its comparable legal systems, Congolese contract law is also mainly based on 
agreement.230 There, acceptance must be certain and unequivocal for it to be 
effective. The Appeal Court of Kinshasa has ruled on the subject that “a contract is 
                                               
224
 Cf. Blerk JA’s rule in Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 3 SA 591 (A) 597D. That 
is to say, where the offeror requires, for instance, that acceptance be communicated by “registered 
letter” or by a “written notice”, acceptance must comply with that requirement to be effective. See 
Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261; Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach 1988 1 SA 318 
(A); Amcoal Collieries Ltd v Truter 1990 1 SA 1 (A). But, Pillay v Shaik 2009 (4) SA 74 (SCA) in 
which the SCA has ruled that, even if an offeror has prescribed a particular form for acceptance, a 
contract may be enforceable by reference to the reliance theory if there is a reasonable  belief on 
the part of the party making the offer that that requirement has been complied with.   
225
 See authorities quoted by Kerr Contract 111 Fn380; see also Sharrock Business 68. 
226
 Christie/Bradfield Contact 71-72. 
227
 Sharrock Business 68. 
228
 See Christie/Bradfield Contact 72; and cases quoted by them in Fn279 and 280. The specific 
moment when an acceptance becomes effective to generate a contract depends on the means of 
communication employed as discussed in Section 5.4.3 below. 
229
 Cf. Sonap Petroleum (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Haralabos Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A); 
Archibald Douw Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A); and Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v 
Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA). See, in the same sense, Pillay v Shaik 2009 (4) 
SA 74 (SCA). 
230
 The principle is of course sometimes tempered by the reliance rule. Compare Articles 1, 8, and 
Article 263 CCO with Article 240 UAGCL, and comments in Section 2.3.4 above. 
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formed only when the intents of parties match on all the essentials that constitute the 
contract subject-matter.”231 The rule in the decision above has been supplemented by 
Article 244 al. 1 UAGCL. Inspired by Article 18(1) CISG, this provision retains the 
moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror as the key-time for the 
effectiveness of an acceptance.232 It follows then that, where the indication of assent 
fails to reach the offeror, acceptance is ineffective, and there is, in addition, no valid 
contract. With regard to acceptance by conduct, on the other hand, it is when the act 
is performed that the acceptance will have effect.233 By contrast to Article 18(3) 
CISG, Article 244 al. 2 UAGCL does not list acts for which performance amounts to 
acceptance by assent. The DUACL does not also help the situation. 
Comments  
An acceptance, whether explicit or implicit, must be communicated to the offeror as 
for it to be effective. In all of the three legal systems under consideration, acceptance 
by conduct is accepted merely as an extraordinary means of contracting, which must 
be accompanied by a real act of performance to have effect. Unlike the CISG and 
South African law, the Commercial Act and the DUACL are silent as regards what 
conduct may amount to legal conduct of acceptance. Despite their silence, it is 
evident that such acts might include acts relating to the dispatch of goods on the part 
of the seller, and those relative to the payment of the price on the part of the buyer 
because these attitudes constitute the key obligations of the parties to a contract. For 
more certainty, the adoption of a provision similar to Article 18(3) CISG and the 
South African common law, which expressly mentions some of the obligations of the 
parties as valuable conduct of acceptance, should be suggested to the Congolese 
legislator.   
                                               
231
 See Léo 2 October 1962 RJC 1964 No. 3 147. 
232
 Article 2/6(2) of the DUACL is also similarly worded. 
233
 See Article 244 al. 2 UAGCL which is similar to Article 18(3) CISG. As stipulated by Article 
244 al. 2, if by virtue of the provisions of the offer and practices established between the parties or 
usages the offeree can, without notice to the offeror, indicate assent by conduct, acceptance takes 
effect when the act is carried out. Compare to Article 2/6(3) of the DUACL. 
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It is necessary to note that for an acceptance to produce legal effect, it must 
have been communicated before the offer expires as explained below. 
   
5.3.4 Deadline for Acceptance  
 
The CISG  
As has been mentioned above, in order to become effective, an acceptance must reach 
the offeror.234 The requirement for an acceptance to reach the offeror applies to all 
kinds of acceptance, whether made in words or by conduct. Furthermore, where the 
offeror has fixed a time for acceptance, acceptance must comply with the time 
indicated in the offer. If the parties did not determine a specific period for acceptance, 
this must, alternatively, be expressed within a reasonable time.235 The time limit for 
acceptance appears, however, not to be authoritative. Article 21(1) agrees with the 
efficacy of a late acceptance if the party making the offer informs the offeree orally 
or dispatches a notice to that effect without delay. This rule also applies if the lateness 
is due to circumstances beyond the control of the party accepting the offer.236 
South African law 
Similar to the CISG, the most natural way for an offer to come to completion and no 
longer be open for acceptance is when it has stated a time limit. As ruled by Innes CJ 
in Laws v Rutherfurd, “when the acceptance of an offer is conditioned to be made 
within a time or in a manner prescribed by the offeror, the prescribed time limit and 
                                               
234
 Article 18(2) is clear in this respect as it states: 
An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the 
offeror. An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent does not reach the offeror 
within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time, due account being 
taken of the circumstances of the transaction, including the rapidity of the means of 
communication employed by the offeror. An oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the 
circumstances indicate otherwise. 
235
 Article 18(2), second sentence. 
236
 As stated by Article 21(2), “If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that 
it has been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would have reached 
the offeror, in due time, the late acceptance is effective as acceptance.”  
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manner should be adhered to.”237 It follows then that if the addressee purports to 
accept the offer after the deadline for acceptance, the offeror is not bound to the 
contract. But, if no time limit was initially fixed, it is deemed that the offer will still 
open for acceptance for a reasonable time beyond which the acceptance lapses.238 
The addressee is not, however, obliged to accept the offer. It may abstain from or 
reject the offeror’s proposal. The principle that the offer must end by the offeree’s 
rejection is explained by Wessels as follows: 
An offer continues only until the offeree has replied to it, and directly he replies (to 
it) the offer ceases to be addressed to him. Unless this were so an offeror would 
never know when a refusal might be turned into an acceptance, and so he would be 
precluded from seeking other parties with whom to contract.239  
Congolese law  
In Congolese law, a buyer accepting an offer must send his/her acceptance within a 
period of time required. If the offeror has fixed a time for acceptance, the addressee 
must comply with that time for the acceptance to have legal effect. In a decision, 
dated 29 September 1925, the Appeal Court of Kinshasa required the offeree to notify 
his/her acceptance within “a period of time normally necessary for the dispatch of 
the offer and the communication of the acceptance.”240 If one considers, however, 
Article 264 CCO which claims that a sale is enforceable once parties have agreed 
upon the thing sold and the price, though the property sold has not yet been delivered 
nor the price paid, it is deemed that the period for acceptance should be very short in 
the DRC. Two reasons might be put forward in this regard. Firstly, the CCO ruled 
with regard to transactions between persons dealing in a face-to-face situation that 
an offer should be accepted immediately. Secondly, under the former Congolese law, 
the offer was generally binding or irrevocable. Consequently, in order to benefit from 
                                               
237
 Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 262, see also Christie/Bradfield Contract 50. 
238
 See Wessels J in Dietrichsen v Dietrichsen 1911 TPD 486 496; Ng’ong’ola 1992 (4) RADIC 
835 852. 
239
 Wessels Contract §175. 
240
 See Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1926 293 whereby, a telegraphic offer has effect if accepted 
within a normal delay necessary for the dispatch of the offer and the communication of the 
acceptance. 
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the offer the addressee was presumed to communicate his/her acceptance as soon as 
possible, otherwise the offer would lapse with the passage of time.241 The principle 
of a timely acceptance is also required by the OHADA Commercial Act. In the terms 
of Article 243 al. 1 UAGCL, an offer must be accepted within the time stipulated by 
the party making the offer. If the offer is silent with regards to the period for 
acceptance, the offeree must reply within a reasonable time, considering the 
circumstances of the offer and the mode of communication used by the offeror.242  
Comments 
All of the three legal systems in comparison accord with the principle that, an 
acceptance has no effect until it is communicated to the offeror. The point of 
departure lies in the fact that, under Congolese law, an acceptance was historically 
supposed to be given at the same time as the offer, or at least allowing for only normal 
delay. In other words, under the previous Congolese law, the duration of an 
acceptance should be shorter than it is under the CISG and South African law. One 
of the reasons in this regard was that, within the CCO, an offer was primarily 
irrevocable, whereas in the CISG and South African law it is normally revocable.  
Under the influence of Article 243 al. 1 UAGCL, undeniably inspired by Article 
18(2) CISG, modern Congolese law has now integrated the “reasonable time” rule 
for acceptance. Thus, the current Congolese legal system has similar principles to its 
comparable legal systems with regard to the cut-off time for acceptance.  
As has been expressed above, an acceptance must, in principle, meet each of 
the terms of the offer for it to produce legal effect. In the modern course of dealings, 
nonetheless, parties used to run their business by employing their standard conditions 
during the formation of contract stage. Those kinds of additional terms may 
occasionally vary the terms of the initial offer and generate the well-known problem 
of the “battle of forms” as discussed in the following section.  
 
                                               
241
 Cf. Léo 2 October 1962 RJC 1964 No. 3 147. 
242
 Article 243 al. 1 UAGCL; compared to Article 2/7 DUACL, and Article 18(2) CISG. 
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5.3.5 Additional Terms  and the Issue of the “Battle of Forms”  
 
This section deals with the “mirror image” rule, the legal regime of counter-offers, 
the status of standard contracts, and the solutions suggested in resolving the “battle 
of forms” issue under the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law.  
 
5.3.5.1 Commentaries on the “mirror image” rule 
 
The CISG  
An acceptance must normally correspond with the terms stated in the offer. Despite 
this principle, from time to time parties supplement their acceptances with additional 
terms which may affect the first proposal. In order to preserve the original offer from 
external changes, the Vienna Sales Convention has opted for the widespread 
principle known as the mirror image rule.243 In conformity with the mirror image 
principle, “an acceptance must coincide with each and every term of an offer in order 
to conclude a contract.”244 Such is the meaning of Article 19(1) which denies legal 
effect to additional terms, unless they are accepted by the offeror. Clearly, Article 
19(1) states that a reply to an offer purported to be an acceptance that contains 
additional terms is a rejection of the offer. This type of reply is no longer a regular 
acceptance; instead, it constitutes a counter-offer which requires further acceptance 
to convert it into a contract.245 As one commentator has said, the “mirror-image rule” 
                                               
243
 See USA Magellan Intern Corp v Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F Supp 2nd 919 927 53 Fed R 
Evid Serv. 563, 40 UCC Rep Serv. 2nd 321 (ND Ill 1999); quoted by Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86-
68 86-126 86-17. See also Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 (39) CILSA 214 217; taking support from 
Article 19(1). Article 19(1) reads: “A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but 
which contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and 
constitutes a counter-offer.” See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 13, available online at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op13.html (accessed 12-06-2013).  
244
 Viscasillas in Felemegas Interpretation 316; see also Magnus Last Shot 185 189. 
245
 See the American Hanwha Corporation v Cedar Petrochemicals Inc. case. In this case, while 
dispatching his acceptance, the buyer wrote that no contract would enter into force unless the seller 
countersigned his documentation as it stood. The seller refused to adopt the buyer’s terms. Instead, 
he also asked him to approve his initial terms as stated in the offer. The court implied from that 
controversial attitude that valid contract did not exist.  
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is consistent with both civil and common law legal systems and that, by opting for it, 
the CISG is in line with the legal systems it attempted to accommodate.246 
 It is important to note that the mirror image rule becomes delicate when parties 
would like their standard terms of business to be part of the contract. One of the most 
difficult questions posed in this regard is whether or not those kinds of standard terms 
and conditions, which are not usually discussed jointly, ought to be included in the 
contract. The drafters of the CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 has considered the problem 
and formulated ten rules dealing with the legal effect of standard terms in the view 
of the CISG. Those rules are given further consideration in section 5.3.5.3 below.  
South African law  
As a rule, any acceptance must reflect the offer, viz. it cannot contain additional or 
conflicting terms or conditions.247 A South African law offeree in receipt of an offer 
may wish to accept a contract but not on the terms contained in the offer. By requiring 
the acceptance to correspond unequivocally to the offer, it appears evident that South 
African law has adopted the “mirror-image rule”.248 The mirror-image rule, in effect, 
is one of the general principles of the common law,249 according to which an 
acceptance must exactly match the offer regardless of its style of communication.250 
It was decided, in this regard, that, if a reply which intends to be an acceptance does 
                                               
246
 See Sukurs 2001 (34/35) VJTL 1481. 
247
 Eiselen E-Commerce 141 148. 
248
 See cases quoted in Fn250 and 251 below; see also Van der Merwe et al Contract 54. 
249
 Cf. English ruling in Tinn v Hoffman & Co (1873) 29 LT 271.  
250
 See Vergne 1985 (33) Am J Comp L 233; Tepper Contracts 64 and 293. Tepper explains that, 
the Common law is very strict in the interpretation of the mirror image rule so that any alteration 
invalidates the offer unless there is further ratification. With regard to American law, however, case 
law and almost all scholars are unanimous in their views that the rule in §2-207(1) UCC has 
modified the mirror-image rule. As stated by§2-207(1) UCC, “An acceptance operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon.” 
Under American law, then, additional terms become part of the contract “unless acceptance is 
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” According to 
commentators, the ruling in the UCC intended not only to change the mirror-image common law 
rule, but also to reflect the way buyers and sellers actually function in the marketplace. See, for 
application, the USA Magellan Intern Corp v Salzgitter Handel GmbH case above; see also Fejos 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/fejos.html; Murray 1988 (8) JL & Com 11; Sukurs 2001 
(34/35) VJTL 1481; Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales 3-15; Forte in MacQueen/Zimmermann 
Contract 112. 
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contain additional terms or conditions, it is no longer a real acceptance, but rather a 
counter-offer.251 As said by Maya AJ, in First National Bank Ltd v Avtjoglou, 
however, if the offeree “expresses his concern on some (added) aspects of the 
agreement,” the expression is not a counter-offer.252 Simply, the mirror image rule 
wants the acceptance to equal the offer. 
Congolese law  
In the same way that the CISG and South African law require, Congolese law also 
calls for the acceptance to correspond to the offer for it to produce effect. One of the 
leading cases on the subject is the Appeal Court of Kinshasa decision, dated 2 
October 1962, which locates the conclusion of a contract at the time when the will of 
the parties meets on all the essentials of the contract subject-matter.253 From this 
approach, it follows that Congolese contract law has also adopted the mirror-image 
rule. Accordingly, an acceptance with reservations or conditions is a counter-offer in 
this legal system, which, in turn, constitutes a rejection of the offer. This is the 
meaning of one of the earlier decisions of the Appeal Court of Kinshasa in which an 
acceptance under condition of a lower price was judged as a rejection of the offer 
that discharges the offeror.254 OHADA law has also adopted a similar ruling. As 
stated by Article 245 al. 1 UAGCL, “The acceptance of an offer, including additions, 
limitations or other modifications, is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-
proposal.”255 It is clear that Article 245 al. 1 is a faithful copy of Article 19(1) CISG. 
This provision has opted for the mirror image principle as has the equivalent CISG 
article.   
  
                                               
251
 See Jones v Reynolds 1913 AD 366 370-371; Houston v Bletchly 1926 EDL 305 309-310; Harlin 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 148G-150B; see also 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 66 Fn238. 
252
 First National Bank Ltd v Avtjoglou 2000 1 SA 989 (C) 995C.  
253
 Léo 2 October 1962 RJC 1964 No. 3 147.  
254
 Léo 20 July 1926 Jur Col 1928 100.  
255
 Compare this to Article 2/11 DUACL and Article 19(1) CISG. 
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Comments 
The mirror image norm is approved of by the CISG, South African law, and 
Congolese law. According to it, an acceptance must bear a resemblance to the offer. 
The mirror image rule, which previously originated in the DRC from case law, is 
now statutorily based. Article 245 al. 1 of the OHADA Commercial Act, which was 
without doubt inspired by Article 19(1) CISG, also describes an acceptance with 
additional terms as a rejection of the original offer which, as a result, amounts to a 
counter-offer.  
 
5.3.5.2  The legal regime of counter-offers  
 
The CISG  
In the Vienna Sales Convention, Article 19(2) deals with additional terms differently 
depending on whether they materially vary the content of the offer or not. By a means 
of exception to the mirror image rule, this provision acknowledges the introduction 
of new terms into the acceptance provided they do not significantly modify the offer. 
More specifically, Article 19(2) states that an acceptance with “additional or different 
terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance.” 
In other words, where a party includes minor terms in the offer, the contract is 
concluded on receipt of the acceptance, and its content consists of the initial offer in 
addition to non-conflicting terms added by the offeree.256 One case in point is the 
American decision in the Magellan Intern Corp v Salzgitter Handel GmbH case. In 
this case, the Court relied on the conduct of the offeree to issue a letter of credit to 
draw the conclusion that there was a valid contract formed between the parties.257 
                                               
256
 See last sentence of Article 19(2); see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86:67 86-125. 
257
 In the Magellan Intern Corp v Salzgitter Handel GmbH case, the offeree proposed a change of 
the price which normally constitutes a counter-offer in terms of Article 19(1) and (2). Taking 
support from Article 18, the Court ruled, 
(…) Article 18(a) requires an indication of assent to an offer (or counter-offer) to constitute its 
acceptance. Such an “indication” may occur through “a statement made by or other conducts of 
the offeree” (…). And at the very least, a jury could find consistently with Magellan’s allegations 
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It is acknowledged that where the offeree adds new terms in the acceptance, 
the initial offeror has an alternative of either approving or rejecting them. In the 
circumstances where an offeror would like to prevent such unimportant additions 
from becoming part of the contract, he/she must object orally or by dispatching a 
notice without delay to that effect.258 This rule was strictly followed in the German 
Automobile case where it is stated that, 
An acceptance that contains alterations is generally regarded as a counter-offer that 
constitutes a rejection of the offer (Article 19(1) CISG). However, this reply did not 
materially alter the terms of the offer, especially since it did not regard the goods 
sold. It would therefore have been up to the [buyer] to object to the reply (Article 
19(2) CISG). Such an objection has undisputedly not taken place here. The alteration 
has thus become part of the contract.259 
With regard to material alterations, they certainly amount to counter-offers. Article 
19(3) provides a list of actions which may be described as fundamental changes. 
These include the terms relating to price and payment, the quality and quantity of the 
goods, the place and time of delivery, the extent of one party’s liability to the other, 
and the settlement of disputes. To illustrate this with the price, the Austrian Supreme 
Court ruled, in the Roofing Material case, that, changing the price of the goods from 
28 Austrian Schillings per kilo to 40 Austrian Schillings per kilo is a relevant 
modification which nullifies the original offer.260 
                                               
that the required indication of complete (mirrored) assent occurred when Magellan issued its 
LC on March 26. So much, then, for the first element of a contract: offer and acceptance. 
See, in the same sense, France 4 January 1995 Supreme Court Fauba v Fujitsu case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/950104f1.html] (accessed 25-4-2012). In the case, the French 
Supreme Court decided that a statement according to which the initial price would be adjusted in 
accordance with the increase or decrease in market price, or in relation to alterations made to goods, 
does not materially alter the offer. 
258
 See the Second part of Article 19(2) CISG. The CISG-AC Opinion No. 1 comments on that the 
concept “notice” includes electronic communications. As explained by this Opinion, Article 19(2) 
aims to regularise an ineffective acceptance to an effective one unless the offeror reacts it promptly, 
even electronically.  
259
 Germany 27 April 1999 Oberlandesgericht (Appellate Court) Naumburg Automobile case 
[http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/990427g1.html] (last accessed 16-6-2013). 
260
 Austria 9 March 2000 Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) Roofing Material case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/000309a3.html] (last accessed 16-6-2013). See also the Swiss 
Chemical Products case whereby, deviations in the amount and the determination of the price were 
considered to be fundamental changes; and a wealth of authorities quoted by Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §86-69 86-130 in Note 2. But, see also, the French Fauba v Fujitsu case in which, a 
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It should be noted that the list in Article 19(3) above is not exhaustive as is 
evidenced by the phrase “among other things” used by the drafters of the Convention. 
In this regard, an American Court, in the Belcher-Robinson v Linamar Corporation 
case,261 and a German Court, in the Printed Goods case,262 were right to extend the 
listing of material alterations to forum-selection and arbitration clauses respectively. 
The prohibition of modifications of the kinds of those enumerated above is justified 
by the fact that comparable changes lead to an acceptance constituting a new offer.  
It is believed that other matters, not expressly listed by Article 19(3) as 
substantial alterations, should normally be adjudicated on a case by case basis, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the importance of the alterations to 
the offer, 263 to conclude whether they are material or not. 
South African law 
As claimed in the previous section, an acceptance which modifies the original offer 
is considered as a counter-offer. In the context of South African law, an acceptance 
by which the offeree modifies the proposed offer produces two legal consequences. 
Firstly, it consists of a rejection of the original offer so that the principal offeror may 
no longer accept it. This rule was formulated by Watermeyer CJ, in Collen v 
Rietfontein Engineering Works, as follows: “It must (…) be remembered that a 
counter-offer is in general equivalent to a refusal of an offer and that thereafter the 
original offer is dead and cannot be accepted until revived (emphasis added).”264 
Secondly, the counter-offer amounts to a new offer which the offeror can accept or 
                                               
purchase order that altered the price and delivery terms was considered not to have altered the offer 
materially. Read with interest Witz’s comments on this where the commentator regrets that the 
French Supreme Court failed to discuss the fact that the price and delivery terms were expressly 
quoted by Article 19(3) as material alterations. 
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 USA 31 March 2010 Federal District Court [Alabama] Belcher-Robinson, LLC v Linamar 
Corporation et al [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100331u1.html] (accessed 10-4-2012). 
262
 See Germany 26 June 2006 Appellate Court Frankfurt Printed Goods case in which, an 
arbitration clause was considered to be a settlement of disputes and, thus, assimilated to material 
alteration terms.  
263
 Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 341 §17. 
264
 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 420; see also Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 53.  
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reject.265 To exemplify this, in the Parow Lands (Pty) Ltd v Schneider case, the Court 
considered an acceptance whereby the offeree proposed a lower price than that 
proposed as valid because the seller had agreed on it.266 In the Court’s understanding, 
because the seller accepted the lower price offered by the offeree, there was no 
prejudice to either party.267  
It is admitted, however, that, where a party in dispatching an acceptance refers 
to terms not expressly mentioned in the offer but which will form part of the contract 
by virtue of law, his/her acceptance is valid.268 As stated by Corbett JA, in 
Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd, likewise, 
an incomplete acceptance does not necessarily constitute a counter-offer requiring a 
further acceptance by the original offeror.269 That kind of acceptance should be 
finalised afterwards and lead to the conclusion of a contract.270 As has been observed, 
the available authorities do not differentiate between substantial and minor 
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 Eiselen E-Commerce 141 146; Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 (39) CILSA 214 215. 
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 Parow Lands (Pty) Ltd v Scheider 1951 3 SA 183 (SWA). 
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 See Van der Merwe et al Contract 53; taking support on Seef Commercial and Industrial 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Silberman 2001 (3) SA 952 (SCA); and Section Three Dolphin Coast 
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 Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 
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 In the Westinghouse Brake & Equipment case, B made an offer by telex to buy certain equipment 
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the other party did not mention. A week later, W advised B telephonically that it accepted the 
Armscor term and took the attitude that a contract had then come into existence. B argued that W’s 
telex amounted to a counter-offer, which it had not accepted and, therefore, no contract had been 
concluded. The Trial Judge upheld B’s contention but the Appeal Court rejected it. Corbett JA 
ruled on appeal that, 
The trial Judge’s characterisation of appellant’s telex as a counter-offer is, with respect, 
incorrect. In this telex appellant did not introduce any new terms or in any way modify the terms 
of the offer. It accepted all the terms proposed in the offer, save that it reserved its approval of 
the Armscor conditions. It was certainly an incomplete acceptance, in the respect that I have 
indicated, and as such did not bring about a concluded contract, but it did not constitute a 
counter-offer necessitating a further acceptance by the respondent. Once appellant notified 
respondent of its approval of the Armscor conditions, then, provided that the offer had not in 
the meantime lapsed or been withdrawn, the acceptance would be complete and a contract 
concluded. 
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alterations. It is then up to the addressee to decide on the importance of the change by 
rejecting or approving it. 
Congolese law 
Historically speaking, there are not many comments on the legal effect of counter-
offers in Congolese law. The only rule which could be mentioned on the subject is 
the abovementioned Appeal Court of Kinshasa decision, dated 20 July 1926. 
According to that decision, an acceptance depending on a lower price was judged to 
be a rejection of the original offer and, therefore, released the offeror.271 It should be 
borne in mind that the CCO does not deal with the process of the formation of the 
contract. Under its ambience, the formation of contract by means of offer and 
acceptance was left to the will of the parties. It was, thus, logical that parties were 
free to consider whether the terms added should be accepted or not.  
Currently, however, the intention of the parties has been supplemented by the 
provisions of Article 245 UAGCL which are similar to Article 19(2) CISG. As for 
the last provision, Article 245 al. 1 of the Commercial Act describes a reply to an 
offer which intends to be an acceptance, but which contains additional terms, 
limitations, or any other modifications, as a rejection of the offer, or a counter-
offer.272 As ruled by the Appeal Court of Ouagadougou, in Société Telecel Faso v 
Société Hortel Project, requiring the seller to attach the original of the order form, 
invoices, and ship’s delivery orders, to the call for payment amounts into a counter-
offer.273 Article 245 al. 2 establishes a distinction between “material additional 
terms” and “immaterial additional terms”. As for the CISG, additional terms which 
alter the terms of the offer materially are devoid of legal effect. With regard to those 
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 See Léo 20 July 1926, Jur Col 1928 100 in Fn266.  
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 Article 2/11 DUACL duplicates Article 245 of the Commercial Act. 
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 Burkina Faso 20 January 2006 Appeal Court [Ouagadougou] (Civil and Commercial Chamber) 
Case No. 15 Société Telecel Faso v Société Hortel Project [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ 
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to deliver documents relating to the goods. 
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which do not modify the initial offer substantially, for example, reminding the other 
his obligations provided by the law such as delivering documents relating to the 
goods, they amount to acceptance, unless the other party objects to them promptly.274 
Consequently, if the original offeror abstains from reacting immediately to the 
newly-added terms by the offeree, the contents of the contract will consist of the 
initial terms plus the modifications contained in the acceptance.275 It is clear that the 
key-question underlying Article 245 al. 2 resides in an understanding of what 
constitutes substantial alterations and modifications and what does not.  
Comments  
In all of the three legal systems being studied, an acceptance must be unconditional, 
which means it must not constitute a counter-proposal. In other words, the acceptance 
must correspond as closely as possible with the offer; otherwise it is considered to 
be a rejection of the initial offer. Unlike South African law, the CISG and modern 
Congolese law establish a neat distinction between substantial and immaterial 
alterations. In the latter legal systems, if secondary modifications amount to 
acceptance, unless they are rejected forthwith, material alterations do not. Despite 
this similarity, there is, however, an interesting difference between the Vienna 
Convention and modern Congolese law with regard to material changes. The CISG 
seems clearer on the subject and for that reason it should be recommended as a model.  
In effect, in contrast to the CISG, the OHADA Commercial Act, and 
consequently modern Congolese sales law, does not contain a provision similar to 
Article 19(3) CISG which enumerates expressly the terms that would qualify as 
material modifications. The DUACL is also silent on the matter. One should 
remember that the expression “substantial alterations” include, in the CISG 
environment, terms relating to the price and its payment, the quality and quantity of 
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 In the Société Telecel Faso v Société Hortel Project above, the Court failed to draw the 
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juge. 
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 Cf. Last sentence of Article 245 al. 2 UAGCL; similar to Article Article 2/11(2) DUACL; 
compare with sentence two of Article 19(2) CISG. 
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the goods, the place and time of delivery, briefly, the obligations of the parties. Faced 
with the silence of the Commercial Act, one may refer to the standards of a 
sufficiently definite offer as they are delineated by Article 241 al. 2 UAGCL to 
decide what, in the DRC, material or immaterial modifications are.  
As required by Article 241 al. 2, an offer is adequately definite on condition 
that it identifies the goods, determines the price, or makes provision for determining 
them. Because these elements constitute the criteria of any sufficiently definite offer, 
it is deemed that modifications of the kind of those affecting the nature or quality and 
quantity of the goods, or those related to the purchase price, would qualify as material 
alterations in Congolese sales law perfectly well. This thinking is, moreover, justified 
by the fact that the quality and the quantity of the goods, on the one hand, and the 
determination of the price, on the other hand, form the basics of any regular offer. 
Without provisions regulating one or another of these requirements, therefore, the 
offer would be substantially meaningless. Similarly, the delivery of the goods and 
the payment of the price constitute the cornerstones of any sales contract so that, as 
long as parties have not reached agreement upon them, there is no valid sale.  
Succinctly, though Congolese law does not provide a list of additional terms 
considered as substantial alterations, this shortcoming may indirectly be filled by 
recourse to the requirements of a sufficiently definite offer, as defined by Article 241 
al. 2 UAGCL. Additional terms which affect the definiteness of the offer requirement 
would qualify as substantial alterations. With regard to changes other than those 
related to the goods and the price, they could  independently be assessed by the Court 
on a case-by-case basis taking into account the circumstances of the case and the 
usages established between the parties to decide whether or not they are material or 
immaterial alterations. For more clarty, however, the adoption of a provision similar 
to Article 19(3) CISG is recommended in order to avoid difficulties subsequent to 
the differentiation between substantial and minor changes. 
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5.3.5.3 Inclusion of standard terms in contracts  
 
A short view on standard terms 
As it has already been mentioned, in current commercial transactions parties use to 
send their offer and acceptance in a form that incorporate the terms of their standard 
business conditions in the contract.276 These terms consist of pre-printed forms 
prepared either by the seller or the buyer. Since standard terms are, in principle, 
intended to favour only the party who has submitted them,277 it is not likely that they 
coincide. On the contrary, they regularly lead to a conflict between the provisions of 
the general conditions exchanged. Such a situation is usually referred to as “the battle 
of forms” problem.278 
Eiselen remarks that “the use of standard terms and conditions in sales 
contracts is a widespread and legally recognised practice.”279 Such a right is 
exercised either by sellers or by buyers through a mechanism referred to as the 
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 Standard conditions are defined in Comment 2 to Article 2.19 PICC as follows: 
“Standard terms” are to be understood as those contract provisions which are prepared in 
advance for general and repeated use by one party and which are actually used without 
negotiation with the other party (…). What is decisive is not their formal presentation (…) (but 
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See 1994 PICC, Comments under Article 2.19 http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.international. 
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Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 347§32. 
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 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 144; Eiselen’s comments to the CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 §2.12; 
see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86:70 86-131; Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 (39) CILSA 214. 
According to the author, reasons for which parties insert standards terms in contracts  include, 
among others, the need for parties to: 
- ensure that they tailor their sales agreements to their own needs; 
- standardise their contractual obligations and business practices and procedures; and 
- exclude or modify their common-law obligations which would normally flow from the sales 
contract, such as the liability for latent defects; etc.  
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“incorporation by reference”.280 The question generally posed in this regard is to 
know whether or not those terms and conditions are contained within the contract 
because they have not been discussed mutually. By way of response, the CISG-AC 
Opinion No.13 addresses the issue extensively by distinguishing between situations 
where the inclusion is admitted from those in which it is not. South African law has 
also tried to rule on the matter. With regard to Congolese law, conversely, it appears 
that it has not dealt with the subject. With the exception of provisions regulating the 
formation of contract, in general, even the advent of OHADA law seems not to have 
provided a satisfactory solution.  
The CISG 
The Vienna Convention does not specifically regulate the problem of the inclusion 
of standard terms in contracts.281 In this context, the inclusion of the standard terms 
issue was drawn to the attention of the CISG-AC so that, following its seventeenth 
meeting, the Council formulated in the thirteenth Opinion ten rules relating to the 
legal regime of standard terms. As stated by the two first rules, for instance,  
The inclusion of standard terms under the CISG is determined according to the rules 
for the formation and interpretation of contracts under the CISG. 
Standard terms are included in the contract where the parties have expressly or 
impliedly agreed to their inclusion at the time of the conclusion of the contract and 
the other party had a reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms.282   
It is recognised that, despite the CISG’s silence with regard to standard terms, their 
legal regime may be dealt with by an interpretation of the provisions regulating the 
formation of contract. These provisions include, in particular, Article 8 relating to 
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 See Austria 6 February 1996 Supreme Court Propane case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
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pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op13.html. 
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statement and conduct,283 and Articles 18 and 19 dealing with the acceptance and its 
modification.  
Normally, standard conditions must be incorporated in the offer and brought 
to the knowledge of the other party to produce effect. Where standard conditions are 
explicitly referred to in the offer, and the offeree accepts them without objection, 
there is no conflict.  The French Appeal Court of Paris, in the ISEA Industry v Lu 
case, has ruled on an inverse situation where the order forms contained standard 
terms written on the back but were not referred to on the front of the document. The 
Court stated that, 
Bearing in mind the absence, on the reverse side of that form, of an express reference 
to the general terms of sale appearing on the back, the [Seller] cannot be considered 
to have accepted the latter. The confirmation of the order (…), which contains the 
general terms of sale, being subsequent to the date of contract formation, cannot be 
analysed as a counter-offer within the meaning of Article 19(1) of the [CISG]; 
consequently, [Buyer]’s silence is stripped of its import.284  
This decision was criticised on the basis that it was very severe with regard to 
standard conditions not clearly integrated into the offer by denying them legal effect. 
Its ruling was recently contradicted by the American Golden Valley Grape Juice case 
wherein, though not specifically mentioned, all documents attached to an e-mail, 
including standard terms, were considered relevant to the formation of the 
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 See Schmidt-Kessel in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 173 §55-56; see also comments 
on the CISG-AC Opinion No. 13. It was ruled by the German Supreme Court in the Machinery 
case that, 
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cases/011031g1.html] (last accessed 25-4-2013); see also USA 16 November 2007 Barbara Berry, 
SA de CV v Ken M Spooner Farms. 
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 See France 13 December 1995 Appellate Court Paris ISEA Industry v Lu 
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contract.285 The implications of the Golden Valley Grape Juice case are that it 
formulates as a general rule that, if standard conditions are written on the back of an 
offer or an acceptance, whether they are explicitly referred to or not, the other party 
must take notice of them; otherwise he/she would suffer the consequences of his/her 
negligence when these standard conditions are invoked by their author. 
With regard to the time when standard conditions must be incorporated to be 
effective, it is required that they are included before, or simultaneously with, the 
formation of the contract, except where the contract is modified.286 Thus, conditions 
alluded to after the contract has been concluded are irrelevant. Furthermore, the 
incorporation “must be clear to a reasonable person of the same kind as the other 
party and in the same circumstances”287 as that party. There is legal authority that to 
satisfy the requirement above, standard terms and conditions must be stipulated in 
the same language as is used in the principal contract, or at least worded in a language 
the other party understands.288  
In a few words, despite the absence of a specific provision relating to standard 
terms and conditions, case law and the CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 have filled the gap 
so that currently there is no doubt that standard terms and conditions fall within the 
Convention’s field of operation. 
South African law   
As mentioned in the introductory subsection, it is not surprising that, in the course of 
dealings, 
(…) the buyer submits a purchase order with his general terms and conditions (often 
set forth in fine print on the reverse of the purchase order) and with information on 
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such matters as product, price, quantity, and delivery typed on the face of the 
purchase order; and seller responds with an acknowledgement containing his general 
terms and conditions (also often set forth in fine print on the reverse of the document) 
and with a typed response to the typed information recited on the face of the purchase 
order.289 
Standard forms contracts of the kind of the ones described in the statement above 
may even be offered by one party to the extent that the other party is obliged to accept 
or reject the terms as proposed without discussion. That is the case regarding the 
well-known “contracts of adhesion”.290 With regard to the importance of 
standardised contracts in contemporary commercial dealings, Hutchison argues that:  
It has been estimated that probably 95 per cent of all transactions today are 
concluded (…) (by recourse to standard terms and conditions). The individual 
negotiation of contracts is expensive in terms of both time and money, and so most 
businesses operate on the basis of documents drawn up for them by their legal 
advisers and are not prepared to consider any variation of their standard terms. 
Systems are set up so that transactions can be concluded quickly and efficiently 
(…).291   
It was claimed earlier that using standard terms and conditions is a lawful practice. 
In commercial transactions, indeed, parties used to submit pre-printed forms where 
most of the terms of the contract, other than those related to the price, quantity, 
quality, and date of delivery which will be negotiated individually, “are pre-
determined and apparently not open to negotiation.”292 For them to have effect, 
however, it is recommended that a party using standard terms and conditions “must 
either expressly make the other party aware of the inclusion of the terms or place the 
reference to their inclusion in such a conspicuous place and manner that a reasonable 
party would have noticed the inclusion notice.”293   
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It is important to note that, if the use of standardised contracts becomes more 
free and unregulated it may end in the abuse of rights, mostly in consumer contracts. 
This feeling led McNally JA to rule about them in the Transport and Crane Hire 
case.294 Generally, this case discloses the kinds of documents where standard clauses 
are found, viz. invoices, catalogues, and timetables. It also shows that, when a party 
includes his/her standard terms in the contract, if the other party does not want them 
to form part of the contract, he/she must object immediately. In other words, when a 
person entering a contract discovers that documents submitted to him/her contain 
standard terms, he/she must read them carefully, or it is presumed that he/she has 
approved of them.295 Nevertheless, for standards terms to produce effect they must 
be reasonable and brought to the attention of the other party or they are ineffective. 
Congolese law   
The inclusion of standard terms seems not to have formed the basis of many disputes 
in Congolese law. There is only one isolated case dealing with the burden of proof 
of conditions of sale which uses terms like those of “conditions of contract of sale”, 
and “general printed clauses”.296 The UAGCL also does not include specific 
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provisions devoted to the inclusion of standard forms in the contract. Article 2/19(1) 
of the OHADA DUACL provides for an explicit solution by stating that, where one 
party or both use standard terms in concluding the contract, the general rules on the 
formation of the contract, i.e. the exchange of offer and acceptance, apply.297 In the 
OHADA law region, the phrase “general conditions of sale specified on the back of 
the invoices” was invoked by the Appeal Court of Ouagadougou in the Sitaci v 
Misetal SA case without any other comment.298 In this case, the contract contained a 
dispute settlement clause selecting French courts for arbitration on the reverse of 
seller’s standard form. Its effect was not discussed at all. Matters in question rather 
included issues such as those of partial and late delivery, lack of conformity, handing 
over of goods to a carrier, and passing of risk, in one word, the obligations of the 
parties. 
Comments  
The available literature and case law do not make it easy to know the consequence 
of the inclusion of standard terms in contracts in the DRC. Thus, the CISG and South 
African law are more detailed on the subject than is Congolese law and that would 
be recommended. Because the inclusion of standard terms topic is closely linked to 
the formation of contract, however, it is deemed that articles regulating the formation 
of contract on the whole would govern standard terms as well.299 Alternatively, 
should the inclusion of the standard terms issue appears controversial, the CCJA 
might be asked to interpret it. This prerogative is provided for by Article 14 al. 2 of 
the OHADA Treaty which allows the CCJA to be consulted on any matters falling 
within the Treaty or the field of application of other Uniform Acts for their 
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interpretation and enforcement.300 In the meantime, it is assumed that standard terms 
should produce legal effect in the DRC provided they do not materially modify the 
main contract.301 Thus, in circumstances where one party would intend to reject 
standard terms and conditions alluded to by his/her counterparty, he/she must object 
to them immediately.302 If one party starts carrying out the contract notwithstanding 
the presence of those standards, for instance, by delivering the goods or paying the 
price, he/she is then presumed to have approved them.  
 In any rate, the topic of the inclusion of standard terms in the contract becomes 
subtle where both parties refer to their standard conditions of business. Such a 
situation may generate a battle of forms problem which needs solution as discussed 
below.  
 
5.3.5.4 Solutions to the “battle of forms” issue 
 
Introduction  
Rules relating to the modification of the offer are particularly important in the 
principle known as “the battle of forms” where each party would like its standard 
terms to govern the contract. As many scholars have observed, the battle arises when 
a reply to an offer, identified itself as an acceptance, contains provisions that clearly 
contradict those in the offer.303 The question asked in this respect relates to whose 
general conditions would prevail in any conflicting case. By means of answer, 
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whereas South African and modern Congolese sales laws prefer the terms submitted 
last, modern CISG case law looks as if it has adopted a solution which is at variance 
with the literal reading of the Convention’s provisions.  
The CISG 
The issue of the battle of forms has been intensively debated within the 
Convention.304 It is often listed among the most controversial problems of the 
CISG.305 This subject is complex; it entails per se three more questions. The one is 
to know whether, where parties refer to their standard terms; there is a validly 
concluded contract. The second is clearly whether the terms of the seller or those of 
the buyer will prevail, and, lastly, whether the CISG deals with the problem of the 
battle of forms.  
As regards the question relating to the existence of a contract when parties 
refer to standard terms, the answer is positive. A propos of this, a number of judicial 
decisions have implied from “parties’ performance notwithstanding partial 
contradiction between their standard terms (...) an enforceable contract.”306 In 
support of this, Viscasillas contends that it has been proved that, “usually parties go 
ahead with the contract although each has referred to its general conditions.”307 Thus, 
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Int’l L. Rev. 97-155; Viscasillas http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross19.html; Kadner 
2012/2013 YB of PIL 71-101; Eiselen/ Bergenthal 2006 (39) CILSA 214-240; Sukurs 2001 (34/35) 
VJTL 1481; Magnus Last Shot 185-200; Vergne 1985 (33) Am J Comp L 233-258; Fejos 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/fejos.html; Farnsworth in Galston/Smit Sales §3:04; 
Ferrari in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 280-295; Schroeter in Schlechtriem/ 
Schwenzer Commentary 347-355; Forte in  MacQueen/Zimmermann Contract 98-122. 
305
 Cf. Note 39 above; see also Viscasillas in Felemegas Interpretation 318; Viscasillas 1998 (10) 
Pace Int’l L. Rev. 97; Viscasillas http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross19.html; Fejos 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ fejos.html; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86:68 86-127. 
306
 See Germany 9 January 2002  BGH [Federal Supreme Court] CISG-online 651, NJW 2002, 
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that parties either derogated from Article 19 or waived enforcement of conflicting standard terms); 
Germany 11 March 1998 Oberlandesgericht München, CLOUT case No. 232 (buyer accepted 
standard terms that differed from its offer by performing contract); cases reproduced in 
UNCITRAL Digest 103 Fn26. 
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the most difficult question is the one dealing with the exact content of the contract 
when parties mention their standard terms, and the applicable law in the case.  
It should be said immediately that the Vienna Sales Convention lacks a 
specific provision dealing with the subject of the battle of forms.308 The only 
provision which could be invoked in this regard is Article 19 regulating the effect of 
acceptances with modifications. Unfortunately, Article 19 does not also provide a 
clear rule on the question under discussion.309 The absence of a specific provision 
does not mean, however, that the battle of forms issue is governed by domestic law.310 
In conformity with Article 7(2), the battle of forms subject should be considered as 
one of the gaps which have to be closed by applying the general principles on which 
the CISG is based, namely the principles of good faith and party autonomy.  
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discussed at the Vienna Sales Conference, participants left it open because of lack of compromise. 
See Schroeter in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 336 §4; Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 (39) 
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A dual trend of positions has appeared amongst scholars in relation to the kind 
of solution suitable to the battle of forms problem. Most scholars believe that the 
appropriate solution to the matter could be found by applying the so-called “last-shot 
rule”,311 while others advocate the application of the well-known “knock-out rule”.312 
As far as the last-shot rule is concerned, its followers consider that “the last person 
to send its form is considered to control the terms of the contract and (is), therefore, 
the one who wins the battle.”313 To exemplify this, the last shot theory was applied 
by the German Appeal Court of Köln in the Shock-cushioning Seat case, in the 
following words, 
Pursuant to the provisions of the CISG (…), the interpretation of contracts with 
conflicting terms leads to the application of at least those provisions which do not 
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 Viscasillas in Felemegas Interpretation 318; Valioti http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
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 See Viscasillas in Felemegas Interpretation 318; see also Kadner 2012/2013 YB of PIL 71 76; 
Schwenzer/ Mohs 2006 (6) IHR 239 243; Forte in MacQueen/Zimmermann Contract 115; 
Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 (39) CILSA 214 220; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §86:68 86-128; CISG-AC 
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differ. Beyond this, the so-called “last-shot” doctrine applies, according to which the 
governing terms are those which were exchanged last.314   
Consistent with the last-shot approach, if the original offeror performs the contract 
notwithstanding the presence of the offeree’s standard terms, he/she is supposed to 
have ratified them.315 In that case, the terms of the contract will be the standard terms 
contained in the acceptance in addition to the terms of the initial offer.316 One 
commentator contends, however, that such “is quite simply not an acceptable 
solution to the problem”317 under consideration; in practice things do not happen so 
easily.   
With regard to the knock-out rule, its supporters believe that where parties 
refer to their standard terms and conditions, parties are in agreement on common 
clauses of the contract and on those non-conflicting standardised clauses.318 
According to them, the principle of good faith should play an important role in 
resolving the battle of forms problem.319 Simply, in the thinking of the knock-out 
rule, parties would certainly enforce the terms and conditions exchanged with which 
they both concur. The German Supreme Court has adopted a similar reasoning in the 
Powdered Milk case in which it is expressly ruled that,  
Certainly under the point of view of good faith and fair dealing (…) (the) seller 
should not have assumed that the question whether certain provisions of the 
opposing terms and conditions contradicted its own (even insofar as it served its 
Terms and Conditions last) could be answered in isolation for individual clauses 
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with the consequence that the individual provisions that were beneficial to it would 
apply.320 
Subsequent to this case, it is clear that, within the knock-out rule, the terms of the 
contract would include primarily those terms upon which parties have reached 
agreement. Regarding the terms that remain in conflict, they would be replaced by 
the default rules of the Convention.321 As some commentators have said,  
Recent developments in CISG contract formation place decreasing importance on a 
disagreement of the parties where such disagreement refers only to standard terms 
and conditions. These developments point to the application of the knock-out rule to 
those cases, as opposed to the last shot rule, which is in line with the plain wording 
of Article 19.322 
What is more, a comparable mode of resolving the battle of forms issue is the 
principle promoted by recent international commercial instruments, namely the 
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PICC, PECL, and CESL,323 and some modern national laws.324 All of these legal 
instruments admit that standard terms form part of the contract, provided that they 
are common in substance.  
South African law 
As in other legal systems, a counter-proposal generated by the use of standard terms 
may produce a battle of forms problem in South African law. The issue of battle of 
forms was recently addressed in Ideal Fastener Corporation CC v Book Vision (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Colour Graphic.325 In this case, a buyer placed an order for goods to which 
the seller responded by referring to his conditions of sale. In dealing with the case, 
Kondile J experienced little difficulty in resolving the dispute by applying the normal 
rules of offer and acceptance.326 The learned judge implied from the buyer’s 
behaviour shown by returning the “(...) seller’s form after deliberately omitting to 
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draw lines through the conditions of sale (...) an acceptance of the counter-offer.”327 
He concluded, therefore, that the contract had been concluded on the terms of the 
seller.  
 The result of the ruling in the Ideal Fastener Corporation decision is that 
South African law has opted for the “last-shot rule” as a solution to the battle of forms 
problem.328 It seems, however, that the issue of battle of forms has not received much 
attention in South African law. Christie specifies this by saying that South Africa 
ignores any “other way of resolving a battle of forms than by applying the rules of 
offer and acceptance, leading in a proper (…) application of the last shot doctrine.”329 
This is also the dominant position in English law.330 In the UK, if any contract is 
concluded without agreement on the standard terms evoked by the parties, the 
contract is governed by the terms last dispatched, unless the offeree assents to the 
offeror’s terms. 
Congolese law 
Immediately, an examination of the available case law gives the idea that no typical 
case of battle of forms has been settled by Congolese courts. We have already 
mentioned one of the Lower court of Lubumbashi’s decisions331 and, under the 
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OHADA law environment, the Ouagadougou Appeal Court Sitaci v Misetal SA 
case.332 These decisions made reference to expressions such as those of “conditions 
of contract of sale”, and “general printed clauses”. As was claimed then, concepts 
like these are frequently referred to under the inclusion of standard terms in contracts 
and the battle of forms framework. The shortage of cases relating to the battle of 
forms may be due to the fact that Congolese law did not initially rule about the offer 
and acceptance technique, or to the tendency of the courts to solve comparable issues 
with reference to rules applicable to lack of consent.333 In this context, a contract in 
which parties failed to reach agreement on pre-printed terms would be considered to 
be null and void.  
Comments 
Both the CISG and South African law are principally based on the last-shot rule in 
solving the battle of forms problem. In line with the said principle, standards terms 
submitted at the last stage are preferred to those contained in the initial offer. With 
regard to Congolese law, in contrast, faced with the rarity of case law in this legal 
system, the present researcher is unable to determine whether the DRC is in favour 
of the last-shot rule or the knock out principle, or any other solution. Nevertheless, 
the solution adopted by Article 245 al. 2 UAGCL is indirectly consistent with the 
last-shot rule. As for its equivalent, Article 19(2) CISG, Article 245 al. 2 of the 
Commercial Act states that where one party refers to standard terms without these 
being subsequently objected to by the other party, “(…) the terms of the contract are 
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the terms of the offer with the modifications stated in the acceptance.”334 From this 
ruling, one is tempted to conclude that modern Congolese law also follows the last-
shot rule. 
The last-shot method does not, however, occupy a good position.335 It is, 
among other things, reproached on the basis of being an arbitrary solution that tends 
to favour the last person to send the form, particularly the seller.336 Accordingly, 
recent contractual law instruments337 have opted for the “knock-out rule” considered 
as the most reasonable and equitable solution because it is based on the actual 
consensus of the parties.338 The knock-out rule is also the solution suggested by 
Article 2/22 DUACL. This technique has the merit of seeking to enforce terms and 
conditions on which parties have had an agreement. The knock-out approach, in other 
words, “avoids an arbitrary choice between the two sets of competing standard terms, 
instead using only those elements which are common to both sets, (…) which accords 
with the actual intention of both parties.”339 
Since the knock-out method of resolving the battle of form issue is in 
conformity with the intention of the parties to enforce the contract notwithstanding 
the existence of conflicting clauses, it might be favoured to its opposite, the last-shot 
principle. Without minimising the importance of the first doctrine, it is also useful to 
quote the approval given by PICC Comment 3 to the last-shot solution. As stated by 
this comment, “The ‘last shot’ doctrine may be appropriate if the parties clearly 
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indicate that the adoption of their standard terms is an essential condition for the 
conclusion of the contract.”340  
Following from this statement, it is clear that the appropriate solution in 
resolving the problem under discussion can be found in the collaboration of the 
parties. Of course, where the offer and acceptance diverge considerably, i.e. if they 
differ materially, there is no valid contract. Where the knock-out rule applies, 
however, it is possible for a party to obviate such disagreement.341 One of the ways 
is to notify the other party of the intention not to be bound by the contract. A propos 
of this, the CISG and modern Congolese law342 depart from South African law as 
they expressly require the notification to be given immediately subsequent to the 
formation of the contract, or prior to its conclusion.  
 
5.3.6 Conclusion on the Acceptance  
 
It is commonly admitted that the addressee must communicate his/her acceptance to 
the offeror for it to have effect. On this subject, the historical approach under 
Congolese law was to be totally silent about the acceptance process. Currently, the 
UAGCL has improved the situation. Inspired by the Vienna Convention, the 
OHADA Commercial Act, and indirectly Congolese law, now requires an acceptance 
to resemble the terms of the offer strictly; otherwise it constitutes a counter-offer. 
Moreover, both the CISG and modern Congolese sales law distinguish between 
material and immaterial alterations. If minor modifications amount to acceptance 
unless they are rejected at once, material alterations do not. Nonetheless, though the 
Commercial Act appears to have duplicated CISG provisions, there are some 
particularities which differentiate them. Specifically, Congolese law departs from the 
CISG on the grounds that it does not provide a list of conducts that are likely to be 
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converted into acceptance nor does it provide for material alterations. Of course the 
last type of shortcoming may indirectly be filled by the interpretation of the criteria 
of a sufficiently definite offer. For more certainty, the Convention is recommended 
as the pattern to improve Congolese sales law in this respect.  
In addition, the common feature between the CISG, South African law, and 
modern Congolese law on the subject of the insertion of additional terms in the 
contract resides in the adoption of the mirror image rule. The implementation of this 
resemblance obligation is sometimes contradicted in the course of dealings when 
parties conduct business by means of standardised contract terms. Situations of this 
kind may produce a battle of forms problem. Though several solutions have been 
advocated to resolve the matter, among which the last-shot and the knock-out rules 
are, the recourse to the mutual collaboration of the parties appears to be the best 
solution. As Eiselen and Bergenthal have said, the acceptance of a modified 
consensual approach, that is the knock-out method of resolving the battle of forms 
issue, is not without importance.343 But, given that, owing to the rarity of case law it 
is not possible to show, at this stage, preference to neither solution in the DRC, before 
the entry into frce of the DUACL, the introduction of the knock-out rule into modern 
Congolese law is recommended in order to harmonise it with the most recent 
favourite solution of commercial instruments and contemporary CISG case law. 
To sum this up, no valid contract is concluded unless the offer and acceptance 
coincide. It should be noted, however, that international sales usually involve 
engagements between parties separated in time and place. This entails the problem 
regarding the exact moment and the place where the contract is concluded. 
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5.4 The Moment and Place of Contracting  
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
  
In general, the time when the period for acceptance begins to run and, subsequently, 
the time of contracting depends on the mode of communication used. As Hutchison 
has said, one of the most interesting and fundamental questions with regard to the 
conclusion of a contract is the time and place of the formation of a contact concluded 
inter absentes.344 With regard to these categories of contracts, scholars have 
developed a number of approaches so that each legal system aligns behind one or 
another theory. The following discussion seeks to know which of the competing 
theories prevail under the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law. In detail, 
this section discusses different theories developed on the moment of the formation 
of contract subject, applies them to the legal systems under comparison, and 
examines the legal nature of a contract concluded electronically. A comparative 
assessment of what contemporary Congolese law is will follow step by step.  
 
5.4.2 General Remarks  
 
When parties are face-to-face, there is not as complicated a problem as where they 
are not. In such a case, the contract is concluded at the exact moment when, and the 
place where, parties become conscious that their wills correspond.345 Concretely, 
while contracting parties are physically present, in the same place, when acceptance 
is communicated to the offeror, the time of formation of the contract coincides with 
the time of communication. With regard to contracts concluded by correspondence, 
telegram or other means of communication, the moment of their effectiveness has 
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aroused controversy. Many theories have been developed in this respect, of which 
there are the declaration, information, expedition, and the reception theories.346  
As far as the “declaration theory” is concerned, it assumes that an acceptance 
is effective and the contract concluded as soon as there is a meeting of wills. The 
declaration theory is also known as the “emission theory”. By contrast to this theory, 
the “information theory” requires the acceptance of an offer to develop into a contract 
only when it has come to the actual knowledge of the offeror, i.e. when the offeror is 
informed of the letter of acceptance. This principle applies regardless of the time 
when the offeror receives the letter of acceptance.347 In this regard, there is an 
assumption that the person making an offer may have known of the acceptance once 
the notice thereof has been placed at his/her disposal.348 The basis of the information 
theory consists, in other words, of “the perfect concordance of the exchanged 
wills.”349 This approach is sometimes assimilated to the “communication theory” 
which locates the moment of the contract at the time the offeror has physically 
received the communication of the acceptance.  
With regard to the “expedition theory”, it is closely linked to postal 
acceptances. Theoretically, an acceptance sent by post may take effect at a variety of 
points which are the time the letter is posted and the moment it is received by the 
offeror.350 On the basis of commercial convenience, the English House of Lords has 
favoured the first option by ruling that a contract negotiated through the post is 
concluded as soon as the letter of acceptance is placed in the hands of the post 
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office.351 The expedition theory is known in the context of Anglo-American law as 
“the postal rule”, “mailbox rule,” or “dispatch rule”.352 Compliant with the mailbox 
rule, an acceptance is effective upon the dispatch if it is properly sent through an 
implicitly authorised mode of communication.353 
As regards the “reception theory”, it assumes that an acceptance produces 
effect at the moment when it reaches the offeror, meaning when the letter arrives 
from the post office.354 After these general comments, let us discuss the special 
features of each legal system.  
 
5.4.3 Moment and Place of the Contract in Detail  
 
The CISG 
Usually, an offer made between persons in each other’s presence, without stating a 
period for acceptance, must be accepted immediately. Sentence three of Article 18(2) 
states in this regard that an offer is deemed to take place between people present 
when it is made orally.355 The situation differs when negotiations involve non-present 
parties. In effect, where contracting parties are absent from one another, both the 
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conclusion of the contract and the time of its conclusion depend on the time an 
acceptance becomes effective; this means at the moment the indication of assent 
reaches the offeror.356 Owing to the fact that an acceptance must reach the offeror for 
a contract to come into being, where the indication of assent fails to do so; acceptance 
is ineffective and there is also no contract.357  
It is noted, however, that the period during which an acceptance reaches the 
offeror, and, consequently, the time of conclusion of the contract, differs depending 
on whether the offer was made by telegram, letter, or by means of instantaneous 
communication.358 To illustrate this, where the period is fixed in a telegram, or a 
letter, the time for acceptance begins to run from the moment the telegram is handed 
in for dispatch, or from the date shown on the letter or, when the first date is not 
available, from the date shown on the envelope. In addition to non-instantaneous 
methods of communication, the second sentence of Article 20(1) regulates the delay 
for acceptance of an offer sent by means of instantaneous communication. As stated 
by this provision, if the offer was communicated by telephone, telex or other means 
of instantaneous communication, the period starts to run from the moment the offer 
reaches the offeree.359  
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From the explanation above, it follows that the CISG has adopted the reception 
theory as the mode of determination of the time a contract is concluded.360 
Accordingly, as long as an acceptance has not yet reached the offeror there is no 
validly concluded contract, except when acceptance is expressed by conduct, in 
which case the contract is formed at the time the performance begins.361 As Garro 
says, the fact that the Vienna Convention prefers the reception theory has resolved 
“a classic instance of theoretical conflict between common law and civil law 
approaches.”362 Under the civil law legal system, an acceptance is, as a rule, not 
effective until it reaches the offeror, whereas in common law jurisdiction a contract 
is completed the moment the offeree has dispatched his/her acceptance.  
South African law  
In general, a contract is concluded when and where the offeror is informed of the 
acceptance, viz. when and where acceptance is communicated.363 As explained 
earlier, the principle according to which a contract is concluded at the time and the 
place an acceptance is expressed is named the “information theory”, by contrast to 
the “expedition theory” for which an acceptance may be given merely by posting. 
South African law posits the information theory as the general mode for 
acceptance.364 This principle goes along, however, with the reception theory as being 
an exceptional mode of contracting where parties have chosen the Post Office as 
mode of communication.365 
The information theory was first formulated by Kotzé CJ, in Fern Gold Mining 
Co v Tobias, as follows: “[A]n offer made by letter, although accepted by the person 
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to whom it is made, does not establish a contract until the acceptance has come to 
the knowledge of the offeror, or at any rate until an answer by means of posted letter 
has been sent to the offeror.”366  This was confirmed a long time later by Wessels J 
in the following words, “As a general rule, South African law requires not only that 
an offer should be accepted, but that that acceptance should be communicated to the 
offeror within a reasonable time.”367 The author goes on to say that the information 
rule should exceptionally be departed from, such as in circumstances where 
acceptance by post was tacitly authorised.368 
The information doctrine was, moreover, approved by Flemming J in the 
Hawkins v Contract Design decision.369 In this case, after hesitation on whether the 
Kergeulen case370 had concerned a postal contract, the learned judge indicated that 
the case was difficult to reconcile with the Driftwood Properties ruling in which the 
AD had reaffirmed the pre-eminence of the information theory.371 In line with the 
latter decision, Flemming ruled, “It must be taken that communication of acceptance 
is necessary for the conclusion of a contract unless and until a sufficient factual basis 
for reaching the conclusion that a contrary intention should prevail is established.”372 
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With regard to the expedition theory, the leading case in this regard is the Cape 
Explosives Works v South African Oil and Fat Industries Ltd case.373 In this case, 
Kotzé CJ, who had already manifested a preference for the information theory in the 
Tobias case,374 changed  his mind by opting for its opposite. As stated by him, in a 
normal situation, if the Post Office is used as mode of communication, a written offer 
made through the post becomes a contract at the time and place the letter of 
acceptance is posted.375 Kotzé said, 
I think that as those of our Roman-Dutch jurists, who have written on the subject, 
differ in opinion,376 we should now lay down that, where in the ordinary course the 
Post Office is used as the channel of communication, and a written offer is made, 
the offer becomes a contract on the posting of the letter of acceptance. This is the 
principle of the English, Scotch and American systems of jurisprudence, and appears 
to me also, apart from its practical convenience, to be in accordance with the learning 
of our courts (…).377 
It is an impression that, in so ruling, Kotzé inserted the Anglo-American expedition 
or mail box rule under South African law. This principle was approved eighteen years 
later by the AD in Kergeulen Sealing & Whaling Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue.378 It was held in this case that, if a party makes an offer by post, he/she 
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tacitly authorises his/her counterparty to accept simply by posting a letter of 
acceptance, unless otherwise stipulated.379 It should be borne in mind that pursuant 
to the expedition theory, a contract is deemed to be accurately concluded at the place 
and the time the letter of acceptance is posted even before it is received by the offeror. 
To use Van Niekerk’s example, if a South African seller in Johannesburg makes a 
postal offer to sell certain goods to a German buyer in Hamburg which the latter 
accepts by way of a letter of acceptance, the contract of sale between them is 
concluded in Hamburg at the time that the letter was posted there.380  
The rule according to which a mere posting of the letter of acceptance 
concludes the contract seems not to be obligatory in nature. In accordance with the 
principle of freedom of contract, parties may opt out from it by requiring the delivery 
of the letter of acceptance as a starting point of the binding force of the contract.381 
Simply, the expedition theory will apply only when no other intention appears from 
the agreement,382 so that in the contrary case the wills of the parties shall prevail.383  
A question occurs, however, of whether the expedition theory may prevent an 
offeree who has dispatched the letter of acceptance from cancelling it by way of 
another method of rapid communication. In response, Van Heerden J answered 
negatively in A to Z Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture.384 This decision was 
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criticised as considering the expedition theory as binding. In effect, because the 
theory in consideration was established in favour of the offeree, it is, therefore, 
reasonable that he/she may withdraw his/her acceptance by means of another, faster 
mode of communication, provided the withdrawal reaches the offeror before or 
simultaneously with the initial letter of acceptance.385  
Congolese law  
The historical Congolese law gives the impression of lacking a decided option on the 
appropriate mode for acceptance. It is not necessary to be reminded that the CCO does 
not rule on the exchange of offer and acceptance topic. Faced with the silence of the 
Code on the matter of the moment and place a contract between persons not in each 
other’s presence is concluded, the Appeal Court of Kinshasa recommended Judges to 
consult practices in force in the Belgian law for establishing the intention of the 
parties.386 Influenced by French and Belgian jurisprudence, the DRC has vacillated 
between the declaration theory, the information theory, and the reception theory.  
To start with the declaration theory, texts which have been mentioned in 
support of it, in a Napoleonic civil code environment, are Article 1121 dealing with 
the stipulation for a third party and Article 1985 al. 2 relating to the conclusion of 
contract by agency. These provisions were literally reproduced under Congolese law 
via Article 21 and Article 527 al. 2 CCO respectively.387 As regards the second 
sentence of Article 21 CCO, it establishes the irrevocability of a stipulation for a third 
party as a rule. According to it, the stipulation can no longer be revoked once the 
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third party has declared that he/she is willing to benefit from it. The principle stated 
in this way applies without the need of the party making the stipulation knowing of 
the declaration or not.388 Similarly, Article 527 al. 2 CCO announces that an 
acceptance of a mandate may implicitly result from the conduct of the agent at which 
point the contract will be completed without any further steps being undertaken.389 
As has been observed, the two provisions being explained have, as common features, 
the fact that an acceptance is immediately effective following the time it is made 
without any necessity for the offeror to learn of it.390 The declaration theory is not 
supported by case law.  
Coming to the information theory, authorities suggested in its favour include 
Article 932 of the Napoleonic civil code relating to forms of donations. This 
provision was duplicated by Article 875 CFC with merely some differences.391 As 
far as Article 875 al. 1 CFC is concerned, it declares donations inter vivos effective 
from the day they are accepted in express terms. Despite such a general rule, the third 
section of the same provision releases the donor until he/she takes notice of the 
acceptance. In other words, before he/she knows of the acceptance, the benefactor is 
not legally bound. That is to say, as under the information theory field of influence, 
the effectiveness of donations, and, subsequently, the conclusion of the contract, will 
depend on the offeror’s knowledge of the acceptance. Nevertheless, as for its 
predecessor, the declaration theory, the information rule has also been criticised on 
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the basis that a donation is a gratuitous contract whose rules cannot be generalised.392 
Contrary to the first theory, however, there are some cases which argue that an offeror 
is deemed to have known of the acceptance since notification.393 
Finally, turning to the reception theory, it supposes an acceptance to be 
effective from when it reaches the offeror. On the subject, the ruling of Belgian courts 
which has influenced Congolese case law appears to have favoured the theory of 
reception to determine both the time when and the place where a contract is 
formed.394 As De Bondt put it, “between absentes the contract is regarded as made at 
the time and the place - as a rule the place of business of the offeror - where the 
acceptance is received.”395 Similar reasoning was formulated in the DRC by the 
Lower Court of Lubumbashi as follows: “Il est nécessaire pour la formation d’un 
contrat consensual que l’acceptation émise hors de la présence de l’offrant lui soit 
signifiée; la volonté transmise au loin ne produit son effet que lorsqu’elle parvient à 
la connaissance du destinataire.”396 
In addition, the Appeal Court of Kinshasa ruled, on 28 October 1941, by 
reference to Belgian case law, that “mail orders become effective only by the 
acceptance of the addressee.”397 The Court of First Instance of Lubumbashi 
complemented this by ruling that, even if the finalisation of negotiations may 
sometimes depend upon their approval by the mother company, the contract is 
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presumed to have been concluded not when and where the sale is ratified, but at the 
time when and the place where the middleman dealt with the buyer.398  
It follows from case law that, under Congolese law, a mailing contract is 
completed on the receipt of the letter evidencing the agreement of the parties, but not 
at its posting time as it is under South African law. This principle applies, according 
to case law, on condition that there is no ambiguity relative to the goods when the 
letter is received.399 With regard to the support it has obtained from case law, the 
reception theory appears to be the most convenient rule on the conclusion of the 
contract topic in Congolese contract law. This principle was also favoured by the 
OHADA legislator via Article 244 al. 1 UAGCL.400 In conformity with this 
provision, an acceptance becomes effective the moment it is received by the offeror. 
It is then logical that, though the OHADA Commercial Act does not state it 
expressly, where the indication of assent fails to reach the offeror the contract is 
ineffective.401 
On the question of whether a Congolese law buyer may withdraw his/her 
acceptance, the CCO lacked an explicit rule allowing such a right as for other matters 
relating to the process of the formation of contracts. Such a prerogative would, 
however, be deduced from an earlier decision of the Appeal Court of Kinshasa.402 It 
was ruled, in this case, with regard to mail contracts, that the contract is concluded 
the moment acceptance reaches the offeror, so that a later notice withdrawing the 
contract is unsuccessful.403 Considering a non-timely withdrawal as imperfect 
implies that, if the withdrawal or revocation notice comes to the offeror’s knowledge 
                                               
398
 Translated form of the French original, “Le contrat de vente passé par commis voyageur sous 
réserve de ratification de la maison qu’il représente, doit être consideré comme ayant été passé au 
lieu où le commis voyageur a traité avec l’acheteur et non pas au lieu où la vente a été ratifié.” 
First Inst Elis 26 November 1942 Rev Jur 1943 74. 
399
 Elis 31 October 1942 RJCB 1943 6; see also Bours Répertoire 134; Katuala Code 160, and Piron 
122. 
400
 See comments by Santos/Toe Commercial 379. 
401
 Compare this with sentences one and two of Article 18(2) CISG. 
402
 See Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1929 84; see also Kalongo Obligations 59; Mubalama 
Obligations 58. 
403
 Ibid. 
385 
 
before or concomitantly with the main acceptance, there is no binding acceptance. 
With such a deductive rationale, it is then assumed that a Congolese law party 
accepting the offer may, like his/her comparable CISG and South African law 
offerees, withdraw or revoke the acceptance provided it does so before the 
acceptance is received. These days the withdrawal and revocation rule has been 
expressly recognised by Article 247 UAGCL. Accordingly, an acceptance may be 
withdrawn or revoked subject to the condition that the withdrawal or revocation 
reaches the offeror prior to the time the first acceptance would have effect.404  
Comments  
The previous approach to the conclusion of contract in Congolese law has seen a 
competition between three different theories, namely the declaration theory, the 
information theory, and the reception theory. Given that the first two theories were 
not adequately supported by case law, it is presumed that the most suitable approach 
to contract was the reception theory. By opting for the reception theory, Congolese 
law aligns itself with the CISG. Both legal systems depart from South African law 
where the acceptance time and place happen together with the time and place of the 
contract.   
It is generally acknowledged that, the party making an offer is presumed to 
have known of the acceptance since a notice is placed at his/her disposal. The 
intention of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the contract may 
sometimes play a significant role in determining the moment and place of the 
contract. Where such intention is absent, then the reception theory appears more 
appropriate for contracts inter absentes because it ensures “an objective proof which 
is easier to produce.”405 In addition, applying the reception theory guarantees the 
meeting of assents for persons not in each other’s presence. This seems to be the 
reason for which the OHADA Commercial Act has also preferred it as a suitable 
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 Article 247 UAGCL; compared to Article 22 CISG. 
405
 Owsia Contract 553. 
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method to determine the time and place of contracting in the same way as the CISG 
and Congolese courts. As one scholar has commented on, 
The reason for the adoption of the “receipt” principle (by the CISG particularly) in 
preference to the “dispatch” principle is that the risk of transmission is better placed 
on the offeree than on the offeror, since it is the former who chooses the means of 
communication, who knows whether the chosen means of communication is subject 
to special risks or delay, and who is consequently best able to take measures to 
ensure that the acceptance reaches its destination.406  
Briefly, the main approach to the time of the formation of contracts in the DRC is 
the reception theory. This approach is now code-based with the influence of the 
OHADA Commercial Act.  
It should be noted, however, that commercial transactions are not any longer 
conducted frequently by using the post. This method has been substituted by other 
more modern means of communication, viz. telephone, telex, fax, e-mail, and other 
equivalent means of immediate communication commonly referred to as “electronic 
communications”. The following section seeks to know the significance of electronic 
contracts in the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law.  
 
5.4.4 The Legal Value of Electronic Communications  
 
The CISG  
It has already been mentioned that the Vienna Convention was drafted when today’s 
means of communication, namely e-mails and electronic communications, had not 
yet been developed. In order to fill the gap, the CISG-AC Opinion No.1 introduces 
the legal value of e-mails and other electronic communications.407 Furthermore, three 
                                               
406
 Comments quoted by Christie Law of Contract 59 66. 
407
 The expression “electronic communications” was, for the first time, described in Article 2(a) of 
the 1996 EC Model Law. According to this provision,  that concept refers to “information 
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited 
to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.” From 2005, this 
definition has been specified by Article 4(b) and (c) of the UNECIC for which, the phrase 
“electronic communication” refers to any communication that parties may make by means of “data 
387 
 
other instruments have been enacted under UNCITRAL sponsorship, namely the 
1996 EC Model law,408 the 2001 Model law on Electronic Signatures, and the 2005 
UNECIC.409 All of these instruments agree that an offer and its acceptance may be 
communicated electronically. Thus, when electronic communications are used 
during the formation stage, the contract is as valid and enforceable as other ordinary 
contracts.410 With regard to the moment such a contract is concluded, the principle 
adopted is the possibility that the communication be “retrieved and processed by the 
addressee”,411 without the need to acknowledge that he/she has knowledge of the 
message. 
Simply, electronic contracts are governed by the reception theory. In this 
regard, the UNECIC is important for the Vienna Sales Convention as it purports to 
fill any gap relating to the use of electronic communications in connection with the 
formation and the performance of contracts which fall, inter alia, within the ambit of 
the CISG.412 That is to say, if a country has adhered to both the CISG and the 
UNECIC, gaps left by the first in connection with e-communications will be filled 
by the second. 
It is possible that formalities such as writing or signature are needed in 
international transactions. As for the CISG, the position is that no formalities are 
                                               
message”. The phrase “data message” is defined in the same terms as Article 2(a) of the EC Model 
Law above.  
408
 According to Eiselen (2002 (6) VJ 305), the EC Model Law  
[is] intended to facilitate the use of modern means of communications and storage of 
information, such as electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail and telecopy, with or 
without the use of such support as the Internet. It is based on the establishment of a functional 
equivalent for paper-based concepts such as “writing”, “signature” and “original.” By providing 
standards by which the legal value of electronic messages can be assessed, the Model Law 
should play a significant role in enhancing the use of paperless communication.  
409
 For comments on the UNECIC’s scope and content, and the efficiency of electronic contracts, 
see Coetzee 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 245.   
410
 See Articles 5, 5bis, and 11 EC-Model Law; and Article 8(1) UNECIC. 
411
 Cf. Article 10(1) UNECIC; see, for comments, Quinot Contract 74 79; Eiselen 1999 (6) EDI 
Law Review 21 24; Eiselen 2002 (6) VJ 305 309-310; Coetzee 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 245 254; 
Owsia Contract 551-562. 
412
 See Article 20(1) UNECIC; see also Wethmar-Lemmer PIL 121. 
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required for contract validity and evidence.413 Consequently, international sales 
contracts can be freely concluded in any manner, including any electronic 
communications.414  
South African law  
The legal value of electronic communications, at the stage of the formation of 
contracts, depends on the means of the instrument used. As Eiselen remarks, “For 
legal purposes telefaxes, faxes, e-mails, SMSs and interaction with Internet websites 
must be regarded as indirect communications, (…) (while) telephonic 
communications (…) are regarded as direct communications.”415 Electronic 
communications are regulated by the ECT Act 25 of 2002. 
The question of the legal effect of contracts concluded via telephone rose first 
in Wolmer v Rees.416 In this case, the court was asked whether the posting rule should 
also govern telephonic contracts; Greenberg J agreed.417 Greenberg’s ruling was 
criticised on the ground that, as an instantaneous method of communication, a 
telephone differs from the post because of the prompt rectification possibility that it 
offers.418 That is why it was rejected in the Tel Peda Investigation Bureau v Van Zyl 
case in favour of the information approach.419 A similar ruling was adopted a few 
                                               
413
 See Article 11 CISG; for exceptions, see Articles 12 and 96 CISG. Article 240 UAGCL 
reproduces authentically Article 11 CISG.  
414
 See Article 13 CISG and CISG-AC Opinion No. 1 comments under Article 11 in which: “A 
contract may be concluded or evidenced by electronic communications.” See also Eiselen 2002 (6) 
VJ 305 312; Viscasillas in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 202-203. 
415
 Eiselen E-Commerce 141 148; see also Coetzee 2004 (3) Stell LR 501 517. 
416
 Wolmer v Rees 1935 TPD 319. 
417
 As stated by Greenberg J, “When a person makes an offer over the telephone he authorises the 
use of the same instrument for an acceptance, and as soon as the acceptance is uttered into the 
telephone, whether he hears it or not, there is an acceptance.” Greenberg specified at 324, “When 
the offeree accepts the offer in the manner invited by the offeror, that is an acceptance whether it 
reaches the offeror or not.” 
418
 Christie/Bradfield Contract 81; Van der Merwe et al Contract 60. 
419
 Tel Peda Investigation Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl 1965 4 SA 475 (E). It was ruled in the case 
that, “Parties in telephonic communication with each other are virtually in the same position as if 
they are inter praesentes. In order to speak to each other they make use of an instrument that enables 
them to do so. The very object of their using such instrument is to gain the direct communication 
that it affords.” With regard to the suitability of the information theory to direct communications 
such as telephones, see Eiselen E-Commerce 141 151. 
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years later in the Odendaal v Norbert,420 and the S v Henckert cases.421 This 
amendment was justified by the fact that,  
When one is dealing with direct communications (…), the general rule of the law of 
contract applies, namely that the offer or acceptances becomes valid and effective in 
law when it comes to the subjective notice of the addressee. Thus, the offer becomes 
effective when the offeree comes to know of it, and acceptance becomes effective 
when it is communicated to the offeror. The contract becomes final and binding 
when the offeror obtains subjective knowledge of the acceptance.422    
With regard to the legal value of contracts concluded by indirect means of 
communication such as those made by telex and telefax, the question relating to them 
appeared in Ex Parte Jamieson; In re Jamieson v Sabingo.423 In this case, the buyer 
contended that the contract was concluded at the place where the telefax was 
received, while the seller preferred the place from where it was sent. Willis J said at 
593 that, “(…) principles relating to letters sent by post rather than agreements 
concluded by telephone should more appropriately apply to determine the place 
where the agreement was concluded.” The learned judge inferred, by virtue of the 
                                               
420
 Odendaal v Norbert 1973 2 SA 749 (R). 
421
 S v Henckert 1981 3 SA 445 (A) 451B. In the case,   
The respondent had been found guilty in a regional court of a contravention of s 4 of the Tiger’s 
Eye Control Act 77 of 1977 in that he was in possession of, and had traded in tiger’s eye, a semi-
precious stone, without a permit. In an appeal the conviction was set aside on the ground that 
the delivery of the tiger’s eye had taken place in South West Africa (currently Namibia) where 
the Act did not apply. The State appealed, (among others), on the grounds (…) whether the 
agreement which was concluded in this case had been concluded in the Republic of South Africa 
or in Namibia where the Act did not apply.  
After it was found that the buyer ordered goods telephonically from Namibia and that he heard the 
seller’s acceptance over the telephone in the same country, the Court held that the contract had 
been concluded in Namibia instead of South Africa. It then applied to telephonic communications 
the information theory as general default rule. See Quinot Contract 74 85; see also Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 60 and authorities quoted by them in Fn108. 
422
 Eiselen E-Commerce 141 148-149; see also Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA). 
423
 Ex Parte Jamieson; In re Jamieson v Sabingo 2000 4 All SA 591 (W). In the present case, a 
seller, located in Johannesburg, agreed to sell and install, at the buyer’s hotel in Luanda, a “water 
purification system, a power generator, and a vibrating compact roller”. The contract was formed 
by the seller sending a quotation by telefax transmission to the buyer in Angola, and his sending a 
telefax accepting the quotation to the seller in South Africa. The buyer submitted that the contract 
was concluded not in Luanda, but in Johannesburg where the telefax was received. The Court held 
that the posting theory was applicable in the case, so that Luanda was kept as the place of 
conclusion of the contract. 
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“expedition theory” that the contract was made, not in South Africa, but in Angola.424 
On appeal, though, the decision ended in an identical result as the first judge, Farlam 
JA, took an opposite reasoning. He adopted the “information theory” for telexes and 
telefaxes contracts, as is the case for telephonic communications.425 
It should be noted, however, that the Jamieson case ruling was given before 
the advent of the ECT Act.426 In fact, if it is right that people communicating over 
the telephone are equated to persons being present,427 it is not so for those using 
telexes, faxes, and e-mails.428 Evidence of this is the fact that all of these methods 
fall within the definition of “data messages” as provided by s 1 ECT Act and are, 
therefore, considered as indirect forms of communications. As part of data messages, 
they are governed by s 22(2) ECT Act for which “an agreement concluded between 
parties by means of data messages is concluded at the time when and the place where 
the acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror.”429 As is clear, the provision 
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 According to one commentator, Willis decided “unfortunately without any exposition of the 
precise circumstances of the case and without giving detailed reasons” supporting the decision. See 
Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 71. It is assumed that he did so because Luanda was the place where 
the acceptance telefax was sent.  
425
 Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA) ; finding advice, inter alia, in the Tel Peda 
Investigation Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl ; and the S v Henckert decisions. Specifically, after 
referring to the English Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation case, Farlam held that people 
communicating by telephone, telex, and fax are compared to those who are in each other’s presence.  
426
 According to s 1 ECT Act, electronic communications are perceived as communications made 
by data messages, viz. electronic representations of information in any form sent, received or stored 
by electronic means. Section 1 of the 2008 CPA includes in electronic communications, telephone, 
fax, sms, wireless computer access, e-mail, and any similar technology or device. See South 
African Gazette Vol. 526 18 §40. Both definitions are similar to the one in Article 2(a) of the 1996 
EC Model Law as supplemented by Article 4(b) and (c) UNECIC.  
427
 See Eiselen E-Commerce 141 150; Christie/Bradfield Contract 82; Sharrock Business 70; Van 
Niekerk/ Schulze Trade 71. 
428
 With regard to e-mail and SMS contracts, the question of whether an acceptance of an offer sent 
by these methods result in a valid contract was recently asked in SB Jafta v Ezmvelo KZN Wildlife 
before the Durban Labour Court. See SB Jafta v Ezmvelo KZN Wildlife 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC). 
In this case, among other issues, was the legality of an acceptance of the offer made by e-Mail or 
SMS and the moment and place of conclusion of such a contract.  By means of response, the Court 
addressed the issue in the light of the Common law rules relating to the communication of 
acceptance and the ECT Act.  For comments, see Papadopoulos 2010 (1) Obiter 188; Stoop 2009 
(21) SA Merc LJ 110; and Collier 2008 (16) 1 JBL 20. 
429
 See also s 22(1) ECT Act in which no one can deny legal effect to a contract solely because it 
is concluded electronically; compare this to Articles 5, 5bis, and 11(1) EC Model Law, and to 
Article 8(1) UNECIC.  
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above locates the formation of electronic agreements at the time and place the 
acceptance reaches the offeror.430 By so ruling, the ECT Act has adopted the 
reception theory as the default rule for electronic contracts.431 Thus, what is important 
for electronic communications is not that the offeror knows of the message, but rather 
that he/she is able to recover and handle it.432 There is a general presumption, in this 
respect, that an offeror is able to repossess a message when this enters his/her 
electronic address.433  
In other words, in deciding on the time and place that electronic contracts are 
formed,  
[T]he deciding moment is dependent upon the communication being available to the 
recipient in the sense that it has been placed at its disposal in a place in which it 
would expect to receive communications in the normal course of business and in a 
manner which is comprehensible to it.434 
If this requirement is met, the contract will enter into force irrespective of whether 
or not the offeror has taken notice of the message. Quinot concludes that the adoption 
                                               
430
 The time and place of communication, dispatch, and receipt of electronic communications are 
dealt with in s 23 ECT Act which states: 
 A data message, 
(a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be regarded as having been sent 
by the originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the originator 
or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information system, when it is capable of 
being retrieved by the addressee; 
(b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data message 
enters an information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is 
capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee; and 
(c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator’s usual place of business or 
residence and as having been received at the addressee’s usual place of business or residence.  
431
 As ruled by Pillay DJ in SB Jafta v Ezmvelo KZN Wildlife 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC) 79-82, 
The assumption that postal contracts are concluded when a letter or telegram of acceptance is 
handed at the post office cannot apply to acceptance by email or SMS because the forms of 
communication differ substantially. Whereas the expedition theory applies to postal contracts 
and the information theory to telephone contracts, (...) section 23 of the ECT Act (...) adopt(s) 
the reception theory for receipt of electronic communication. 
See, in the same sense, Eiselen E-Commerce 141 150-151; Van der Merwe et al Contract 62; Coetzee 
2004 (3) Stell LR 501 517; Papadopoulos 2010 (1) Obiter 188 194; Sharrock Business 71; Collier 
2008 (16) 1 JBL 20 21; Stoop 2009 (21) SA Merc LJ 110 119; Christie Law of Contract 59 67.  
432
 See Quinot Contract 74 79; Eiselen 1999 (6) EDI Law Review 21 24; Eiselen 2002 (6) VJ 
305 309-310; Owsia Contract 551-562; Butler Practical Guide §3.07 3-19. 
433
 Cf. First sentence of Article 10(2) UNECIC. 
434
 Eiselen 1999 (6) EDI Law Review 21 24; Eiselen 2002 (6) VJ 305 310. 
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of the reception theory for electronic communications “seems to be much more in 
line with the reality of modern (international) trade than the allocation under the 
postal rule and information theory.”435 It follows then that its adoption improves 
South African law on the subject of the time and place of contract. Henceforth, 
although the Jafta case dealt with labour contracts, it is desirable that its influence 
goes beyond and reaches even international sales contracts concluded via electronic 
communications with businessmen established in South Africa and abroad.  
Congolese law  
It is obvious that the CCO was drafted in a period when more sophisticated methods 
of communication were not yet known. Under its field of application, parties were 
supposed to contract in person so that any sale of goods which amounts to, or the 
value of which exceeded FC 2,000.00 had to be evidenced by an “entirely 
handwritten and signed document, except for commercial agreements.”436 Requiring 
an offeree’s entirely handwritten document presupposes physical contact between 
the parties, an attitude not in line with electronic communications. With the 
development of new communication technology, indeed, there is no need for face-
to-face communication for negotiation between the seller and the buyer.437 
Commercial transactions are, these days, conducted either by telephone, telex, e-
mail, SMS, EDI, or other means of electronic communication without losing their 
legal effect. 
With regard to the time and place of electronic contracts, the available case 
law looks as if the courts in the DRC rarely face this issue. The only mention made 
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 See Quinot Contract 74 93; see, in the same sense, Coetzee 2004 (3) Stell LR 501 517-518; 
Eiselen E-Commerce 141 152. Read together with Article 10(2) UNECIC; Articles 5, 5bis, and 11 
EC Model Law; Article 24 CISG; Article 1.10 PICC; and Articles 1:303(3) and (6) with Article 
2:205(1) PECL.  
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 See Article 217 al. 2 CCO and Article 9 CCom; see also L’shi 11 August 1972 RJZ 1972 No. 2 
& 3 188. Article 9 CCom deals with the freedom of evidence of commercial transactions. Article 
240 of the OHADA Commercial Act has adopted a similar principle. 
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 Eiselen 1999 (6) EDI Law Review 21 22. 
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on the subject alludes to “telegram” as a quick communicating means.438 Of course, 
the problem of electronic communications was, recently, heard before the 
commercial court of Kinshasa/Gombe in the Family Holding Foundation v Blattner 
& Cinat Sarl case.439 The case, however, was not concerned with the enforceability 
of the contract, but rather with the admissibility of e-communications as means of 
proof.440 In addition the UAGCL does not address the issue. Its Article 243 al. 1, 
which would fill the gap, requires merely the acceptance to be made bearing in mind, 
inter alia, “the rapidity of the means of communication employed by the offeror” 
without specifying what those means are.441 It is evident that Article 5 al. 1 of the 
OHADA Commercial Act has taken into account the new developments in modern 
means of communication by authorising commercial transactions to be proved by 
any means even “electronically” between merchants. On the other hand, Book V, 
which makes reference to the expression “electronic communications”, regulates it 
in the framework of the computerisation of the trade register,442  rather than in the 
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 See Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1929 84 (withdrawal or modification of an offer before it 
reaches the offeree); Léo 29 September 1925 Jur Col 1926 293 (reasonable time for acceptance). 
439
 Tricom Kin/Gombe 20 March 2007 RCE 13 Family Holding Foundation Society v Blattner & 
Cinat Sarl (unreported decision). 
440
 Electronic communications were admitted, in the case, as “a beginning of written proof” by 
virtue of Article 223 al. 1 CCO. Compliance with this provision, rules relating to evidence by 
witnesses are departed from in circumstances where there exists “a beginning of written proof”. 
The latter expression is described in the second paragraph of Article 223 CCO as, “any written act 
emanating from the person against whom a claim is brought, (e.g. the buyer) (…) and which makes 
probable that the fact alleged (for instance the enforceability of contract of sale) is true.” The 
question of whether or not there is a beginning of written evidence is independently considered by 
the court. See Elis 1 April 1916 Jur Col 1927 43; Elis 20 October 1923 Kat II 211; Léo 27 August 
1929 Jur Congo 1930-1931 230. 
441
 The Commercial Act does not contain a provision similar to Article 13 CISG which includes in 
the concept “writing” the quick modes of communication of the time the Convention was drafted, 
namely the telegram and telex. Article 209 UAGCL, initial version, which had already introduced 
telegram, telex, and telefax into writing has been repealed. Article 2/7 first sentence DUACL does 
not ameliorate the situation. 
442
 See Articles 79 to 100 UAGCL. It should be noted, however, that the SADC has, in November 
2012, produced a Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Commerce which could act as a 
model for developing rules on electronic contracts in the DRC. (See text of that Model Law at 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-
ACP/HIPSSA/Documents/FINAL%20DOCUMENTS/FINAL%20DOCS%20ENGLISH/sadc_m
odel_law_e-transactions.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2014). What is more, the DRC has signed 
the Declaration of Blantyre of 14 August 2001 recognising the importance of e-commerce in a 
modern country. See Declaration on Information and Communications Technology (ICT), 
394 
 
context of the conclusion of contracts. Moreover, this Book does not enumerate the 
different types of electronic communications in a similar way as Article 4(b) and (c) 
UNECIC does. The absence of preparatory works makes it difficult to determine 
what the intention of the OHADA law legislator was. It also puts the researcher in 
trouble with regard to defining the theory governing the conclusion of e-contracts in 
the DRC.  
Comments  
South African law appears to be more developed than the initial CISG and Congolese 
law on the topic of the conclusion of contracts by electronic communication. That 
legal system departs from the other two because it has established a neat distinction 
between direct ways of communications which refer mostly to telephones, and 
indirect means of communications which include telex, telefax, e-mail, SMS, and 
other means of communication with regard to the exact moment of the contract. In 
South Africa, if contracts concluded via telephones are considered as being formed 
between parties in the presence of each other, they are then governed by the 
information theory; other means of communication are subject to the reception 
theory. The contract is concluded once the acceptance is retrievable or able to be 
processed by the addressee without the need to demonstrate whether he/she has been 
read it or not. 
With regard to the CISG, the most recent UNECIC might be used to fill the 
gap in the Vienna Convention. Article 20 UNECIC offers that opportunity by 
extending its field of application to CISG provisions relating to the use of e-
communications during the formation or the performance of contracts stage provided 
that a State ratifies both Conventions. Thus, under modern CISG dealings, as long as 
the information contained in electronic communications “is accessible as to be usable 
for subsequent reference”,443 the contract is formed the moment the message enters 
                                               
available online at:  http://www.misa.org/downloads/SADC%20Declaration%20on%20Informa 
tion%20and%20Communications%20Technology.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2014). 
Unfortunately, the DRC has not yet integrated the SADC EC Model Law in its legal system. 
443
 Cf. Article 9(2) UNECIC. 
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the addressee’s information system. This means that CISG e-contracts are also 
currently ruled by the reception theory.  
As regards Congolese law, the lack of specific provisions dealing with the 
legal value of more recent instantaneous means of communication constitutes an 
enormous gap.  Though this shortcoming may be filled by an interpretation of 
Articles 5 al. 1 and 243 al. 1 UAGCL which make reference to electronic 
communications, the advanced approaches of South African law and the CISG would 
be recommended as reference. More specifically, the adoption in the DRC of a law 
similar to the South African ECT Act would appreciably improve the Congolese law 
of international sales contracts. This recommendation is justified by the fact that 
international transactions are now increasingly concluded via electronic 
communications rather than in person or by post. Likewise, a ruling of the kind of 
the ECT Act will put Congolese law in line with the reality of modern international 
commerce whereby e-contracts are governed by the reception theory.  
 
5.4.5 Conclusion on the Time and Place of Contracting  
 
Several theories have been advocated to determine the right time and place that a 
contract is concluded. These principles include the declaration, information, 
reception, and the expedition theories. Among them, the reception theory has been 
preferred for contracts concluded between parties not in each other presence and 
electronic contracts. Congolese law has always favoured the reception theory. The 
most grievous gap in respect of the conclusion of a contract subject to the latter legal 
system consists in its silence on the matter of electronic contracts. In order to fill this 
gap, and consequently to line up with modern international commercial practices, 
South African law and contemporary CISG tendency are recommended.  
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5.5 Conclusion on Chapter Five 
 
Establishing a comparison between the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law 
on the formation of the contract rules has had the intention of achieving a triple 
objective. It has aimed, firstly, to investigate the influence that UAGCL provisions 
have had on modern Congolese sales law in order to enable it to conform to the CISG 
and South African law. Secondly, it has intended to examine the gaps that are still 
present in Congolese sales law, and, finally, to suggest the means by which they can 
be overcome. After this discussion, it has been discovered that the CISG and South 
African law are based on the traditional principle that a contract is formed by means 
of a meeting of an offer and an acceptance.  
With regard to Congolese law, however, its initial approach to the making of 
a contract lacked specific provisions dealing with the offer and acceptance. This 
situation was the consequence of the influence of the legal tradition of its mother 
country resulting in the fact that the CCO is silent on the process of contracting. The 
conclusion of contract chapter has sometimes been described as the weakest civil 
code chapter. Faced with this situation, it was necessary to resort to the party 
autonomy principle by an interpretation of Article 9 CCO dealing with consensus 
obtained improperly. From that reading, it became clear that, for a contract to be 
validly concluded, it was also necessary that two wills met. And, since one will was 
insufficient to generate a contract, an offer not accepted was deemed to be revoked. 
But, once the offer had been accepted, there was immediately a valid contract that 
could not be revoked, save by the mutual consent of the parties.  
In other words, the process of the formation of contract was developed in the 
DRC by judicial decisions as a matter of fact. Resorting to the case law as the main 
source of law was not without technical hitches for parties as the DRC belongs to the 
civil law legal system where statutes prevail over case law. The advent of the 
OHADA Commercial Act has filled some of the gaps. So, comparably to the CISG 
and South African law, in modern Congolese law, the formation of contract process 
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is currently based on the offer and acceptance model of contracting. As for its 
comparable legal systems, modern Congolese contract law has provided a number of 
requirements for the conclusion of contracts, among which is the agreement between 
contractual parties, or, more specifically, the meeting of an offer and an acceptance.  
In spite of this improvement, there are still a number of variances between the 
initial Congolese law, on the one hand, and the CISG and South African law, on the 
other hand, which require attention. To start with the offer, there is no notable 
difference between the CISG, South African law, and modern Congolese law. In all 
of the three legal systems, a regular offer must be sufficiently definite, i.e. indicating 
the goods, fixing the price or making them be determined or determinable, and 
showing the offeror’s intention to be bound. What is noteworthy on the subject of 
the offer is that, offers which were irrevocable by nature in the DRC have become 
revocable as it is under the CISG and South African law.  
With regard to the acceptance, likewise, all of the three legal systems have 
adopted the same principle that an acceptance must be similar to the offer; if not, it 
amounts to a counter-offer devoid of legal effect. On this point, Congolese law 
departs, however, from the CISG and South African law on the basis that it does not 
provide a list of conducts which may qualify as acceptance. In addition, though 
Congolese conforms to the CISG by ruling about material alterations of the offer, in 
contrast to South African law, it does not document about those material alterations. 
The Vienna Convention is then recommended as guidance to both legal systems. It 
was observed, on the other hand, that the inclusion of additional terms in the contract 
may turn into a battle of forms, particularly when parties use standard contracts. 
Congolese law and South African law have opted for the criticised last-shot solution, 
but it is recommended that they adopt the knock-out rule in order to conform to most 
recent commercial instruments and the preferred solution of contemporary CISG 
case law.  
As regards the moment a contract is formed, the most notable shortcoming in 
the DRC relates to the absence of any regulation on electronic contracts. In this 
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respect, South African law is more suitable as it applies the information theory to 
telephonic communications, and the reception theory to contracts concluded by telex, 
telefax, e-mail, SMS, and other means of electronic communication. Its ECT Act is, 
therefore, recommended to bring Congolese law into line with modern international 
commercial practices. 
In conclusion, there are not many differences between the CISG, South 
African law, and modern Congolese sales law with regard to the subject of the 
formation of contract. Congolese provisions which were previously based on case 
law have become code-based as a result of the OHADA Commercial Act influence. 
So, therefore, given that the Commercial Act is largely inspired by the CISG, it has 
appreciably improved Congolese law and aligns it with the CISG and South African 
law on rules relating to the formation of the contract, except for electronic contracts. 
This aspect would be considerably improved by reference to South African law. 
Chapter Six 
 
COMPARISON WITH REGARD TO THE OBLIGATIONS  
OF THE SELLER AND THE BUYER 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Once a contract has been legally established, the next step consists understanding 
what the obligations of the parties are. In conformity with the party autonomy 
principle, the obligations of the parties are governed most of the time by the terms 
they have approved in the contract.1 In the CISG, the obligations of the parties are 
dealt with in Part III entitled “Sale of Goods”.2 As far as the main obligations of the 
seller and the buyer are concerned, they are summarised in Articles 30 and 53 CISG. 
Pursuant to these provisions, the seller is obliged to “deliver the goods (…) and 
transfer the property” in them to the buyer,3 and the buyer to “pay the price for the 
goods and take delivery of them”.4  
The obligations of the parties, as summarised by the CISG, bear a resemblance 
to those provided by Article 263 CCO. The latter defines a contract of sale as an 
agreement whereby, the seller agrees to deliver a thing and the buyer to pay for it. 
Article 263 CCO is currently specified by Articles 250 and 262 of the OHADA 
Commercial Act which define the obligations of contracting parties as consisting of 
                                               
1
 See Lando in Hartkamp et al Civil Code 201; Morrissey/Graves Sales 147. 
2
 Part III consists of five chapters dealing successively with general provisions (Articles 25 to 29); 
the obligations of the seller (Articles 30 to 52); the obligations of the buyer (Articles 53 to 70); and 
provisions common to the obligations of the seller and the buyer (Articles 71 to 88). As was said 
in Section 4.3.4 above, Article 92 CISG allows any state to exclude the CISG’s Part III and to 
consider only its Part II relating to the formation of contracts, and vice  versa. Currently, no state 
has made such exclusion because, without the provisions regulating the rights and obligations of 
the parties, the CISG would lose sense. See UNCITRAL Digest 115; Piltz in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 392; Hugo 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 1 11. 
3
 Article 30 CISG. 
4
 Article 53 CISG. 
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delivering the goods and guaranteeing them, for the seller, and paying the price and 
taking delivery of the goods, for the buyer.5 A  similar ruling is found, in South 
African law, in the Treasurer-General v Lippert case in which De Villiers CJ said, 
“Under our law (…) a sale may be defined as a contract in which one person promises 
to deliver a thing to another, who on his part promises to pay a certain price.”6   
A contract of sale is usually considered as a “bilateral legal transaction”7 which 
produces reciprocal obligations for both contracting parties. Under it, the seller 
commits to a performance with the purpose of obtaining compliance with the 
commitment of the buyer, and vice versa.8 Thus, “a seller cannot demand payment 
unless he tenders delivery, nor can the buyer claim delivery of the goods unless he 
tenders payment.”9  
In general, under all of the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law, 
provisions regulating sales contracts state, in principle, only the obligations of the 
parties. But, given that the obligations of each party constitute the rights of the other 
party, one finds the rights of the buyer implied in the obligations of the seller, and 
the rights of the seller enclosed with the obligations of the buyer.10 It should be said, 
                                               
5
 Compare these with Articles 280 and 327CCO respectively.  
6
 See The Treasurer-General v Lippert 2 SC 172. In the words of Hackwill (Sale 65), where there 
is no special agreement to the contrary, “delivery and payment are concurrent conditions” for the 
existence of a contract of sale. So, the buyer demanding delivery must offer the price, and the seller 
requesting payment must have delivered the goods. See also comments in Section 3.4 above. 
7
 Butler Guide 4-3; quoting Spain 29 March 2005 Court of First Instance of Tudela; see also Van 
Niekerk/ Schulze Trade 71. 
8
 As stated by Greenberg JA, in Crispette & Candy Co Ltd v Oscar Michaelis NO & Leopold 
Alexander NO1947 (4) SA 521 (A) 537,   
Where a plaintiff sues on a contract between him and a defendant and claims performance of 
the defendant’s obligation to him under the contract (…); he is only entitled to judgement against 
performance by him of his obligation. A typical case of this kind is (…) a contract of sale in 
which the term of payment is cash against delivery (…).  
Ruled followed in Etkind and Others v Hicor and Another Trading Ltd 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) 127C; 
and Combustion Technology (Pty) Ltd v Technoburn (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 265 (C) 270C.  
9
 See Sampson v Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd (In Liquidation) 1929 AD 468; see also Zulman/Kairinos 
Sale 101; Christie/Bradfield Contract 419. 
10
 In other words, the rights of each party are provided as remedies for breach of the other party’s 
obligations. For the CISG, see Articles 30-44 (obligations of the seller) and Articles 53-60 
(obligations of the buyer), see also comments by Enderlein Rights 133 134; Oosthuizen Rights 78 
Fn319. For Congolese law, read Articles 250 to 261 UAGCL with Articles 279 to 326 CCO 
regulating the obligations of the seller; and Articles 262 to 268 UAGCL with Articles 327 to 334 
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immediately, that, unless otherwise stipulated, contracting parties are bound by 
existing practices and usages11 as well as by the provisions of the CISG, common 
law, and the Commercial Act, depending on the legal system.  
In the following sections, consideration will be given to the obligations of the 
seller first, and to those of the buyer next. As it was the case with the preceding 
chapter, this chapter aims to assess critically the current state of Congolese sales law. 
Thus, where Congolese law diverges from the CISG and/or South African law, 
critical discussion will be undertaken to determine how such a discrepancy could be 
overcome. 
 
6.2 The Obligations of the Seller 
 
6.2.1 Introduction  
 
In any contract of sale, the seller is generally obliged to deliver the goods; to deliver 
goods in conformity with the contract; and guarantee those goods against a third 
person’s rights. This general rule is, however, subject to particularities depending on 
the legal system concerned. Thus, after a brief overview of what the main obligations 
of the seller are, further consideration will be given to each of the three legal systems 
under examination. A comparative appraisal of the position of modern Congolese 
law will follow at every stage. 
 
6.2.2 General Principles 
 
Article 30 CISG, which abridges the obligations of the seller, requires the seller to 
deliver the goods, together with any documents relating to them, and transfer the 
                                               
CCO, for the obligations of the buyer. For the South African law, see Kerr Sale 159; 
Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 38; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 95; Hackwill Sale 65. As was mentioned in 
Chapter one, remedies for breach of contract are beyond the scope of this study.  
11
 Cf. Article 9 CISG, and Article 239 UAGCL. 
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property in those goods, as required by the contract and the CISG.12 As Honnold has 
stated, Article 30 “is significant for its explicit statement of the central and unitary 
role that the Convention gives to the contract.”13 In accordance with the party 
autonomy principle, in fact, “the substance of seller’s obligations is determined by 
what the parties have agreed upon.”14 Article 6 CISG declares, in this regard, that 
parties may depart from the application of the CISG or “derogate from or vary the 
effect of any of its provisions.” The supremacy of the autonomy of the parties is 
confirmed, with regard to seller’s obligations, by the use of expressions such “as 
required by the contract”,15 “in accordance with the contract”,16 or “required by the 
contract”17 in provisions regulating his/her duties. In addition to the delivery and 
transfer of property in the goods, Articles 35 to 44 CISG impose on the seller the 
delivery of goods which  conform to the ones agreed in the contract, and which are 
free from any third party claims.   
As regards South African law, there is also the authority that “each party to a 
sale is bound by those obligations expressly or tacitly undertaken.”18 These 
obligations include the duty to take care of the thing sold until delivery; to make it 
available and transfer ownership of it to the buyer; the duty to guarantee the buyer 
against eviction by third party; and the duty to guarantee the property sold against 
                                               
12
 Article 30 CISG has the merit of outlining the main obligations of the seller. A number of 
subsidiary obligations may, however, arise from the contract or other specific legal provisions.   
13
 Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 309.  
14
 Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales 6-2; see also Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 490; Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 393; Lookofsky CISG 85; 
Enderlein Rights 133 135; Schwenzer/ Fountoulakis Sales 203. As ruled by one American court, 
“the CISG does not pre-empt a private contract between the parties; instead, it provides a statutory 
authority from which contract provisions are interpreted, fills gap in contract language, and governs 
issues not addressed by the contract.” See USA 29 January 2003 Federal District Court [Illinois] 
Ajax Tool Works Inc. v CanEng Manufacturing Ltd 2003 US Dist LEXIS 1306, 2003 WL 22187 
(ND III 2003) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.ed/cisg/wais/db/cases2/030129ul.html] (last accessed 10 
October 2013).  
15
 Cf. Article 30 CISG in fine. 
16
 Cf. Article 32(1) CISG. 
17
 Cf. Article 35(1) CISG; see also Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales 6-2.  
18
 Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 64; Kerr Sale 159; see also Sharrock Business 205; Lotz Sale 361 383. 
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latent defects.19 Of course some other obligations may also be imposed on the parties 
by common law. Common law provisions apply, however, “only if the parties have 
not expressly or tacitly agreed to exclude or to vary them.”20  
With regard to Congolese law, the obligations of the seller are dealt with in 
Book VIII Title III Chapter I of the OHADA Commercial Act.21 This Chapter is 
divided into three sections dealing successively with the delivery of the goods,22 the 
conformity obligation,23 and the obligation of guarantee.24 As far as the main 
obligations of the seller are concerned, they are summarised in Article 250 UAGCL 
which reproduces Article 30 CISG.25 In contrast to the latter provision, Article 250 
al. 2 UAGCL obliges explicitly the seller to ensure that goods comply with the ones 
ordered before delivery, and offer his/her guarantee at the risk of bearing 
responsibility. As for the preceding legal systems, the seller in Congolese law has, in 
addition, to perform his/her obligations in accordance with the provisions of the 
contract as provided for by Article 33 al. 1 CCO and a number of the provisions of 
                                               
19
 See Sharrock Business 286; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 72; Kerr Sale 160; Bradfield/Lehmann 
Sale 38; Lotz Sale 361 373; and Volpe Sale 69. In addition to the common law rules, the 2008 CPA 
has also established a veritable legal regime of parties’ obligations with regards to consumer 
contracts; see particularly Sections 18 to 21. Its comment is outside the ambit of this study. 
20
 Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 37-38; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 137. In other words, the provisions 
of the common law have to be regarded as default or residual terms, applying only if parties did 
not provide otherwise. In this context, consensual obligations are called incidentalia while those 
provided by the common law, considered here as “residual obligations”, are named naturalia. See 
Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 71; Bradfield/ Lehmann Sale 37 and 64; Kerr Sale 159. See also 
comments in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 above dealing with the principles of consensualism and 
freedom of contracts. 
21
 See Articles 250 to 261 UAGCL; compare with Articles 279 to 326 CCO which form Title III, 
Chapter III of the CCO.  
22
 Articles 251 to 254 UAGCL; compare with Articles 279 to 301 CCO; see also Goma 28 
November 2005 RCA 1359 Kamaliro Paluku J v Kisambio Kambale; Kin/Gombe 7 April 2011 
RCA 27 575/27 714 Luwanda Lubuata v Moke Molobini N (unreported decisions). 
23
 Articles 255 to 259 UAGCL; compare with Articles 318 to 336 CCO. 
24
 Articles 260 and 261 UAGCL; compare with Articles 303 to 317 CCO. 
25
 As stated by Article 250 UAGCL, “The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents 
relating to them and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and (…) Book 
(VIII).” Previously, the seller’s obligations were regulated by Article 280 CCO which imposed on 
the seller two main obligations, viz. delivering the property sold, and guaranteeing it against third 
party claims or defects. See Tricom Kin/Matete 18 April 2012 RCE 569 Batiment Commerce Sprl 
v Bureau d’Analyse et d’Assistance Technique; Tricom Kin/Gombe 18 October 2011 RCE 2012 
LT Cimpex Sprl v Biz Africa Sprl (unreported decisions). 
404 
 
the OHADA Commercial Act.26 On 3 April 1976, the Supreme Court stated that the 
agreement constitutes the law which governs the performance of the obligations of 
parties so that a judgment which contradicts this principle must be repealed in this 
respect.27 
From the outline above, it is clear that, in all of the three legal systems under 
consideration, the seller is not only bound to deliver the goods, he/she is also obliged 
to deliver goods which are free from any defects, and goods which are free from any 
third party claims. These three main obligations are discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
6.2.3 The Delivery of the Goods  
 
6.2.3.1 General remarks  
 
Within the context of the CISG, the seller’s delivery obligation covers a triple 
domain: delivering the goods sold; handing over any documents relating to them; 
and transporting the property in the goods to the buyer. It is evident that the delivery 
of the goods and the transfer of ownership are not typical of the CISG.28 These 
obligations are essential in all legal systems, including South African and Congolese 
                                               
26
 See Article 253 al. 1 (delivery of the goods at the date “set by the contract” or determined 
according to its stipulations); Article 254 (delivery at the time, place, and in the form “required in 
the contract”); compare this with Article 327 CCO. See also Article 250 UAGCL whereby, the 
seller must conform to the requirements provided for “in the contract”; and, particularly, Article 
255 al. 1 UAGCL which requires the seller to perform his/her delivery obligation “in accordance 
with the stipulations of the contract”, or “as agreed upon” between parties. Compare these with 
Articles 287, 288, 293, 294 al. 1, and Article 295 CCO. See also Article 54 CCO which considers 
the common intention of parties as the starting-point of the interpretation of any contract, and 
comments in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3 above dealing with the freedom of contract and 
autonomy of the will principles. 
27
 See CSJ 3 April 1976 BA 1977 64 65.  
28
 But, Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 392 for who considers the transfer of 
property in the goods as typical and characteristic of a contract of sale of goods governed by the 
CISG. 
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laws, even if “what is done to ‘deliver’ the goods and how the transfer of property 
occurs may be different.”29  
Although the Vienna Sales Convention obliges the seller to transfer ownership 
in the goods sold to the buyer, it is however silent on the way this obligation may be 
fulfilled. This is undoubtedly justified by the fact that the CISG does not deal with 
the influence that the contract has on the property in the goods sold.30 Thus, the issue 
of how and when the property is transferred from the seller to the buyer has to be 
resolved by reference to the law designated by local conflict-of-laws rules.31 In this 
regard, it is the domestic property law that will determine whether the property 
passed at the moment the contract was concluded or afterward, and which documents 
or formalities were required for the transfer of property.32 To give an example of this, 
under South African law, the conclusion of the contract does not entail an automatic 
transfer of ownership. Instead, it creates a simple presumption of the transfer of 
property which needs to be confirmed by the conclusion of an additional and separate 
transaction for it to produce legal effect.33 Unlike South African law, in the CCO’s 
scope of application, the transfer of ownership occurred immediately after parties 
have agreed on the thing sold and the price, irrespective of whether or not delivery 
and payment have happened.34 In a decision heard on 20 November 1976, the 
Supreme Court held,  
                                               
29
 Enderlein Rights 133 143 -144; see also Kerr Sale 159. In one word, there is no sale without 
delivery and transfer of property. 
30
 Cf. Second sentence of Article 4(b) whereby, the CISG “is not concerned (inter alia) with the 
effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold”, except when the transfer of 
property occurs in connection with other provisions of the CISG (my emphasis).  
31
 See UNCITRAL Digest 130; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 492.  
32
 Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales 6-7; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 492.  
33
 See Brewer v Berman 26 SC 441 443; Meyer v Retief & Co OPD 3 9; Lendalease Finance (Pty) 
Ltd v Corporacion de Marcadeo Agricola & Others 1976 (4) SA 464 (A); Marcard Stein & Co v 
Port Marine Contractors (Pty) Ltd & Others 1995 (3) SA 663 (A); see also Van Niekerk/Schulze 
Trade 83; Sharrock Business 875; Belcher Sale 3; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 137; and comments 
in Section 3.4.5 above. 
34
 Article 264 CCO; see also Léo 15 June 1926 Jur Col 1929 95; Léo 28 October 1930 Jur Col 
1930-1931 108; Kisangani 15 April 1980 RCA 487 Jacques Alber v Malisawa Tshimbalanga 
(unreported decision).  
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A contract of sale is complete when parties have agreed on the thing sold and the 
price. A clause according to which the buyer would not acquire ownership until 
payment of the last instalment has to be analysed as a mere ‘suspensive condition’ 
of the transfer of ownership in the thing sold.35 
With regard to the OHADA Commercial Act, it locates the transfer of ownership at 
the time of the taking of delivery of the goods.36 
The implementation of the delivery duty in the DRC is currently governed by 
Articles 251 to 254 UAGCL.37 The first three Articles define the place and time for 
delivery while the final provision regulates the documentation obligation.  
 
6.2.3.2 Place of delivery  
 
Introduction  
As a general rule, the place of delivery is the place contractually determined by the 
parties.38 Such a rule is consistent with the principle of the freedom of contract. In 
addition to contractual clauses, parties may also address the place of delivery issue 
by stipulating Incoterms,39 of which the most usual are CIF and FOB.40 As for other 
                                               
35
 CSJ 20 November 1976 BA 1977 188; see also CSJ 20 January 1976 RC 117 (unreported 
decision, quoted in Katuala Code 161).  
36
 See Article 275 and Article 277 al. 1 UAGCL. 
37
 For the CISG, see Articles 31 to 34; and for South African law, see D 19.1.11.2; Kerr Sale 161; 
Bradfield/ Lehmann Sale 23; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 96; Oosthuizen Rights 83; Sharrock Business 287.   
38
 For the CISG, see Article 31; for the DRC, Articles 251 and 252 UAGCL; and for South African 
law, Concrete Products Co (Pty) Ltd v Natal Leather Industries 1946 NPD 377.  
39
 “Incoterms” is the acronym of the phrase “International Commercial Terms”. Incoterms are a 
series of standardised acronyms used in international trade to determine the obligations of both the 
seller and the buyer in respect to the place, time, and manner of delivery. They consist of a number 
of “commercial terms that represent a set of agreements regarding the place of delivery, 
responsibility for carriage and insurance, and the transfer of risk of goods subject to an international 
sale.” Sponsored by the ICC, Incoterms were first published in 1936, and most recently edited in 
2010. See Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 400; Coetzee Incoterms 10 and 191; 
Klotz/Barrett Sales 63; Morrissey/Graves Sales 148; Lookofsky CISG 85; and Romein 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/romein.html (accessed 11-7-2012).  
40
 FOB means “Free on Board”; and CIF means “Freight, Insurance, and Coast”. For more detail, 
see authorities quoted by Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 400 Fn59; see also 
Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 491. Under South African law, CIF sales are 
ruled in Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Marcadeo Agricola & Others 1976 (4) 
SA 464 (A) 491H-492D wherein Corbett JA said, “Under the c.i.f. contract, in its usual form, the 
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contractual matters, however, parties often fail to address the place of delivery issue 
accurately, nor to determine the Incoterms governing the contract. In such 
circumstances, the provisions established by the CISG, South African common law, 
or by the OHADA Commercial Act, as discussed below, will intervene as default 
rules to fill the gaps created by the contract.41  
The CISG 
The place of delivery matter is addressed by Article 31. This provision specifies the 
place where the seller has to carry out his/her delivery duty, meaning where the 
delivery of the goods occurs and what kinds of acts are performed for that purpose.42 
                                               
seller is obliged to ship and insure the contract goods and to invoice them to the purchaser for an 
amount payable under the contract of affreightment.” Concerning FOB sales, they are ruled in 
Murray & Co v Stephan Bros 1917 AD 243 250 where Solomon JA stated that, “If the vendor 
agrees to deliver on board the purchaser’s ship as soon as the latter is ready to receive the goods, 
the purchaser must name the ship and give notice of his readiness to receive the goods on board 
before he can complain of non-delivery.” In the DRC, for CIF sales, see Brux 14 July 1952 Belg 
Col 1956 9; and for FOB sales, see Elis 29 March 1947 RJCB 93; in Piron 123, and Katuala Code 
173-174. 
41
 In the context of the CISG, see Austria 1 June 2004 Appellate Court Wein 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases /040601a3.html]; Switzerland 11 December 2003 District Court 
Zug [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031211s1. html]; Germany 16 July 2001 Appellate Court 
Köln [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010716g1.html]; Germany 3 December 1999 
Oberlandesgericht München, CLOUT case No. 430; in UNCITRAL Digest 132 Fn7. See also, 
Klotz/Barrett Sales 159; Enderlein Rights 133 144; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 310; 
Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 495; Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 409; Morrissey/Graves Sales 147. For South African law, see Concrete Products Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Natal Leather Industries 1946 NPD 377; Adler v Taylor 1948 (3) SA 322 (T); Conradie 
v Greyling Implemente Fabriek 1955 (1) SA 433 (T); Bradfield/ Lehmann Sale 23; Volpe Sale 71. 
For Congolese law, see Articles 251 and 252 UAGCL; compared with Article 286 CCO. 
42
 As stated by Article 31, 
If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place, his obligation to 
deliver consists: 
a) if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods – in handing the goods over to the first 
carrier for transmission to the buyer; 
b) if, in cases not within the preceding subparagraph, the contract related to specific goods, or 
unidentified goods to be drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured or produced, and 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that the goods were at, or were 
to be manufactured or produced at, a particular place – in placing the goods at the buyer’s 
disposal at that place; 
c) in other cases – in placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal at the place where the seller had 
his place of business at the time of the conclusion of the contract.  
See also UNCITRAL Digest 132; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §88:18; Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit 
Sales 6-9. 
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Article 31 provides three possibilities in this respect. More specifically, the CISG 
distinguishes between contracts involving carriage,43 those where the seller has to 
place the goods at the buyer’s disposal at a particular place,44 and contracts in which 
he/she has to place the goods at the buyer’s disposal at his/her own place of 
business.45 As Piltz says,  
The subsections of Article 31 correlate to each other in order of priority. Article 
31(c) governs all “other cases” and therefore constitutes a subordinate gap rule. 
Article 31(b) is applicable only to cases not within the scope of Article 31(a). 
Consequently, Article 31(a) is authoritative in the first place. However, this 
provision requires that the contract of sale involves carriage of goods.46   
International sales contracts generally involve the carriage of goods. Thus, where 
carriage is required, delivery consists of handing the goods to a carrier for 
transportation to the buyer.47 If several successive carriers are involved, a seller who 
hands over the goods to the first carrier has fulfilled his/her delivery obligation.48 It 
is acknowledged, however, that for it to constitute delivery in the spirit of the CISG, 
goods must have been handed over to an “independent” carrier,49 viz. “a third party 
                                               
43
 Article 31(a) CISG. 
44
 Article 31(b) CISG. 
45
 Article 31(c) CISG. It was held that, “Unless the place of performance can be inferred from the 
contract, the place of performance has been deemed to be ‘where the physical transfer of the goods 
took place, as a result of which the purchaser obtained, or should have obtained, actual power of 
disposal over those goods at the final destination of the sales transaction’.” See Luxembourg 25 
February 2010 European Court of Justice (C-381/08) IHR 2010 170; Germany 23 June 2010 
Bundesgerichtshof IHR 2010 217; Italy 5 October 2009 Corte di Cassazione, CISG-online No. 
2105; in UNCITRAL Digest 132 Fn6. 
46
 Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 411-412; see also Widmer in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 495; Liu in Felemegas Interpretation 346. 
47
 Article 32 specifies that the seller is obliged to hand over goods to a carrier if the contract or the 
CISG requires it. Furthermore, where goods are not marked or provided with shipping documents, 
the seller must notify the buyer of the consignment specifying the goods. And where it is his/her 
duty to arrange for the carriage of the goods, the seller must do whatever is necessary to dispatch 
goods to the place agreed on, complying with the circumstances and usual terms for such 
transportation. 
48
 Cf. Article 31(a); see also UNCITRAL Digest 132 §6; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §88:18 88-32. 
Article 31(a) corresponds to Article 67(1) in relation with the transfer of risk from the seller to the 
buyer. 
49
 See Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 500; Enderlein Rights 133 147; Butler 
Guide 4-9; Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties_obligations_by% 20Naiyana 
Guerin.doc (accessed 10-7-2012). 
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not under seller’s or the buyer’s direct control.”50 In other words, if the seller 
himself/herself or one of his/her employee operates a truck, he/she will not be 
considered as a carrier because, in this sense, he/she is not an independent party.51  
It is important to note that Article 31(a) is concerned only with contracts 
involving the carriage of goods. Contracts not requiring carriage, and ones in which 
“the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any particular place” are ruled by 
Article 31 subsections (b) and (c) respectively. As the drafters of the UNCITRAL 
Digest have reported, Article 31(b) requires three conditions for it to apply: 
[First], delivery as per the contract must not involve carriage of the goods in the 
sense of article 31(a) - so that it is the buyer’s task to get possession of the goods; 
second, the goods sold must be specific goods, goods of a specific stock, or goods 
to be manufactured or produced; third, both parties must have known when the 
contract was concluded that the goods were located at (or were to be manufactured 
or produced at) a particular place.52 
Where these requirements are met, the seller fulfils his/her delivery obligation by 
“placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal (italics added) at the place” where they are 
located at that moment or at the place of manufacture or production. As Enderlein 
has specified, the place designated by Article 31(b) “could be (…) a factory, a mill, 
a plantation, or a warehouse.”53 The phrase “placing the goods at the buyer’s 
disposal” should be understood as making the goods available to the buyer so that 
he/she needs only to take possession of them.54 
With regard to cases where the contract does not involve carriage,55 or those 
in which goods are situated at an unidentified place, the delivery obligation is 
fulfilled by placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal at the place where the seller has 
                                               
50
 Lookofsky CISG 86. 
51
 Enderlein Rights 133 147; Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties_ 
obligations_by%20Nai yana_Guerin.doc; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 500-
501. 
52
 UNCITRAL Digest 133 §8. 
53
 Enderlein Rights 133 148; supported by Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_ 
parties_obligations_ by%20Nai yana_Guerin.doc. 
54
 See Oosthuizen Rights 81; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 511; Schlechtriem 
in Gaston/ Smit Sales 6-10.  
55
 It seems, however, that sales not involving carriage of goods occur in a limited number compared 
to other kinds of international transactions. Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 313 §209. 
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his/her place of business56 the moment the contract was formed. Through its wording, 
Article 31(c) establishes the seller’s place of business as the default place of 
delivery.57 Thus, where the contract does not require either any transportation or 
where the place of delivery is not specified in the contract, the place where the seller 
runs his/her business will prevail.  
South African law  
According to South African common law, any seller has, among other main 
obligations, to take care of the item sold and make it available.58 As Kerr has said, 
making the thing sold available to the buyer is justified by the fact that the latter 
concludes the contract in order to acquire ownership of it.59 It is then the seller’s duty 
to deliver its possession to him/her.60 It should immediately be noted that the 
obligation of the seller to make the thing sold available to the buyer is 
multidimensional. This duty has been exhaustively codified by the 2008 CPA with 
regard to consumer sales contracts.61 The provisions of the CPA have consequently 
supplemented the common law rules so that they may be found useful for 
                                               
56
 For what the “place of business” is, see Article 10 CISG.  
57
 See UNCITRAL Digest 132 §§1 and 10; Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 423; 
Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 511; Schlechtriem in Gaston/Smit Sales 6-11. 
58
 See Kerr Sale 161; Lehmann Sale 888 895; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 64; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 
96; Oosthuizen Rights 83; Sharrock Business 287; Hackwill Sale 65. Authority relating to the 
seller’s duty to deliver the thing sold to the buyer may be found in Ulpian’s statement in D 19.1.11.2 
whereby, “The primary obligation on the seller is to make the thing itself available, that is, to deliver 
it” (Mackintosh’s translation); quoted by Kerr Sale 161 Fn25; and Oosthuizen Rights 83 Fn341. 
59
 Kerr Sale 161; supported by Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 71.  
60
 Volpe has stated in this respect that, “Delivery may be effectuated by any voluntary act of the 
seller by which the thing sold is put into the possession of the buyer, or the buyer is enabled to 
obtain possession (…).” See Volpe Sale 71; for the different methods of delivery, see Hackwill 
Sale 67-72. 
61
 According to s 19(2) CPA, 
Unless otherwise expressly provided or anticipated in an agreement, it is an implied condition 
of every transaction for the supply of goods (italics added) (…) that -  
(a) the supplier is responsible to deliver the goods (…) -  
(i) on the agreed date and at the agreed time, if any, or otherwise within a reasonable time 
after concluding the transaction or agreement; 
(ii) at the agreed place of delivery or performance; and 
(iii) at the cost of the supplier, in the case of delivery of goods; or 
(b) the agreed place of delivery of goods (…) is the supplier’s place of business, if the supplier 
has one, and if not, the supplier’s residence; (…). 
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international sales contracts. Such a suggestion is supported by s 5(1)(a) which 
extends the provisions of the Act over “every transaction occurring within the 
Republic, unless it is (expressly) exempted” by a specific provision of the CPA.62 
This opinion is confirmed by s 5(8)(a) which extends the field of influence of the 
CPA to all commercial transactions “irrespective of whether the supplier resides or 
has its principal office within or outside” South Africa (italics added).    
 In addition, the seller’s duty to supply the thing sold involves that “the seller 
must deliver the thing sold at the time (and place) stipulated in the contract.”63 As far 
as the place of delivery is concerned, it is well established that where the place of 
delivery has been agreed on, the seller is obliged to deliver at that place.64 If parties 
have not reached agreement on a specific place, and “if there is no custom or trade 
usage to the contrary,”65 where goods are specified they must be supplied at the place 
where they were at the time of the sale.66 Alternatively, with regard to unascertained 
goods, they have to be delivered at the seller’s place of business or at his/her 
residence in the absence of a place of business.67 Concerning goods to be 
manufactured, they have to be supplied at their place of manufacture.68 
The idea underlining the above principles is that the seller must place the goods 
in a deliverable state allowing the buyer to take free possession of them. Thus, if any 
                                               
62
 For a list of sales excluded from the field of application of the CPA, see s 5(2) to (5) which does 
not mention international sales. 
63
 See Concrete Products Co (Pty) Ltd v Natal Leather Industries 1946 NPD 377; Adler v Taylor 
1948 (3) SA 322 (T); Conradie v Greyling Implemente Fabriek 1955 (1) SA 433 (T); see also 
Volpe Sale 71; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; Lehmann Sale 888 895; and s 19(2) (a) (i) and (ii) 
CPA. 
64
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 101; quoting Pothier Vente 51 (Cushing’s translation 30); see also 
Hackwill Sale 77; Oosthuizen Rights 83; and s 19(2) (a) (ii) CPA. 
65
 See Goldblatt v Merwe 1902 19 SC 373 375; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; Kerr Sale 97; 
Zulman/Kairinos Sale 101; and Volpe Sale 73. See also Kahn 1985 (1) 1 Lesotho LJ 69 83 
explaining the role of trade usage in the absence of legislation in general. 
66
 Gilson v Payn (1899) 16 SC 286 289; Hackwill Sale 77; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; 
Zulman/Kairinos Sale 101; Volpe Sale 74; Oosthuizen Rights 83; see also s 19(2) (a) (ii) CPA. 
67
 Hackwill Sale 77; under the CPA regime, seller’s place of business or his/her residence, 
depending on the case,  is presumed to be the default place of delivery; see s 19(2) (b) CPA. 
68
 Richards, Slater and Co v Fuller and Co (1880) 1 EDC 1 4; Goldblatt v Merwe (1902) 19 SC 
373 375; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; Volpe Sale 74; Kerr Sale 97; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 101; 
Oosthuizen Rights 83. 
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transport is required during the delivery stage, it is the buyer’s responsibility to 
provide it,69 except for FOB sales.70 As has already been noted in the introduction to 
section 6.2.3.2, the specificity of FOB clauses consists of the fact that the seller is 
responsible for the main transportation of the goods to the place of destination.71 
It should be remembered that international transactions frequently involve 
carriage. In Stephen Fraser v Clydesdale Transvaal Collieries, Solomon J said that, 
“Where goods are delivered to a carrier for transmission to the buyer, the general rule 
is that delivery to the carrier is delivery to the purchaser, the carrier being regarded 
as his agent and not the seller’s.”72 This rule does not apply, however, where the 
seller undertakes to make the delivery himself/herself. In comparable circumstances, 
the person to whom the seller hands the goods for delivery is his/her agent so that 
goods are delivered only when they are received by the buyer at the destination.73 By 
contrast, if the carrier is the buyer’s agent, delivery is fulfilled as soon as goods are 
handed over to the transporter.  
The development above makes it clear that, as for the CISG, South African 
law establishes several places of delivery depending on whether the goods are 
specified or not, whether they are already manufactured or not, and whether they 
involve transportation or not, in addition to the place conjointly determined by parties 
in the contract.   
 
 
                                               
69
 See Sharrock Business 287; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72. It is not excluded that parties agree that 
the seller must, at his/her own expense, transport the thing sold to the buyer’s address. Such is the 
rule for consumer transactions wherein the seller is obliged to cover the costs entailed by the 
delivery. See s 19(2) (a) (iii) CPA. 
70
 See Chong Sun Wood Products Pte Ltd v K & T Trading Ltd & another 2001 (2) SA 651 (D). 
71
 It was ruled, in the Chong Sun Wood Products Pte Ltd v K & T Trading Ltd & another case that, 
“A seller who undertakes to deliver goods free on board is responsible for the cost of transporting 
the goods to the ship, and putting them on board (…).” See also, Coetzee Incoterms 98-99; 
Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 131. 
72
 Stephen Fraser and Co v Clydesdale Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1903 TH 121 125; see also 
Hackwill Sale 24 and 74; Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 84; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 94 and 126-127; 
Volpe Sale 83; Oosthuizen Rights 83. 
73
 Ibid. 
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Congolese law 
Seller’s delivery obligation, initially delimited by Articles 281 to 302 CCO, is 
currently regulated by Articles 251 to 254 UAGCL. This duty is defined by Article 
281 CCO as the “transfer of the thing sold to the control and the possession of the 
buyer.”74 Generally, the delivery of movable effects is executed by simple traditio. 
It may even occur by the sole consent of the parties, where transfer cannot take place 
immediately, or where the buyer had already acquired the goods on another basis.75 
Because it is the seller’s duty to deliver goods to the buyer, the Appeal court of 
Kinshasa ruled that, the seller bears the burden of proof that he/she has fulfilled 
his/her delivery obligation and, if necessary, that the goods delivered were of 
authentic and marketable quality.76  
With regard to the place of delivery, it is expressly regulated by Articles 251 
and 252 of the OHADA Commercial Act which have adopted solutions similar to 
those established by the CISG, though inverted in the order of presentation.77 As was 
mentioned in the introductory subsection, it is generally admitted that the seller fulfils 
his/her delivery obligation at the place contractually agreed upon.78 Congolese 
economic operators should, likewise, “commonly designate the place of delivery of 
the goods by inserting within their contract a selected national or international term 
                                               
74
 Under OHADA law perspective, see CCJA (1st chamber) 24 April 2008, Case No. 18 Dr A v 
Distribution Pharmaceutique de Cote d’Ivoire SA, Receuil de la Jurisprudence No. 11 January-
June 2008 51. 
75
 Cf. Article 283 CCO with Article 264 CCO. 
76
 Léo 18 August 1953 RJCB 290; confirmed in Léo 12 July 1955 JTO 1956 62; see also Katuala 
Code 171, and Piron 123 (for the first case). 
77
 Where the CISG regulates the place of delivery in one article, the Commercial Act provides two. 
Within the ambit of the Commercial Act, delivery to a carrier comes in the fourth position (Article 
252 al. 1), after delivery at a stipulated place (Article 251, first part), delivery at a particular place 
(Article 251, second part), and delivery at seller’s place of business (Article 251, third part). 
78
 Cf. The first part of Article 251 UAGCL which states, “When the seller is not bound to supply 
the goods in a specific place (…)”; compare this to Article 286 CCO in fine which reads, “Delivery 
has to be made at the place where the thing sold was located at the time the sale was formed, unless 
otherwise agreed (italics added)” 
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of commerce,”79 or the ICC’s Incoterms.80 It is only where parties did not determine 
a specific place of delivery nor selected any Incoterms that the default rules provided 
by the Uniform Act will apply. 
Insofar as default places of delivery are concerned, it is assumed that the buyer 
must himself/herself come to the seller for the goods. In that condition, the seller 
achieves his/her delivery obligation by placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal 
either at the place where they were manufactured or stored, or at the seller’s own 
place of business.81 Since, for commercial sales, the place selected for delivery is 
seller’s domicile and not the buyer’s, one Cameroonian court ruled, on 4 March 2002, 
that, “a buyer who fails to take delivery at that place cannot later sue the seller for 
lack of delivery.”82 
The delivery duty does not entail automatically an obligation with regard to 
the carriage of goods. Such an obligation may at times be imposed by a court when 
it is required by trade usages.83 A propos of this, Article 252 al. 1 UAGCL states that 
in circumstances where the contract provides for carriage, the seller accomplishes 
his/her delivery obligation solely by the handing of goods to the carrier.84  
In the context of the OHADA Commercial Act, the obligation of carriage 
carries an additional obligation. As stipulated by the second paragraph of Article 252 
                                               
79
 For similar situation under Latin American, Spanish, and Portuguese laws, see Munoz Contracts 
287. 
80
 Cf. Brux 14 July 1952 Belg Col 1956 9, for CIF sales; and Elis 29 March 1947 RJCB 93, for 
FOB sales.  
81
 Article 251, second part, UAGCL; compared with Article 31(b) and (c) CISG. 
82
 See Cameroun 4 March 2002 Gde Inst Mfoundi, Case No. 246 Mejo M’obam M v LABOREX 
Cameroun SA [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-04-216.html] (accessed 6-4-2013). 
83
 See Cass B 8 January 1852 Pas I 1853 178; see also Katuala Code 171. There is an authority that 
argues that “unascertained goods handed over for carriage remain to the seller’s risk until delivery. 
With regard to those kinds of goods, delivery results in general of their being handed to the carrier, 
unless when either according to the convention or the usages, delivery must occur at the place of 
destination.” See Léo 25 February 1930 RJCB 1930 262.  
84
 Article 252 al. 1 UAGCL; compared with Article 31(a) CISG. It was ruled in this regard that 
when goods are handed to the first carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer who must pay the 
price although the goods are lost or destroyed later, unless the seller has failed to take care of them. 
See Elis 29 March 1949 RJCB 1949 93; see also Cote d’Ivoire First Inst Abidjan 25 April 2001, 
Case No. 327 Sitbai v Cfcd-ci; and Cote d’Ivoire 14 June 2001 Appellate Court Abidjan, Case No. 
677 Lotus Import Co v Skalli Fortant de France [http://www.ohada.com/ jurisprudence/ohadata/J-
04-102.html] (accessed 6-4-2013). 
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UAGCL, when transport is required, the seller must conclude all contracts necessary 
bearing in mind the appropriateness of the means of transportation to the 
circumstances and the usual terms of such carriage.85 It is obvious that the seller is 
not bound to take out any carriage insurance. But, if it is so required by the buyer, 
the seller must provide the buyer with all useful information to enable him/her to 
arrange carriage insurance.86  
Comments  
The CISG, South African law, and Congolese law all agree on the general principle 
that the place of delivery is commonly determined by the parties in the contract. They 
also agree on the fact that seller’s place of business constitutes the main default place 
for delivery. That place is, however, complemented by other designated places 
depending on whether the contract deals with the delivery of specific goods, 
unidentified goods, or goods to be manufactured or produced. In addition, where 
goods are located at a particular place, the three legal systems provide for their 
delivery either at the place where they are or at the place of manufacture, or storage, 
or at the place of production. Similarly, all of them address the issue of contracts 
involving carriage and agree that, in contracts of these kinds, the handing over of 
goods to a carrier amounts to delivery.  
Before the coming into force of OHADA law in the DRC, however, Congolese 
law provided a single default place of delivery irrespective of whether or not the sale 
involved the carriage of goods, whether goods were specified or unidentified, or 
whether goods were to be manufactured or produced. In conformity with Article 286 
CCO, except contrary convention, the seller, in the DRC, had to fulfil his duty of 
delivery at the place where goods sold were situated at the time the sale was made. 
Such a restrictive legal regime might have been justified by the fact that, previously, 
                                               
85
 Compare this with Article 32 (2) CISG; see also Spain 12 February 2002 Appellate Court 
Barcelona [http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020212s4.html]; China 18 July 2001 Zhejiang Cixi 
People’s Court [District Court] Carl Hill v Cixi Old Furniture Trade Co Ltd 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010718c1.html] (last accessed 11 October 2013). 
86
 Article 252 al. 3 UAGCL. This provision does not have equivalent in the CISG.  
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the transfer of possession was supposed to take place concomitantly with the transfer 
of ownership when there is exchange of consent.87 In effect, the CCO was, like the 
French and Belgian civil codes, drafted considering situations of direct and 
immediate delivery.88 The buyer was then obliged to collect the goods himself/herself 
the moment following the conclusion of the contract at the seller’s place of domicile. 
As has been observed, nowadays situations in which the buyer himself/herself 
collects goods from the seller are rare in international transactions. The most frequent 
ones are those where the seller is obliged to organise the conveyance by independent 
carriers.89  
It is evident that the limited option taken by the former Congolese legislator 
had become inconsistent with the complexity of current international transactions. 
As was said earlier, modern commercial international instruments have opted for 
several possibilities in determining the place of delivery depending on the type of 
goods and the means of delivery. For instance, where the seller has to hand over 
goods to a carrier, he/she must identify them as agreed in the contract, or by marking 
them, or by shipping documents.90 Similarly, if goods are not properly identified, the 
seller must provide the buyer with a notification of the consignment labelling the 
goods. Moreover, where the seller is bound to arrange for the carriage of the goods, 
such a contract necessary for the carriage to the place agreed must be concluded.91 
The seller is even required to assist the buyer in arranging insurance for goods. 
Thus, by selecting many places where the seller should deliver the goods, the 
OHADA Commercial Act has improved Congolese law with regard to the 
determination of default places of delivery and it, therefore, aligns it with the CISG 
and South African law.  
 
                                               
87
 Cf. L’shi 14 April 1981 RC 6237 (unreported decision) with Article 264 CCO.  
88
 Compare Article 264 CCO to Article 1583 Napoleonic civil code; for a similar situation under 
Latin American, Spain and Portuguese laws, see Munoz Contracts 290. 
89
 Cf. Schlechtriem in Gaston/Smit Sales 6-10 and 11; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 313. 
90
 Cf. Article 32(1) CISG. 
91
 See Article 252 al. 2 UAGCL; compare to Article 32(2) CISG. 
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6.2.3.3 Time for delivery 
 
The CISG  
Within the Convention, the time for delivery is provided by Article 3392 which 
obliges the seller to deliver the goods at the date jointly agreed on, or at the date fixed 
by, or determinable from the contract.93 In the same way as for the place of delivery, 
parties are at the liberty to determine the time for the performance of their contractual 
obligations. This rule is consistent with the principle of party autonomy which 
constitutes one of the general principles on which the CISG is based.94 
In addition to a fixed or determinable date, Article 33(b) regulates the case of 
delivery within a fixed period. Consistent with this provision, where a period is 
contractually determined, or where it is determinable, the seller must deliver the goods 
at any time within that period. Nevertheless, where, depending on circumstances, the 
buyer is interested in fixing an exact date for receipt of the goods he/she might reserve 
the right to choose a suitable date for delivery.95 If no time for delivery is stipulated in 
the contract, however, the seller is obliged to deliver the goods “within a reasonable 
time” after the conclusion of the contract. The concept “reasonable time” is to be 
understood, in this context, as adequate time depending on the circumstances of the 
case.96 It results from Article 33(c) that the notion of “reasonable time” is the default 
time for delivery.  
                                               
92
 As stated by Article 33, 
The seller must deliver the goods: 
(a) if a date is fixed by or determinable from the contract, on that date; 
(b) if a period of time is fixed by or determinable from the contract, at any time within that period 
unless circumstances indicate that the buyer is to choose a date; or 
(c) in any other case, within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract.  
93
 Article 33 (a) and (b) CISG.   
94
 Cf. Articles 6 and 7(2) CISG; see also Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 549; 
Piltz in Kröll/ Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 460; UNCITRAL Digest 137 §1; and comments 
in Section 4.3.6.3 above. 
95
 Article 33(b) in fine; see also Enderlein Rights 133 152. 
96
 See UNCITRAL Digest 137. That is to say, the compilation of the “reasonable time” should be 
assessed on a case by case basis depending, for instance, on the kind of the goods to be delivered. 
It was acknowledged, hence, that delivering a bulldozer two weeks after the seller receives the first 
instalment on the price is reasonable. See Switzerland 28 October 1997 Tribunal Cantonal Valais, 
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Owing to the fact that the seller is bound to deliver goods on time, late delivery 
constitutes, in principle, a breach of the contract. Furthermore, if the stipulation of 
time was of the essence of the contract, the failure of the seller to deliver in time may 
amount to a fundamental breach.97 In a similar way, an early delivery would produce 
the same effects as a late delivery. In contrast to a late delivery, however, premature 
deliveries appear to be tolerated. In cases of early delivery, indeed, the seller has the 
right, up to the date of delivery, to deliver any missing part or repair any non-
conforming goods provided that the exercise of such a right spares the buyer 
unreasonable inconvenience or expense.98  
South African law  
The time for delivery is governed by the Broderick Properties Ltd v Rood case. The 
rule in the Broderick Properties Ltd v Rood case is that the seller must deliver the 
thing sold at the time stipulated in the contract.99 Where no specific time for delivery 
has been stated, and, if that time cannot be inferred from other elements of the 
contract, the seller must perform whatever is necessary in order to deliver within a 
“reasonable time” after concluding the transaction.100 As ruled by Colman J in St 
Martin’s Trust v Willowdene Landowners Ltd, “In deciding what would have been a 
reasonable time, the Court must have regard to the nature of the performance which 
                                               
CLOUT case No. 219; and similar cases in UNCITRAL Digest 137-138 §7; Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §88:42 88-75 to 88-79; Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 467; Widmer 
in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 557.  
97
 Cf. Articles 45 and 49; see also UNCITRAL Digest 138 §9. 
98
 Cf. Article 37 CISG. 
99
 See Broderick Properties Ltd v Rood 1962 (4) SA 447 (T) 453; see also Louw v Trust 
Administrateurs Bpk 1971 (1) SA 896 (W) 903; and comments by Hackwill Sale 77; 
Zulman/Kairinos Sale 98; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; Kerr Sale 100; Volpe Sale 71; see, in the 
same sense, s 19(2) (a) (i) CPA. 
100
 See Concrete Products Co (Pty) Ltd v Natal Leather Industries 1946 NPD 377 in which it is 
stated: “In the absence of an agreed date for the commencement of delivery, delivery must occur 
within a ‘reasonable period’.” See also Mitchell v Howard, Farrar & Co 5 EDC 131 140; Hackwill 
Sale 77; Volpe Sale 71 and 73; and, particularly, s 19(2) (a) (i) in fine and (3) of the CPA. This 
provision is clear that, if no specific date or time for delivery was agreed in the contract, the seller 
cannot require the buyer to accept delivery at “an unreasonable time”.  
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was due by the party who is alleged to have been in default, and to the difficulties, 
obstacles, and delays attendant upon such performance.”101 
Because a timely delivery is fundamental to the sale, a seller who fails to fulfil 
his/her delivery obligation at the day agreed, or within a reasonable time, is in breach 
of contract. Similarly, if the seller makes the property sold available on time, but the 
buyer fails to remove it at the appropriate time, the latter is also in breach of 
contract.102 Simply, if the seller delivers goods at a date or a day other than the one 
agreed upon, the buyer is free to accept the goods, or to require delivery at the agreed 
time, if it has not yet expired, or to cancel the contract for lack of delivery.103   
Congolese law  
Article 253 of the OHADA Commercial Act which, currently, regulates the time for 
delivery, in the DRC, has adopted the principle of freedom of contract according to 
which parties are free to determine the date of delivery at will.104 As stipulated by it, 
the seller must deliver the goods by the date fixed in the contract or determinable 
according to the terms of the contract. The second paragraph of the same provision 
adds to this that, where delivery is intended during a given period of time, the seller 
should deliver at any time within that period. With regard to the last paragraph, it states 
that, in the absence of a determined date of delivery, the delivery should take place 
within a reasonable time running from the date the contract was formed. Further to 
Article 253, Article 257 UAGCL rules about anticipatory delivery; it literally 
reproduces Article 37 CISG.   
 
                                               
101
 St Martin’s Trust v Willowdene Landowners Ltd 1970 (3) SA 132 (W) 135F-136G.  
102
 See Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; and Sharrock Business 712. In the general context of breach 
of contracts, see Kerr Contract 615; Christie/Bradfield Contract 515; Van der Merwe Contract 
307-323. See, in the same sense, MV Snow Crystal Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v 
Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA). 
103
 Cf. s 19(6) CPA.  
104
 Compare Article 253 al. 1 UAGCL to Article 287 CCO in limine; see also Goma 28 November 
2005 RCA 1359 Kamaliro Paluku J v Kisambio Kambale; Kin/Gombe 7 April 2011 RCA 27 
575/27 714 Luwanda Lubuata v Moke Molobini N (unreported decisions). 
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Comments 
The CISG, South African law, and Congolese law all defer the time for delivery to 
wills of the parties first. It is only in cases where parties fail to determine the date in 
the contract that a reasonable time applies. All of the legal systems being discussed, 
similarly, allow the seller to deliver anticipatively provided that the buyer has the 
right to refuse or accept the goods delivered beforehand.  
If the contractual time for delivery is familiar to Congolese law, the notion of 
“reasonable time” and the concept of “early delivery” appear, however, to be new. 
As far as the reasonableness rule is concerned, its novelty is due to the fact that, as 
was said in section 6.2.3.2 above, the CCO was drafted considering situations of 
prompt performance. The seller was then supposed to make the thing sold available 
immediately after the conclusion of the contract105 or at least at the time approved 
jointly.106 Additionally, in the absence of a stated period for delivery, the judge was 
allowed to provide parties with a normal period, instead of recourse to reasonable 
time.107 That principle was formulated in case law as follows: “Where the contract is 
silent with regard to the date of delivery, the time of delivery is a normal delay that 
the judge determines autonomously considering the opinion of the buyer.”108 From 
such a general rule it was evident that a seller who failed to deliver the item sold 
within the period agreed upon or within the one judicially fixed was in breach of the 
contract.109  
                                               
105
 Cf. Article 264 CCO; compared to South African law authorities such D 50.17.14; Grotius 
3.3.51; Pothier Sale pra 50; Van der Linden 1.15.9.62 Inst 3.15.5; quoted by Kerr Sale 166. 
106
 Cf. Article 287 CCO in limine. It was ruled in this regard that, “for the sale of fungible items, 
subject to fast and important fluctuations, the stipulation of a period for delivery is of the essence 
of the contract. The seller is on formal notice by the mere expiration of the term and parties’ will 
is that the contract is automatically resolved if the seller does not deliver the goods by the fixed 
period.” See Ru-Ur App 14 March 1944 Rev Jur 1944 184; in Répertoire 135. 
107
 See Elis 30 January 1915 Jur Col 1925 319 (need of a declaration in pleading). 
108
 Cf. Comm Brux 10 January 1949 Belg Col 1950 80. 
109
 See Articles 287 and 288 CCO which state on the whole that “where the seller fails to deliver 
the thing sold within the time agreed between the parties, it may be ordered to pay damages if the 
buyer has suffered a loss because of seller’s failure to deliver at the agreed time.” For an 
application, in the context OHADA law, see Burkina Faso 7 December 2001 Appellate Court of 
Ouagadougou (civil and commercial chamber), Case No. 99 Dremont F v Ouagraoua Tikouilga P 
[http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-09-06.html] (accessed 6-4-2013). It was held in 
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From this explanation, it is clear that, in contrast to the CISG110 and South 
African law,111 the CCO did not provide any residual time for delivery. Yet, the 
possibility of immediate delivery is not appropriate for international sales contracts. 
Nor does the sovereign judicial determination of the period of delivery give much 
certainty as to the time of performance of international sales. That is the reason why 
the OHADA Commercial Act has adopted, through Article 253 al. 3 UAGCL, a 
solution similar to the one stated in the CISG and South African law. This article 
states expressly that, in the absence of any stipulation in the contract, delivery should 
be made within a reasonable period after the conclusion of the contract. It 
consequently introduces the “reasonable time rule” in the DRC and improves modern 
Congolese sales law in compliance with contracts lacking an agreed period for 
delivery as the CISG and South African law do.  
 
6.2.3.4 Handing over documents relating to the goods 
 
The CISG  
Further to the delivery of goods, the CISG seller is also inquired to hand over any 
documents relating to the goods.112 This additional duty is regulated by Article 34 
which obliges the seller to deliver documents relating to the goods “at the time and 
place and in the form required by the contract.”113 As commentators have stated, 
Article 34 has the merit of attesting that “international sales are very often 
documentary sales, where the delivery of the documents is very closely linked to the 
                                               
this case that, Article 254 UAGCL (1997 version) (equivalent to modern Article 282 UAGCL) is 
applicable only in cases of late delivery or of breach other than late delivery. 
110
 See Article 33(c) CISG; compared with Article 253 al. 3 UAGCL.   
111
 See Concrete Products Co (Pty) Ltd v Natal Leather Industries 1946 NPD 377; Mitchell v 
Howard, Farrar & Co 5 EDC 131; and Stapleford Estates (Pty) Ltd & another v Wright 1968 (1) 
SA 1 (E) at 4A-C; see also Zulman/Kairinos Sale 98; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 72; Volpe Sale 71 
and 73.  
112
 See Articles 30 and 34; see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 11[http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/CISG-AC-op11.html] (accessed 30-4-2013).   
113
 See the first sentence of Article 34 CISG. 
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delivery of the goods and forms a substantial and important part of the obligations of 
the seller.”114 Contrary to the delivery of goods, the duty of the handing over of 
documents seems not to be common. It occurs only in circumstances where the 
contract, practices established between the parties, or trade usages required it.115  
As regards its wording, Article 34 is normally concerned with all kinds of 
documents relating to the goods. Although the CISG is silent on what those 
documents are, the CISG-AC Opinion No. 11, scholars, and the case law have 
inferred that the documentary obligation covers documents that confer to the buyer 
the title in the goods, such as bills of lading, as well as other all kinds of documents, 
namely warehouse receipts, insurance policies, invoices, certificates of origin, 
certificates of control or quality, and so on.116 According to Article 34, where the 
seller is bound to hand over any of the above documents, he/she must do so at the 
time, place, and in the manner agreed on.117 It is deemed, likewise, that if parties have 
agreed on payment by letter of credit, this letter must list the documents needed 
before payment.  
It should be noted, however, that if parties did not reach agreement on the 
categories of documents to be handed over, the buyer is not bound to pay the price 
until the seller places either the goods or documents controlling their disposition at  
                                               
114
 Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §88:51 88-87; finding counsel in Russia 6 June 2003 Arbitration 
proceeding 97/2002 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030606r1.html]; and Spain 12 February 
2002 Audiencia Provincial [Appellate Court] Barcelona (Comercial San Antonio, SA v Grupo 
Blocnesa, SL) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020212s4. html]. 
115
 See UNCITRAL Digest 140; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 560; Piltz in 
Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 475; Davies Comments to CISG-AC Opinion No. 11§3. 
116
 For an exhaustive list of documents relating to the goods, see CISG-AC Opinion No. 11 §§1 to 
6; Widmer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 561; Piltz in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 476; Enderlein Rights 133 152-153; Butler Guide 4-11 12; Fiser-Sobot 2011 (3) BLR 
196 199. See also authorities quoted in UNCITRAL Digest 140 Fn2 & 3; and in Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §88:52. On the supply of certificates of origin and of quality, for instance, see Germany 
3 April 1996 Bundesgerichtshof Cobalt Sulphate case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/960403g1.html] (accessed 10-8-2012).  
117
 For an application, see Russia 6 June 2003 Arbitration proceeding 97/2002 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 030606r1.html]; Spain 12 February 2002 Appellate Court 
Barcelona [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020212s4. html]; Russia 11 May 1997 Arbitration 
proceeding 2/1995 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970511r1.html]; and France March 1995 
Court of Arbitration of the ICC (Arbitral award No. 7645), ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin 2000 34; in UNCITRAL Digest 140 Fn5.  
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his/her disposal.118 In addition, if the seller has handed over non-conforming 
documents before the due date, he/she may cure any lack of conformity until the 
agreed delivery period. The exercise of this right is, however, subject to the condition 
that it “does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable 
expense.”119 Thus, as the delivery of non-conforming documents may constitute a 
breach of the contract,120 the buyer reserves the right to claim damages in respect of 
such loss.  
South African law 
The duty regarding the delivery of documents is organised under South African law 
mainly in relation to CIF sales. As was alluded to in section 6.2.3.2 above, CIF sales 
are types of contracts where “the seller is obliged to ship at the port of shipment 
goods of the description contained in the contract; procure a contract of 
affreightment; insure the contract goods; and invoice them to the purchaser.”121 As 
Corbett JA stated in the Lendalease Finance case,  
Under the c.i.f. contract, (…) [a]s soon as reasonably possible after shipment, the 
seller must tender to the buyer or his agent, in proper form, the bill of lading, 
evidencing the contract of affreightment, the policy of insurance and the invoice, 
these being collectively referred to as ‘the shipping documents’.122 
                                               
118
 Cf. Article 58 CISG and CISG-AC Opinion No. 11 §§4&5. 
119
 See Second sentence of Article 34 CISG; compared to Article 37 for repair of non-conforming 
goods. For implementation, see France March 1995 ICC Arbitral award No. 7645.  
120
 Cf. Article 34, last sentence; contra the Cobalt Sulphate case whereby, the delivery of wrong 
documents did not amount to a breach of the contract since the buyer could obtain correct 
documents from other sources. 
121
 A CIF seller has five main obligations: (1) to ship the goods to the port of shipment in 
accordance with the contract; (2) to procure a contract of affreightment for delivery of the goods at 
the agreed destination; (3) to arrange insurance for the goods; (4) to invoice the goods to the buyer; 
and (5) to tender to the buyer as soon as is reasonably possible after shipment, the documents in a 
valid and effective condition. See Coetzee Incoterms 44 and 101-102; Sharrock Business 305-306; 
Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 130; Hackwill Sale 256-257. 
122
 Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Marcadeo Agricola & Others 491H-192D; 
quoted with approval in Golden Meats and Seafood Supplies CC v Best Seafood Import CC and 
Another (A167/10) [2010] ZAKZDHC 73; 2011 (2) SA 491 (KZD) (9 December 2010) [14]. See 
in the same sense Frank Wright (Pty) Ltd v Corticas ‘BCM’ Ltd 1948 (4) SA 456 (C) 463-464; 
Chattanooga Tufters Supply Co v Chenille Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1974 (2) SA 10 
(E) 15; Kerr Sale 232. 
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It results from the case above that the main documents relating to the goods, under 
the jurisdiction of South African law, include the bill of lading, the policy of 
insurance and commercial invoices. After he/she has handed over these documents, 
though he/she may not yet have delivered the actual goods, the seller is discharged 
from the delivery obligation.123 
Congolese law  
Compliance with Articles 250 and 254 UAGCL, the seller must deliver the goods 
together with “any documents relating to them, and all accessories124 necessary to 
their usage”. The last Article specifies that, where the seller is bound to hand over 
any documents and accessories relating to the goods, he/she must carry out that 
obligation at the time and place and in the form provided for in the contract or 
required by the practices established in the sector of trade concerned. Given that the 
Uniform Act does not enumerate the kinds of those compulsory documents, it is 
assumed that the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraphs should be issued 
mutatis mutandis in the DRC.125 In Congolese law, in particular, it was ruled that the 
bill of lading does not constitute an absolute title of ownership of the goods. Its 
handing over does not, therefore, fulfil the duty of the delivery of goods.126 In 
addition to the bill of lading, the seller must perform a proper delivery for him/her 
definitively to be released from the obligation regarding the delivery of the goods.  
Comments  
The duty of the delivery of documents relating to goods is mentioned in all of the 
three legal systems being studied. If this obligation is established under South 
                                               
123
 It was ruled, in the Lendalease Finance decision that, unless otherwise stipulated, in CIF 
contracts the only thing the buyer waits for from the seller are “shipping documents,” so that, once 
they have been tendered, the buyer is obliged to pay for the goods.   
124
 Accessories are understood, in this context, as those things which form an integral part of the 
principal item, and which are indispensable for its normal use, e.g., a wheel for a car.  
125
 For an illustration, one should mention the Burkina Faso Société Telecel Faso v Société Hortel 
Project case which alludes to mailing orders, invoices and ship’s delivery orders as documents 
required for payment of the price.  
126
 Léo 25 February 1930 Jur Col 1932 50; RJCB 1930 262. 
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African law mostly with regard to CIF contracts, in the other two jurisdictions the 
delivery of documents is needed in all kinds of overseas sales provided that the 
contract or mercantile usages require it. Unlike the CISG, however, Articles 250 and 
254 UAGCL,127 which introduced the documentary duty in the DRC, do not envisage 
any possibility of replacing non-conforming documents with correct ones. Instead, 
they impose an additional obligation relating to the delivery of the accessories of 
goods. This extra duty seems to be an allegiance to the Napoleonic civil code from 
which OHADA law is, to some extent, generated. One should remember that the civil 
code, which was applicable in almost of former French colonies before the advent of 
OHADA law, demands that the property sold should be delivered with its 
“accessories and appurtenances,” and with everything necessary for its permanent 
use.128 Thus, the Congolese law documentary obligation appears to be more 
demanding than the CISG’s obligation of delivery of documents relating to the 
goods. 
 
6.2.3.5 Conclusion on the delivery obligation 
 
With regard to the delivery obligation, there are many innovations introduced under 
Congolese law by the OHADA Commercial Act. Because the latter was influenced 
by the CISG, a number of solutions adopted by the Vienna Convention, and also in 
force in South African law, in connection with the delivery of goods apply now also 
in the DRC. These include the triple default place of delivery, the reasonable time 
rule for delivery; the right to repair non-conforming goods, in case of premature 
delivery,129 and the obligation for the seller to hand over documents relating to the 
goods. The only major difference is that Congolese law and South African law do 
                                               
127
 Articles 250 and 254 UAGCL depart from the CISG by stating expressly that the duty of the 
delivery of documents must be performed, among other things, in accordance with commercial 
usages. 
128
 See Article 292 CCO which corresponds to Article 1695 Napoleonic civil code. Compare, under 
South African law, with old authorities quoted by Kerr Sale 9 in Fn11 and 163 in Fn45.  
129
 This prerogative is not organised in South African law. 
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not rule about the replacement of non-conforming documents for early delivery. 
Instead, modern Congolese law substitutes that obligation by the delivery of 
accessories relating to the goods so that the documentary obligation seems more 
severe in the DRC than under the CISG. The same tendency may be found in South 
African law too. 
 
6.2.4 Conformity of the Goods 
 
6.2.4.1 General principles   
 
The obligations of the seller with respect to the conformity of the goods are regulated, 
under the CISG, in Articles 35 to 40,130 and, under modern Congolese law, in Articles 
255 to 259 UAGCL.131 All of these provisions are common with regard to the fact 
that the seller must deliver the goods which comply with the requirements of the 
contract or those laid down by the law. The norm so stated resembles the South 
African common law principle in American Cotton Products Corporation v Felt and 
Tweds Ltd whereby, the goods delivered must conform in terms of description, 
quality, and quantity with those agreed upon.132 
As Lookofsky has said, the main duties of the seller in any sales law consist in 
delivering the “goods at the right place and at the right time.”133 In addition to the 
                                               
130
 Articles 35 and 36 define the obligations of the seller with regard to the quality of the goods; 
Articles 38 and 39 deal with buyer’s obligation to examine the goods and notify the seller of any 
lack of conformity; and Article 40 regulates the case of a seller knowing of the existence of the 
defects in the goods. These provisions are “amongst the most important and heavily-litigated” in 
the Convention. See Flechtner http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ls/ Flechtner_outline2.pdf  
(accessed 10-7-2012); Kröll 2011 (3) BLR 162; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 
484; Kruisinga Non-Conformity 24; Henschel Creation of Rules 177 178; Schlechtriem 
http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html (accessed 10-8-2012). As in July 2013, 
the Pace Law database has reported 313 cases dealing with the conformity of goods and of 
documents. 
131
 Articles 255 to 259 UAGCL bear a resemblance to their equivalent CISG provisions on the 
difference that, under the Commercial Act, the examination of goods duty is regulated under 
buyer’s obligations (Cf. Article 270 UAGCL).  
132
 See American Cotton Products Corporation v Felt and Tweds Ltd 1953 (2) SA 753 (N) 756C-H. 
133
 See Lookofsky CISG 85; also confirmed by Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_ 
CISG_parties_obligations _by% 20Naiyana_Guerin.doc. 
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delivery at the right place and time, the seller must also deliver the “right goods”.134 
This requirement is justified by the fact that, frequently, the buyer purchases the 
goods for a particular purpose, e.g. to consume, use, or to resell them.135 The buyer’s 
intentions with respect to the goods would, therefore, be frustrated if the goods do 
not conform to the goods he/she intended to acquire. So, the obligation of the seller 
with respect to the conformity of the goods includes the requirement that the goods 
must satisfy “in order for the buyer to have had his rights under the contract duly 
fulfilled.”136  
As was mentioned earlier, the seller’s duty to deliver the right goods is 
expressly regulated, within the CISG, in Article 35.137 The first section of this 
provision obliges the seller to “deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and 
description required by the contract, and which are contained or packaged in the 
manner required by the contract.”138 Article 255 al. 1 of the OHADA Commercial 
Act has reproduced the same ruling.139 As is clear, the seller’s duty with regard to 
                                               
134
 Lookofsky CISG 85; Henschel Conformity 23. 
135
 Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties_obligation s_by% 20Naiyana_Guerin. 
doc. 
136
 Henschel Conformity 23; see also Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 484; 
Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:1 89-7. 
137
 According to Article 35,  
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description required by 
the contract, and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract 
unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer 
did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgement; 
(c)  possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or 
model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such 
manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.  
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack 
of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or 
could not have been unaware of such lack of conformity.  
138
  As an illustration, see Italy 16 February 2009 Tribunale di Forli [District Court] Cisterns and 
Accessories case, CLOUT case No. 867 [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090216i3.html] 
139
 As stated by Article 255 al. 1 UAGCL, “The seller shall deliver the goods in the quantity, 
quality, and specifications and packaging in accordance with the stipulations of the contract.” 
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conforming goods, as regulated by both Article 35 CISG and Article 255 al. 1 
UAGCL, bears a resemblance to seller’s guarantee against latent or hidden defects140 
as provided in South African law141 and the CCO.142 
In other words, the CISG conformity obligation, as well as the domestic law 
guarantee against latent defects, oblige the seller to deliver goods the quality of which 
corresponds to the goods agreed on. If they are not, the seller bears legal 
responsibility for breach of contract. For him/her to rely on the provisions relative to 
the non-conformity of goods, nevertheless, the buyer is also obliged to examine the 
goods and notify the seller of any lack of conformity in the required period. Since 
the duties of examination and notification depend on the buyer, they are discussed in 
section 6.3 below dealing with the obligations of the buyer.  
 Concretely, the following sections deal respectively with seller’s obligation 
in respect of the delivery of conforming goods, and his/her responsibility for lack of 
conformity in the goods delivered.  
 
6.2.4.2 The obligations of the seller with regard to the conformity of the goods 
 
Introduction  
The topic of the conformity of goods has been much discussed within the CISG.143 
At present, suffice it to outline its principal rules and compare them with those laid 
                                               
140
 For the similarities between the CISG conformity obligation and the domestic law warranty 
against latent defects, see Winship 1995 (29) International Lawyer 525; but exceptions in the next 
Section. 
141
 See Van Wijk v Curry NO 1907 TS 1109; Frumer v Maitland 1954 (3) SA 840 (A); Cedarmont 
Store v Webster & Co 1922 TPD 106 108; Mannix & Co v Osbord 1921 OPD 138; and American 
Cotton Products Corporation v Felt and Tweds Ltd 1953 (2) SA 753 (N) 756C-H. See also Kerr 
Sale 107-155; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 97; Bradfield/ Lehmann Sale 73.  
142
 See Article 291 al. 1 and Article 318 CCO which state respectively that, “The thing sold must 
be delivered in the condition in which it was at the time of the sale”. “A seller is bound to a warranty 
against latent defects which render the thing sold unfit for the use for which it was intended, or so 
impair this use that the buyer would not have bought it, or would only have paid a lower price if 
he had known of them.” 
143
 For an exhaustive development  of the subject, see, among others, Flechtner 2007 (64) Bepress 
1; Flechtner Funky Mussels; Henschel Conformity 1; Henschel 2004 (1) NJCL; Henschel 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ henschel.html; Henschel in Felemegas Interpretation 
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down under domestic law, especially in Congolese sales law, in order to discover the 
particularities of the latter legal system. The discussion will turn successively on 
contractual conformity principles, the requirements as for fitness for ordinary 
purposes, and conformity with regard to particular purposes, sample, and model. 
Contractual conformity criterions 
The CISG 
It has already been claimed that the duty of the seller with reference to the conformity 
of the goods is ruled under Article 35. As summarised by Henschel,  
[Article 35] is in three sections, of which the first, the conformity of the goods to the 
terms of the contract, consists of the primary rule for assessing lack of conformity. 
Only where the parties have not agreed otherwise will the secondary rule in Article 
35(2) apply, laying down a number of positively expressed assumptions about the 
contractual requirements for the goods. Finally, Article 35(3) contains an exception 
to the seller’s liability for some lack of conformity of goods, where the buyer knew 
or could not have been unaware of the lack of conformity.144  
In detail, Article 35(1) posits the basic principle that goods must conform to the 
contract. According to that principle, the goods conform to the contract on condition 
that they correspond to the “quantity, quality and description” conjointly approved, 
and when they are packaged as required by the contract.145 With regard to its 
meaning, a number of scholars146 and the case law147 have inferred that Article 35 
                                               
166-174; Henschel Creation of Rules 177-202; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 
484-634; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 568-647; Kruisinga Non-
Conformity 1; Vincze Conformity 552; Poikela 2003 (1) NJCL; and Hyland http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hyland1.html (accessed 1-8-2012).  
144
 Henschel Conformity 19; Henschel http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/henschel.html §a; 
Henschel in Felemegas Interpretation 166; see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:5 89-15 89-16. 
145
 For application, see Australia 6 August 2010 Supreme Court of Victoria Delphic Wholesalers 
(Aust) (Pty) Ltd v Agrilex Co Ltd [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100806a2.html] (accessed 1-8-
2012); Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale di Forli [District Court] Mitias v Solidea Srl 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081211i3.html] (accessed 10-7-2012). 
146
 See Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 570; Henschel Conformity 149; 
Kruisinga Non-Conformity 26-27. 
147
 See Spain 17 January 2008 Tribunal Supremo, CLOUT case No. 802; Switzerland 29 June 1998 
Tribunal Cantonal du Valais, CLOUT case No. 256; Switzerland 28 October 1997 Tribunal 
Cantonal Valais, CLOUT case No. 219; in UNCITRAL Digest 144 Fn1. See also cases quoted by 
Kruisinga Non-Conformity 26-27; and by Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:4 89-10 89-14. 
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provisions are based on a standardised concept of “lack of conformity” which 
displaces comparable concepts under domestic laws.148 
It follows that, while establishing the lack of conformity obligation, the 
primary test is to understand “what characteristics of the goods are laid down in the 
contract by means of quantitative and qualitative descriptions.”149 One of the leading 
cases in this regard is the so-called Mussels case.150 A propos of this, the German 
Supreme Court held that the treatment of the conformity obligation under Article 35 
is based on the subjective understanding of a defect.151 Thus, even though the goods 
delivered, viz. New Zealand mussels, contained a higher cadmium concentration, 
they were judged to be in conformity to the contract because “the seller could not be 
                                               
148
 More specifically, the CISG does not distinguish between the French law and related legal 
systems’ “hidden defects” (vices cachés) and “apparent defects” (vices apparents); the English 
sales law “conditions” and “warranties”; the American law “express” and “implied warranties”; 
the German or Australian law peius (non-conforming goods) and aliud (totally different goods). 
(See Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 570; Henschel Conformity 149; 
Kruisinga Non-Conformity 26-27). In the context of the CISG, the delivery of goods of a different 
type from those required by the contract, called in domestic law “aliud”, amounts to a delivery of 
nonconforming goods. See Spain 17 January 2008 Tribunal Supremo, CLOUT case No. 802; 
Germany 4 June 2002 Landgericht Stuttgart [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020604g1.html]; 
Germany 11 April 2002 Amtsgericht Viechtach [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
020411g1.html]; in UNCITRAL Digest 144 Fn2. In the Spanish Lathe Machine case, the Trial 
Court of Barcelona deemed that it should apply benchmarks for fairness that would avoid the need 
to endorse the absolute authority of the aliud pro alio principle. It held that a good benchmark 
could be found in the references to conformity with ordinary use or a particular purpose, as set out 
in Article 35 CISG. Spain 27 January 2010 Trial Court Barcelona Lathe Machine case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100127s4.html] (accessed 1-8-2012).   
149
 Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 571; see also Flechtner 2007 (64) Bepress 
2-3; Flechtner Funky Mussels 4; Neumann 2007 (11) 1 VJ 81; Hyland 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hyland1.html; Henschel Conformity 147; Kruisinga Non-
Conformity 29. 
150
 In this case, a Swiss company sold “New Zealand mussels” to a German importer. “The buyer 
claimed that a certain level of cadmium in the mussels violated German food regulations. That 
cadmium level was, however, acceptable under Swiss regulations. He declared the contract void 
owing to lack of conformity of the goods while the seller sued for the sales price. The Court found 
the goods conformed to the contract.” Germany 8 March 1995 Supreme Court New Zealand 
Mussels case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html] (accessed 1-8-2012); confirmed 
in Germany 2 March 2005 Bundesgerichtshof Federal Court of Justice [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/050302g1.html] (accessed 5-9-2012). See, for comments, Flechtner 2007 (64) Bepress 1; 
Flechtner Funky Mussels 7; Schlechtriem http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
schlechtriem3.html. 
151
 See Editorial Remarks to the Mussels case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050302g1.html]; 
see also Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 571; and Schlechtriem 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlech triem3.html. 
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expected to know the special public law regulations on product safety, public health 
in the destination state, Germany.”152 
As is for the delivery, parties are free to determine the quantity, quality of the 
goods, and the way they should be packaged. The concept “quantity” is understood 
in this context as implying the number, volume, or weight of goods. In this case, the 
seller must deliver neither more nor less than the quantity determined in the 
agreement. Delivering a greater quantity than the quantity agreed could then 
constitute a failure to comply with the contract which confers on the buyer the right 
to accept or refuse the excess quantity.153 Similarly, if the seller delivers only a part 
of the goods, or if only a part of them conforms to the contract, the buyer is free to 
exercise the remedies provided by Articles 46 to 50 CISG for breach of the 
contract,154 unless he/she accepted the goods without complaint.155 
As regard the concept “quality”, it covers the physical conditions of the goods 
including factual and legal factors which are relevant to the goods and their 
circumstances.156 Comparable to the regulation with regard to quantity, the quality 
of the goods must also be determined by the parties. In that sense, goods that do not 
correspond to the criteria agreed on are deficient even if they are of a higher quality 
than that stipulated in the contract.157 Nevertheless, though the seller is bound to 
                                               
152
 Henschel http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/henschel.html. It was ruled in the New 
Zealand RJ & AM Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller case that “a seller is not 
responsible for compliance with the regulatory provisions or standards of the importing country 
even if it knows the destination of the goods,” unless the same regulations exist in his own country. 
153
 See Article 52(2) according to which, “If the seller delivers a quantity of goods greater than that 
provided for in the contract, the buyer may take delivery or refuse to take delivery of the excess 
quantity.” If the buyer decides to take delivery of all or a portion of the excess quantity, he/she 
must pay for it at the contract rate. See Germany 5 December 2006 District Court Köln Plastic 
Faceplates for Mobile Telephones case [http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/061205g1.html] 
(accessed 21-8-2012). 
154
 See Article 51(1) CISG. 
155
 See Belgium 24 April 2006 Hof van Beroep Antwerpen, Unilex; in UNCITRAL Digest 144 
Fn11. 
156
 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 495; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 572-573; Henschel Conformity 156. For instances of cases relating to different 
variances of quality of goods, see Henschel Conformity 156-158. 
157
 See Butler Guide 4-20; taking support from Switzerland 27 January 2004 District Court 
Schaffhausen [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040127s1.html]  
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deliver conforming goods in respect of quality, deviations can only be taken into 
account if “the defects reach a certain level of seriousness.”158 Mere nonconformities 
are not sufficient to vitiate the sale.  
With regard to the “description”, the delivery of goods different from those 
labelled in the contract also constitutes a delivery of nonconforming goods. As said 
above, unlike national laws, the CISG does not differentiate between 
“nonconforming goods” and “different goods.” Such a rule was formulated in the 
Cobalt Sulphate case as follows: “the delivery of cobalt sulphate of South African 
origin did not constitute a non-delivery of the English Cobalt Sulphate contracted 
for, but merely, a delivery of non-conforming cobalt sulphate (emphasis added).”159  
Finally, Article 35(1) considers “containers and packaging” as being an 
integral part of the goods. Thus, if parties have reached agreement on the kind of 
containers and packaging to be used, goods differently wrapped constitute 
nonconforming goods in respect of Article 35(2)(d).160 Article 35(2)(d) is clear that 
the goods do not conform to the contract, unless they are contained or packaged in 
the manner usual for such goods, or at least in an adequate manner to preserve and 
protect them. 
South African law  
South African law has also expressly adopted the principle that “the thing sold must 
be delivered according to any agreement as to size, quantity, quality, condition, or 
other qualification.”161 In Cedarmont Store v Webster, Wessels JP said, “According 
                                               
158
 Cf. Germany 8 March 1995 Supreme Court New Zealand Mussels case. 
159
 In this case, the disputed contract involved a Dutch company, which sold four different 
quantities of cobalt sulphate to a German company. The contracts were concluded when South 
Africa was under economic embargo. It was agreed that the goods should be of British origin and 
that the plaintiff should supply certificates of origin and of quality. After the receipt of the 
documents, the buyer declared the contracts to be void since the cobalt sulphate was made in South 
Africa and the certificate of origin supplied was wrong. The German Supreme Court held that the 
delivery of goods of different origin from those agreed upon did not constitute non-delivery, but a 
delivery of non-conforming goods.  
160
 See Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 498; Henschel Conformity 182. The 
CISG differs from some legal systems which consider packaging as an accessory obligation. See 
illustrations by Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 574 and 575. 
161
 Volpe Sale 75; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 73; Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 232.  
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to our law (…) a contract to deliver at one and at the same time a number of articles 
of a particular quality is prima facie an entire contract and the seller has no right to 
alter the nature of the contract (…).”162 Ward J amplified this in Mannix v Osbord by 
stating that the buyer is not obliged to select conforming goods from defective ones 
as he/she may reject the whole load.163 Thus, if the seller delivers goods which differ 
from those provided in the agreement, the buyer is entitled to cancel the contract for 
failure of delivery164 even though the goods supplied bear some resemblance to the 
ones agreed upon.165 With regard to their quantity, there are authorities that state that 
where the amount of goods is approximately determined, the qualification is 
immaterial. When it comes to unspecified goods, however, the quantity must 
necessarily be determined.166 In the same way, where a number of goods are sold 
together, the seller cannot deliver them by instalments, unless it is otherwise 
stipulated in the contract.167  
Except for consumer contracts,168 South African law seems to be silent with 
regard to the packaging duty in international sales contracts.169 Such a duty may, 
however, be implied from the phrase “or other qualification” used in the definition 
of the seller’s obligations which shows that the enumeration is not exhaustive. 
Likewise, it may be put forward that the lack of a specific packaging provision is 
                                               
162
 Cedarmont Store v Webster & Co 1922 TPD 106 108; see also American Cotton Products 
Corporation v Felt and Tweds Ltd 1953 (2) SA 753 (N) 756C-H. 
163
 That is to say, where the seller delivers goods of a grade inferior to the ones agreed, or if goods 
delivered are mixed, “the purchaser may accept such of the goods as are according to the contract 
and reject those that are not, but the seller cannot compel him to make such selection, as he may 
reject the whole.” See Mannix & Co v Osbord 1921 OPD 138. 
164
 See Marais v Commercial General Agency Ltd 1922 TPD 440. 
165
 See Ayob and Co v Clouts 1925 WLD 199; referred to by Zulman/Kairinos Sale 74. 
166
 See Young v Thomas and another 1950 SR 45; De Villiers v Nichollas & Co (1907) 24 SC 208; 
Elliot v McKillop (1902) 19 SC 350. 
167
 See Moosa v Robert Shaw & Co Ltd 1948 (4) SA 914(T). 
168
 The CPA has established a real packaging legal regime with regard to consumer contracts. 
Concepts such as “packaged”, “packages” or “packaging” are used there 21 times under sections 
dealing, inter alia, with: Protection against discriminatory marketing (s 8(2)(e)); Consumer’s right 
to return goods (s 20(6)(b) and (s 20(6)(c)(ii)); Products labelling and trade description (s 24(1)(a)); 
Warning concerning fact and nature of right (s 58 (2)); Recovery and safe disposal of designated 
products or components (s 59); and Deposits in respect of containers, pallets or similar objects (s 
66). 
169
 View also supported by Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 232.  
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supplemented by the provisions of the CPA dealing with the subject. This inference 
is justified by the fact that a reseller cannot be required to provide packages that 
he/she did not himself/herself receive from the manufacturer while acquiring the 
goods. 
 In brief, the common understanding of Article 35(2) CISG is not so different 
from the South African law seller’s duty to deliver what he/she has guaranteed to 
sell. For more certainty, however, the present study approves Ng’ong’ola’s view by 
which, “The suggestion that conformity must also be assessed in reference to 
packaging (in international sales) would in (South African) law amount to a welcome 
clarification of the seller’s responsibility.”170  
Congolese law  
Historically speaking, the obligation of the seller with regard to the delivery of 
conforming goods could be implied from Article 291 al. 1 and Article 318 CCO 
relating to seller’s guarantee against defects. The first of these provisions required 
the seller to deliver the item sold “in the condition in which it was at the time of the 
sale”. With regard to the second provision, it asked the seller to guarantee the buyer 
“against latent defects which render the thing sold unfit for the use for which it was 
intended, or so impair this use that the buyer would not have bought it, or would only 
have paid a lower price if he had known of them.” 
It should be noted that the CCO did not originally contain an express provision 
dealing with the quantity, quality, and nature of the goods. Of course, a similar 
obligation could be implied from Article 291 al. 1 CCO which obliged the seller to 
deliver the thing sold “in the condition in which it was at the time of the sale.” 
Requiring the seller to deliver the property in comparable conditions as it was 
stipulated means, in other words, that it required him/her to deliver goods of the same 
quantity, quality, and nature as determined in the contract. Insofar as the quality and 
quantity of goods are concerned, this implication was substituted by two earlier 
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 Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 232. 
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cases, dated 10 April 1926 and 4 December 1951. These decisions stated expressly 
that the seller was bound to deliver goods the “quality”171 and “quantity”172 of which 
match with those approved by the contract. With the coming of the OHADA 
Commercial Act, and its requirement for quantity and quality of the goods, the 
obligation of conformity has now been explicitly codified. 
In modern Congolese sales law, in fact, the obligation of the seller with regard 
to the conformity of goods is currently governed by Article 255 al.1 UAGCL which 
reproduces Article 35(1) CISG literally. As for the latter, Article 255 al.1 declares 
that goods conform to the contract on condition that they are of the quantity, quality, 
description, and packaging required by the contract. Such a similarity is in 
conformity with the words of Henschel in respect of the concurrence of Article 255 
UAGCL with Article 35 CISG.173  
Through the provision above, it is clear that the requirement for conformity 
constitutes, within the Commercial Act, an independent obligation different from the 
delivery duty.174 In the sphere of application of the former Article 280 CCO, the seller 
was supposed to have two main obligations, to deliver the thing sold, first, and to 
guarantee it, then,175 so that conformity was considered as a supplementary 
obligation. As Santos and Toe have said, by providing a specific conformity 
obligation, the UAGCL intended to modernise the former civil law, probably in order 
to escape from French law criticisms regarding the distinction between “lack of 
conformity” and “hidden defects”.176 In other words, the Vienna Sales Convention 
that inspired the OHADA Commercial Act has opted for a single concept of 
conformity which covers all kinds of defects regardless of their nature.177 Unlike the 
                                               
171
 Elis 10 April 1926 Kat II 183; see also Piron 124; Katuala Code 175. 
172
 Léo 4 December 1951 RJCB 1952 98. 
173
 See Henschel Creation of Rules Fn27.  
174
 Compare this with Article 280 CCO.  
175
 The guarantee obligation covered a double domain, the guarantee against latent defects, and the 
guarantee against eviction. 
176
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 392; see also Note 146 above. 
177
 See Kruisinga Non-Conformity 26; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 570; 
Henschel Conformity 149; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 492. 
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CISG, however, though the Uniform Act has also adopted a unitary concept of 
“conformity”, it has maintained the distinction between hidden and latent defects as 
well.178 Such an ambiguity creates difficulties in understanding the duty of 
conformity as it encroaches on the guarantee against hidden defects. To this we will 
return in section 6.2.4.3 below.  
Without needing to engage in a greater debate, it is necessary to say that, as 
for the CISG, the conformity requirement must be analysed, in modern Congolese 
law, in terms of quantity, quality, description, and packaging179 as explained above. 
With regard to the description, for instance, the Commercial court of 
Kinshasa/Matete ruled in the LTJ v Ital Motors case that the goods delivered must 
conform to the conditions stipulated in the contract.180 In the same way, Article 6(a) 
of the Packaging Regulation No. 409/CAB/MIN/ TC/0082/2006 provides that, where 
parties have reached agreement on the conditions of packaging, the seller must 
package the goods in such a manner that they are protected from normal shocks and 
ordinary storage conditions.181 
Comments  
There is a common understanding that the goods delivered must conform to the ones 
stipulated in the contract. The main rule retained by all of the three legal systems 
under comparison is that goods are conforming on condition that they correspond in 
                                               
178
 See Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL for which, any latent defect must be denounced within a 
month of the day of delivery, and any hidden defect revealed a year after the discovery of the defect.  
179
 See Article 255 al. 1 UAGCL; see also the Packaging Regulation No. 
409/CAB/MIN/TC/0082/2006 of 18 July 2006 (JORDC No. 18 of 15 September 2006). Article one 
of this Regulation defines packaging as any object intended to contain and to protect the goods, 
and to allow their handling from the producer to the user.  
180
 Cf. Tricom Kin/Matete 20 April 2011 RCE 438/469 LTJ v Ital Motors Co (unreported decision). 
In this case, LTG placed an order for three motorcars on 17 January 2009. At the delivery time, the 
buyer found that the vehicles delivered did not meet the requirements stipulated in the contract 
because they were different from the ones ordered and it retracted the transaction. The court 
approved its action, and sued the seller for a refund of the instalment paid.   
181
 Compare this with the second sentence of Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL which obliges the seller to 
deliver the goods in the packaging usually used for those kinds of goods. As long as the Packaging 
Regulation does not conflict with the UAGCL, it is assumed that it is still in force. It could, besides, 
be considered as a measure of enforcement of the Commercial Act insofar as the obligation of 
packaging is concerned.   
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terms of quantity, quality, and description and, if possible, of packaging as 
contractually accepted. Compared to South African and Congolese laws, the CISG 
appears to have established a clearer conformity rule by opting for a single concept 
regardless of the kind of the defect. Regarding Congolese law, in particular, though 
the UAGCL has been influenced by the Vienna Sales Convention, it has complicated 
its conformity solutions by mixing conformity requirements with those of guarantee 
against hidden defects. This situation constitutes a gap which needs to be dealt with, 
mostly in respect of international sales contracts. In spite of such a shortcoming, 
however, Article 255 UAGCL appears to have modernised Congolese law, to a 
certain degree, in compliance with the duty of conformity, because, previously, there 
was no specific obligation in this regard. Additionally, Article 255 of the OHADA 
Commercial Act has established in Congolese law an independent conformity 
obligation which, until recently, was considered to be an accessory of the obligation 
of delivery.  
As for other contractual issues, it is possible that the parties fail to define the 
standards that goods should have or that contractual clauses are incomplete. In such 
circumstances, default principles of conformity, as those discussed in the following 
paragraphs, will carry the contract.  
 
Fitness for ordinary purposes  
The CISG 
It is acknowledged that contractual clauses constitute the principal source of the 
seller’s conformity obligation. It is not uncommon, however, that goods are ordered 
without any indication to the seller as to their final purpose. In that case, Article 35(2) 
provides a number of objective standards to be used in order to describe the 
conformity of the goods. As stated by Article 35(2) (a), in the absence of any 
indications to the contrary, goods are satisfactory where they “are fit for the purposes 
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for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used.”182 In a High Court 
of New Zealand ruling, for instance, “trucks are ordinarily used for carting goods on 
the road.”183 If not, they do not meet the requirements under Article 35(2) (a) and, 
therefore, lack conformity. In the same sense, ceramic ovenware which cannot be 
used in ovens with high temperatures is not fit for ordinary baking purposes.184  
Usually, international transactions involve professional factory owners.185 
Because commercial operators buy goods for commercial purposes, in the view of 
the Secretariat Commentary, goods are fit for ordinary purposes where “they must 
be honestly resalable in the ordinary course of business.”186 The Netherlands 
Arbitration Institute stated, in the Condensate Crude Oil Mix case, that, even though 
goods may not necessarily be purchased for resell, goods are not fit for ordinary 
purposes if they do not meet the reasonable quality norms required of them.187 The 
                                               
182
 The Federal Court of Australia ruled, in the Cortem v Controlmatic case that, a product fits for 
ordinary purposes “if it is in the same condition as it would have been supplied to any other 
wholesaler everywhere in the world.” See Australia 13 August 2010 Federal Court of Australia 
Cortem SpA v Controlmatic Pty Ltd [http:// cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/100813a2.html] (accessed 
1-8-2012).  
183
 New Zealand 30 July 2010, RJ & AM Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller 
case. 
184
 France 17 December 1996 Supreme Court Ceramique Culinaire v Musgrave 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 961217f1.html] (accessed 21-8-2012). 
185
 See Article 2(a) which excludes consumer sales, viz. sales of goods bought for personal, family 
or household use, from the CISG’s field of application. 
186
 Thus, “if the goods available to the seller are fit for only some of the purposes for which such 
goods are ordinary used, he must ask the buyer the particular purposes for which these goods are 
intended so that he can refuse the order, if necessary.” See Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 
Draft CISG, in Honnold Documentary 422; see also Kruisinga Non-Conformity 30. 
187
 Netherlands 15 October 2002 Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case No. 2319 Condensate 
Crude Oil Mix case. In the case,  
Because the contract contained no quality specifications, the Arbitral Tribunal found that the 
issue of conformity should be decided based on Article 35(2)(a) CISG, which requires that the 
goods are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used. 
The Arbitral Tribunal explained that three possible interpretations in this respect exist. The first 
interpretation requires the goods to be of a merchantable quality. In this view, which is favoured 
in English common law legal systems; goods are in conformity with the contract if a reasonable 
buyer would have concluded contracts for the goods at similar prices if the buyer had known the 
quality of the goods. A second line of thought, derived from civil law, calls for goods of average 
quality. A third interpretation rejects the merchantable and average quality standard, stating 
those do not fit in the CISG system, and suggests a reasonable quality criterion. Interpretations 
based on the merchantable and average quality norms led to different conclusions in this case. 
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Arbitration tribunal, therefore, upheld the buyer’s contention that the price the parties 
determined would not be paid for condensate with increased levels of mercury.188 
As Henschel has repeatedly remarked, fitness for ordinary purposes as 
required by Article 35(2) (a) is one of the most important rules in practice.189 
According to him, this requirement expresses “one of the clearest and most 
fundamental rules about the seller’s obligation to provide goods which conform to 
the contract.”190 Gillette and Ferrari specify this by saying that the obligation under 
examination carries out a double function which facilitates international transactions:   
First, it reduces the risk that sellers will engage in fraud by intentionally substituting 
an inferior good for the one that buyers expected. (…) Second, (…) it allocates to 
sellers the risk of non-conforming deliveries, even when no negligence or fraud is 
involved, and to provide prospective purchasers with information about products 
that they could otherwise easily obtain.191  
Seller’s duty to deliver goods which are fit to the normal purposes for which they are 
sold is widely accepted even under domestic sales laws.192 It is now necessary to 
examine its implications in South African and Congolese laws. 
 
 
                                               
Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal decided that Article 35(2)(a) CISG should be interpreted 
according to ‘the reasonable quality criterion’.  
The Arbitral Tribunal concluded then that the buyer was right to suspend the contract. See Abstract 
by Voogd, at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html. 
188
 Netherlands 15 October 2002 Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Case No. 2319 Condensate 
Crude Oil Mix case. 
189
 Henschel Conformity 190; Henschel Creation of Rules 185; Henschel http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ henschel.html §e; Henschel in Felemegas Interpretation 168 §e. Henschel 
argues that with the default rule contained in Article 35(2)(a), as long as goods are acquired for 
their habitual usage, parties do not need to specify the purpose for which they are sold.  
190
 Ibid.  
191
 Gillette/Ferrari 2010 (1) IHR 2 3. 
192
 Countries which have imposed the requirement as for fitness of goods for ordinary purposes 
include: Germany: § 434(1) BGB; Switzerland: Article 197(1), Sentence 1 OR; Austria: § 922 
ABGB; France and Belgium: Article 1641 CC; England: SGA, s 14(2B) (a); USA: § 2-314(2) 
UCC; see Henschel Conformity 190-191; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 575 
Fn63. According to Henschel, in view of the number of countries which have adopted the rule, the 
fitness of goods for ordinary purposes can be considered “as a codification of a basic principle of 
international sales law.” See Henschel in Felemegas Interpretation 168 §e in fine.  
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South African law 
The duty on the part of the seller to deliver goods suitable for their ordinary purposes 
is implicitly ruled in Minister van Landbou-tegniese Dienste v Scholtz.193 Kerr 
argues, in this regard that, in any contract of sale, international or not, there “will 
often be an expressed or implied warranty that the thing sold is fit for the purpose for 
which it is sold.”194 Zulman and Kairinos add to this that the principle of South 
African law “is that everyone selling an article is bound, though nothing is said as to 
the quality, to supply a good article without defect which would render it useless (…) 
for the purpose for which it was sold.”195  
The concept “defect” is defined by Corbett JA in Holmdene Brickworks v 
Roberts Construction as “an abnormal quality or attribute which destroys or 
substantially impairs the utility or effectiveness of the res vendita for the purpose for 
which it has been sold or for which it is commonly used (emphasis added).”196 Thus, 
where the article delivered suffers from a latent defect which renders it unfit for its 
normal use, the seller might be sued for legal liability.197 
                                               
193
 See Minister van Landbou-tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A); for comments, see 
Kerr Sale 205; Koop Sale 173; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 78.  
194
 Kerr Sale 205; on the distinction between “implied” and “express warranties”, see 
Christie/Bradfield Contract 162-164; Van der Merwe Contract 301-306; Kerr Contract 458-461. 
195
 Zulman/Kairinos Sale 163; see also Sharrock Business 294. In Ornelas v Andrew’s Café and 
Another 1980 (1) SA 378 (W), however, a seller who delivered a restaurant without licence was 
considered to have breached the duty of delivery instead of the duty to assume liability for defects. 
As is for the delivery, common law rules relating to the fitness of goods for their ordinary purposes 
have been supplemented, with regard to consumer contracts, by the CPA. See s 18(3) and (4); s 55; 
and, specially, s 56 dealing with implied warranty of quality.  
196
 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) (E-F).  
197
 As stated by Corbett JA, in the Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 
case, “(…) a merchant who sells goods of his own manufacture or goods in relation to which he 
publicly professes to have attributes of skill and expert knowledge is liable to the purchaser for 
consequential damages caused to the latter by reason of any latent defect in the goods. Ignorance 
of the defect does not excuse the seller. (…).” See also Koop Sale 108; Lotz in Zimmermann/Visser 
Southern Cross 377; Volpe Sale 115. See, in the same sense, Sarembock v Medical Leasing 
Services (Pty) Ltd and Another 1991 (1) SA 344 (A). This case involved a car whose entire front 
had been cut off and replaced with the front of another car of the same type at the time the contract 
was formed. It was not proved that the front-end graft rendered the car less safe to drive, which 
amounted to a latent defect.  
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The guarantee against defect, however, only covers defects that are “latent” 
the moment the contract is made.198 As specified in the Holmdene Brickworks case, 
“a defect is latent when it is one which is not visible or discoverable upon an 
inspection of the res vendita,”199 by an ordinary prudent person.200 By contrast, if it 
is easily discoverable, the defect is said “patent” and is accordingly not covered by 
the guarantee. 
Congolese law 
Under the first sentence of Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL, if the contract is silent on the 
issue of conformity, the seller must deliver goods which, among other things, are “fit 
to the purposes for which they are usually used.”201 This means that goods will not 
be judged as conforming unless they are fit for their ordinary purposes. The 
requirement regarding conformity as for ordinary purposes is somewhat similar to 
the guarantee against defects in the property sold as ruled in Articles 318 to 326 CCO. 
In detail, Article 318 CCO obliged the seller to insure the buyer against “latent 
defects which make the thing sold unfit for the use for which it was intended, 
(emphasis added) or which so impairs that use that the buyer, if he had known of the 
defects, would not have bought the thing, or would have paid a lower price.” The 
concept “defect” is described, in this context, as any anomaly or a change that harms 
the functioning of the goods, their solidity or their appearance.202 In other words, all 
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 See Lakier v Hager 1958 (4) SA 180 (T); see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 78. 
199
 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) (E-F); see 
also Gardiner J in Zieve v Verster & Co 1918 CPD 296.   
200
 See Lakier v Hager 1958 (4) SA 180 (T) 184. In this case, a buyer bought a second-hand motor 
car and sought to rescind the price on the basis of latent defects of which he had been unaware. 
One of those defects was the crack in the chassis of the vehicle. Ramsbottom J denied to the crack 
in the chassis the status of latent defect. He stated,  
The man is buying a very old car, and he must give it a proper inspection. If he wishes to rely 
on defects existing at the time of the sale which are latent then, (…) he must show that he gave 
the car a proper inspection, and a proper inspection involves examining, at any rate, the external 
part of the car, whether that is underneath or on top. (…) One of the things that a person buying 
an old second-hand car of this kind might be expected to look for would be a cracked chassis, 
and if that had been done in this case it would immediately have been discovered. 
201
 Compare this to Article 35(2) (a). 
202
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 297; see also Tricom Kin/Matete 18 April 2012 RCE 569 above. 
This case deals with a transformer found defective at the moment of use. 
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failure likely to reduce the way goods are usually used amounts to non-conformity 
in the terms of Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL and Article 318 CCO. 
In principle, the defect must be “hidden” for it to entail the seller’s 
responsibility.203 In this sense, the seller would normally be discharged from 
“apparent defects” that the buyer could have discovered himself/herself.204 Insofar as 
latent defects are concerned, they are defined as defects which are not discoverable 
at the time of taking delivery, but which come to light in the future.205 As stated by 
case law,  
A defect can also be described as latent even though it is discovered later while using 
the thing sold. Such can be the case following an expert inspection, or a chemical 
analysis, or when the immediate and complete verification was impossible when the 
contract was formed (or the goods delivered), either because the goods were sold by 
big quantities, or packaged in cases or in bales; or because they risked to be spoiled 
if the packaging was opened or because they had to be resold as packaged.206 
Yet, Article 258 UAGCL appears to hold the seller liable for patent defects too. As 
stated by this provision, where the buyer wishes to take advantage of “any apparent 
                                               
203
 See Tricom Kin/Gombe 8 August 2007 RCE 136/IV Afritec Sprl v Tala Sprl (unreported 
decision). In this case, the buyer purchased a vibrating compact system to be used on a building 
site. When he tried it, the vibrator failed to work owing to a latent defect. The court sued the seller 
for breach of the contract because he was obliged to deliver an item free from defect. Under the 
context of consumer contracts, the guarantee against latent defects is one of the main obligations 
of the seller that the seller is liable for any hidden defects in the thing sold, “even though he did not 
know of them,” unless, in such case, he had excluded his warranty. See Article 320 CCO; and cases 
quoted by both Katuala Code and Piron under Article 320 CCO. 
204
 Cf. Article 319 CCO; as ruled by the Appeal Court of Lubumbashi, “apparent defects” are those 
defects that the purchaser can discover himself at the time of the delivery by an attentive examination. 
Such being the principle, a buyer who omits to inspect the goods before taking delivery must pay the 
consequences of his/her negligence. See Elis 6 December 1913 Jur Col 1924 166.  
205
 Cf. Article 259 UAGCL contra Article 258 UAGCL dealing with apparent defects. There is 
authority that states that defects must affect the usefulness of the thing sold for them to produce 
legal effects. See Cass B 20 April 1959 Pas I 773; referred to by Katuala Code 186. 
206
 Ibid. Translated form of the original French version stated as follows : 
Le vice peut être considéré comme caché lorsqu’il ne se révèle qu’à l’usage, à la suite d’une 
expertise, d’une analyse chimique, ou lorsque la vérification immédiate et complète est 
impossible, soit parce qu’il s’agit d’une marchandise vendue par grandes quantités, emballée en 
caisses ou en balles, et qui risque de s’avarier si l’on ouvre les emballages ou qui doit se revendre 
emballée, etc. 
See also Tricom Kin/Gombe 11 January 2012 RCE 1967 Dijimba Sprl v Tractafric Congo Sprl 
(unreported decision), in which a defect discovered in an engine 358 hours after delivery was 
judged latent.  
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lack of conformity”, he/she must notify that non-conformity within a month 
following the day of delivery. Such a ruling does not go without consequences for 
the behaviour of commercial operators. The logic should be that, if the buyer knew, 
or is presumed to have known, of the defect and took delivery notwithstanding the 
existence of the defect, his/her conduct discharges the seller.207 In any event, the test 
of whether a defect is latent or patent is a matter of fact which must be adjudicated 
according to the circumstances of the case.208 With regard to the place and time the 
obligation should be performed, the Appeal Court of Lubumbashi ruled that, unless 
otherwise stipulated, the seller’s duty to guarantee against latent defects must be 
fulfilled at the place where the thing that constitutes its object was located when the 
obligation was made.209  
Comments  
All of the three legal systems under view require the seller to deliver goods which 
are fit for their ordinary purposes. The point of departure for them is located in the 
fact that, the CISG has adopted a single concept which governs both the issue of 
conformity and the issue of latent defects, whereas domestic laws acknowledge a 
double kind of guarantee. The OHADA Commercial Act, which was supposed to 
improve Congolese law on this matter, has also indirectly maintained the same 
distinction. Unlike Congolese law, French and Belgian laws, which inspired the 
original CCO, have espoused the CISG unitary concept in connection with 
international sale of goods. To illustrate this with the ICC Steel Bars case,  
(…) in the context of the obligations of the seller, the French internal law of the sale 
of goods distinguishes between a warranty of conformity and a warranty against 
defects, whereas the French international law of the sale of goods - the Vienna 
                                               
207
 To this we will return in Section 6.2.4.3 below. 
208
 See First Inst Léo 10 December 1952 RJCB 1953 261; and Cass B 14 January 1841 Pas I 135; 
see also Katuala Code 184; Piron 125. 
209
 See Elis 21 April 1945 RJCB 205. 
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Convention - sticks to a uniform term, which is that of an obligation of conformity 
covering both warranties of the French internal law.210  
The unitary conformity rule was confirmed three years later by the French Appeal 
Court of Grenoble in Thermo King v. Cigna Insurance whereby, the Court specified 
that the CISG “ignores the notion of hidden defects.”211 To use the ruling of the Swiss 
Appeal Court of Valais in the Second-hand Bulldozer case, the Convention has 
favoured a “new and common concept of non-conformity”212 instead of local law 
expressions. As a result of this, CISG goods delivered must conform to the contract, 
“regardless of the distinction between the warranty of conformity and the warranty 
against hidden defects.”213 The only requirement is that those goods must be adequate 
for their ordinary purposes.  
It should be borne in mind that, before the DRC adhered to the OHADA law; 
Congolese commercial contract law was hidden behind civil law rules.214 The CCO, 
which employs the double concept being discussed, had to apply to both domestic 
and international sales contracts.215 Of course Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL, which now 
governs commercial sales in the DRC, requires the seller, as is under the CISG, “to 
deliver goods which are fit for purposes to which they are habitually intended,” 
without any distinction between the warranty of conformity and the warranty against 
                                               
210
 See ICC Arbitration Case No. 6653 of 26 March 1993 Steel bars case [http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/ 936653i1.html] (accessed 10-8-2012). In this case, parties opted for the 
“substantive laws of France”, i.e. the French law to govern the contract. The ICC inferred that, even 
though the French sale of goods law is governed by the Civil Code, since the entry into force of the 
CISG in the country in January 1, 1988, international sales are ruled, in France, by the Vienna Sales 
Convention. It concluded, therefore, that the obligations of the seller had to be considered in the 
light of Article 35(2)(a) CISG, instead of Article 1641 FCC. 
211
 See France 15 May 1996 Appellate Court Grenoble Thermo King v Cigna Insurance case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace .edu/cases/960515f1.html] (accessed 10-8-2012). In this case, the court 
stated that the Vienna Convention disregards the notion of “hidden defects”. Evidence of this is the 
fact that the CISG specifies that goods are in conformity with the contract only when they are fit 
for the purposes for which goods of the same nature would ordinarily be used.  
212
 Switzerland 28 October 1997 Appellate Court Valais Second-hand Bulldozer case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/971028s1.html] (accessed 10-8-2012).   
213
 See Belgium 8 March 2001 Appellate Court Mons Vetimo v Aubert case http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/cases/010308 b1.html] (accessed 10-8-2012).  
214
 See Masamba Modalités 22; Vanderstraete Business 16; Mutenda Apport 13. 
215
 Cf. Articles 7 and 265 al. 3 CCO for which, contractual general rules apply to sales contracts 
irrespective of their nature.  
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hidden defects. This statement is, however, confused by Articles 258 and 259 of the 
same Commercial Act which allude to patent and hidden defects. By their wording, 
the Commercial Act, and consequently modern Congolese law, has, as far as 
international sale of goods contracts are concerned, gone back to square one. Thus, 
the distinction between guarantee of conformity and guarantee against latent defects 
is still intact in the DRC, as it is under South African law, so that the CISG is 
recommended for both legal systems. 
 
Conformity with regard to particular purposes, sample, and model 
The CISG  
Further to the requirements regarding the fitness for ordinary purposes, Article 
35(2)(b) requires the seller to deliver, where necessary, goods which are fit for a 
particular purpose other than their ordinary one. The requirement as for fitness to 
particular purposes enters, however, into consideration only if that specific use was 
expressly or implicitly made known to the seller at the time of the contract.216 It was 
said in the RJ & AM Smallmon v Transport Sales case that specifying the country of 
use of the goods is a particular purpose that the seller should take into 
consideration.217 The German Supreme Court, in the New Zealand Mussels case, 
denied the status of particular purpose in the meaning of the CISG to public 
regulations in the importing country because they were different from those in force 
in the exporting state.218 The requirement for particular purpose can, nevertheless, be 
                                               
216
 It was held in the Australian Cortem SpA v Controlmatic (Pty) Ltd case that, where a contract is 
concluded after the products had received certification; it is implicit that those products are 
purported for resell.  
217
 See New Zealand 30 July 2010 RJ & AM Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller 
case. See also instances given by Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sale §6:03 2-21 relating to the use 
of building equipment made in German for the Antarctic region.     
218
 See Germany 8 March 1995 New Zealand Mussels case; see also the New Zealand RJ & AM 
Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd and Grant Alan Miller case. As Schlechtriem has summarised,  
Decisive is the particular purpose for the goods; thus, first of all whether the goods are to be 
used or resold in the importing country or whether they are to be further exported  to a third 
country. If the seller knows where the goods are intended to be used, then he will usually be 
expected to have taken the factors that influence the possibility of their use in that country into 
consideration. 
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derogated from, “if the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely on, or that it 
was unreasonable for him to rely on, the seller’s skill and judgment.”219 Under Article 
35(2) (c), furthermore, where the contract is concluded on the basis of sample or 
model, the seller must deliver goods which possess the qualities of goods which it 
has shown to the buyer as a sample and model.  
South African law 
The requirement for the fitness of goods for particular purposes is also recognised in 
South African law. Lotz makes it clear that, “(…) where a buyer buys an object for 
a special purpose known to the seller, the latter may normally be assumed to have 
guaranteed (or depending on the circumstances, to have represented) that the object 
was fit for that specific purpose.”220 In the Minister van Landbou-tegniese Dienste v 
Scholtz case, for example, the seller was found to be liable for the express or implied 
warranty against the existence of latent defects because he has guaranteed the fitness 
of the thing sold for the purpose for which it was bought.221  
                                               
See Schlechtriem http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html; but Karollus 1995 
Cornell Review of the CISG 51 66.  
219
 Cf. Article 35(2) (b), second part. It is recognised that, Article 35(2) (b) was inspired by s 14(3) 
of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, and § 2-315 UCC. See Schwenzer in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 580; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 
518; Hyland http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ hyland1.html; and Krieger 1989 (106) 
SALJ 184 188. Krieger says, “The articles governing the (…) conformity of goods (Articles 35-44) 
closely resemble the rules of the Uniform Commercial Code (…). Warranties as established under 
the UCC §§ 2-313 to 2-315 are combined in article 35 of the Convention (…).” 
220
 See Lotz Sale 361 377; finding advice in Kroomer v Hess & Co 1919 AD 204; Bower v Sparks, 
Young and Farmers’ Meat Industries Ltd 1936 NPD 1; and esp. Minister van Landbou-tegniese 
Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A). Oosthuizen (Rights 89 Fn386) is, however, uncertain as to 
the period for which the goods are warranted to be fit for the purposes for which they were 
purchased. The learned author quotes with approval Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis and others 
[1981] 2 WLR 713 (HL) 720C-G where the court referred to the position under English law to 
determine when the obligation is fulfilled. Lord Diplock stated, in the Lexmead (Basingstoke) case, 
that “the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose relates to the goods at the time of delivery and 
continues for a reasonable time thereafter.” Quoted by Oosthuizen Rights 89 Fn386. 
221
 Minister van Landbou-tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A) (sale of bull for stud 
purposes) for the full case, see Koop Sale 173-197; and for an excerpt see Volpe Sale 113-114. 
Some of other leading cases on the subject include Wheeler v Woodhouse (1902) 21 NLR 162; 
Hugo v Henwood 1905 TS 578; and Kroomer v Hess & Co 1919 AD 204. In the first of these cases, 
it was justifiably expected that a cow bought for milk must give milk; in the second that a mare 
sold for racing purposes must race; and, in the last case, that when goods are sold for human 
consumption, it is an implied condition of the contract that they shall be reasonably fit for that 
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With regard to sales by sample, it is required that the goods delivered must 
conform to the sample exposed as a model when the contract was concluded.222 
Similarly, where the sale is by description, the seller is bound to deliver goods 
corresponding to the agreed description, otherwise the goods delivered will be 
considered as non-conforming goods.223 
Congolese law 
The CCO does not prescribe a specific duty in respect of the particular use of the 
thing sold. Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL which deals with the fitness of goods, likewise, 
alludes only to their suitability with regard to their habitual usage. Article 224 al. 2 
2°) of the former 1997 version of the OHADA Commercial Act224 which could 
include such an express objective standard under modern Congolese international 
sale of goods was repealed in 2011 by Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL.225 Owing to the 
absence of the travaux préparatoires, the present researcher has difficulty in offering 
a reason for such an omission.226 The absence of an express residual duty on the part 
of the seller to deliver goods which fit a specific purpose does not, however, mean 
that parties cannot stipulate one in the contract. Confirmation of this is the phrase 
“when no provision is made in the contract” introducing Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL. 
                                               
purpose. For further comments, see Kerr Sale 205-215; Volpe Sale 111-112. See in the same sense, 
Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers’ Meat Industries Ltd 1936 NPD 1; Evans and Plows v Willis 
& Co 1923 CPD 496.  
222
 See, specially, Bouwer v Ferguson 4 EDC 90, and authorities quoted by Zulman/Kairinos Sale 
214-417; and by Volpe Sale 158-159. South African common law rules relating to sales by sample 
has been supplemented by s 24 CPA dealing with product labelling and trade description.  
223
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 427; taking support from SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v Park Rynie 
Whaling Co Ltd 1916 AD 400. According to Volpe (Sale 159), a sale by description is a kind of 
sale in which parties agree that the goods sold will be of a particular type and of the same quality 
as the sample. Thus, as stated in the SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd case, “Where the sample and 
description differ, the seller must deliver in terms of the description and will not fulfil his obligation 
by supplying goods of the same quality as the sample.”  
224
 As was stated by Article 224 al. 2 2°), “Except where there is an agreement to the contrary, the 
goods shall not conform to the contract unless: (…) 2°) they are fit for any special purpose which 
was brought to the knowledge of the seller at the time of conclusion of the contract.”  
225
 Cf. Article 306 of the 2011 version of the Commercial Act. Article 224 al. 2 2°) UAGCL 1997 
version was virtually a duplicate of Article 35(2) (b) CISG.  
226
 It is possible that the obligation under discussion has been omitted because most of OHADA 
member-states belong to the French legal system, while the requirement for particular purpose is 
Anglo-American in origin. See Note 217 above and Section 2.2.7.1 on OHADA countries. 
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If the buyer, therefore, can prove that the seller was aware of the particular purpose 
for which the goods were bought, conformity requirements would be established with 
regard to that aspect as well.  
Finally, with regard to the requirement of conformity in terms of sample and 
model, it is expressly regulated by the first sentence of Article 255 al. 2 UAGCL in 
fine. Pursuant to this, the seller must deliver goods which, inter alia, possess the 
qualities of goods it has presented as samples or models. If not, the goods delivered 
lack conformity. 
Comments  
By contrast to the fitness for ordinary purposes, the duty of the seller to deliver goods 
which fit a particular usage is a non-compulsory requirement. It is required provided 
that the seller has knowledge of the particular use for which goods will be used or 
when parties have required it in the contract. On this particular aspect, Congolese 
law departs from the CISG and South African law as it does not provide such a 
specific requirement. The OHADA Commercial Act which would introduce the 
obligation is also silent on the matter, which constitutes a gap in Congolese law. In 
order to fill it, the adoption of a provision similar to that of Article 35(2)(b) CISG, 
and South African law is recommended for the improvement of Congolese law on 
the specification of the subject of the seller’s obligations. 
Succinctly, from what has been said so far, it is clear that the conformity duty 
is really one of the main obligations of the seller. Reason why, where the goods 
delivered do not meet the conformity requirements being discussed, the seller is 
liable for lack of conformity.  
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6.2.4.3 The seller’s liability for lack of conformity  
 
The CISG  
As in almost all other legal systems, the CISG seller is legally responsible for any 
lack of conformity with regard to the goods delivered,227 which may amount to a 
fundamental breach.228  Exceptionally, however, the seller should be released from 
his/her responsibility if “the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack 
of conformity”229 at the time the contract was formed. The idea behind the exemption 
of the seller’s responsibility under Article 35(3) is that, where the buyer knows of 
the defects, he/she is supposed to accept the goods as they are.230 It would, thus, be 
abnormal for him/her to ask for goods of a better quality or in better condition than 
the ones delivered later.231 
The most important question in respect of the seller’s liability for lack of 
conformity relates to the right moment that it should be implemented. By means of 
response, Article 36(1) held the seller responsible for any non-conforming goods 
existing at the time the risk passes to the buyer,232 even though the defect becomes 
                                               
227
 As stated by Article 36, 
(1) The seller is liable in accordance with the contract and this Convention for any lack of 
conformity which exists at the time when the risk passes to the buyer, even though the lack of 
conformity becomes apparent only after that time. 
(2) The seller is also liable for any lack of conformity which occurs after the time indicated in 
the preceding paragraph and which is due to a breach of any of his obligations, including a 
breach of any guarantee that for a period of time the goods will remain fit for their ordinary 
purpose or for some particular purpose or will retain specified qualities or characteristics. 
228
 See Article 49 CISG; see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 5 [http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/CISG-AC-op5.html] (accessed 30-4-2013). 
229
 Cf. Article 35(3) CISG; for an illustration, see France Arbitration Chamber of Paris, Case No. 
9926 of 2007 Chemical Compound case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/079926f1.html] 
(accessed 21-8-2012). In this case, the seller was not found liable because the buyer knew of the 
non-standard quality of the cargo and could have been aware of the cargo’s condition by carrying 
out inspections; see also UNCITRAL Digest 147 Fn74. 
230
 See Kruisinga Non-Conformity 52-56; Henschel Conformity 280ff.  
231
 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 527; Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales 6-
23; Enderlein Rights 133 160.   
232
 The passing of risk is ruled under Articles 66 to 70 CISG. For comments, see Schmidt-Kessel 
in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 921-947; Erauw in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN 
Convention 878-911; Honnold in Galston/Smit Sales Chapter 8; Bollée 1999-2000 Pace Review of 
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apparent afterwards. In the view of many scholars, the relevance of this provision is 
that it is in conformity with the principle adopted by several domestic laws.233 
Usually, conforming qualities of goods are required when goods are handed over for 
carriage, unless it is otherwise stipulated in the contract.234 If such qualities are absent 
at that time, the seller is liable, regardless of when the lack of conformity becomes 
apparent.235 Moreover, Article 36(2) extends the seller’s liability with regard to the 
lack of conformity occurring after the time of passing of risk subsequent to the breach 
of his/her obligations, “including a breach of a guarantee of the future performance 
or qualities of the goods.”236 
South African law 
The seller must deliver goods free from any defect, whether latent or patent. Where 
the seller delivers goods which suffer from any defect, the buyer may take legal 
action for breach of the contract. Despite such a general principle, the seller does not 
bear responsibility for defects that the buyer knows about, or ought to have known 
about, at the time of contracting.237 As Kerr has explained, “‘A normally intelligent 
individual’ buying something in front of him and acting with the usual degree of care, 
sees obvious defects.”238 Thus, where the buyer was negligent in not seeing those 
defects, the seller is freed from his/her responsibility. The rule in Kroomer v Hess & 
Co, however, moderates the consequences of this principle in the case of a seller’s 
being aware of the defects or where goods are bought for a particular purpose.239 A 
propos of this, where specific goods are “mentally identified” or non-specific goods 
                                               
the CISG 245-290; Romein http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/romein.html; Roth 1979 (27) 
Am J Comp L 291-310.   
233
 See Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 543; Schwenzer in 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 596 Fn9; Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales §6-03 6-24; 
Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties _obligations_by% 20Naiyana_Guerin. doc.  
234
 Cf. Article 67(1) regulating the passing of risk time. 
235
 Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit Sales 6-24; Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_ 
CISG_parties_obligations _by% 20Naiyana_Guerin.doc. 
236
 UNCITRAL Digest 155 §1.  
237
 For a series of reasons advanced in support of the immunity of the seller against patent defects 
and Roman Dutch-Law authorities on the subject, see Kerr Sale 136-137.  
238
 Ibid 137.  
239
 See Kroomer v Hess & Co 1919 AD 204. 
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are added by the seller to the contract, and the goods suffer from patent defects, the 
buyer might go to court for a breach of contract  as a result of  defective 
performance.240 In any event, the seller is held liable for any latent defects that exist 
at the time the contract was concluded.241 
Congolese law 
Pursuant to Article 250 al. 2 UAGCL, the seller must ensure that goods delivered 
comply with the order placed and offer his/her guarantee. So, if goods do not 
encounter the instruction given, the seller should be sued for being responsible for a 
lack of conformity. With regard to the time when that liability applies, Article 256 of 
the OHADA Commercial Act tries to imitate Article 36(1) CISG. In fact, if the latter 
locates the liability for non-conformity at the time of the passing of risk, the first 
provision requires compliance with conformity conditions to be established at the 
date of taking delivery even though the fault appears much later.242 Because the 
seller’s liability for non-conforming goods is assessed at the time of delivery, a buyer 
who fails to inspect the goods, for example, a car at that time, but takes it and starts 
using it, cannot, in the future, claim a new car on the grounds that the first was 
                                               
240
 In the Kroomer v Hess & Co case, a party sold monkey nuts knowing that they were “for human 
consumption”. The buyer rejected the nuts on delivery and sued for damages; his evidence showed 
that the nuts were mouldy, weevily and smelt and were not fit for human consumption (emphasis 
added). His action was upheld.  
241
 See Lakier v Hager 1958 (4) SA 180 (T); see also Sharrock Business 284 & 293; Van 
Niekerk/Schulze Trade 71; Lehmann Sale 888 897. See also cases reproduced by Volpe Sale 119-
120; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 171-172. The common law rule relating to liability for latent defects 
has been supplemented by s 55 and 56 CPA which implies a warranty to obtain safe, suitable, and 
good quality goods for the consumer.    
242
 The difference from the two legal systems in this respect is due to the fact that, unlike the 
UAGCL (Articles 275 and 276), the CISG does not deal with the matter of the transfer of property 
in the goods (Cf. Article 4(b)). Nevertheless, the legal consequence is identical for both because, 
through Article 277 al. 1 UAGCL, the transfer of ownership coincides with the time of the passing 
of risk, 
452 
 
defective.243 Simply, “a buyer who fails to examine the goods before taking delivery 
is liable of negligence.”244  
A thorough examination of the OHADA Commercial Act gives the impression 
that this Act lacks a provision excluding the seller’s liability for non-conforming 
goods where the buyer have knowledge or could not have been aware of the defect.245 
A reading of Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL reveals that a seller in OHADA law, and 
consequently also in modern Congolese commercial law, is liable for both latent and 
apparent defects provided the buyer gives notice of the defect in time.246 
Acknowledging the seller’s liability even for patent defects has the consequence of 
creating careless dealers; it puts the seller into an uncomfortable situation. Yet, 
Article 319 CCO purported to discharge the seller from “patent defects” (vices 
apparents) which the buyer could have discovered for himself/herself.247 Patent 
defects are defined, in this context, as “inadequacies that the buyer is able to discover 
at the time of delivery by an attentive inspection.”248 Consequently, a buyer who 
failed to examine the goods before taking delivery was liable of his/her own 
negligence.249 But, because Article 319 CCO and its subsequent cases appear to be 
at variance with Article 258 of the OHADA Commercial Act, it is assumed that the 
                                               
243
 Translated form of the original French worded as follows: (…) L’acheteur, ayant accepté la 
livraison du véhicule et l’ayant même déjà exploité, ne peut aujourd’hui revendiquer la propriété 
d’un autre véhicule quoique cité au contrat. C’est à la livraison qu’il devait vérifier la conformité 
ou non du véhicule.” See Burkina Faso 18 August 2006 Appeal Court of Ouagadougou (Civil and 
commercial chamber), Case No. 133/06 Sankara N M v SOBFI & SCIMI [http://www.ohada. 
com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-09-49.html] (accessed 6-4-2013).   
244
 See Elis 6 December 1913 Jur Col 1924 166. 
245
 See Article 258 UAGCL, contra Article 319 CCO and Article 35(3) CISG. 
246
 The time for notification of the non-conformity is discussed in Section 6.3.5 below. 
247
 Within the CCO sphere of application, where the seller had informed the buyer of the defect or 
where the buyer should have discovered that defect by a careful examination, the seller was no 
longer responsible. For similar reasoning under French law, see Hyland 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hyland1.html for whom, 
The seller is liable neither for apparent defects nor for those that the buyer is able to discover. 
(…) French courts require buyers to use reasonable diligence in examining the goods. The 
diligence required is determined in light of several factors, including the buyer’s technical 
competence, the nature of the defect, the circumstances surrounding the inspection, and the 
nature of the goods, etc.   
248
 See Elis 6 December 1913 Jur Col 1924 166; see also Katuala Code 185, and Piron 125.  
249
 See Léo 20 May 1930 Jur Col 1932 100.  
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first has been excluded from the sphere of influence of commercial transactions,250 a 
situation which is not beneficial to the seller. 
Comments   
Despite some small differences, the CISG provisions express many of the concepts 
of non-conformity found in both South African and Congolese laws. All three of the 
legal systems admit that, where the goods delivered differ with those determined in 
the contract, there is lack of conformity which results in the seller’s liability. The 
point of departure between them would then be found in the precise moment that 
responsibility takes legal effect. Under the CISG, it starts at the time when the risk 
passes from the seller to the buyer. In Congolese law, the starting point is located at 
the time of taking delivery; whereas under South African law the seller is liable for 
defects that were in existence at the time the contract was concluded. With regard to 
the constraints attendant on the international sale of goods, the time of delivery which 
coincides with the passing of risk seems the most reasonable. 
In addition, the CISG and South African law require the non-conformity to be 
hidden from the buyer; otherwise the seller is released from his/her liability. In 
contrast to these two legal systems, the seller, in Congolese law, is liable for both 
latent and patent defects, the only difference being their discovery in time. To 
recognise that the seller is liable even for a disclosed lack of conformity appears 
abnormal. In effect, taking delivery of the goods notwithstanding their lack of 
conformity would be interpreted as their acceptance. If it was otherwise, the buyer 
should reject them immediately at the time of delivery. In this context, Article 258 
UAGCL ruling has introduced a gap in Congolese law, which would be filled by 
bring Article 319 CCO into effect again, or by adopting a provision similar to Article 
35(3) CISG, or a principle closer to South African common law.  
                                               
250
 Cf. Article 10 of the OHADA Treaty relative to the Uniform Acts’ mandatory character. Owing 
to the absence of travaux préparatoires, the researcher is in difficulty to provide any justification 
for such ruling. 
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Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note that, whether under the 
CISG or under domestic laws, the issue of the seller’s liability for lack of conformity 
appears mostly to be a question of the burden of proof. In accordance with the well-
known general principle of law, i.e. actori incumbit probatio, the onus is on the buyer 
to prove that defects were in existence at the time of taking delivery.251 In other 
words, where defects arose after the risk has fallen to the buyer, the latter must bear 
the loss. But, if they are discovered shortly afterwards this should constitute a 
presumption that defects were in existence at the time of sale or of delivery depending 
on the legal system.252 In such circumstances, the seller will remain liable unless 
he/she had furnished the real cause of the defects pursuant to the principle reus in 
exceptione fit actor.253  
From this explanation, the burden of proving lack of conformity in the goods 
appears to be a “vicious circle” which places the buyer in an uncomfortable situation, 
especially when the time of transfer of risk corresponds to the time of contracting. A 
                                               
251
 For the CISG, see France Arbitration Chamber of Paris, Case No. 9926 of 2007 Chemical 
Compound case (the burden of proof is on the party making an allegation); Belgium 16 December 
2002 Appellate Court Antwerpen Steel Plates case (proof that the non-conformity of goods existed 
at the moment of delivery) [http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/021216b1.html] (accessed 1-8-
2012). See also Bollée 1999-2000 Pace Review of the CISG 245 260; Romein 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/romein.html §14; Linne 2008 (20) Pace Int’l L. Rev. 31-42. 
For South African law, see Seboko v Soll 1949 337 (T); see also Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 
233; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 171; Volpe Sale 119; Kerr Sale 115; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 79. For 
Congolese law, read Article 197 al. 1 CCO in which a party making an allegation must prove it, 
with Article 237 al. 1 UAGCL, and Article 265 al. 3 CCO extending the general principles of the 
law of contract to commercial sales.  
252
 For the CISG, see Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale di Forli [District Court] Mitias v Solidea 
Srl (defects discovered seven days after delivery); France 5 January 1999 [Supreme Court] Thermo 
King v Cigna Insurance (non-conformity discovered about fifteen days after). But, Germany 11 
April 2005 Landgericht [District Court] Frankfurt Ugandan Used Shoes case (three weeks judged 
not reasonable) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 050411g1.html] (accessed 1-8-2012). For South 
African law, see Seboko v Soll 1949 337(T); Norton v Johnston 1930 SR 93; and other similar cases 
quoted by Zulman/Kairinos Sale 171-172; Kerr Sale 115. For Congolese law, see Tricom 
Kin/Gombe 11 January 2012 RCE 1967 Dijimba Sprl v Tractafric Congo Sprl (defect discovered 
358 hours after delivery); see also Cass B 20 April 1959 Pas I 773. 
253
 For further comments, see Kröll 2011 (3) BLR 162-180; Linne 2008 (20) Pace Int’l L. Rev. 31-
42. For Congolese law see, Article 197 al. 2 for which, a party who claims to be released must 
substantiate the fact which has ended his/her obligation. Succinctly, both the seller and the buyer 
bear the burden of proving the conformity depending on their interests. For explanatory cases see 
Kröll 2011 (3) BLR 162 173 Fn32.  
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similar situation which prevailed under the CCO has been improved by the OHADA 
Commercial Act by assessing the passing of risk time at a moment different from the 
conclusion of the contract, viz. the date of taking delivery. 
 
6.2.4.4 Conclusion on the conformity of the goods 
 
It is evident that the UAGCL has updated Congolese commercial law in a number of 
respects connected to the conformity of goods requirement. It has, among other 
things, codified the objective standards of quality, quantity, and the description of 
the goods which were previously dealt with on a case law basis. It has also established 
the conformity requirement as an independent duty different from that of delivery. 
Its ruling is, however, not at all perfect. As for any other legal systems, the OHADA 
Commercial Act provisions dealing with the conformity of the goods have their 
shortcomings. Among these shortcomings, the most grievous is the maintenance of 
a double guarantee, the guarantee of conformity and the guarantee against latent 
defects instead of a single concept encompassing both of them. An additional gap 
consists of holding the seller liable for patent defects in the same way as for latent 
defects. Such a ruling seems unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of commercial 
dealings. The last shortcoming which may be mentioned is the lack of a default rule 
governing the fitness of goods for particular purposes. In order to fill these gaps, the 
provisions of the CISG and the principles of South African law are recommended to 
specify the conformity obligation of the seller.  
Parenthetically, though the law has established a number of conformity 
standards, the goods delivered may still lack conformity. It is then the buyer’s duty 
to inspect them and immediately notify the seller about the deficiency as explained 
in section 6.3.5 below. Before discussing that, our attention is orientated now towards 
seller’s guaranty against third party claims.  
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6.2.5 Third-party Rights and Claims Guarantee  
 
6.2.5.1 Introduction 
 
In accordance with Article 30 CISG, the first obligation on the part of the seller 
consists of delivering the goods sold. This obligation is complemented by the one in 
the first sentence of Article 41 which requires the goods delivered to be “free from 
any right or claim of a third party.”254 The second sentence of the same provision 
declares that where third party rights or claims are based on industrial property or 
other intellectual property, the seller’s duty is governed by Article 42 CISG. The 
obligation of the seller to deliver goods which are free from any third party claims as 
ruled under the CISG is also known within many legal systems.255 That requirement 
is named in South African law as the vacua possessio; it is ruled in a general 
“warranty against eviction” framework.256 Within the civil law, the same obligation 
is referred to as the “warranty against dispossession”;257 and under the UAGCL rules 
as the “guarantee”.258  
Compared with other legal systems, however, the CISG appears more detailed. 
In its field of application, the duty of the seller to guarantee the goods against legal 
defects covers two domains, viz. the guarantee against third party property rights, 
                                               
254
 For an illustration, see Germany 21 March 2007 Appellate Court Dresden Stolen Automobile case 
[http://cisgw3. law.pace.edu/cases/070321g1.html] (accessed 21-8-2012). A propos of this, a car sold 
was seized because it had been stolen. The court found the seller liable of two breaches, the inability 
to transfer property in the car, and the incapacity to deliver a car free from third party claims.  
255
 These include, Germany: §§433(1) and 435 BGB; UK: 1979 Sale of Goods Act, s 12; USA: §2-
312(1) UCC; Switzerland: Articles 192-196 OR; France and Belgium: Articles 1625 to 1640 CC; 
Austria §923 ABGB. See Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 649. Section 435 of 
the German BGB states, for example, that, “The thing is free of legal defects if third parties, in 
relation to the thing, can assert either no rights, or only the rights taken over in the purchase 
agreement, against the buyer.”  
256
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 145-154; Kerr Sale 179; Hackwill Sale 164-177; Volpe Sale 97-110; 
Sharrock Business 290-293; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 89-94; Lotz Sale 361 374. 
257
 See, for France and Belgium: Articles 1625 to 1640 CC; and for the DRC: Articles 302 to 317 
CCO. 
258
 See Articles 260 and 261 UAGCL. 
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and the guarantee against third party intellectual property rights. It is this distinction 
that is examined in the following paragraphs.  
 
6.2.5.2 Guarantee against third party property rights 
 
The CISG 
In general, the seller’s duty to deliver goods free from third-party claims consists in 
guaranteeing that the buyer is secure in his/her possession. As Flechtner has said, 
“the seller must transfer to the buyer the property in (good title to) the goods, so that 
the buyer can enjoy the use of what it purchased without interference from another 
claiming to be the true owner of the goods.”259 The only exception admitted in this 
respect is when the buyer agreed to take the goods despite the existence of third party 
rights or claims.260 Thus, if it is proved that the buyer had knowledge of third party 
rights or claims on the goods, but accepted to contract despite their existence, a seller 
delivering the goods under those conditions has properly performed his/her 
obligation.261 In the words of Kritzer and Eiselen, the requirement for guarantee 
against third party claims does not also mean that the seller is liable for breach of  
contract “every time a third person makes a frivolous claim in respect of the 
goods.”262 Instead, the claim must be serious and must intend to deprive the buyer of 
his/her title to the goods bought.  
                                               
259
 Flechtner Bepress 8-9; see also Etier/Rauda http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
raudaetier.html (accessed 21-8-2012). In the Automobile case, a German seller and an Italian buyer 
dealt with a second hand car. After delivery, the car was seized by the Italian police because it had 
been registered first in Italy and was recorded as stolen. Following the seizure, the car was given 
back to the first owner. The court inferred that the seller was unable to transfer ownership of the 
car to the buyer. See Germany 22 August 2002 District Court Freiburg Automobile case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020822g1.html] (accessed 21-8-2012).  
260
 Cf. Article 41 CISG, first sentence, second part. For an illustration, see Russia 21 January 1998 
Arbitration proceeding 99/1997 (buyer unaware that the car bought was subject to ‘a temporary 
import regime’ while contracting) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980121r1.html] (accessed 21-
8-2012).  
261
 See Russia 6 August 2002 Arbitration Court [Appellate Court] for the Western Siberia Circuit 
Harvesting Combines case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020806r1.html] (accessed 24-8-
2012); but Russia 21 January 1998 Arbitration proceeding 99/1997.  
262
 Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:110 89-220. 
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South African law 
As was commented on earlier, the seller’s duty in respect of third party claims is 
ruled in South African law as a warranty against eviction. One of the leading 
authorities on the subject is the Lammers and Lammers v Giovannoni case.263 
Schreiner JA ruled, in this case, that a seller delivering a property has, among other 
duties, to “guarantee the buyer in his possession, so that as long as the buyer enjoys 
vacua possessio, (undisturbed possession), he cannot complain that his title is 
defective.”264 The learned judge specified that, “the basic obligation of the seller is 
to protect the buyer in his possession,”265 meaning to prevent him/her from any 
intrusion whether on the part of the seller himself/herself or a third person.266  
It should be noted that the responsibility of the seller to guarantee the buyer 
against eviction covers, in the South African law environment, three main 
obligations. Firstly, the seller must abstain from any act which would tend to disturb 
the buyer’s possession. Secondly, he/she must protect the buyer against any attempts 
at such dispossession, and undertake his/her defence in any action brought to 
interfere with the rights of the buyer. Finally, if the seller is unsuccessful in protecting 
the buyer, the buyer may bring a claim for breach of the contract.267 To use the words 
of Lehmann, where the buyer is lawfully and permanently evicted, “he may sue the 
seller ex empto for cancellation, return of the purchase price and damages.”268 
Briefly, where the seller fails to protect the buyer from any disturbance, he/she will 
be held liable for defects in warranty against eviction.  
 
 
                                               
263
 Lammers and Lammers v Giovannoni 1955 (3) SA 385 (A) 390A-B; reproduced in Koop Sale 
159-172. 
264
 For comments, see Kerr Sale 191; Sharrock Business 290-293; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 89; 
Lotz Sale 361 375. 
265
 For further cases, see Volpe Sale 97-110. 
266
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 145; Hackwill Sale 166. 
267
 Ibid.  
268
 Lehmann Sale 888 901 
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Congolese law  
Article 250 al. 2 UAGCL, which defines the seller’s main obligations, requires the 
seller to supply the buyer with his/her guarantee in addition to the delivery and 
conformity of the goods. The scope of the guarantee obligation is specified by 
Articles 260 and 261 UAGCL.269 As far as Article 260 al. 1 is concerned, it sets out 
the obligation of the seller in relation to the transfer of title in the same words as 
Article 41 CISG. As for the last of these provisions, the OHADA Commercial Act 
obliges the seller to “deliver goods which are free from any right or claim” of a third 
person unless the buyer accepts them in those conditions. With regard to Article 260 
al. 1 UAGCL, it compels the seller, in addition, to protect the buyer from any eviction 
subsequent to his/her own actions.270 
The guarantee against third party claims as required by the Uniform Act is in 
conformity with the civil law requirement, on the side of the seller, to offer “peaceful 
possession” of the property sold.271 In line with that guarantee, the seller is not 
allowed to sell other peoples’ properties. Such is the meaning of Article 276 CCO 
which declares “null and void the sale of third party’s objects”, i.e. objects on which 
someone other than the seller claims rights. In other words, the seller must own the 
article sold in order for him/her to transfer ownership in it and, consequently, be able 
to provide the buyer with peaceful possession, or there is no valid contract of sale. A 
similar ruling was handed down, in OHADA law jurisdiction, by the Appeal Court 
of Ouagadougou, in the Bile Bile v Cooperative Agricole Kakovika case, in which 
the court held that a second sale of the same car was not free from third person claims 
and, therefore, nullified it.272  
                                               
269
 Compare this to Articles 303 to 317 CCO for details.  
270
 See Article 260 al. 2 UAGCL similar to Article 305 CCO. Pursuant to Articles 303 and 330 
CCO, even when there is no express obligation as to warranty, the seller is legally bound to 
guarantee the buyer against dispossession which it may suffer in the property sold as a whole or in 
portion. It is also obliged to protect the buyer against encumbrances alleged on the item sold and 
for which the latter had no knowledge at the time of the sale. Thus, if the buyer did not know of 
the third party right on the goods, and that it is disturbed or rightly fears to be disturbed, the buyer 
may suspend the payment of the price until the eviction ceased.  
271
 Cf. Article 302 CCO. 
272
 Translated from the original French version ruled as follows:  
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The second part of Article 276 CCO seems, however, confusing. It states that 
the sale of someone else’s property “may give rise to damages where the buyer did 
not know that the thing sold belonged to another person.” That is to say, if the buyer 
knew or ought to have known of the rights of other people on the object, the sale 
would be valid.273 In this context, if the first owner claims his/her rights thereafter, 
the seller is no longer liable because, in such a case, the buyer is presumed to have 
concluded the contract at his/her own risk.274 
It is not surprising that parties postpone the transfer of ownership in the goods 
by virtue of the retention of title clause in order to secure the seller’s claim for 
payment.275 The guarantee against third party claims prevents the seller from selling 
goods in which he/she has retained title. In accordance with this, as long as the buyer 
is not found insolvent, the seller cannot retail the goods at the risk of bearing 
responsibility for breach of the sale. But, if it is proved that the delivery was 
consistent with the will of parties, the contract is valid.276 In the same way, the seller 
may contractually exclude or limit his/her liability for third parties claims by virtue 
of an exclusion of liability clause. Pursuant to Article 261 al. 1 UAGCL, any clause 
of this kind must be interpreted restrictively. Thus, a seller invoking any clause 
                                               
Un véhicule vendu n’est pas libre de toute prétention de la part d’un tiers dès lors qu’il avait 
préalablement été vendu à un tiers et que le vendeur a usé de dol en faisant croire que la vente 
initiale avait été annulée. Une vente intervenue dans ces conditions est nulle. 
See Burkina Faso 6 May 2005 Appeal Court of Ouagadougou (Civil and commercial chamber), 
Case No. 497 Bile Bile v Cooperative Agricole Kakovika [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ 
ohadata/J-09-163.html] (accessed 6-4-2013). 
273
 Cf. Article 303 CCO in fine which rules about encumbrances not declared at the time of the sale. 
274
 Cf. Article 306 CCO which discharges the seller if the buyer has knowledge of the risk of 
dispossession at the time of the sale. 
275
 See Article 276 UAGCL; see also Schwenzer/Hachem in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 
94 §47. 
276
 Ruled by the CCJA ((1st chamber) 24 April 2008, Case No. 18 Dr A v Distribution Pharmaceutique 
de Cote d’Ivoire SA, Receuil de la Jurisprudence No. 11 January-June 2008 51) that, 
La clause de réserve de propriété ne servant en réalité qu’en protéger les droits du créancier 
qui s’est dessaisi des marchandises, le contrat de vente a été formé, dès lors qu’il est établi que 
les marchandises ont été livrées conformément à la volonté des parties, et ce, en application de 
l’Article (…) (276) de l’Acte Uniforme portant sur le droit commercial général.   
(“The retention of property clause intends to protect the rights of the seller who has delivered the 
goods. In this sense, the contract of sale is formed, from the moment it is established that the goods 
have been delivered in accordance with the will of the parties pursuant to Article 276 UAGCL.”) 
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excluding his/her liability for third parties claims bears the onus of proving that the 
buyer was aware of it and has agreed to it at the time the sale was made.277 If this is 
not the case, the responsibility of the seller remains intact.  
Comments 
Under the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law, the seller has the 
responsibility of delivering goods free from any defects in title, unless the buyer 
decides on taking delivery under such conditions.278 The point of departure from 
them is that, if the CISG limits the guarantee to third parties rights, the domestic laws 
include teething troubles the buyer would suffer as a result of actions of the seller. 
Thus, the domestic law guarantee is greater than the guarantee against third party 
claims established by the Convention. In spite of that, what is required by the 
obligation of guarantee, in any of the three legal systems, is the right to compensation 
granted to the buyer in case of dispossession by the seller himself/herself or a third 
person claiming rights to the goods.  
 
6.2.5.3 Guarantee against third party intellectual  property rights  
 
The CISG  
Pursuant to Article 42 CISG, the seller is obliged to deliver goods which are free 
from any right or claim of third party based on “industrial property or other 
intellectual property.” Compared with its counterpart guarantee against defects in 
title, the requirement to deliver goods free from industrial property rights or claims 
seems to be less familiar in domestic laws,279 although Kritzer and Eiselen may have 
                                               
277
 Article 261 al. 2 UAGCL; compare with Articles 304 and 303 CCO. 
278
 See Article 260 al 1 UAGCL; compared to Article 41 CISG and South African common law. 
279
 See Rauda/Etier 2000 (4) 1 VJ 30 32 Fn7; Beline 2007 (7) University of Pittsburgh Journal of 
Technology Law & Policy 6; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 648; but 
Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:127 89-235. Some of the legal systems which have established an 
express intellectual property infringement include, USA: §2-312(3) UCC; Germany: §435 BGB; 
and Spain: Article 1474 CC. Insofar as the USA is concerned, §2-312(3) UCC states that, “A seller 
who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered 
free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the like (…).”  
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an opposite view. According to them, “It appears to be the general rule in most, if 
not all, legal systems that the seller is obligated to deliver goods free from any right 
or claim of any third party based on industrial or intellectual property (…).”280 
Concerning its meaning, the CISG is silent on what the “intellectual property 
right” is. In the context of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 
however, that expression includes any rights “resulting from intellectual activity in 
the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.”281 Transposed into the field of the 
international sale of goods, intellectual property rights may be understood, in the 
words of Rauda and Etier, as “All rights protecting an intellectual activity which (sic) 
a pecuniary value, which are attached to a good and which are able to infringe the 
use or the resale of the merchandise.”282 Beline clarifies this by saying that industrial 
and intellectual property rights that would be infringed should be limited “to 
copyright, trademark, and patents”.283  
With regard to its implementation, the seller’s liability for third party 
intellectual property rights is subject to the condition that the seller had knowledge 
of the existence of such rights or claims the time the contract is concluded.284 As a 
number of scholars and courts have observed, “a seller who sells goods that are 
encumbered by third-party patent, copyright or trademark rights, and who knew or 
could have been aware of said fact”285 breaches the obligation to deliver goods that 
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 Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §89:127 89-235. 
281
 See Article 2(viii) of the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation, 
Stockholm 14 July 1967, as revised on 28 September 1979. http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
treaties/en/convention/pdf/ trtdocs_wo029.pdf (accessed 31-8-2012). See also, Beline 2007 (7) 
University of Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law & Policy 6 Fn24; Rauda/Etier 2000 (4) 1 VJ 
30 32 Fn24; and Etier/Rauda http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ biblio/raudaetier.html Fn11. 
282
 Rauda/Etier 2000 (4) 1 VJ 30 36. 
283
 Beline 2007 (7) University of Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law & Policy 6; see also 
Etier/Rauda http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/raudaetier.html; Rauda/Etier 2000 (4) 1 VJ 
30 36 Fn22. The latter authors include in the definition of “intellectual property right”, the 
exploitation of illegally obtained know-how. 
284
 Article 42(1) CISG; for comments, see Zeller 2011 (15) 2 VJ 289. 
285
 Butler Practical Guide 4-15; Zeller 2011 (15) 2 VJ 289 295; see also France 13 November 2002 
Appellate Court Colmar Printed Textile Fabric case (professional dealer presumed knowing of the 
existence of the right protected) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021113f1.html] (accessed 24-8-
2012). 
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are free from any intellectual property right. Alternatively, if the buyer knew or ought 
to have known of the right or claim considered, the seller is freed from his/her 
responsibility.286 Likewise, the buyer loses the right to rely on legal defects where 
he/she fails to notify the seller of the infringement within a reasonable time.287 As 
was ruled in the German Automobile case, the notion of “reasonable time” constitutes 
a matter of fact which varies from case to case.288  
South African law 
South African law gives the impression of lacking an express provision dealing with 
the responsibility of the seller with respect to goods affected by the intellectual 
property rights or claims of third parties, except for consumer sales contracts.289 
While establishing a comparison between the law of sale of Southern African 
countries and the CISG, Ng’ong’ola overlooked the matter. Ng’ong’ola quickly 
noted that the rules under Articles 41 and 42 CISG resemble the South African sales 
law “warranty against the eviction,”290 without any other distinction between defects 
in title and defects in industrial property rights. Oosthuizen, also, does not shed much 
light on this aspect. In the same way as the first author had done, Oosthuizen limited 
her argument to the fact that, in South African law the seller “is (…) required to make 
                                               
286
 See Article 42(2) (a) which excludes the seller’s liability in cases where “at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of the right or claim.” 
It was ruled by the French Supreme Court that a professional buyer cannot be unaware of the 
counterfeit in the goods sold, namely “shoes with counterfeit ribbons”. See France 19 March 2002 
Supreme Court Footwear case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 020319f1.html] (accessed 24-8-
2012). 
287
 In Article 43(1) CISG ruling, the notice must be given in “a few days” following the date of 
infringement for it to produce legal effect. See also Germany 21 March 2007 Appellate Court 
Dresden Stolen automobile case. 
288
 Germany 11 January 2006 Supreme Court Automobile case (a two-month notice judged 
unreasonable) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060111g1.html] (accessed 21-8-2012).  
289
 See s 24(2) CPA according to which, 
(2) A person must not -   
(a) knowingly apply to any goods a trade description that is likely to mislead the consumer as 
to any matter implied or expressed in that trade description; or 
(b) alter, deface, cover, remove or obscure a trade description or trade mark applied to any 
goods in a manner calculated to mislead consumers. 
290
 Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 231. 
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available the thing sold free from all third party claims involving an immediate or a 
future right of possession,”291 without further comment. 
In a consumer sales law environment, however, s 24(2) CPA prohibits 
applying knowingly to goods a “trade description that is likely to mislead the 
consumer”. The concept “trade description” is defined in s 1 CPA as including, inter 
alia, “patent, privilege, and copyright”, viz. industrial and intellectual property 
rights.292 This means that, in every transaction, the seller must make sure that he/she 
has legal right or authority from the right owner to sell the goods. By forbidding to 
the seller the application of marks to goods which may deceive the other party, the 
law requires the seller, by implication, to protect the buyer against third party 
intellectual property rights and claims. It follows from such a reading that s 24(2) 
CPA has supplemented the common law on the liability of the seller in respect of the 
issue of third party intellectual property rights and claims. Its ruling is recommended 
for international sales contracts. 
Congolese law 
The situation of Congolese law with regard to the seller’s warranty against a third 
party’s intellectual property rights and claims seems similar to the South African law 
situation prior to the CPA. As was the case in South Africa, the DRC does not have 
a specific provision regulating the duty of the seller to deliver goods free from third 
party’s intellectual rights or claims. The OHADA Commercial Act is silent on the 
subject as well. Although its Article 260 al. 1 reproduces literally the first sentence 
of Article 41 CISG, the Commercial Act lacks the equivalent of the second sentence 
of Article 41 and Article 42 CISG dealing with the warranty against intellectual 
property rights. Article 260 al. 2 and Article 261 UAGCL, which would play this 
role, rather regulate the obligation of the seller to abstain from troubling the buyer in 
his/her possession, and provide a guidance for the interpretation of clauses limiting 
the seller’s liability in respect of defects in title. 
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 Oosthuizen Rights 92. 
292
 Section 1 CPA v° “trade description” (a) (vi). 
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The absence of an express provision dealing with the guarantee against 
intellectual property rights does not imply, however, the total exclusion of seller’s 
liability for the infringement of those kinds of rights. Confirmation of this is the fact 
that Article 1 al. 1 of the Land Law lists “intellectual property rights” among the 
three patrimonial rights, in addition to obligations and ownership.293 Furthermore, 
intellectual property rights are ruled by the Industrial Property Law No. 82-001 of 7 
January 1982.294 In accordance with this law, whoever possesses a patent or a trade 
mark, or any intellectual property rights, has an exclusive right to use them for a 
period of fifteen to twenty years295 or ten years296 respectively. If goods covered by 
such property rights are sold unbeknown to the holder, it is implied that the proper 
owner is free to claim his/her rights from the buyer who, in turn, must require a 
guarantee from the seller. But, given that there is no special legal regime regarding 
them, the seller’s guarantee against intellectual property rights should be considered, 
in the DRC, as part of the general obligation for defects in title.  
Comments  
The CISG’s duty in respect of third party intellectual property rights and claims does 
not have a specific equivalent in either South African law or Congolese law. It is 
regulated by domestic laws, in the context of a general warranty against eviction. 
Such an attitude is in conformity with the opinion of Schwenzer according to which, 
“Most domestic legal systems (…) classify the seller’s warranty of freedom from 
industrial or intellectual rights as part of general liability for defects in title.”297 This 
situation appears not to be favourable to the seller owing to the specificity of 
intellectual rights. For more certainty, the adoption of a specific rule similar to Article 
42 CISG is needed in both South African and Congolese sales laws. 
 
                                               
293
 See Article 1 al. 1 of Law No. 73-021 of 21 July 1973 as currently modified.  
294
 Industrial Property Law No. 82-001 of 7 January 1982; for comments, see Masamba Affaires 
167-209. 
295
 Article 36 of the Industrial Property Law. 
296
 Article 137 of the Industrial Property Law. 
297
 Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 661 §1. 
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6.2.6 Conclusion on the Obligations of the Seller   
 
By means of a contract of sale of goods, the seller is obliged not only to deliver the 
goods but also to deliver the accurate goods, at the true place, and at the correct time. 
If he/she fails to do so, the seller will bear responsibility either for a lack of delivery 
or for a lack of conformity. In this regard, the CISG has indirectly influenced 
domestic laws, South African law via the 2008 CPA, and Congolese law through the 
provisions of the UAGCL. As far as Congolese law is concerned, the OHADA 
Commercial Act has codified requirements like those of quality, quantity, 
description, and packaging which were formerly based on case law. The same Act 
has, likewise, introduced into the Congolese legal system a specific documentary 
obligation, established an autonomous conformity obligation distinct from the 
delivery, and clarified the obligation of the seller to deliver goods free from the 
claims of third parties.  
In spite of such an improvement, Congolese law still has some shortcomings 
in respect of the seller’s obligations. Among those gaps, the most important are: the 
maintenance of a double warranty, the guarantee of conformity, and the guarantee 
against latent defects, instead of a single concept including both concepts; 
recognising the seller’s liability for both patent and latent defects; the absence of a 
default rule governing the fitness of goods to particular purposes; and the absence of 
an express duty relating to the obligation of the seller with regard to intellectual 
property rights. All of these gaps are likely to undermine the security and certainty 
of commercial dealings in the DRC. For more certainty, the provisions of the CISG 
are recommended.  
After having discussed the obligations of the seller, the following section 
analyses the obligations of the buyer resulting from the contract. 
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6.3 The Obligations of the Buyer 
 
6.3.1 Introduction  
 
This section aims to demonstrate that, though the obligations of the buyer seem alike 
in almost all legal systems, there are some differences among them. In Congolese 
law, for instance, the delay for giving notice is shorter than it is in the CISG and 
South African law which may cause prejudice to the buyer. Thus, after a brief 
summary of what the main obligations of the buyer are, the discussion will turn 
around the payment of the price, taking delivery, and the examination of goods and 
notice for lack of conformity. An assessment of the modern Congolese law will 
follow step by step.  
 
6.3.2 General Principles  
 
The obligations of the buyer are regulated under the CISG in Articles 53 to 60.298 
Article 53 abridges those obligations by obliging the buyer to take delivery of the 
goods bought and to pay for them as required by the contract or the Convention. A 
CISG buyer has, in principle, two main obligations: paying the price and taking 
delivery of the goods.299 Both obligations are subject to the contractual agreement of 
the parties so that the parties may modify or limit them at will. In addition to the 
obligations above, the buyer also has the responsibility of examining the goods 
                                               
298
 It is noted that seller’s remedies for breach of the contract by the buyer (Articles 61 to 65) are 
ruled in the same heading as the obligations of the buyer stricto sensu. Those remedies are beyond 
the field of this study.  
299
 See Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 792 §1; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:6 91-
12; for case law, see Slovak Republic 11 October 2010 District Court in Michalovce 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/101011k1. html]; Germany 11 November 2009 District Court 
Stuttgart Packaging Machinery case [http://cisgw3.law.pace. edu/cases/091111g1.html]; Serbia 18 
June 2008 Foreign Trade Court attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce One-day old female 
chicken case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080618sb.html]. 
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delivered in order to verify whether they conform to the goods ordered, and, if 
necessary, to give the seller  timely notice for lack of conformity.300  
The obligations of the buyer as ruled by the CISG resemble those stipulated 
under domestic law. As for South African law, there are authorities that claim that 
the most important duty on the part of the buyer consists in paying the price.301 
Domestic law does not seem to attach much consideration to the obligation of taking 
delivery. But, owing to the fact that the buyer purchases goods with the purpose of 
acquiring ownership of them, it is reasonable that the payment of the price goes 
together with “the receipt of the goods”.302 
Turning to Congolese law, similar obligations are found in Article 262 
UAGCL which specifies that, “The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take 
delivery of them.”303 In addition to the payment of the price and taking delivery of 
the goods, the buyer is also required to inspect the goods as soon as possible for 
him/her to be certain that they conform to those ordered so that he/she may notify 
the seller of any defects304  in them should it be necessary.  
 
6.3.3 The Payment of the Price  
 
6.3.3.1 General remarks 
 
As a general rule, the first obligation of the buyer consists of paying the price. This 
obligation is considered in the CISG, South African law, and Congolese law as one 
                                               
300
 See Articles 38 and 39 CISG. 
301
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 101; Hackhill Sale 199; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 98; Sharrock 
Business 300; Volpe Sale 139; Lotz Sale 361 369. For authorities establishing that obligation, see 
Kerr Sale 221 Fn1. 
302
 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 155; see also Hackhill Sale 199; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 94; 
Zulman/ Kairinos Sale 108; Volpe Sale 139. 
303
 Compare this to Article 327 CCO; see also Tricom Kin/Gombe 18 October 2011 RCE 2012 LT 
Cimpex Sprl v Biz Africa Sprl; Goma 13 February 2008 RCA 1670 Kambale Kisambio v Kamaliro 
Paluku (unreported decisions). 
304
 See Articles 270, 258 and Article 259 UAGCL. 
469 
 
of the main obligations of the buyer.305 The obligations of the buyer appear to be 
relatively simple compared with those imposed on the seller.306 This is justified, 
according to Sevon, by the fact that “in most cases the important issues relating to 
the price and its payment are almost invariably dealt with in the contract.”307 
As is the case for the obligations of the seller, the obligations of the buyer are, 
first of all, a matter of the contractual agreement of the parties. Parties are free to 
determine the outline of the obligation of payment for the goods within the limits 
established by the law. But, as for other contractual issues, the seller and buyer may 
fail to determine those obligations. In such circumstances, the principles provided by 
the law will become involved as default rules. The payment of the price poses, in 
practice, a triple question relating to the calculation of the price, the place of payment, 
and the due time for payment. These issues are discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.3.3.2 Assessment of the price  
The CISG 
The CISG has two provisions which relate to the assessment of the price. These are 
Article 55 ruling the issue of open price terms,308 and Article 56 dealing with the 
price set by weight. There are many methods according to which the purchase price 
                                               
305
 For the CISG, see Article 53 CISG; Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 793; Butler/ 
Harindranath in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 797; Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:6 91-
12; Sevon Obligations 203 207; Sevon http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sevon.html; 
Gabriel 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 273; UNCITRAL Digest 252 §1; see also Serbia 18 June 2008 
Foreign Trade Court attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce One-day old female chicken 
case. For South African law, see Kerr Sale 221; Zulman/Kairinos  Sale 101; Hackhill Sale 199; 
Volpe Sale 139; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 98; Sharrock Business 300; Lotz Sale 361 369. For 
Congolese law; see Article 262 UAGCL; and Tricot 2011 (281) Droit et Patrimoine 75 79. See 
also Article 327 CCO which reads, “The main obligation of the buyer is to pay the price on the day 
and at the place fixed by the sale.” 
306
 Under the CISG, the obligations of the buyer are regulated in eight articles out of 101 CISG 
provisions; under the UAGCL, they are regulated in thirteen articles (Articles 262 to 274); and 
under the CCO, in eight sections (Articles 327 to 334) contra 47 for the seller (Articles 279-326).  
307
 See Sevon http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sevon.html; Sevon Obligations 203 204; 
see also Butler/ Harindranath in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 797; Gabriel 2005/2006 
(25) JL & Com 273; and Osuna-Gonzalez 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 299. 
308
 For the issue of unstated price terms, see Section 5.2.3.2 above.  
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can be assessed, including the price set by pieces, units or weight, depending on what 
way suits the parties. Where parties have opted for the last way, the question is 
whether goods should be measured at net weight or at gross weight. In response, the 
CISG gives, through Article 56, preference to the net weight. As stated by this 
provision “If the price is fixed according to the weight of the goods, in case of doubt 
it is to be determined by the net weight.” 
As a rule, the buyer must pay the price fixed contractually.309 In the absence 
of an express or an implicit clause in the contract determining the price, parties are 
presumed to refer to the price generally charged in the trade concerned,310 or to the 
one fixed by reference to trade usages and the course of dealings.311 It is only where 
doubt persists on the way the price should be evaluated that the residual rule in 
Article 56 will apply. Simply, Article 56 plays an explanatory role to fill the gaps left 
in the contract.312 The CISG does not, however, contain any provision dealing with 
the currency of payment so that the currency determined in the contract might 
prevail.313  
South African law 
For a sales contract to be perfect, parties must reach agreement on the price or let it 
be determinable.314 In the words of Coetzee, “if it is possible to determine the price 
by means of an easy calculation or if a third party is to determine the price, the 
requirement is met on determination of the price.”315 Lehmann complements this by 
stating that, for a contract to be one of sale, there must be a price “fixed in definite 
sum, or capable of being fixed by the use of external standard without further 
                                               
309
 Cf. Article 53 which requires the buyer to pay the price (…) “as required in the contract (…).” 
310
 See Article 55 CISG in fine. 
311
 See Article 9; see also Gabriel 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 273 277. 
312
 See Sevon Obligations 203 209; Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 824; 
Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:36 91-53; UNCITRAL Digest 272 §1. 
313
 For solutions proposed in the case, see Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 794-797; 
Butler/ Harindranath in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 806-808. 
314
 See Section 3.4.4 above. 
315
 Coetzee Incoterms 87. 
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reference to the parties themselves;316 e.g. by counting, weighing, or measuring the 
things sold,317 or the seller’s usual price,318 or the current market price (…) (italics 
added).”319  
It follows from Lehmann’s statement, and cases from which the author found 
support, that the price may be assessed either by reference to goods as a stock, or 
their weight, measure, or a unit. It is clear then that, there are instances where the 
goods have to be counted, weighed, or measured before the price can be assessed. 
Those kinds of sales are called sales ad mensuram or ad quantitatem, opposed to 
sales ad corpus in which goods are sold together for a single stipulated price.320 That 
is to say, contracting parties may freely adopt one or another method of evaluating 
the price as they see fit. The common law seems silent on the residual rule in a 
situation whether parties have opted for a price set by weight. With regard to the 
method of payment, nevertheless, it is required that payment be made in the national 
legal tender,321 “unless otherwise agreed.”322 Thus, as South African Rand323 has 
legal tender in the country, “the seller may refuse payment by cheque, bill of 
exchange, postal order, or money order.”324  
                                               
316
 Cf. Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 
(A) 574. 
317
 Kotze v Frenkel & Co 1929 AD 418. 
318
 See Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333 338; R v Kramer 1948 (3) SA 48 (N); Erasmus v Arcade 
Electric 1962 (3) SA 418 (T) 420; Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) 
SA 663 (T) 668; and Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt 1986 (4) SA 523 (C). 
319
 See Lehmann Sale 888 891; finding counsel in R v Pearson 1942 EDL 117; Erasmus v Arcade 
Electric 1962 (3) SA 418 (T) 420.  
320
 See Kerr Sale 30 and 72-75; see also Coetzee Incoterms 87 Fn360 and 361. 
321
 For what constitutes legal tender in South Africa, see s 17 of the South African Reserve Bank 
Act 90 of 1989; see also Exdev (Pty) Ltd v Yeoman Properties 1007 (Pty) Ltd [2008] 2 All SA 223 
(SCA).  
322
 It is acknowledged that, when parties agree on payment in a foreign currency, the latter can be 
converted into South African currency. In such circumstances, the rate of exchange at which 
conversion is to be made is that which prevails at the time of payment. See Barry Colne & Co 
(Transvaal) Ltd v Jackson’s Ltd 1922 CPD 372; Bassa Ltd v East Asiatic (SA) Co Ltd 1932 NPD 
386 391; Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Dampskibsselskabet Torm Ltd 1988 (4) SA 671 (N) 
672F-674H; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) 776J-
777B; see also cases quoted by Lotz Sale 361 370 Fn59.   
323
 See s 15 of South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. 
324
 See Lotz Sale 361 370. But, Trollip J, in Esterhuyse v Selection Cartage (Pty) Ltd 1965 (1) SA 
360 (W), who, in 1965, emphasised the importance of payments by cheque in commercial 
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Congolese law  
The buyer must pay for the goods because payment constitutes the counterpart of the 
delivery obligation fulfilled by the seller. He/she is normally obliged to pay the price 
mutually fixed in the contract.325 If the buyer defaults on making the payment, the 
seller is not bound to deliver the goods even for any previous debt overdue.326 With 
regard to its assessment, case law states that the price should be fixed either according 
to the block of goods or by reference to each piece of them.327 Articles 266 and 267 
CCO allude also to contracts for which goods are not sold in block, but by weight, 
number, or measure.328  
Following from these provisions, it may be implied that where goods are sold 
by weight, number, or measure, the price is also calculated according to the weight, 
the unit (piece), or the measure of those goods. Where parties have preferred to 
determine their price by reference to the weight, the Commercial Act recommends 
that price to be calculated net weight in case of doubt.329 Additionally, if the contract 
is silent with regard to the determination of the price, the market price should 
                                               
contracts. As Trollip said, “(…) in an ordinary commercial contract, in the absence of anything 
signifying the contrary, only some slight indication in the contract or evidence would generally 
suffice for inferring or implying that payment of the creditor can be effected by cheque, because 
that is now a widely used and recognised medium of payment in such transactions.” Ruling 
confirmed in Vena and Another v Vena and Others (2461/2008) [2009] ZAECPEHC 26; 2010 (2) 
SA 248 (ECP) (28 May 2009). Up until recently, payment by cheque was considered as the most 
popular method of payment. These days, owing to fraud and cost implications it entails, payment 
by cheque has been supplemented by newer modes of payment, i.e. the use of electronic funds 
transfer and credit cards. These means of payment are currently preferred because of their rapidity 
and the security they provide to sellers and buyers. See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 156. 
325
 Cf. First sentence of Article 263 al. 1 UAGCL. The price may also be determined according to 
commercial dealings or trade usages. It was ruled, in this respect, that a buyer who receives invoices 
submitted to him without protest recognises himself to be the debtor. See L’shi 1 December 1970 
RJC 1971 No. 1 33. 
326
 Cf. Cameroun 19 January 2004 Appeal Court of the Littoral (Douala), Case No. 45/REF SFID-
PFI v Uchegbusi S [http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ohadata/J-06-188.html] (accessed 6-4-
2013).  
327
 See Burkina Faso 13 June 2007 Grande Inst Ouagadougou, Case No. 83/2007 Société de Gestion 
du Patrimoine Ferroviaire du Burkina (SOPAFER) v I GUIGMA & R Ouedraogo Sabane 
[http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence/ ohadata/J-06-39.html] (accessed 20- 3-2013). 
328
 As stated by Article 266 CCO, “Where goods are not sold in block but by weight, number, or 
measure, a sale is not complete, in that the things sold are at the risk of the seller until they have 
been weighed, counted, or measured (…).”  
329
 Article 265 UAGCL; compare with Article 56 CISG. 
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indisputably apply.330 As it is observed, in Congolese law, contracting parties have 
many means of evaluating the purchase price. In all cases, the price stated in the 
contract is supposed to be stipulated out of charge; which means that the buyer bears 
any costs relating to the payment.331 
As is for the CISG, the Commercial Act does not allude to the currency of 
payment.332 Where the contract is concluded in, or is to be performed, in the DRC, it 
is assumed that there the price will normally be paid in Congolese national tender, 
i.e. the “Franc Congolais” (FC),333 except where parties have stipulated to the 
contrary.334 In practice, however, parties prefer to stipulate payment in foreign 
currencies (mainly in American dollars and Euros) because of the FC frequent 
devaluation.335 In compliance with Article 2 al.1 ERCA, these kinds of transactions 
may be paid in any foreign currencies allowed by the BCC. 
                                               
330
 See Article 263 al. 2 UAGCL; see also L’shi 13 December 1966 RJC No. 1 54; L’shi 1 
December 1970 RJC 1971 No. 1 33; and comments in Section 2.4.4.  
331
 Cf. Sentence two of Article 263 al. 1 UAGCL; compared to Articles 269 and 146 CCO which 
charge all costs regarding the sale to the buyer or the debtor in general. 
332
 Santos and Toe (Commercial 404) argue that such a silence is justified by the fact that almost 
all OHADA countries belong to a same monetary zone, i.e. the zone CFA, the DRC being the 
exception. Article 6/13 of the DUACL proposes that where a monetary obligation is expressed in 
a currency different from that of the place for payment, the latter may be used to extinguish the 
obligation. The exceptions to this are where the currency in question is not convertible or if parties 
did not provide a possibility of replacement.   
333
 See Article 1 of the New Monetary Unit Law-Decree No. 80 of 17 June 1998 (JORDC Special 
No. of 30 June 1998); and Article 170 of the Constitution which recognise the FC as unique national 
legal tender.  
334
 Generally, private agreements must be stipulated in FC. (See the first sentence of Article 1 of 
the Operations in National and Foreign Currencies Law-Decree No. 4/2001 of 31 January 2001; 
Article 2 al.3, first sentence, of the Central Bank (BCC) Exchange Regulation Control Act (ERCA) 
of 22 February 2001; Article 18 of the BCC Law-Ordinance No. 93-002 of 28 September 1993, as 
amended by Law No. 5-2002 of 7 May 2002 (JORDC Special No. of 22 May 2002 58)). See also 
CSJ 24 February 2006 RC 2193 Mpumba Kyalo v BDEGL BA 2004-2009 TI 214, as interpreted in 
Goma 10 January 2007 RCA 1531 Mpumba Kyalo v BDEGL (unreported decision), which declared  
null and void a contract stipulated in the Belgian Franc. (This decision is not beyond criticism). 
Because Congolese residents are also granted the freedom of holding foreign currencies (Cf. Article 
1 ERCA), however, contracts may legally be stated in a foreign currency in line with the methods 
established by the BCC. (See Article 1, second sentence, of the Law-Decree No. 4/2001, and 
second sentence of Article 2 al.3 ERCA).  
335
 This is confirmed by the words of the Congolese Minister of Finance and the Governor of BCC 
which state that around 90 per cent of banking deposits are made in US Dollars, and about 95 per 
cent of credit granted by commercial banks is paid in the same currency. See AFP 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20130403T162 128 Z20130403T162124Z/ (accessed 5-4-
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Comments  
The CISG, South African law, and Congolese law all have formulated as principle 
that the price is set in the contract and that parties are free to  determine it as they 
want, selecting from a number of methods determined by the law. In particular, the 
principles relating to the assessment of the price reveal that the UAGCL has largely 
been influenced by the CISG. As is for the Convention, the Commercial Act provides 
the “net weight” as the default way of determining the price where goods are charged 
with reference to their weight. Similarly, both instruments are silent as regards the 
currency of payment, which is consequently determined by virtue of the applicable 
domestic law, unless otherwise agreed. It has been observed, however, that, though 
Congolese law prescribes the FC as currency of payment, parties prefer foreign 
currencies in contrast to the situation in South Africa. On the issue of costs entailed 
by payment, the Uniform Act appears clearer than the CISG as it specifies that the 
price contractually fixed is stipulated exclusive of costs. But, as a whole, modern 
                                               
2013); Unknown http://radiookapi.net/economie/2012/09/11/rdc-le-gouverne ment-sengage-la-
dedollarisation-des-transactions-monetaires/ (accessed 12-9-2012). There are, moreover, a number 
of cases in which even damages in litigation and judicial costs are stipulated in US dollars, Euros 
or in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (in French Droits de Tirages Speciaux – DTS), instead of the 
FC, or “indexed” to those foreign currencies. For reference to the SDR, see Kin/Gombe 28 June 
2012 RCA 28 817 Air France v Maluna (760.00 SDR indexed in line with the Euro); Tricom 
Kin/Gombe 21 December 2010 RCE 1457 (1,350.00USD indexed to 1,000.00 SDR). For 
stipulation in US dollar or its equivalent in FC, see among others, Goma 13 February 2008 RCA 1 
532 Kambale Isemimbi v Mugabo Nkeka; Goma 12 November 2008 RCA 1 581 Mapendo 
Dieudonné & others v Tours Hotels Sarl & others; Goma 23 March 2011 RCA 1 604 Rwabahenda 
Desiré v Maisha Bosco; Goma 21 May 2008 RCA 1 654 Matongo bin Katunga v Kasole Mwanda 
& Amissi Famba; Goma 7 May 2008 RCA 1 666bis Muhindo Sirisombola v Paluku Kasambili;  
Kin/Gombe 24 May 2012 RCA 28 402 Celtel-Congo v Kombozi Kitenge; Kin/Gombe 28 June 2012 
RCA 28 410 GSA Co v Alain Grevesy; Kin/Gombe 13 September 2012 RCA 28 875 Kabamba 
Kanyinda v Celtel-Congo; Kin/Gombe 26 September 2012 RCA 29 071 Bolongi Bomponge v Cilu 
Sarl; Tricom Kin/Gombe 27 December 2010 RCE 1 573 Jacob’s Sprl v Kabongo Development 
Company; Tricom Kin/Gombe 29 May 2012 RCE 2 155 Siforco Sprl v Fret in Construct Sprl; 
Tricom Kin/Matete 19 October 2011 RCE 485 Basakwawu v Cinat Sarl; Tricom Kin/Matete 12 
September 2012 RCE 640/766 EBAG Sprl Agency v NRJ Sprl; Tricom Kin/Matete 7 November 
2012 RCE 748 Richard Wynne v Sobaco Sprl; Tricom L’shi 20 January 2010 RAC 213 Mme 
Brigitte Kaloko & others v Groupe Luigi; Tricom L’shi 23 December 2009 RAC 214 FID Consult 
Sprl & Jean Moran v La Gecamine; and Tricom L’shi 2 February 2009 RAC 228 Oni Congo 
Trading Sprl v Demco Sprl (unreported decisions). 
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Congolese law is consistent with the CISG and South African law on the assessment 
of the price subject.  
 
6.3.3.3 Place of payment  
 
The CISG  
Rules relating to the place of payment are established by Article 57.336 As for other 
contractual issues, this provision relies on the party autonomy principle in 
determining the place of payment. It is not uncommon, however, that parties fail to 
indicate the place where payment is to be performed. In those circumstances, the 
provisions of Article 57 will fill the gap as evidenced by the phrase “if the buyer is 
not bound to pay the price at any other particular place”. In detail, the provision under 
consideration provides a double default place for payment. Pursuant to Article 
57(1)(a), first, where the buyer is not bound to pay at a specific place, the seller’s 
place of business plays the role of place of payment. This ruling was expressly 
implemented by the Austrian Supreme Court in the Gasoline and Gas Oil case as 
follows: 
Failing an agreement to the contrary, the interpretative rule of Article 57(1)(a) CISG 
determines that the buyer was bound to pay the price at the seller’s place of business 
in Hungary (the seller’s place of business needs to be established under Article 10 
CISG). The purchase price is a debt payable at the creditor’s place of business.337 
                                               
336
 Article 57 states,  
(1) If the buyer is not bound to pay the price at any other particular place, he must pay it to the 
seller: 
(a) At the seller’s place of business; or 
(b) If the payment is to be made against the handing over of the goods or of documents, at the 
place where the handing over takes place. 
(2) The seller must bear any increase in the expenses incidental to payment which is caused by 
a change in his place of business subsequent to the conclusion of the contract. 
337
 Austria 22 October 2001 Bundesgericht Supreme Court Gasoline and Gas Oil case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/011022a3.html]; see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:43 91-
63; Sevon Obligations 203 212; Sevon http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sevon.html; 
Gabriel 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 273 277. 
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In addition to payment being made at the seller’s place of business, Article 57(1)(b) 
regulates the place for payment subject to an exchange of goods or documents. In 
accordance with this provision, where payment is made against the handing over of 
goods or documents, the place where they are handed over amounts to the place of 
payment. 
In principle, the buyer bears any costs and risks relative to the payment of the 
price. But, if extra costs are due to the change of the place of payment by the seller, 
they are to his/her charge. That is the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 57 
which obliges the seller to bear any increases in the expenses that are the consequence 
of a change of the place of payment after the conclusion of the contract. 
South African law 
As a rule, the buyer must pay the price at the place expressly or implicitly determined 
by the parties in the contract.338 The place of payment may also be determined by the 
course of dealing or trade usages.339 When parties fail to reach agreement on the 
place, or where there are no elements from which it could be implied, the question is 
whether which of the seller or the buyer has to seek out the other party for payment. 
In response, Ng’ong’ola is unclear about how to settle the issue. The learned author 
declares that, “it has not always been very certain that a debtor has a duty to seek out 
his creditor before he has been placed in mora by a due demand.”340 Differently from 
him, Bradfield and Lehmann explain clearly that,  
(…) the residual obligation is, in the case of a cash sale, to pay the price where the 
property sold is delivered. In the case of a credit sale, the buyer must tender payment 
to the seller to avoid breach of the contract, and such payment must be at any place 
that is convenient to the parties and where the buyer may lawfully perform in terms 
of the contract. In the latter case that will usually be the place where the contract was 
concluded.341  
                                               
338
 See Hackwill Sale 203; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 104; see also Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 99 Fn734; 
taking support on Van Loggenberg v Sachs 1940 WLD 253; and Venter v Venter 1949 (1) SA 768 
(A) 778. 
339
 Hackwill Sale 203; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 99. 
340
 See Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 236.   
341
 Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 99.  
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It is important to note that in the earlier cases, it was the creditor’s duty, meaning the 
seller, to seek out the buyer for payment.342 In modern business practices, however, 
it is rather the buyer who must look for the seller for payment. This innovative 
approach was formulated by Ramsbottom J in the Goldfields Confectionery and 
Bakery v Norman Adam case as follows:  
The common practice in the business world is for the debtor to go to the creditor; he 
either takes his money or cheque himself, or he sends it by messenger, without any 
consideration of the question whether the debtor is obliged to pay in that way or 
whether he has the right to refuse to pay until the creditor calls or sends for his 
money. It is the ordinary practice of business, of which the court can take notice, for 
creditors to send out statements of account and for debtors to pay those accounts by 
taking or sending money to their creditors.343   
Following from the authorities above, it is clear that, except in cases where the place 
of payment is dealt with in the contract, there are two supplementary places where 
the buyer may fulfil his/her payment obligation. These are the place where the 
contract was concluded, and the place where the contract is performed. As was 
discussed in section 6.2.2.2 above, most of the time the place of formation of the 
contract and its place of performance coincide. Succinctly, the place of performance 
corresponds to the place of delivery, meaning the seller’s place of business.344 
Therefore, the main residual place of payment is seller’s place of business, or 
alternatively his/her residence.  
Congolese law 
The place of delivery is regulated in Article 266 UAGCL which states that the 
payment of the price is fulfilled either at seller’s place of operations or at the place 
of delivery if the price is paid in cash, or if delivery is performed against the exchange 
of documents. Usually, the place of delivery is determined in the contract. That was 
the meaning of Article 327 CCO which obliged the buyer to pay the price “on the 
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 For an illustration, see Venter v Venter 1949 (1) SA 768 (A) 778. 
343
 Goldfields Confectionery and Bakery (Pty) Ltd v Norman Adam (Pty) Ltd 1950 2 SA 763 (T) 
769-770. 
344
 See Zulman/Kairinos Sale 104; Hackwill Sale 77; and CPA s 19(2) (b).  
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day and at the place fixed by the sale (emphasis added).”345 It is only where the 
contract is silent as regards the place for payment that the default rules in Article 266 
UAGCL will be applied. 
 In detail, Article 266 of the OHADA Commercial Act designates a double 
place for payment, the place where the seller has his/her head office, and the place 
of delivery. With regard to the first residual rule, it requires the buyer to pay at the 
seller’s centre of operations. By so stating, Article 266 is contrary to the civil code 
rule on payment in Article 145 CCO.346 Pursuant to that rule, the buyer was supposed 
to pay at the place where the contract was concluded or at least at his/her own place 
of business (or domicile).347 In other words, within the CCO’s ambience, the seller 
had the obligation of seeking out the buyer before payment. This rule was known via 
a general principle of law worded as, “La dette est quérable et non portable.”348 With 
the UAGCL, commercial debts are no longer querable, but portable, means payable 
at the seller’s place of business. Because commercial debts are transportable, it is an 
obligation of the buyer to seek out the seller for payment, but not the inverse, or 
he/she will bear responsibility for breach of contract.  
Regarding the second residual rule, it recommends that the price be paid at the 
place of delivery.349 A comparable hypothesis may occur in two circumstances, 
namely where it is a cash sale, and payment is due at the time of delivery, or if 
delivery is subject to the handing over of documents. Article 266 does not require 
the buyer to pay the price at his/her own place of business, but at the place of delivery 
                                               
345
 Read this with the first sentence of Article 263 UAGCL; and Article 145 al.1, first sentence, 
CCO.  
346
 As stipulated by the second sentence of Article 145 al. 1 CCO, and the second paragraph of the 
same provision,  
Payment must be made in the place provided by the agreement.  
Where a place is not designated, payment, if it is for a thing certain and determined, must be 
made at the place where the thing forming the object of the obligation was at the time of that 
obligation. 
Apart from the two cases above, payment must be made at the domicile of the debtor. 
347
 Cf. Article 145 al. 3 CCO. 
348
 (“The debt is collectible, but not portable.”) 
349
 Article 266, second part UAGCL; compare with Article 328 CCO for which, where the contract 
is silent as for the place of payment, “the buyer must pay at the place (…) where delivery is to be 
made.” 
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of the goods. That is to say, if parties have agreed on a specific place for delivery, 
the same agreement would produce legal effects with respect to the place for payment 
without the need of a special clause on the latter issue. If there is no agreement as to 
a particular place for delivery, however, the place where the contract was concluded, 
which generally corresponds to the seller’s place of business will prevail, unless 
when goods are manufactured or stored elsewhere.350 In a situation of the kind, the 
place of manufacture or the place of storage will amount to the place of payment. 
Likewise, if the contract involves the handing over of goods to a carrier, the place 
where goods are handed over would play the role of place of payment.351 The same 
rule applies also in cases where the sale is performed step-by-step and delivery is 
made against exchange of documents.  
Comments  
The place of payment is fixed by the parties in the contract. Such being the principle 
admitted by all of the three legal systems being considered, rules  provided by Article 
57 CISG, Article 266 UAGCL, and South African common law are residual rules 
used to supplement the failure of the parties. Compared to South African and 
Congolese laws, the CISG posits a clear ruling by choosing the seller’s place of 
business as the main default place for payment, except where payment depends on 
the exchange of documents. With regard to South African law, it selects the place of 
the contract or its place of performance, while Congolese law points at the seller’s 
centre of operations or the place for delivery. After interpretation, it becomes clear 
that the places selected by both of South African and Congolese laws converge at the 
seller’s place of business. Subsequent to that interpretation, the seller’s place of 
business appears to be the main default place of payment in all of the three legal 
systems being studied. As regards the DRC, in particular, the rules relating to the 
place of payment have restructured civil law principles so that, currently, the buyer 
bears the responsibility of seeking out the seller, instead of the seller coming to the 
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 Cf. Article 251 UAGCL relating to the place for delivery. 
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 Cf. Article 252 al. 1 UAGCL. 
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buyer for payment. Commercial debts “portability” appears to be a good progress as 
it safeguards the seller against any risk related to the currency of payment or the 
transfer of funds. 
 
6.3.3.4 Time for payment 
 
The CISG 
The time for payment is ruled by Articles 58 and 59. The basic principle in these 
provisions is that the time for payment is freely determined by parties in the contract 
as is the case for the place of payment. This is implied from the use of the expression 
“if the buyer is not bound to pay at any specific time”.352 In addition, these provisions 
highlight the fact that goods should be exchanged for payment of the price, and vice 
versa. Thus, as stated by Sevon, “The seller is not obliged to extend credit to the 
buyer and the buyer is not required to pay until he receives the goods or documents 
controlling their disposition.”353 More specifically, Article 58(1) provides that where 
parties did not reach agreement on the time of payment, the price is paid at the time 
of the delivery of the goods or of the documents controlling the goods.354 In such a 
case, the seller may subordinate the handing over of goods and documents to the 
payment.355 
                                               
352
 See Article 58(1) CISG. Article 59 specifies that the buyer must pay the price on the “date fixed 
by or determinable from the contract” and the CISG without the need for any request or compliance 
with any formality on the part of the seller. For application, see Slovak Republic 11 October 2010 
District Court in Michalovce [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/101011k1.html]; Serbia 18 June 
2008 Foreign Trade Court attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce One-day old female 
chicken case. 
353
 Cf. Second part of Article 58(1) CISG; Sevon Obligations 203 215; Sevon 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ biblio/sevon.html 335; see also Kuoppala http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kuoppala.html; and Kritzer/ Eiselen Contract §91:52 91-78. 
354
 According to Article 58(1) CISG, in the absence of an agreement on the time of payment, the 
buyer must pay the price “when the seller places either the goods or the documents controlling their 
disposition at the buyer’s disposal in accordance with the contract” or the CISG.  
355
 See Article 58(1), second sentence, and particularly Article 58(2) which reads: “If the contract 
involves carriage of the goods, the seller may dispatch the goods on terms whereby the goods, or 
documents controlling their disposition, will not be handed over to the buyer except against 
payment of the price.” 
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 As the drafters of the CISG-AC Opinion No. 11 explain, the expression 
“documents controlling their disposition” has to be understood as referring to “any 
document (electronic or paper) that entitles the buyer to take possession of the goods 
or, once in the hands of the buyer, establishes that the seller no longer has the right 
to control disposition of the goods.”356 The concept “documents controlling the 
goods” refers, in other words, to situations where goods are delivered only against 
documents as it is for CIF sales.357 As was mentioned in section 6.2.3.4, these types 
of documents include negotiable bills of lading, straight bills of lading, the 
consignor’s copy of air waybill, and ship’s delivery orders.358  
It is important to note that the responsibility of the buyer to pay the price is not 
limited to a mere handing over of money. Rather, in keeping with Article 54, it 
includes “taking such steps and complying with such formalities as may be required 
under the contract or any (…) (governing) law to enable payment (…)” at the 
appointed time, without need for any request from the seller.359 Scholars and case 
law admit that the relevance of Article 54 consists of ensuring that the buyer complies 
with government procedures together with commercial or banking requirements.360 
Accordingly, preliminary actions that the buyer may perform in connection with the 
payment include the opening of a letter of credit, negotiating banking facilities, or 
accepting a bill of exchange.361 Mohs puts it that,  
The most secure way to arrange for the payment of the purchase price is by 
implementing a documentary credit. (…) Such payment arrangements are usually 
incorporated into an international sales contract by using the payment clause ‘L/C’ 
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 CISG-AC Opinion No. 11 §5. 
357
 See Sevon Obligations 203 216; Sevon http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sevon.html.  
358
 For a full list of documents controlling goods, see Davies’ comments on CISG-AC Opinion No. 
11 §6. 
359
 Read Article 54 with Article 59 CISG. 
360
 See Osuna-Gonzalez 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 299-323; Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer 
Commentary 811; Butler/Harindranath in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 803. For case 
law, see Russia 17 October 1995 Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian 
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry; CLOUT case No. 142 [http://cisgw3. 
law.pace.edu/cases/951017r1.html] (accessed 17-5-2013). In this case, the buyer was held liable 
because he failed to give an order to his bank without ensuring that payment would be performed 
in a convertible currency. 
361
 See UN Secretariat Commentary as reported by Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:16 91-21. 
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or ‘letter of credit’. These clauses are frequently used in international trade because 
they present one of the most secured ways of executing an international payment.362   
If parties have reached agreement on payment by letter of credit, therefore, the failure 
of the buyer to procure one as stipulated in the contract may amount to a breach of 
the sale.363 In the same way, if the buyer delays payment because of banking 
formalities, he/she may bear responsibility for late payment.  
South African law  
Within South African sales law, the buyer must pay the price at the time agreed in 
the contract.364 If there is a failure to determine a date in the contract, payment is due 
at the time of delivery.365 As was claimed while discussing the issue of the place of 
payment, the payment is not due immediately after the conclusion of the contract, 
but when the goods are delivered. Where parties have agreed on a specific time for 
delivery, the same agreement will govern the time of payment. Simply, the time of 
payment takes place simultaneously with the time of delivery of the goods. In the 
particular case of payment, however, the law distinguishes between cash sales and 
credit sales in determining the time for payment.366 In cases of cash sales, payment 
should take place concomitantly with delivery,367 while for credit sales, payment 
must intervene within a reasonable time, meaning the last day for which credit was 
given.368 In either case, the buyer is permitted to refuse to pay the price if he/she is 
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 Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 800. 
363
 See Australia 17 November 2000 Supreme Court of Queensland Downs Investments v Perwaja 
Steel case; see, for comments, Gabriel 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 273 274; see also Kritzer/Eiselen 
Contract §91:16 91-22. 
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 Hackwill Sale 202; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 102.  
365
 See Eiselen in Scott Commerce 157; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 102; Kerr Sale 22; Hackwill Sale 
202.   
366
 For details, see Kerr Sale 222-223; Zulman/Kairinos Sale 102-104; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 
100.  
367
 There is an authority that, “In cash sales, payment should be made on delivery, and the purchaser 
cannot claim delivery unless he tenders the price. Where delivery has been made by the seller, the 
purchaser should pay immediately, i.e. within a reasonable interval.” (Voet 46.3.12 - Gane’s 
translation Vol VII 106-107); see also Lehmann Sale 888 904. 
368
 See Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 100; taking support on Celliers v Papenfus and Rooth 1904 TS 73 
79; Nel v Cloete 1972(2) SA 150 (A) 158E-F; Ver Elst v Sabena Belgian World Airlines 1983 (3) 
SA 637 (A) 644D-E.  
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not granted an opportunity to inspect the goods to ascertain whether they comply 
with the contract.369 South African law seems not to have ruled expressly about 
payment against the exchange of documents. 
Congolese law  
Comparable to the place for payment, the time payment is due is normally regulated 
in the contract. On this subject, Article 268 of the OHADA Commercial Act 
duplicates Article 59 CISG. As for the latter, Article 268 UAGCL obliges the buyer 
to pay the price “at the date agreed upon”370 without necessarily subordinating it to 
any request or formalities taken by the seller. It is only where parties fail to determine 
the due time that the provisions in Article 267 will apply. It should immediately be 
noted that, unlike Article 58(1) CISG, Article 267 UAGCL rules only on the due 
time for sales involving carriage. The right for the seller to retain the goods until total 
payment is, rather, regulated under the Section dealing with the obligation of taking 
of delivery.371  
Through Article 271 al. 1 UAGCL, the times for delivery, payment, and the 
time for taking delivery all coincide. All three events occur simultaneously and are 
mutually dependent. Such a ruling is beneficial for both parties on the grounds that 
the seller is allowed to keep the goods up until full payment is made and the buyer 
pay only when he/she has received delivery.372 In order to protect the buyer from 
taking delivery of defective goods, parties are allowed to subordinate the payment to 
a preliminary examination of the goods by the buyer.373 This situation has, however, 
the risk of delaying the time of payment. As has been mentioned earlier, with regard 
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 Hackwill Sale 204. 
370
 Compare this with Article 328 CCO which specifies that if “nothing has been fixed (…) at the 
time of the sale, the buyer must pay at the time when delivery is to be made”; see, for an illustration, 
Tricom Kin/Gombe 18 October 2011 Cimpex Sprl v Biz Africa Sprl. 
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 See Article 271 al. 1 UAGCL according to which, “When payment is due on the day of delivery 
and that the buyer delays taking delivery  of the goods, or does not pay for them, the seller, if he 
has the goods with him or under his control, is expected to keep them until they have been fully 
paid.”  
372
 See Santos/Toe Commercial 405. 
373
 Cf. Article 267 al. 2 UAGCL.   
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to sales involving carriage, the seller fulfils his/her delivery duty by handing the 
goods to a carrier.374 Because in similar situation the seller may suffer from a buyer’s 
insolvency, Article 267 al. 1 UAGCL authorises him/her to retain the goods or the 
document controlling their disposition until definitive payment.375 With the 
combination of the two rules, there is now a balance between the obligation of 
delivery on the part of the seller and the payment of the price on the part of the buyer. 
Comments  
The time for payment is one of the most important moments of the performance of 
buyer’s duties. This period is generally stated in the contract. In the context of the 
CISG, where the contract is silent regarding the time for payment, the time when the 
goods or the documents controlling the disposition of the goods are delivered 
corresponds to the time of payment. Though domestic laws do not rule expressly 
about documents, they have also adopted the day of delivery as the default time for 
payment. The provisions of the Commercial Act dealing with the time of delivery, in 
particular, have largely been influenced by their comparable CISG provisions. They 
read like duplicates. All of them weigh the rights of the parties so that the delivery 
and payment times are concomitant, unless it is otherwise stipulated in the contract. 
So, in the same way as the buyer may subject payment to the examination of the 
goods, the seller may also retain the goods and documents controlling those goods 
up to the day they have been paid for in full. Given these similarities, the UAGCL 
puts Congolese law in line with the Vienna Convention on the subject of the time for 
delivery. Compared to South African law, however, Congolese law does not 
distinguish between sales for cash and credit sales with regard to the time of payment. 
The ruling adopted under South African law is, therefore, recommended to improve 
Congolese law in this respect.  
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 Cf. Article 252 UAGCL. 
375
 The Commercial Act invokes “document” in the singular, while the CISG speaks of 
“documents” in the plural. It is deemed that the UAGCL alludes to the “negotiable bill of lading” 
which is the most used carriage document.    
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6.3.4 Taking Delivery of the Goods 
 
The CISG 
The obligation of the buyer regarding the taking delivery of the goods is ruled under 
Article 60.376 According to this provision, the buyer’s obligation to take delivery is 
twofold; it consists in facilitating the delivery and taking over the goods. In detail, 
Article 60(a) obliges the buyer to perform “all the acts which could reasonably be 
expected of him in order to enable the seller to make delivery.”377 Many scholars 
have argued in this regard that Article 60(a) means that where the buyer has, for 
instance, to collaborate in carriage arrangements, the taking delivery obligation 
“covers the duty to enter into a contract of carriage.”378 Such cooperation is needed 
in order to enable the seller to fulfil his/her delivery obligation by handing the goods 
over to the carrier for transmission to the buyer.379 Similarly, if the seller has to 
deliver at the buyer’s place of business, the buyer is obliged to cooperate with the 
seller by keeping facilities ready for the delivery.380   
In addition to the cooperation in the process of delivery, the buyer must also 
take over the goods delivered.381 This obligation covers the primary responsibility of 
the buyer to take control of the goods physically. As Guerin has said, the buyer’s 
obligation to take over the goods “is of importance where the contract calls for the 
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 As stated by Article 60,  
The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists: 
(a) In doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable the seller 
to make delivery; and 
(b) In taking over the goods. 
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 Mohs in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 863; see also Butler/Harindranath in 
Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 850; compare this with Russia 24 January 2002 Tribunal 
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Industry Arbitral Award Iron Products case, CISG-Online 88 (Pace). 
378
 Sevon Rights 203 232; Sevon http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sevon.html 232; 
Gabriel 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 273 282; Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG 
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 Cf. Articles 31(a) and 32(1) CISG.  
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 See Articles 60(b) CISG. 
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seller to make delivery by placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal at a particular 
place or at the seller’s place of business.”382 In such a case, the buyer must physically 
remove the goods from that place in order to fulfil his/her obligation to take delivery. 
Failing to do so in a reasonable time may amount to a fundamental breach leading 
the seller to annul the sale.383  
South African law 
A second obligation of the buyer, under South African law, in addition to the 
payment of the price, consists in taking delivery of the item sold. In this regard, there 
are authorities that state that, “The buyer must take delivery of the thing sold, and, if 
necessary, remove it, upon due tender of the article at the contract time and place.”384 
In other words, as is the case under the CISG, in South African law, the buyer is 
obliged to receive the goods at the time and place contractually agreed on. It is 
acknowledged that where the contract is silent with regard to the time and place of 
receipt of the goods, “the buyer must collect them from the seller within a reasonable 
period of time at the buyer’s (sic) place of business or where the goods were situated 
at the time of the contract.”385 Because taking delivery is one of the main obligations 
of the buyer, a buyer who neglects to do so in the time agreed falls into mora 
creditoris.386 The essence of the concept mora creditoris consists of making the 
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 Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties_obligations_by% 20Naiyana_Guerin. 
doc; see also Article 31(b) and (c) CISG. 
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 See Articles 61 to 64; see also Kritzer/Eiselen Contract §91:76 91-107; taking support on 
Switzerland 12 December 2002 Kantonsgericht [District Court] Zug Methyl tertiary-butyl ether 
case [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cases/021212s1.html]; China 31 May 1999 CIETAC Arbitration 
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 See Volpe Sale 139; Eiselen in Scott Commerce 157; Hackhill Sale 207; see also authorities 
quoted by Zulman/Kairinos Sale 108-109. 
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 Eiselen in Scott Commerce 157; see also Zulman/Kairinos Sale 108; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 
94. 
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 See Volpe Sale 139. The word mora refers to a period of time offered to one party to perform 
his/her contractual obligations. It means, in other words, “a wrongful failure to perform timeously”. 
See Mulligan 1952 (69) SALJ 276; quoted by Kerr Contract 615. 
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buyer responsible for failing to cooperate with the seller in order to enable him/her 
to achieve his/her delivery obligation.387  
Congolese law  
The obligation of the buyer to take delivery of the goods is regulated by Articles 269 
to 274 UAGCL which mix the taking of delivery obligation with rules relating to the 
examination of the goods. Article 269 has tried to adapt to the ruling in Article 60 
CISG. As is for the latter, the Commercial Act imposes on the buyer the obligation 
to take delivery by performing acts which enable the seller to deliver the goods and 
then taking over the goods. Requiring the buyer to perform acts enabling the seller 
to achieve his/her delivery duty implies, on the part of the buyer, collaboration with 
the seller. Thus, after the seller has put goods at the buyer’s disposal, either at his/her 
own place of business or by handing them to a carrier, the buyer must take over the 
goods. The failure to remove the goods in time amounts to a breach of the sale.388   
It is possible that the buyer, who has taken delivery of the goods, intends to 
reject them. In such a situation, the buyer is obliged to take such steps to preserve the 
goods as are reasonable in the circumstances. The buyer is authorised to retain the 
goods until he/she has been reimbursed by the seller for his/her expenses.389 If, 
furthermore, the seller takes time to return the rejected goods, the buyer may sell 
them after having notified the seller of that intention.390 
Comments 
The duty of taking delivery of the goods is similarly ruled in the CISG, South African 
law, and Congolese law. In all of them, taking delivery is coupled with a requirement 
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 Cf. LTA Construction Ltd v Minister of Public Works and Land Affairs 1992 (1) SA 837 (C) 
848 G; Martin Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens 2000 (3) SA 339 
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 See Article 272 al. 1 UAGCL; compare with Article 86 CISG.  
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for parties to collaborate in order to bring the sale to a good completion. The failure 
of the buyer to comply with these requirements constitutes a breach of the sale. The 
point of departure between the CISG and the Commercial Act is that, if the CISG 
regulates the examination of the goods under the framework of the obligations of the 
seller, modern Congolese law considers the examination of the goods as one of the 
obligations of the buyer upon taking delivery. It then regulates it under the section 
regulating the obligation of the buyer to take delivery. In spite of its location, 
however, the legal consequences are alike for both legal systems. 
Notwithstanding the incisive comment above, in all of the legal systems being 
considered, the buyer is primarily bound to pay the price at the time and place 
conjointly agreed or established by the law and to take delivery of the goods. In 
addition to these classical obligations, the buyer must also examine the goods in order 
to determine a potential lack of conformity in them.  
 
6.3.5 Examination of the Goods and Notice for Non-conformity 
 
The CISG  
The obligations of the buyer with regard to the conformity of the goods are regulated 
under Articles 38 and 39 CISG. In accordance with these provisions, the buyer must 
inspect the goods delivered and notify the seller of possible non-conformities in the 
time required if he/she is not to incur the liability of losing his/her remedies.391 In 
detail, Article 38(1) lays down a general principle that the buyer must examine the 
goods, or cause them to be examined, “within as short a period as is practicable in 
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 Article 38(1) and Article 39(1) state respectively,  
(1) The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a period 
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the circumstances.” The second paragraph of the same provision postpones the 
examination time up to the final destination of the goods in cases of contracts 
involving carriage. This exception also applies where goods have to be redirected in 
transit, or dispatched without reasonable opportunity for examination.392  
According to commentators and case law, Article 38 is prefatory to Article 39, 
for which “if sufficient and timely notice has not been given, the buyer cannot rely 
on any non-conformity of the goods, and has no remedies available to him.”393 Thus, 
it is only cases where the seller either knew of, or could not have been unaware of, 
the lack of conformity394 and cases in which the buyer has a reasonable excuse for 
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 Article 38(2) & (3) CISG; for application, see Russia 24 January 2000 Arbitration proceeding 
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html; Guerin http://www.spu.ac.th/.../TCCC_V_CISG_parties_obligations_ by%20Naiyana_ 
Guerin.doc; Butler Guide 4-40. For case law, see Italy 11 December 2008 Tribunale di Forli 
[District Court] Mitias v Solidea Srl (inspection made at the time of delivery, defects proved by 
pictures and notice given within seven days). It was held by a German District Court that, where 
the lack of conformity consists of excess delivery of different kinds of goods, a notice stating 
merely the value of the excess is insufficient. See Germany 5 December 2006 District Court Köln 
Plastic Faceplates for Mobile Telephones case.  
As a whole, Germanic legal systems have adopted a short period of time (notice to be given 
without undue delay, i.e. three to five days); Anglo-American legal systems have opted for a long 
period (reasonable time, i.e. up to four years). With regard to French legal systems countries, they 
have adopted a middle period (brief delay). Italy (60 days), Portugal (eight days); Latino American 
countries (one month to one year), and OHADA states (one month for disclosed defects, and one 
year for hidden defects) are amongst civil law countries with a precise period of time for giving 
notice. For an overview on the period within which notice must be given in different legal systems, 
see Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 624; Schwenzer 2009 (19) 1 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev. 103 105-106; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 749; Kruisinga Non-
Conformity 76-88; for Latino American countries, see Munoz Contracts 523; and for OHADA 
countries, see Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL. 
394
 See Article 40 CISG. For an illustration, see Sweden 5 June 1998 Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (Arbitration Award) Beijing Light Automobile Co v Connell (seller must have been 
aware of defects)  [http://cisgw3.law.pace .edu/cases/980605s5.html]; Germany 12 October 1995 
District Court Trier Wine case (seller could not be unaware that wine was watered) 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951012g1.html]; Germany 5 April 1995 District Court Landshut 
Sport Clothing case (seller admitted knowing of the non-conformity in the clothes) 
[http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/950405g1.html]; and ICC Arbitration Case No. 5713 of 1989 
(seller knew or could not be  unaware of non-conformity) [http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
895713i1.html] (all accessed 1-8-2012). 
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his/her failure to give a timely notice that are exempted from such a loss.395 The 
guarantee of period is, nevertheless, not unlimited. Pursuant to Article 39(2), the 
buyer has the duty to notify the seller of the defects “at latest in a period of two years” 
from the time of delivery; otherwise it loses once and for all the right to rely on lack 
of conformity remedies.396    
South African law 
Ng’ong’ola is tentative on the question of whether or not South African law 
prescribes “an express” duty to examine and give notice of defects in the item sold. 
As stated by him, although the importance of the examination of the thing sold and 
notice of possible latent defects is nowhere denied, “Some authorities equivocate as 
to whether such a duty exists.”397 Despite such hesitancy, it is indisputable that, as in 
all other legal systems, a seller, under South African law, must deliver goods free 
from any defect, whether latent or patent.398 If, in contrast, he/she delivers defective 
goods, the seller bears the responsibility for lack of conformity. For the buyer to 
discover deficiencies in the goods after delivery, he/she must have examined them 
or caused them to be inspected.  
One may find an illustration of the buyer’s obligation to inspect the goods in 
the words of Ramsbottom J formulated in the Lakier v Hager case. In this case, 
Ramsbottom J said,  
                                               
395
 See Article 44 CISG. Canellas clarifies this by saying that the relevance of Article 44 is “to 
avoid the unfair total loss of buyer’s remedies, (i.e. reducing the price or claiming damages), when 
an examination of the goods and notice has been carried out within a reasonable period of time.” 
See Canellas 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 261 264; see also Andersen 2005 (9) VJ 17 20; Kröll in 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 559.  
396
 See China 30 March 1999 CIETAC Arbitration proceeding Flanges case 
[http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 990330c2.html] (accessed 1-8-2012). It was ruled in this case 
that Article 40 does not apply beyond the two-year cut-off period provided by Article 39(2) CISG. 
But, the Swedish Beijing Light Automobile Co case in which, the Article 39(2) cut-off period is 
temperate; see comments by Andersen 2005 (9) VJ 17 19. 
397
 Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 234; finding advice in Scharzer v John Roderics Motors Ltd 
1940 OPD 170 179. In this case, it was admitted that the buyer was not bound to inspect new items. 
The question was whether the situation was similar for pre-owned items; the Court answered 
positively.  
398
 Cf. Section 6.2.4 above. 
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(…) The man is buying a very old car, and he must give it proper inspection. If he 
wishes to rely on defects existing at the time of the sale which are latent then, I think, 
he must show that he gave the car a proper inspection, and a proper inspection 
involves examining, at any rate, the external part of the car, whether that is 
underneath or on top.399 
Although the Lakier v Hager case involved an “old car”, it may be implied that at 
the time goods are delivered to the buyer he/she must examine them carefully. Such 
a requirement is justified by the fact that a buyer who fails to inspect the goods “may 
not be in a position to appreciate the existence of patent defects, and he takes the risk 
of being considered as having accepted the goods with their obvious, discoverable 
defects.”400 It has already been mentioned that the seller is generally responsible only 
for latent defects, meaning those defects which would not be apparent upon 
inspection by an ordinary reasonable person. As for patent defects, the seller is not 
responsible because the buyer is supposed to have concluded the contract knowingly.  
The discovery of latent defects in the property sold provides the buyer with a 
double remedy.  He/she may both return the thing sold and have the price repaid to 
him, or keep the thing sold and have a part of the price returned to him. These two 
remedies are commonly referred to as “the aedilitian remedies”.401 The aedilitian 
remedies consist of two distinctive actions, the “redhibitory action” (actio 
redhibitoria), which purports to rescind the sale and claim refund of the price if 
already paid, and the actio quanti minoris which aims to reduce the price 
proportionally to the actual value of the goods.402 With regard to their 
implementation, the actio redhibitoria can be used if the buyer believes that the 
defect has impaired the thing so that a reasonable person would not have paid for it 
                                               
399
 Lakier v Hager 1958 (4) SA 180 (T) 184; see also Kerr Sale 140-141. 
400
 Ng’ong’ola 1995 (7) RADIC 227 234; see, in the same sense, Hackwill Sale 88 and 134. 
401
 See Kerr Sale 106; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 80. 
402
 For further comments, see Zulman/Kairinos Sale 163-208; Kerr Sale 106-155; Volpe Sale 124-
132; Bradfield/Lehmann Sale 80-85; Sharrock Business 296-299; Lehmann Sale 888 899; compare 
with Articles 44 and 50 CISG. Of course, parties may agree that the seller will not be liable for 
latent defects in the article sold. A clause of this kind is called a “Voetstoots clause”. Voetstoots 
clauses are excluded from contracts governed by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005; and their 
effects are also limited for consumer contracts. See Sharrock Business 297; Christie/Bradfield 
Contract 165-167. 
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if he/she had known of the defect. In contrast, the actio quanti minoris is used as an 
alternative where the thing sold is not completely defective so that the buyer prefers 
to adjust the price and keep the contract in effect.403 The degree of the responsibility 
of the seller in respect of redhibitory actions varies depending on whether or not 
he/she knew of the defects. In the first case, the buyer may claim damages in addition 
to the price, whereas, in the second case, only the price paid should be claimed or 
reduced.404  
The actions available to the buyer in terms of aedilitian remedies are not 
perpetual. A buyer who has discovered latent defects in the goods, but has taken time 
to seek for the aedilitian remedy, is expected to have waived his/her rights to that 
remedy.405 Yet, scholars were hesitant on the real duration of the notification period 
in cases of latent defects.406 Currently, there are grounds for keeping a three-year 
period of time as the time limit for giving notice of latent defects as long as 
Parliament has not provided otherwise.407 This period runs from the time the buyer 
acquired, or should have acquired by exercise of reasonable care, knowledge of the 
defect in the thing sold.408 If the buyer fails to notify the seller of the latent defects in 
time, he/she loses the right to rely on aedilitian remedies. 
Congolese law 
The requirement for the examination of goods is regulated, in the DRC, by Article 
270 UAGCL which reproduces word by word Article 38 CISG. Compared to the 
latter provision, the first sentence of Article 270 al. 1 of the Commercial Act requires 
                                               
403
 Cf. Eiselen in Scott Commerce 162-163. 
404
 See Kroomer v Hess & Co 1919 AD 204; compare with Article 40 CISG. 
405
 See Goldblatt v Sweeny 1918 CPD 320; see also Vorster Bros v Louw 1910 TPD 1099. 
406
 According to Ng’ong’ola (1995 (7) RADIC 227 234), for instance, in 1969 that period was set 
at three years (emphasis added). For Lotz (Sale 361 382), “Until 30 November 1970 the actiones 
rhedibitoria and quanti minoris were subject to a shorter prescription period (of one year) (…).”  
407
 See s 11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, entered into effect on the 1st of December 1970. 
See also Van Niekerk/Schulze Trade 97; Sharrock Business 705; Lotz Sale 361 383. Section 11(d) 
of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 states that all debts for which there is no a specific period of 
prescription are prescribed by three years, except where Parliament has ruled otherwise. For the 
definition of the concept “debt” in the Act’s understanding, see Christie/Bradfield Contract 501. 
408
 s 12(3) of the Prescription Act. 
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the buyer to look at the goods or cause them to be inspected as soon as possible after 
taking delivery. Such being the general principle, Article 270 al. 2 accepts the 
examination to be postponed until the arrival of the goods at their destination only 
for sales involving carriage, and for goods redirected or redispatched.  
The examination duty as ruled by the OHADA Commercial Act is different 
from the one which was in force in the previous law particularly in connection with 
the place and time of examination and the time limit for giving notice of non-
conformity. As regards the place and the time of performance of the obligation of 
examination, there was authority that the inspection was to be performed at the time 
and the place of delivery, viz. immediately after the conclusion of the contract.409 
One should bear in mind that, until recently, the place and time of delivery 
corresponded in the DRC to the place and time of the formation of the contract. 
Nowadays, such concomitance has been judged inconsistent with the complexity of 
modern international transactions so that situations where the buyer collects the 
goods himself/herself are becoming more and more rare.410 Conscious of such an 
imperative, a number of cases delayed the inspection time limit until the arrival at 
the destination of the goods in some circumstances.411 That was the case for sales 
where the buyer was not able to inspect the goods or cause them to be inspected,412 
or if the buyer was not informed of the date of delivery.413 In addition, taking delivery 
                                               
409
 See First Inst Léo 5 March 1941 Rev Jur 1941 155, in Répertoire 135; and Article 264 CCO 
relating to the immediate enforceability of sales contracts.  
410
 Cf. Schlechtriem in Gaston/Smit Sales §6.02 6-10; Flechtner Honnold’s Uniform Law 313. 
411
 See First Inst Léo 5 March 1941 Rev Jur 1941 155; compared to Article 38(2) & (3) CISG. 
412
 There are authorities that state that the principle according to which goods must be examined at 
the moment and place of delivery has no effect if it was impossible for the buyer to inspect the 
goods before shipment. See Comm Brux 26 April 1951 Pas III 1953 29; Elis 16 August 1949 RJCB 
1950 120; Liège 16 November 1948 RJCB 1950 117; see also Katuala Code 185; Piron 125. 
413
 As ruled by the Lower Court of Kinshasa, 
As a rule, the inspection of the goods is performed at the moment and the place of delivery. But, 
when the seller, in spite of the purchaser’s express demand, let him unaware of the date of 
delivery, sends the goods and prevents him from examining the goods by himself or by third 
party, (…) the examination is delayed until the receipt of the goods at the place of destination.  
See First Inst Léo 5 March 1941 Rev Jur 1941 155; in Répertoire 135. 
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of the goods per se does not suffice to attest their approval by the buyer.414 There are, 
nevertheless, grounds for presuming that the buyer has approved the goods if he/she 
receives them without complaining about non-conformity after a brief delay.415 
As far as the notification of the defects is concerned, a number of scholars 
argue that in countries following the French law legal system, as is the case for the 
DRC, “there is no duty to give notice of lack of conformity.”416 According to them, 
the only requirement on the subject is that the action for lack of conformity be sued 
“within a brief delay from the discovery of the defect.”417 With humility, it is 
considered that this argument ought to be taken with reservations. In effect, although 
in most of civil law countries the civil code section dealing with the guarantee against 
latent defects does not set down “an explicit” duty on the part of the buyer to give 
notice of the defects, a similar obligation may be implied from provisions regulating 
the effects of obligations in general.418 To exemplify this, Articles 38 and 44 CCO 
deal with a practice well-known as the mise en demeure.419 As stated by Article 38 
CCO, “A debtor is given notice of default either through a demand or other equivalent 
act (…).” Article 44 CCO complements this by stating that, “Damages are due only 
                                               
414
 See First Inst Cost 17 September 1943 RJCB 1946 115; compare with First Inst Léo 8 September 
1951 JTO 1952 151. 
415
 Elis 28 February 1956 RJCB 1956 209. 
416
 See Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer Commentary 624; Schwenzer 2009 (19) 1 Pace Int’l 
L. Rev. 103 105; see also Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 596 where the authors 
refer to Article 1648 FCC. For a list of civil law countries with an express obligation of notice rule, 
see Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/ Schwenzer Commentary 624 Fn13; Thieffry 1988 (22) 4 Int’l L 
1017 1024. 
417
 Cf. Article 1648 FCC which reads, “The action resulting from redhibitory defects must be 
brought to court by the buyer within a brief delay depending on the nature of the defects and the 
usages of the place where the sale was concluded.” For comments, see Schwenzer 2009 (19) 1 Pace 
Int’l L. Rev. 103 105; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/ Viscasillas UN Convention 596; Thieffry 1988 (22) 
4 Int’l L 1017 1024. As explained below, Article 1648 is differently worded from its comparable 
Article 325 CCO. 
418
 See Articles 33 to 62 CCO, especially Articles 38 and 44, which correspond to Articles 1134 to 
1164, especially Articles 1139 and 1146; read with Article 234 UAGCL and Article 265 al. 3 CCO 
extending the general principles of the law of contract to sales contracts. 
419
 The expression “Mettre en demeure” is defined as “giving a formal notice” to a party to perform 
an act or an obligation within a time limit on responsibility of legal consequences. See Glossary by 
Crabb Constitution 383. The same meaning applies to the French concept “dénoncer” used in the 
French version of the CISG to translate the English phrase “to give notice”.  
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where a debtor is given notice to fulfil his obligation (…) (emphasis added).”420 
Subsequent to these provisions, it appears that, as is in other legal systems, a buyer, 
under Congolese law, should invoke defects in the goods on condition that he/she 
has “mis en demeure” the seller; viz. notified him/her of the alleged defect.421 
According to case law, a notice may be given by any means.422 What is needed is 
that the notice be properly and timely given; otherwise the buyer will lose his/her 
rights to rely on latent defects remedies.423  
Normally the seller is liable for latent defects only.424 With regard to the time 
in which notice must be given, Article 301 al. 1 UAGCL provides a two-year period 
for any action resulting from the sale, “except [where] otherwise stipulated” in the 
Commercial Act. In other words, contrary to other sales contract issues, the period 
for notice for lack of conformity is governed by Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL.425 
These provisions state the time of notice depending on whether the non-conformity 
is patent or hidden. Specifically, notice relating to patent lack of conformity must be 
given within the month following the day of delivery. With regard to latent defects, 
actions relating to them are prescribed within a one-year period of time from the day 
the defect was discovered or would have been discovered.426 
                                               
420
 For the application of the “mise en demeure” requirement, see: Kin/Gombe 13 September 2012 
RCA 28 875 Kabamba Kanyinda v Celtel-Congo Sarl; Tricom Kin/Matete 28 November 2012 
RCE 706 J Ngebo Ngebu Liwanga v F Fadi Mahmoud Sha’Ban; Tricom Kin/Matete 25 June 2012 
RCE 641 Golden Money Trust Sprl v Cinat; Tricom Kin/Matete 22 June 2011 RCE 486 Jack 
Kalanga v Cinat; Tricom Kin/Gombe 7 June 2011 RCE 1618 FDK Sprl v Socider (unreported 
decisions). 
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 Tricom Kin/Gombe 11 January 2012 RCE 1967 Dijimba Sprl v Tractafric Congo Sprl; Tricom 
Kin/Gombe 26 June 2007 RCE 18 Regideso v Mohak Co (unreported decisions). 
422
 For a notice given by letter missive, see Léo 15 October 1929 Jur Col 1930-1931 279.  
423
 Remedies available to the buyer are ruled in Article 283 UAGCL which states the replacement 
of non-conforming goods by conforming goods as primary solution. But, Article 321 CCO for 
which the buyer may return the goods and have the price paid back, or keeps them and reduces the 
purchase price. 
424
 Cf. Articles 318 and 319 CCO. 
425
 Article 258 states that, “If the buyer wishes to take advantage of the defect, a lack of conformity 
apparent at the day of taking delivery must be notified to the seller within the month following the 
delivery.” As regards Article 259 al. 1, it states that, “The action of the buyer, based on a lack of 
conformity hidden at the day of delivery, is prescribed within a one-year delay from the time when 
the defect was discovered or should have been discovered.” 
426
 But, Article 325 CCO in which, “Proceedings resulting from redhibitory defects must be sued 
at latest within a period of 60 days, not including the day fixed for delivery.” It was ruled that the 
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It is not excluded that the parties stipulated a contractual guarantee longer than 
the legal period of notice. In circumstances of that kind, the period of prescription 
will start running from the expiry of that guarantee.427 After the expiry of the period 
stated above, the buyer is deprived of his/her rights to rely on non-conformity 
remedies.428 
Comments 
It is a principle that the seller is liable for lack of conformity in the goods delivered. 
For him/her to know whether the goods delivered are in conformity with the goods 
ordered, the buyer must examine them immediately after having taken delivery of 
them and notify the seller in time of any defect. The duty to examine the goods and 
give timely notice is known to Congolese law as it is under the CISG and South 
African law, though there is still doubt about its implementation in South African 
law. The greatest difference among the three legal systems consists of the period 
within which notice of lack of conformity should be given. If the CISG has adopted 
a compromise between the short and long limitation periods by adopting a two-year 
period limit, South Africa law has adhered to the long limitation period of three years. 
Concerning the DRC, it has, via UAGCL provisions, recently opted for a shorter 
limitation period of one month or a year depending on whether the non-conformity 
is patent or latent.429  
As is clear, the short period for giving notice in Congolese law is not 
favourable to buyers from developing countries. Yet, the CISG two-year limit was 
considered as “too drastic for developing countries”; 430 there is greater reason for 
                                               
principle in Article 325 CCO entailed that the defect had to be discovered within 60 days and the 
claim brought to court within the same period of time. See Elis 7 April 1917 RJCB 1932 28; 
confirmed in Elis 21 March 1942 RJCB 1942 124.  
427
 Read Article 259 al. 2, with Article 302 UAGCL. 
428
 See Articles 282 to 284 UAGCL, in particular, Article 283 UAGCL which provides that, “If the 
buyer notifies the seller of the defect in the goods in due time as stated by Articles 258 and 259, 
the seller may impose, at his own costs and without delay, to the buyer the replacement of defective 
goods by conforming goods.”   
429
 The previous cut-off time was fixed, in the CCO, to 60 days for both disclosed and hidden 
defects.  
430
 Canellas 2005/2006 (25) JL & Com 261 262.   
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one month or a year. In the context of the CISG, it was contended that buyers from 
developing countries “often buy machinery and lack the technical knowledge needed 
for an immediate examination of these complex goods.”431 Applied to the modern 
Congolese law, the compliance to the notification requirement is more exacting than 
the two comparable legal systems, which would certainly constitute a reason for the 
rejection of Congolese law as the law governing the contract. 
Simply, accession to the OHADA law did not greatly enhance Congolese law 
with regard to the issue of the notification of lack of conformity period. Of course, 
with its coming into force, the previous period of notification of latent defects has 
been increased from two months (60 days) to one year, i.e. an average of ten months. 
As regards apparent defects, however, there is a decrease of one month in the 
notification period, what is not considerable for buyers. Passing from two months to 
one year, likewise, is not yet significant, especially for importing countries as the 
DRC is. In order to make a worthwhile improvement of Congolese law in this 
respect, the adoption of a default limitation period similar to the one in force in the 
CISG or under South African law is recommended.  
 
6.3.6 Conclusion on the Obligations of the Buyer  
 
The obligations of the buyer resulting from a contract of sale are summarised in three 
main activities: the payment of the price at the right place and time; taking delivery 
of the goods; and the examination of the goods in due time in order to notify the 
seller for lack of conformity. With regard to these obligations, the OHADA 
Commercial Act has largely duplicated CISG provisions so that it brings Congolese 
law into line with the Vienna Sales Convention. For instance, because of the 
influence of the Commercial Act, the civil law principle relating to the place for 
payment has changed so that it is no longer the seller who seeks out the buyer for 
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 Ibid, but Kruisinga Non-Conformity 86 ; citing Witz C 2000 D Jurisprudence 789-790, for 
whom a period of one month is considered as reasonable for international transactions.  
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payment, but the inverse. Some shortcomings remain in Congolese law, however, 
particularly in relation to the time limit to give notice for lack of conformity and the 
time for payment. Regarding the time of notice, a one-year period is very severe for 
buyers so that the period stated by the CISG or South African law is suggested as 
reference. Similarly, because Congolese law does not differentiate between cash 
sales and credit sales on the issue of the time of payment, the South African law rule 
on the subject is recommended.  
 
6.4 Conclusion on Chapter Six  
 
Chapter six has consisted of a comparison between the CISG, South African law, and 
Congolese law on matters regarding the obligations of the parties to a contract of 
sale. The common principle governing these obligations is that they are normally 
determined by parties in the contract. Consequently, the rules provided by the CISG, 
the OHADA Commercial Act, or by South African common law, depending on the 
legal system, play a subsidiary role of filling the gaps left in the contract.  
Following from the examination of the rules of law in force in each of the three 
legal systems above, it is clear that the main obligations of the seller consists of 
delivering the right goods, at the right place, and at the correct time; otherwise he/she 
will bear responsibility either for lack of delivery or for lack of conformity. In 
addition, the seller must guarantee the buyer against third party claims. On the subject 
of the seller’s obligations, South African law and Congolese law appear to have been 
influenced indirectly by the CISG, the first through the 2008 CPA, and the second 
via the UAGCL. As far as Congolese law is concerned, it has particularly codified 
requirements such as those of quality, quantity, description, and packaging, which 
were previously dealt with in the DRC on a case law basis. The Commercial Act has, 
moreover, introduced into the DRC a specific handing of documents obligation; 
implemented an independent obligation of conformity different from the delivery 
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obligation; and elucidated the obligation of the seller in connection with the 
guarantee against third person’s claims.  
Notwithstanding this enhancement, Congolese law still has a number of gaps 
in respect of seller’s obligations. These include: the maintenance of a double 
warranty, the guarantee of conformity and the guarantee against latent defects instead 
of a single concept of conformity; holding the seller liable for both patent and latent 
defects; and the absence of a default rule governing fitness of goods to particular 
purposes. Similarly, there is not yet an express requirement in the DRC as regards 
the responsibility of the seller for intellectual property rights. All these gaps, if not 
filled, are likely to weaken the security and certainty of commercial transactions in 
the DRC. In order to fill them, the adoption of the CISG, or reference to South 
African law, is recommended.  
With regard to the obligations of the buyer, they consist, in all of the three 
legal systems being considered, of paying the purchase price, taking delivery of the 
goods, and inspecting them promptly in order to notify the seller for lack of 
conformity. As for the obligations of the seller, the UAGCL has fundamentally been 
influenced by the CISG so that almost all principles established in the Convention in 
respect of buyer’s obligations have obtained application in Congolese law. The point 
of departure between the two legal systems is located now in the notification of lack 
of conformity period. As it has been demonstrated, a one-year period of time stated 
by the OHADA Commercial Act is too short to protect the buyer victim of the defect. 
Thus, a two-year or three-year period of time as stated by the CISG or South African 
law appears reasonable. In the same way, a differentiation of the due time for 
payment in cash and credit sales as ruled in South African law is also welcomed in 
the DRC.  
Chapter Seven 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7.1 General Statement of the Purpose of the Study   
 
This study is based on the assumption that disparities in national laws create obstacles 
to international trade. In order to remove those obstacles, it was necessary to 
harmonise the law of sale internationally by creating a single substantive law 
applicable worldwide. Such an objective was achieved in 1988 when the CISG 
entered into force.1 The DRC has not yet ratified the CISG. The failure of the DRC 
to ratify the Vienna Sales Convention has had  the consequence that Congolese sales 
law has, for a very long time, been out-dated and not suitable for modern international 
trade requirements. This situation was, to some degree, ameliorated, from the end of 
2012, owing to the introduction of OHADA law in the DRC.  
Since the advent of OHADA law is still very new, this comparative study of 
international sales contracts in Congolese law has aimed at assessing the rules 
established by the OHADA Commercial Act by comparing them with the former 
Congolese Code of Obligations (CCO), the CISG, and South African law rules. By 
undertaking a comparative analysis, this study has had the intention of examining 
whether current Congolese sales law, as modified by OHADA law, is adequate for 
modern international commercial transactions or, instead, whether it still has gaps. 
In the case of the second alternative being proved, this study aimed at identifying 
remaining gaps of Congolese sales law and making proposals about how to provide 
appropriate solutions to help fill those gaps. 
With regard to its objectives, this study intended to achieve a quadruple goal. 
The study aimed, firstly, to outline the basic principles of Congolese contract and 
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 See Section 1.3; Section 1.4; and Section 4.2.4.3. 
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sales laws. It, secondly, intended to establish a comparison between Congolese sales 
law rules and the rules and principles established by both the CISG and South African 
law, with the aim of amending Congolese law. This study intended, thirdly, to assess 
the extent to which OHADA law rules have improved Congolese sales law in order 
to determine the gaps left over and propose the means to overcome them. This study, 
finally, aimed to recommend the ratification of the CISG should Congolese 
international sales law still have gaps. 
From the preceding chapters, it has been learned that the adoption of OHADA 
law by the DRC has meaningfully improved modern Congolese domestic sales law. 
With regard to Congolese international sales law, however, it still has some gaps that 
need to be filled. Owing to the fact that the adoption of OHADA law did not fill all 
the gaps of modern Congolese international sales law, this study ends with a 
suggestion to the DRC to adopt the CISG.  
As mentioned later, this study has primarily made use of the comparative 
method. Two legal systems, namely the CISG and South African law, were selected 
in this regard, the first because of its modernity, and the second by reason of its 
mixture and flexibility character. The comparative approach has helped us to 
discover that any legal system which combines both the rules and principles of the 
civil and the common law legal systems, as is the case with the CISG and South 
African law, is valuable in the sense that it constantly evolves. The same method has 
also helped us to learn that, because of their common civil law denominator, the 
CISG, South African law, and modern Congolese sales law share many similarities 
with respect to the formation of contract and of the obligations of the parties to 
international sales contracts.  
Thus, this final chapter reviews the merits of a unified legal system. It also 
highlights some of the innovations introduced in modern Congolese sales law 
through OHADA law, which appears to have been borrowed from the CISG, and it 
re-emphasises existing gaps. A proposal for the DRC’s ratification of the CISG 
concludes the discussion. 
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7.2 Implications of a Unified Legal System for International Transactions 
 
It is certain that sales contracts play an important role in international transactions. 
Their smooth development is, however, often compromised owing to their 
international character and the origins of parties. In fact, notwithstanding the 
availability, these days, of advanced transport and communication facilities, law still 
remains territorial. It has effect only within a specified national boundary, and is, 
therefore, not binding over other countries. In addition, domestic laws differ from 
country to country. To give an example of a contract between absent persons, 
countries with a civil law legal system delay the formation of such a contract until 
the notice of acceptance reaches the offeror. With regard to Anglo-American legal 
family nations, they presume that the contract has been made immediately after 
dispatch. Owing to the fact that domestic laws are different, one or other of the parties 
may be frustrated by a foreign law. As Coetzee has observed, “Differences in the 
sales laws of countries give rise to uncertainty as to the content of legal rights and 
obligations and reduce the possibility of predicting the outcome of a dispute.”2 In an 
attempt to prevent such uncertainty in international trade, it was indispensable to 
unify the law by providing a set of substantive rules that are applicable universally. 
UNCITRAL was entrusted with that mission from 1966.  
At the time that UNCITRAL was established, in fact, it was accepted that 
differences in domestic laws constitute an enormous handicap to international trade. 
The Vienna Convention adopted in 1980, under the auspices of UNCITRAL, was 
then considered to be a suitable instrument to improve the situation.3 Preceded by 
two unsuccessful Uniform Laws, the ULIS and ULF, the CISG has the advantage 
that, once it is ratified, it becomes binding on all contracting states. As regards its 
scope, the CISG deals generally with the conclusion of sales contracts as well as with 
                                               
 
2
 Coetzee Incoterms 321; see, in the same sense, Lehmann 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 317; De Ly 2005 
(25) 6JL & Com 1; Davis 2001 (106) Commercial Law Journal 457; Viejobueno 1995 (28) CILSA 
201. 
3
 Cf. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the CISG; and Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Preamble of the 
Resolution 2205 instituting UNCITRAL.  
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parties’ rights and obligations resulting from international sale of goods agreements. 
Considering the increasing number of current member countries, the Convention 
appears to have fulfilled the objective of the harmonisation of sales law.4 
To be precise, since its entry into effect in 1988, the influence of the CISG has 
been very practical in that the Convention is currently applied as applicable law in 
79 countries. In the same way, the number of reported cases, approximately 2,500, 
dealing with the CISG shows that the Vienna Sales Convention has had a valuable 
practical impact despite the approach of some companies to exclude the application 
of the CISG in their contracts.5 In addition to the number of contracting states and 
the number of reported cases, the Vienna Convention has also influenced legal 
reforms around the world, either on a local, regional, or international level. On the 
European continent, for instance, the PICC, PECL, the CFR, and the CESL are 
largely inspired by it. Furthermore, national laws of countries such as the 
Scandinavian states, Germany, Estonia, and China were inspired by the CISG. In 
Africa, the influence of the Vienna Sales Convention is evident in the OHADA 
Commercial Act. Because the provisions of the Commercial Act are inspired by the 
CISG, the adoption of OHADA law in the DRC has definitely brought innovations 
to Congolese sales law and has, accordingly, also imported some of the influence of 
the CISG albeit indirectly, as reminded below.  
 
7.3  Improvements to Congolese Sales Law  
 
Before September 2012, commercial transactions were governed, in the Congo, by 
rules dating back to the colonial period, namely the 1888 CCO. Those rules had 
become outdated, obsolete, incomplete, and inadequate to meet international 
transaction requirements as discussed in Chapter 2. Most of their sections were no 
longer aligned with the evolution of commercial dealings worldwide which 
                                               
4
 See Section 4.2.4.3. 
5
 But, Brunner (CVIM 91 112), who believes that the CISG is not regularly excluded in practice. 
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constituted a source of legal uncertainty and an obstacle to foreign trade.6 This 
situation motivated the implementation of a law authorising accession to OHADA 
law, whose preamble clearly states that the harmonisation of business law should 
help to enhance legal security, an indispensable condition for improving the business 
climate in the DRC. 
It is evident that the introduction of OHADA law in the DRC has significantly 
improved Congolese law as set out in Chapter 2 and in comparative assessments in 
chapters 5 and 6. A discussion of UAGCL rules, with specific reference to those 
applicable to commercial sales contracts in general, or those governing the formation 
of contracts and the obligations of sellers and buyers in particular, has revealed that 
the sales Uniform Act was largely influenced by the UN Sales Convention.  
With regard to general provisions applicable to sales contracts, first, the 
innovations include the following: 
1) To restrict the subject matter of sales contracts to goods; the idea of a contract 
dealing only with “sales of goods” is new to Congolese law.7 This concept 
refers, in the context of the UAGCL, mainly to the sale of tangible, corporeal, 
and movable items. It is in this sense that Article 236(d) and (f) excludes from 
commercial transactions issues related to sales of stocks, shares, investment 
securities, negotiable instruments or money, and sales of electricity.8 In the 
previous regime, anything and everything likely to be exchanged for money, 
including both corporeal and incorporeal properties, could form the object of 
sale, except in circumstances where its alienation was prohibited by law as it 
is in South African law.9 As for the CISG, UAGCL provisions exclude from 
commercial contracts the sale of ships, vessels, hovercraft, or aircraft.10 This 
exclusion appears, however, not to be right, given that the Commercial Act 
                                               
6
 See Section 2.2.6.  
7
 Cf. Article 234 of the Commercial Act; compared to Article 1(1) CISG; see also comments in 
Section 2.4.3 and Section 4.3.2.3. 
8
 Compare Article 236(d) and (f) UAGCL to Article 2(d) and (f) CISG. 
9
 Cf. Articles 275 and 27 CCO; see also Section 2.4.3 with Section 3.4.3.   
10
 See Article 236(e) UAGCL, compare to Article 2(e) CISG. 
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governs both domestic and international sales contracts. The OHADA 
legislator should rather include an exception to this principle, limiting the 
exclusion to international sales. 
2) To extend sales rules to mixed contracts; in terms of Article 235(b) of the 
Commercial Act, when a party supplies materials for goods to be 
manufactured or produced, or it mixes labour and sales, if the contribution is 
substantial or preponderant, the contract is a sale.11 This distinction was not 
made in the former Congolese sales law as is still the case in South African 
law. 
3) To codify trade usages and practices; unlike the former legal regime, Article 
239 UAGCL codifies trade usages and practices. This provision extends the 
principle of party autonomy to the incorporation of usages and practices into 
contractual agreements. Consequently, in modern Congolese sales law, parties 
are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by whichever practices 
they may have established among themselves as is the case under the CISG 
and South African law.12 In addition to contractual usages and practices, 
Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL automatically incorporates into contracts the 
practices that parties “knew or ought to have known” and which are familiar 
in their sector of business.13 Previously, and in contrast to the CISG and South 
African law, usages and practices were referred to as a mere general principle 
of law.  
With regard to the topic of the formation of contracts, next, the most important 
improvement of Congolese sales law is the introduction of the offer and acceptance 
approach to contracting.14 Under the ambit of the CCO, but different from the CISG 
and South African law, the process of concluding contracts by means of offer and 
                                               
11
 See Article 235(b) UAGCL, compare to Article 3 CISG. 
12
 See Article 239 al. 1 UAGCL, compare to Article 9(1) CISG; see also comments in Section 
5.2.3.3. 
13
 Compare Article 239 al. 2 UAGCL to Article 9(2) CISG; see also comments in Section 5.3.3.3. 
14
 See Articles 241 to 249 UAGCL, compare to Articles 14 to 24 UAGCL; see also chapter 5 in 
general. 
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acceptance was not regulated. It was instead left to the will of the parties. Congolese 
law was silent on when and how an offer can be considered to be effective or an 
acceptance to be valid. Courts tried to fill the gap, not without difficulty. As a result, 
the characteristics of a valid offer and acceptance, as well as mechanisms such as 
those of withdrawal and revocation of an offer or an acceptance, were as an 
alternative established by case law. These days, all these legal institutions have 
become code-based. Thus, in the same way as with the CISG and South African law, 
substantial requirements for a valid offer and acceptance are now determined by 
law.15 It follows then that, under modern Congolese sales law, any effective offer 
must be sufficiently definite and disclose the offeror’s intention to be bound by the 
offer as is the case in the two other legal systems considered. With regard to the 
acceptance, it must be regularly communicated and reach the offeror in order to have 
legal effect in all of the three legal systems being studied. 
In addition to the codification of the formation of contracts process, in general, 
other improvements include the following: 
1) To introduce the rule of the revocability of offers; in the initial approach, offers 
were in principle binding, i.e. irrevocable, and occasionally revocable. The 
Uniform Act has inverted the rule. Currently, offers in Congolese law have 
become generally revocable and exceptionally irrevocable, as is the case under 
the CISG and South African law.16 In that sense, under modern Congolese 
sales law, an offer should be irrevocable if the parties have intended it to be so 
by fixing a period for acceptance or, if the party accepting the offer was 
reasonable, to rely on the irrevocability of the offer. When it is accepted, 
however, the offer becomes binding in the DRC as is the case in all other legal 
systems.  
2) To codify the means of acceptance by conduct; on the issue of acceptance, the 
Uniform Act has been an innovation by giving effect to conduct indicating 
                                               
15
 See Section 5.2.3 and Section 5.3.3. 
16
 See Section 5.2.4. 
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assent as it is under the CISG and South African law.17 In so doing, the Act 
has anticipated the application of the reliance theory on the grounds that, as 
long as one party has reason to believe that by his/her comportment, words or 
acts, the other party has expressed his/her consent, a contract is formed. Under 
the former system, contracts were based solely on an exchange of agreements. 
3) To have a preference for the last-shot rule as a solution to the battle of forms 
problem; battle of forms issues do not frequently occur  in Congolese law, and  
the researcher was interested to determine which of the last-shot or knock-out 
doctrines apply in that legal system.18 It has been discovered, through the 
interpretation of general rules applicable to the formation of contracts, 
especially those relating to the legal regime of additional terms, that the 
OHADA Commercial Act has adopted the last-shot rule as a means for solving 
the battle of forms issue as is also the case under South African law. Since the 
latter principle has been largely criticised as being arbitrary, the adoption of 
the knock-out solution is recommended to both South African and Congolese 
sales laws. This should enable them to conform to the most recent commercial 
instruments and laws, and to align them with the contemporary preferred 
solution of the CISG case law. 
4) To adopt the reception theory as a suitable approach for contracts between 
persons not in each other’s presence; previously, faced with the silence of the 
CCO, courts grappled with the information, declaration, and reception theories 
as a means for determining the right time and place for a contract to be 
concluded.19 Currently, there is a clear belief that a contract is formed when 
acceptance reaches the offeror, regardless of whether or not he/she knows of 
it. This is also the solution preferred by the CISG and South African law for 
                                               
17
 See Article 241 al. 1 UAGCL, compare to Article 8 CISG; see also Section 5.3.3.2 with Section 
3.3.2.3. 
18
 See Section 5.3.5.4. 
19
 See Section 5.4.3. 
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contracts formed between parties absent from one another and for electronic, 
not instantaneous, communications.  
As regards the obligations of parties, finally, innovations include the following:  
1) To introduce the notion of “reasonable time” and the concept of “cure” for 
early delivery; pursuant to Article 253 al. 3 UAGCL, where the contract is 
silent as to the time for delivery, the seller should carry out his/her delivery 
obligation “within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract” as it 
is under the CISG and South African law.20 Contrary to South African law, but 
similar to the CISG, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods early, 
the seller, in modern Congolese sales law, may repair any deficiencies in them 
up to the date stipulated for delivery. The only exception to this rule is where 
the exercise of the right stipulated above would cause the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or unreasonable expenses.21 It should be remembered that when 
the CCO was drafted in 1888, it was supposed to regulate situations of rapid 
performance. Within its field of influence, the seller was supposed to make the 
item bought available once and at the same time, as it continues to be the case 
in South African law, immediately after the conclusion of the contract or at 
least at the time specified in the contract.22 In cases where parties failed to 
determine a time for delivery, a default period for delivery was stated by the 
Court, but not a reasonable time as is currently the case. Such a ruling aligns 
thus Congolese law with its two other comparable legal systems. With regard 
to the seller’s prerogative to replace any deficient goods, it is considerable as 
it helps to take the interest of both sellers and buyers into account. That 
mechanism is then suggested for South African law as well. 
2) Establishing an independent conformity obligation; Article 255 al. 1 UAGCL 
obliges the seller to deliver goods whose quantity, quality, and nature are in 
                                               
20
 Compare this to Article 33(c) CISG; see also Section 6.2.3.3. 
21
 Compare Article 257 UAGCL to Article 37 CISG, but not South African law. 
22
 See Section 6.2.3.3. 
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conformity with those stipulated in the contract.23 The former CCO did not 
contain such an express provision. A similar obligation should, of course, be 
implied from the interpretation of Article 291 al. 1 CCO, which required the 
seller to deliver the property sold in the condition in which it was at the time 
of the sale. Even in that condition, however, the conformity was considered to 
be a supplementary duty to the delivery obligation, and was, therefore, viewed 
as a mere guarantee of the goods sold, not a veritable obligation. Currently, 
the requirement with regard to conformity has become one of the seller’s main 
obligations, as it is under the CISG and South African law, which means that 
if he/she fails to do so, the seller will bear responsibility for the lack of 
conformity. 
3) To categorise the guarantee against third parties’ rights as an autonomous 
obligation; as with the conformity obligation, the guarantee against other 
people’s rights was previously seen as a complement to the delivery 
requirement.24 Nowadays, it has been implemented as an independent 
obligation in addition to delivery and conformity. A comparison between the 
CISG, South African law and modern Congolese sales law reveals that the 
obligation under consideration appears to be broader in domestic laws than 
under the CISG. In domestic laws, that obligation includes, in addition to the 
claims of third parties, hindrances that the buyer may encounter as a result of 
the seller’s own rights or claims.  
4) Reference to market price terms; Article 263 al. 1 UAGCL reminds us of the 
general principle that, for a contract to be valid, parties must determine the 
price of the goods. The second paragraph of the same provision adds, however, 
that, where parties make reference to a market-price, meaning the price 
generally charged in the trade concerned, the price so determined is valid.25 
Under the CCO, the price has to be assessed by parties at the time of the 
                                               
23
 Compare to Article 35 CISG; see also Section 6.2.4.2. 
24
 See Section 6.2.5.2. 
25
 Compare this with Article 55 CISG. 
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contract as is the case under South African law. The idea of an open price was 
implausible.26 With regard to the notion of “reasonable price”, it is not 
regulated under Congolese law. The debate concerning this notion is still open 
even in South African law where the question of the validity of contract with 
reasonable price has been asked. For that reason, reasonable price terms are 
not suggested to the DRC. 
5) Restructuring civil law principles with regard to the place for payment; debts, 
which previously were paid at the buyer’s domicile, are currently payable at 
the seller’s place of business. In modern Congolese sales law, therefore, the 
buyer must seek out the seller for payment, instead of the seller coming to 
him/her. Commercial debts, within the DRC are, like in the CISG, and modern 
South African law, portable but no longer collectible.  
With the diversity of the innovations above, one may conclude that the DRC has 
indirectly adopted many of the principles and rules of the CISG. Without denying 
the value of these improvements, there are still, however, some unresolved gaps 
which also need to be recapitulated. 
 
7.4  Remaining Gaps to be Filled  
 
As mentioned earlier, the accession by the DRC to OHADA law has significantly 
modernised Congolese law and aligned it, to some extent, with the CISG and South 
African law on matters regarding the conclusion of contracts and the obligations of 
parties. In spite of the improvements registered, there are, however, some unresolved 
gaps which may obstruct the smooth development of international trade in the DRC. 
These shortcomings include the following: 
1) Failure to enumerate conduct which may amount to acceptance; Article 241 
al. 1 of the Commercial Act states clearly that a contract is concluded either 
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 See Section 2.4.4. 
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by acceptance of an offer, or by the conduct of the parties which indicates their 
acceptance of the contract.27 The provision does not, however, provide a list 
of the kind of conduct which may be equated with acceptance in the example 
of Article 18(3) CISG.28 A similar situation is also observed under South 
African law even though the reliance theory may be supported as an 
independent approach to contract in the latter legal system. As a result, the 
nature of this conduct has to be determined by courts on a case-by-case basis 
by virtue of interpretation of the terms of the contract, a mechanism which 
may generate uncertainty. For more legal security, a provision similar to 
Article 18(3) CISG is recommended to both South African law and Congolese 
sales law. 
2) The lack of a list of additional terms which may become material alterations 
of the offer; Article 245 al. 2 UAGCL provides, without listing them, that 
“additional terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer” may 
constitute an acceptance. With regard to South African law, it does not neatly 
distinguish between substantial and immaterial alterations.29 The absence of a 
list of material alterations in the two legal systems might make the task 
difficult for judges to draw a line between terms altering materially the content 
of the contract and issues of minor importance. Thus, for more legal security, 
the adoption of a provision similar to Article 19(3) CISG is suggested to both 
South African law and Congolese sales law. 
3) Preservation of a double warranty, the guarantee of conformity and the 
guarantee against latent defects, instead of a single concept of conformity. As 
with the CISG, but in contrast to South African law, the UAGCL has adopted, 
through Article 255, an independent obligation of conformity. Unfortunately, 
instead of limiting itself to that duty, the Commercial Act has caught up with 
South African law by combining, once again, the obligation of conformity 
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 On South African law, see Section 3.3.2.3 dealing with agreements based on reasonable reliance. 
28
 See Section 5.3.3.2. 
29
 Cf. Section 5.3.5.2.  
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with guarantees against hidden and patent defects.30 In so doing, the provision 
has encountered criticism that it was supposed to avoid, and it has thereby 
introduced legal uncertainty into Congolese international sales law. In other 
words, by conserving a dual guarantee on the part of the seller as mentioned 
above, modern Congolese law, as influenced by OHADA law, has gone back 
to square one. It would have been better had the OHADA legislator provided 
the rule in Article 255 UAGCL with an exception regarding international sales. 
In that sense, the adoption of a provision similar to Article 35 CISG is 
suggested to both South African law and Congolese sales law. 
4) Recognising the seller as being liable for both patent and latent defects; 
establishing the seller’s liability for hidden defects is reasonable. To make 
him/her responsible for disclosed defects in addition to hidden lacks of 
conformity appears, however, to be irregular. In effect, the fact of the buyer’s 
taking delivery of the goods despite their deficiency would normally be 
interpreted as his/her tacit acceptance. If not, the buyer should, in reality, reject 
deficient goods immediately at the time of delivery. Such is the position of the 
CISG in Article 35(3) and of South African common law. The adoption, 
therefore, of a provision similar to Article 35(3) CISG or close to South 
African common law is recommended to the Congolese legislator in order to 
secure the seller in international dealings.  
5) Lack of a default rule governing the fitness of goods to particular purposes 
requirement; even if this gap is able to be filled by virtue of the party autonomy 
principle, a specific provision is also necessary as is the case under the CISG 
and South African law in order to clarify the obligations of the seller. 
6) Harmful shorter cut-off period for notice of lack of conformity; pursuant to 
Articles 258 and 259 UAGCL, patent lack of conformity is notified within a 
month after delivery, and latent defects within a year of their detection.31 A 
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 See Section 6.2.4.2. 
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 Cf. Section 6.2.4.3. 
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one-year period appears to be too short to protect buyers from developing 
countries such as the DRC. The three-year period of South African law, 
therefore, or, at least, the two-year CISG period is recommended to Congolese 
law to protect the buyer against the consequences of acquiring non-conforming 
goods.  
7) Absence of an express requirement with regard to the seller’s duty for 
intellectual property rights. Congolese and South African laws do not have a 
specific provision dealing with the seller’s responsibility for defects in 
industrial rights as does the CISG.32 This obligation is understood in domestic 
laws from the perspective of a general guarantee against eviction. Owing to 
the increasing importance of intellectual property rights over the past decade 
and the coming of the “information age”, together with the current “digital 
revolution”,33 a suggestion for the adoption of a provision similar to Article 42 
CISG is supported in order to align domestic laws with modern international 
trade developments. 
From what has been said thus far, South African law appears to be more developed 
than Congolese sales law in some respects and modern Congolese sales law, as 
amended by the OHADA Commercial Act, more developed than South African law 
in other respects. There is, therefore, the possibility of a reciprocal influence between 
the two legal systems. Insofar as Congolese sales law is concerned, it would benefit 
from South African law, in addition to the improvements already mentioned, the 
differentiation of the due time for payment in cash and credit sales. In the same way, 
because Congolese law has not yet ruled about electronic communications, the South 
African ECT Act would serve as reference to align Congolese law with modern 
international commercial legislations and practices.  
Apart from the above, many of the shortcomings encountered in Congolese 
international sales law are also met in South African law, so that the presence of gaps 
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 See Section 6.2.5.3. 
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 Cf. Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas UN Convention 648 §2. 
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in the two legal systems provides ample motivation for accession to the CISG for 
both of them. 
    
7.5 Additional Reasons for the DRC to Adopt the CISG  
 
The researcher has already made mention of the preamble of the law authorising the 
introduction of OHADA law in the DRC which recognised the merit of harmonising 
business law into a legal system. This foreword showed that a prosper commerce 
cannot be achieved without a secure legal and commercial environment. Meaning, a 
harmonised law stimulates business transactions. If that privilege is conferred on a 
regional instrument in the example of the OHADA Treaty, there is greater reason for 
a Convention such as the CISG, which is accepted universally. Explanations for the 
DRC to ratify the Vienna Convention may be found in the following: 
1) Despite the introduction of OHADA law into the DRC, there are still gaps in 
modern Congolese sales law. It follows then that the ratification of OHADA 
law was not sufficient for the harmonisation of the entire Congolese business 
law. A supplementary solution of the type of the Vienna Convention remains 
needed for a complete improvement.  
2) OHADA is a regional community whose law is currently limited to seventeen 
member countries,34 whereas the Vienna Convention is a universal instrument 
applicable today in 79 countries. 
3) None of the current OHADA countries form part of the DRC’s leading trade 
partners, whereas five of them, namely Belgium, China, France, the USA, and 
Zambia, are at present CISG contracting states. Against this background, the 
provisions of OHADA law should actually be relevant to domestic 
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 Of course, pursuant to Article 53 of the OHADA Treaty, the community is open to any African 
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transactions.35 For international sales contracts, however, the CISG would be 
the most suitable source of reference. 
4) The fact that five of the main Congolese trade partners and three of its 
surrounding countries, i.e. Burundi and Uganda, in addition to Zambia, have 
endorsed the UN Sales Convention; this may apply to many international sales 
of goods contracts concluded by Congolese merchants with their foreign allies. 
Article 1(1)(b) CISG, in fact, envisages the possibility of the application of the 
Convention by virtue of conflict-of-laws rules. Or, unless otherwise stipulated, 
international contracts are ruled, in the DRC, by the law of the place where 
they were formed. If, therefore, Congolese PIL rules lead to the application of 
the law of a member state, for example, one or another of the seven countries 
cited above, the CISG should apply even if the DRC has not yet accessed the 
Convention.  
5) Congolese membership of the OHADA community is not in conflict with 
probable accession to the CISG. The Vienna Convention has anticipated the 
situation of conflict by providing a number of provisions favourable to its co-
existence with regional sales instruments such as the OHADA Commercial 
Act. These provisions include: Article 90 relating to the conflict of 
conventions, which authorises the replacement of the Vienna Convention by 
other sales conventions in existence where parties are located in states which 
are parties to these agreements; Article 92(1) which allows the exclusion of 
either CISG Part II or Part III; and, particularly, Article 94(1) dealing with 
member countries having related legal rules.36 Insofar as Article 94(1) is 
concerned, it authorises contracting states with the same, or closely related, 
legal rules to exclude the Convention from contracts concluded between 
parties established in these countries. That is to say, if the DRC has to ratify 
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 These provisions should apply to international transactions concluded in the DRC only by virtue 
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because the DRC is an importing country. 
36
 See Section 4.5.5; see also Ferrari OHADA 79 86-95. 
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the UN Sales Convention, in one or other of the above cases, OHADA law 
will prevail over the CISG.  
Succinctly, the interaction between the provisions of the CISG and OHADA law 
rules constitute an appropriate solution to the definitive harmonisation of modern 
Congolese international sales law. In this way, gaps not resolved by the rules 
provided by the Commercial Act will be filled by the CISG. For other remaining 
gaps, for instance, those relating to the deadline for payment depending on the nature 
of the sale, or for electronic contracts, an inspiration from South African law would 
be recommended. 
  
7.6 Concluding Recommendation 
 
It is a strong recommendation of this study that the DRC, which played a major role 
in the drafting process of the CISG, now considers ratifying it for the reasons set out 
above. Its membership of the OHADA law will not present a barrier in this regard. 
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TABLE OF CONVENTIONS, MODEL LAWS, 
CONSTITUTIONS, AND OTHER REGULATIONS 
 
 
I. Congolese Legislations 
 
1886 Principles Applicable to Judicial Decisions Ordinance of 14 May 1886 approved by 
Decree of 12 November 1886 (BO 1886 188) 
1887  Commercial Companies Decree of 27 February 1887 as amended and completed by 
Law No. 10/8 of 27 April 2010 
1888  Code of Obligations Decree of 30 July 1888 (BO 1888 109) 
1891 Status of Foreign Nationals Decree of 20 February 1891 integrated in the Decree of 
4 May 1895 (BO 1895 140)  
1895 Civil Code of Persons Decree of 4 May 1895 (BO 1895 138) 
1908 Colonial Charter of 18 October 1908 (BO 1908 65)  
1912 Trade register Decree of 31 July 1912 (BO 1912 726) as amended by Law No. 
10/009 of 27 February 2010 (JORDC Special No. 3 March 2010 1) 
1913 Commercial Code Decree of 2 August 1913 (BO 1913 775) 
1934 Bankrupt Decree of 27 July 1934 as amended by the Decrees of 19 December 1956 
and of 26 August 1959  
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